FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH November 13, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ARTHUR C. WAGNER, JR.,
Individually and for the benefit of
Jean Marie Wagner,
Plaintiff – Appellee/
Cross - Appellant,
v.
LIVE NATION MOTOR SPORTS,
INC., formerly known as SFX
MOTOR SPORTS, INC., doing
No. 07-3365 & 07-3366
business as Clear Channel
Entertainment-Motor Sports,
Defendant – Appellant/
Cross - Appellee,
and
HEARTLAND PARK RACEWAY,
LLC,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-02336-JPO)
Paul M. Croker (Richmond M. Enochs and James L. (Jay) MowBray, on the
briefs), Overland Park, Kansas, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
David R. Cooper (Larry G. Pepperdine and Steve R. Fabert with him on the
briefs), Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., Topeka, Kansas, for Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.
Before KELLY, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
In this diversity case governed by Kansas tort law, SFX Motor Sports, Inc. 1
(“SFX”), appeals the district court’s denial of its post-trial motion for judgment as
a matter of law (“JMOL”). SFX argues that a reasonable jury could not have
found SFX liable for wanton conduct based on its staging of an August 2003
motorcycle race in which Arthur Wagner, Jr. (“Wagner”), crashed and was
seriously injured. Wagner cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in
reducing his damages award pursuant to Kansas’s statutory cap on noneconomic
damages in personal injury actions. Exercising appellate jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we REVERSE the denial of SFX’s motion for JMOL and
DISMISS Wagner’s cross-appeal as moot.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2003, Wagner competed in the Formula USA 250K Team
Challenge Endurance Race at the Heartland Park racetrack in Topeka, Kansas.
1
Since the time of the events at issue in this appeal, SFX has changed its
name to Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. In keeping with the practice of the
district court and the parties, we refer throughout to SFX rather than to Live
Nation Motor Sports.
-2-
SFX staged the race pursuant to its Track Rental Agreement with Heartland Park
Raceway, LLC, to which Jayhawk Racing Properties, L.L.C. had assigned its
rights to operate the track. 2 In order to participate in the August 8 race, Wagner
had signed, the day before, two documents entitled “Release and Waiver of
Liability, Assumption of Risk, Indemnity and Rights Agreement.” (R. vol. 1 at
142-44.) The first release and waiver, for which “HPT–Topeka, KS” served as
the “[d]escription and location of scheduled event(s),” provided as follows:
IN CONSIDERATION (a) of being permitted to compete . . . or (b)
being permitted to enter, for any purpose, any Restricted Area . . . ,
including but not limited to the competition area . . . , EACH OF
THE UNDERSIGNED, for himself/herself, his/her personal
representatives, parent or legal guardian, heirs, and next of kin:
1. Acknowledges, agrees, and represents that he/she has or will
immediately upon entering any of such restricted areas, and will
continuously thereafter, inspect the Restricted Areas which he/she
enters[;] and he/she further agrees and warrants that, if at any time,
he/she is in or about Restricted Areas and he/she feels anything to be
unsafe, he/she will immediately advise the officials of such and will
leave the Restricted Areas and/or refuse to participate further in the
Event(s).
2. HEREBY RELEASE[S], WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND
COVENANTS NOT TO SUE SFX Motor Sports, Inc., d/b/a/ Clear
Channel Entertainment-Motor Sports, and its affiliates and related
companies . . . , track operators, . . . [and] owners and lessees of
premises used to conduct the Event(s), . . . all for the purposes herein
referred to as “Releasees”, FROM ALL LIABILITY TO THE
UNDERSIGNED, his personal representatives, parent or legal
guardian, assigns, heirs, and the next of kin FOR ANY AND ALL
2
Jayhawk Racing Properties, L.L.C. was, in turn, the assignee of the rights
of the City of Topeka, the owner of the racetrack.
-3-
LOSS OR DAMAGE, AND ANY CLAIM OR DEMANDS
THEREFORE ON ACCOUNT OF INJURY TO THE PERSON OR
PROPERTY, OR RESULTING IN DEATH, OF THE
UNDERSIGNED ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE
EVENT(S), WHETHER CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY
THE SOLE OR CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE OR
WRONGDOING, STRICT LIABILITY OR FAULT OF THE
RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE.
(R. vol. 1 at 142.) The second release and waiver, indicating “Formula USA
Testing” as the “Description and Location of Scheduled Events,” included
identical provisions. (Id. at 144.)
In addition to signing their releases and waivers on the day before the race,
Wagner and other racers participated in practice sessions on the Heartland Park
track. During those practice sessions, two riders had to leave the 2.5-mile track
in the area of Corner 10; one rider had run out of fuel, and the other had a
mechanical problem with his motorcycle. Both motorcycles had to be pushed off
the track.
During the race itself, on August 8, Wagner was entering Corner 10 and
leaning into the left-hand curve when the wheels of his motorcycle hit a rumble
strip, or berm, on the outside edge of the track. Wagner’s motorcycle left the
track, sliding—with Wagner still aboard—somewhere between 100 and 250 feet
across a grass and dirt runoff area before colliding with an unpadded portion of a
moveable concrete barrier. The motorcycle burst into flames that engulfed
Wagner, who was thrown into the grass.
-4-
Throughout the race, including at the time of Wagner’s crash, the track’s
turns were staffed by “corner workers,” who were to act as flaggers to inform
racers to proceed with caution or to stop altogether in the event of an accident,
and who also were to serve as emergency responders to aid downed racers.
Corner workers were provided colored flags, radios with which they were to
communicate with the control tower and with other corner workers, and a fire
extinguisher. In roughly hour-long meetings on the mornings of August 7 and
August 8, the corner workers had been instructed, at minimum, when to use the
radio system and what color flags they should wave in the event of an accident.
Corner 10 was staffed by a married couple, Randy and Linda Bodtke, whom
SFX had hired through a temporary employment services agency. Like other
corner workers at the race, the Bodtkes were positioned on the inside of their
corner, behind a barrier that separated and protected them from the riders on the
track. When Wagner crashed on the outside of the track, therefore, the Bodtkes
and other corner workers had to wait for race traffic to clear, climb over the short
wall separating them from the track, and cross the track in order to reach him.
Although Linda Bodtke radioed the control tower and began waving her red
and yellow flags when she saw the accident, the racers temporarily continued
circling the track at race speed. After the last motorcycle cleared their area,
Randy Bodtke and the worker at Corner 11 climbed over the barrier, crossed the
track, and reached Wagner. Both carried their fire extinguishers to the crash
-5-
scene. The worker from Corner 11 arrived first; Randy Bodtke believed he
arrived within a minute of the crash. Both Randy Bodtke and the worker from
Corner 11 sprayed their fire extinguishers on the grass around Wagner, and one or
the other may also have sprayed his fire extinguisher on Wagner’s back. The
corner workers had been instructed not to spray fire extinguishers in a crash
victim’s face; they had also been instructed not to touch or move a crash victim
until emergency personnel arrived.
An ambulance and a fire suppression truck responded to the crash scene.
However, both vehicles had to wait for a gate to be opened before they could
drive onto the infield of the track. Emergency personnel attended to Wagner and
placed him on a backboard, and at some point during this process, an unidentified
individual called for the life-flight helicopter. Roughly forty-four minutes after
the crash, Wagner arrived, by that helicopter, at the KU Medical Center. He was
treated for multiple fractures and for serious burns over most of his lower
extremities and one hand, and he was hospitalized for several weeks after the
accident.
On August 2, 2005, Wagner, who at the time resided in Florida, filed a
diversity lawsuit in federal district court for the District of Kansas, pleading
negligence and wanton conduct as alternative theories of recovery under Kansas
law. Wagner named as defendants SFX; Heartland Park Raceway, L.L.C.; SFX
Entertainment, Inc.; Clear Channel Communications, Inc.; and Jayhawk Racing
-6-
Properties, L.L.C. Following discovery, and based on the release and waiver
forms that Wagner had signed before the race, the district court granted SFX and
Heartland Park partial summary judgment on Wagner’s negligence claims. The
court granted full summary judgment to the remaining defendants, because the
record contained no evidence from which a jury might conclude that they owed
any duty to Wagner. The case thus went to trial solely against SFX and Heartland
Park, and solely on a theory of wanton conduct under Kansas law. 3
The parties consented to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge,
and after a five-day trial over which he presided, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Heartland Park and against SFX. The jury awarded Wagner roughly $2.6
million in compensatory damages. Following entry of judgment in accordance
with the jury’s verdict, SFX moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) for JMOL, 4 based
3
In ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district
court explained that unlike negligence, “[w]anton conduct would be actionable
because it falls outside the scope of plaintiff’s waiver.” Wagner v. SFX Motor
Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271 (D. Kan. 2006) (citing Wolfgang v. Mid-
Am. Motorsports, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Kan. 1995), aff’d, 111 F.3d
1515 (10th Cir. 1997), to the effect that “under Kansas common law, [an] attempt
to waive liability for wanton conduct [is] unenforceable”).
4
In its briefs, SFX refers to its Rule 50(b) motion by its pre-1991 name, as a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As did the district court, we
refer to the motion as one for judgment as a matter of law, or JMOL. See
Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1497 n.1 (10th Cir.
1994).
Pursuant to Rule 50(a), SFX had moved for JMOL at the close of both
(continued...)
-7-
on a claim of insufficient evidence to support a jury finding of wanton conduct;
under Rule 59(a) for a new trial, based on a claim of the court’s error in not
instructing the jury on comparative fault principles or on the distinction between
negligence and wanton conduct; and under Rule 59(e) for alteration or amendment
of the judgment, based on Kansas’s statutory cap of $250,000 on noneconomic
damages in a personal injury action.
The district court denied the motion for JMOL and the motion for new trial,
but granted in part the motion to alter or amend the judgment. The court held that
because the parties had agreed that substantive issues in the case were to be
governed by Kansas law, the state’s mandatory cap on noneconomic damages in
personal injury cases applied to the judgment against SFX. The court then
ordered entry of an amended judgment that reduced Wagner’s damages by just
over a million dollars. 5
SFX timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in (1) not
granting its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) not instructing
4
(...continued)
Plaintiff’s evidence and its own evidence; the district court denied both motions.
5
The district court explained that the jury award included “$264,625 for
noneconomic loss to date, $758,150.62 for future noneconomic loss, and
$263,380.91 for loss or impairment of services as spouse, for a combined total of
$1,286,156.53 in noneconomic loss.” Wagner v. SFX Motor Sports, Inc., 522 F.
Supp. 2d 1330, 1345 (D. Kan. 2007). Applying the statutory damage cap, the
court reduced this total to $250,000. Id.
-8-
the jury on comparative fault, and restricting SFX’s introduction of evidence on
that subject; (3) not instructing the jury on the definition of simple negligence,
and the distinction between simple negligence and wanton conduct; and (4) not
granting a new trial. SFX also filed a motion asking that we certify to the Kansas
Supreme Court the question of whether, under Kansas law, comparative fault
principles apply within an action based solely on a claim of wanton conduct.
On cross-appeal, Wagner argues that the district court erred in reducing his
damages award based on Kansas’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages in
personal injury actions. He further argues that even if the cap does apply in this
case, the district court erred in applying it to the portion of the award for loss of
spousal support.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
1. Standard of review
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion for
JMOL, and we apply the same legal standard as did the district court. United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Rag Am. Coal Co., 392 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir.
2004). In a diversity case such as this one, “the substantive law of the forum
state governs the analysis of the underlying claims, including specification of the
applicable standards of proof, but federal law controls the ultimate, procedural
-9-
question whether [JMOL] is appropriate.” Specialty Beverages, L.L.C. v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 537 F.3d 1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 2008).
A party is entitled to JMOL only if the court concludes that “all of the
evidence in the record . . . [reveals] no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
claim under the controlling law.” Hysten v. Burlington N. Sante Fe Ry. Co., 530
F.3d 1260, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, which in this case is Wagner, we thus will reverse the district
court’s denial of the motion for JMOL “if the evidence points but one way and is
susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the
motion.” Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir.
2004) (quotation omitted). It is not our province to “weigh evidence, judge
witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury.” Hysten, 530
F.3d at 1269 (quotation omitted).
2. Wanton conduct under Kansas law
In Kansas, wanton conduct “is distinct from negligence and differs in
kind.” Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 118 (Kan. 1984) (citing Kniffen v.
Hercules Powder Co., 188 P.2d 980 (Kan. 1948)). Unlike negligence, “[w]anton
conduct is established by the mental attitude of the wrongdoer rather than by . . .
particular negligent acts.” Robison v. State, 43 P.3d 821, 824 (Kan. Ct. App.
2002) (citing Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 524 P.2d 1141
-10-
(Kan. 1974)). That is, “[w]anton conduct is distinguished from a mere lack of due
care by the fact that the actor realized the imminence of injury to others from his
acts and refrained from taking steps to prevent the injury.” Bowman, 686 P.2d at
118. “This reckless disregard or complete indifference rises substantially beyond
mere negligence.” Id. Because “wantonness” derives from “the mental attitude
of the wrongdoer[,] . . . acts of omission as well as acts of commission can be
wanton.” Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511, 518 (Kan. 1986).
To establish wanton conduct, a plaintiff must make a two-pronged showing:
(1) that the act was “performed with a realization of the imminence of danger”;
and (2) that the act was performed with “a reckless disregard [of] or complete
indifference to the probable consequences of the act.” Reeves v. Carlson, 969
P.2d 252, 256 (Kan. 1998); see also Gould, 722 P.2d at 518. Thus, “[t]he keys to
a finding of wantonness are the knowledge of a dangerous condition and
indifference to the consequences.” Reeves, 969 P.2d at 256. The plaintiff need
not prove any intent or willingness to injure. Lanning ex rel Lanning v.
Anderson, 921 P.2d 813, 818 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Boaldin v. Univ. of
Kan., 747 P.2d 811, 814 (Kan. 1987)); see also Reeves, 969 P.2d at 256.
The first prong of the tort—that the act was performed with a realization of
the imminence of danger—may be established in two ways. First, the plaintiff
may put on direct evidence of the defendant’s actual “knowledge of a dangerous
condition.” Lanning, 921 P.2d at 819. Second, the plaintiff may establish,
-11-
through circumstantial evidence, the defendant’s “reason to believe that his act
[might] injure another,” because that act was taken “in disregard of a high and
excessive degree of danger, either known to [the defendant] or apparent to a
reasonable person” in the defendant’s position. Id. (quotations and emphasis
omitted).
As to the tort’s second prong, reckless disregard of or indifference to
probable consequences, the Kansas Supreme Court has explained that “a token
effort to prevent [harmful consequences] would not avoid liability under this
[prong], while definite acts which materially lessen the chances of [those
consequences] would avoid liability.” Friesen, 524 P.2d at 1148. Critical to our
analysis of such precautions is whether they materially lessen the chances of the
consequences of the particular “dangerous condition” that we analyze under the
tort’s first prong.
In Reeves v. Carlson, for instance, the defendant injured the plaintiff when,
while driving intoxicated, he ran a stop sign at an intersection and crashed
through a wall of her house. 969 P.2d at 256. The defendant argued that the
plaintiff had not established that “he was fully aware of and clearly understood
that he was about to collide with [the plaintiff’s] home and that he was indifferent
to the impending collision.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court explained that
the defendant “fail[ed] to recognize that the wanton conduct” at issue “was not
the collision, but his choice to drive under circumstances that would likely or
-12-
probably result in a collision.” Id. In that case, “[t]he precautions and care” that
the defendant claimed to have taken “did little, if anything, to reduce that risk.”
Id. (emphasis added).
In assessing whether a plaintiff has established wanton conduct, then, we
must take care to apply both prongs of the tort to the same alleged risk, whether
that risk be described narrowly (e.g., the risk of the specific accident that
occurred) or broadly (e.g., the risk of any serious accident occurring because of
the conduct at issue—e.g., the risk of any accident when the driver is intoxicated.
See Reeves, supra.) In other words, if the first part of Kansas’s two-part inquiry
asks whether the defendant had knowledge of a broadly described dangerous
condition, the second part of that inquiry must ask whether the defendant
recklessly disregarded or was indifferent to the same broadly described risk;
conversely, if the first part of the test targets the narrow, specific risk that caused
the particular accident at issue and asks if the defendant was aware or should have
been aware of that particular specific risk, then the second part of the analysis to
be consistent must ask if the defendant was indifferent to that specific risk. In
short, a plaintiff may not establish wanton conduct by satisfying the notice or
knowledge element of the tort as to one risk—e.g., a broad generalized risk—and
the second element of indifference of that risk to a differently defined risk—e.g.,
the specific risk that caused the accident at issue.
-13-
We need not decide in this case whether both the knowledge of the risk and
the indifference to that risk should define risk in a generalized and broad manner
or in a narrow, specific manner, and indeed courts seem to have used both
approaches. Compare Robison v. State, 43 P.3d 821 (Kan. App. 2002), and
Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 524 P.2d 1141 (Kan. 1974), with
Reeves v. Carlson, 969 P.2d 252 (Kan. 1998).
But what we can and do conclude from our review of Kansas law is that
risk must be defined consistently for both elements of the tort of wantonness. As
will be seen here, whether the risk is to be defined broadly (e.g., the risk of any
accident in motorcycle races generally) or narrowly (e.g., the specific risk that a
motorcycle might leave the track at corner #10 in this race) a JMOL should have
been granted to SFX in this case so long as the risk is defined consistently for
both elements of this test.
Finally, “[w]hether a defendant’s conduct constitutes wantonness
necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Wolfgang, 111
F.3d at 1522 (applying Kansas law and citing Friesen, 524 P.2d at 1147).
3. Analysis
Wagner alleged seven grounds for wanton conduct on the part of SFX:
a. Defendants failed to provide a safe run-off area for foreseeable
crashes.
b. Defendants left unnecessary moveable concrete walls in the
foreseeable run-off area.
-14-
c. The concrete walls that were in the foreseeable run-off area,
where plaintiff hit the wall, were not padded or protected with
tires, hay bales, air fences, or other safety devices.
d. Defendants failed to properly train and equip corner workers or
fire fighting personnel so that they could quickly and
effectively put out the fire that resulted from plaintiff’s crash.
e. Defendants failed to staff Corners 10 and 11 with adequate
numbers of corner workers, and failed to have any corner
workers on the outside of Corners 10 and 11 so that they could
quickly respond to an injured racer.
f. Defendants’ corner workers, fire fighting personnel, and
medical personnel failed to put out the fire that engulfed
plaintiff, such that the fire ceased burning on its own after
running out of fuel.
g. The communications system between corner workers and the
tower was inadequate, such that the race could be timely
stopped as soon as the accident occurred.
(R. vol. 4 at 1091-92 (Jury Instruction No. 14).) We think these allegations may
be construed as positing two different levels of risk, or two different “dangerous
condition[s],” Reeves, 969 P.2d at 256: the broad risk associated with staging a
motorcycle race writ large; and the much narrower risk associated with the
conditions on Corner 10 at Heartland Park racetrack. We address each in turn,
applying Kansas’s two-pronged test for wanton conduct and recognizing, as did
the district court, that the jury was “within its rights to believe little, or indeed,
none of the sworn testimony” favorable to SFX. Wagner, 522 F. Supp. 2d at
1339; see Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. at 151 (“[A]lthough the court
-15-
should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to
the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.”).
a. Risk of staging a motorcycle race
To satisfy the first part of the two-part test for wanton conduct, Wagner had
to demonstrate that in staging the race in which he was injured, SFX acted, or
failed to act, “with a realization of the imminence of danger.” Reeves, 969 P.2d
at 256. This prong of the test is easily satisfied if the risk is broadly defined as
the risk of operating a motorcycle race. The jury heard testimony from Wagner’s
expert, Russell Darnell, that the “starting point” for all motorcycle race planning
is that “crashes will happen.” (R. vol. 6 at 1591-92.) Indeed, SFX could not
rationally dispute this point, given that it required the racers to sign a waiver form
acknowledging that “THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EVENT(S) ARE VERY
DANGEROUS and involve the risk of serious injury and/or death and/or property
damage.” (R. vol. 1 at 142.) Wagner put on evidence sufficient to establish that
SFX realized the imminence of danger in its overall staging of a motorcycle race.
To satisfy the second part of the two-part test for wanton conduct at this
level of risk, Wagner was required to demonstrate that in its overall staging of the
race, SFX acted with “reckless disregard [of] or complete indifference to the
probable consequences of” its conduct. Reeves, 969 P.2d at 256. Here, applying
the Friesen rule regarding preventative measures, we easily conclude that Wagner
failed to put on evidence based upon which a reasonable jury could have found
-16-
that SFX acted wantonly rather than merely negligently. Under Friesen, “a token
effort” to prevent the harmful consequences of staging a motorcycle race “would
not avoid liability” for wanton conduct, but “definite acts which materially lessen
the chances of” such consequences would avoid liability. Friesen, 524 P.2d at
1148.
It is undisputed that SFX engaged in a number of such definite acts to make
the overall motorcycle race safer, including opening the track for practice runs on
both the day before and the morning of the race to permit racers to learn the track;
stationing at least one corner worker at each corner, providing those workers with
a radio communication system, a fire extinguisher, and colored flags for slowing
or stopping the race in case of an accident, and training the workers for roughly
an hour on each of the mornings of August 7 and August 8; having two
ambulances and a fire-suppression vehicle onsite during the race; placing
protective air fencing in certain areas and tires along certain portions of concrete
barriers outside the track; and being prepared to call for a life-flight helicopter if
the need arose. We think it clear that while these preventative measures may not
have been perfect, they unquestionably “materially lessen[ed] the chances,”
Friesen, 524 P.2d at 1148, of harmful consequences arising from SFX’s staging of
the race. In short, SFX took many significant steps to ensure that the race as a
whole was safe.
-17-
Therefore, even if SFX acted negligently in staging the race—a claim
Wagner waived when he signed the pre-race release form—it did not act with
“reckless disregard [of] or complete indifference to the probable consequences of”
its conduct, Reeves, 969 P.2d at 256. We thus conclude that in construing the
alleged risk and dangerous condition of conducting a motorcycle race broadly, a
reasonable jury could not have found SFX liable for wanton conduct. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a).
b. Specific risk associated with the conditions on Corner 10
Wagner’s case at trial, and his argument on appeal, focused most intensely
on the claim that SFX behaved wantonly when it did not eliminate or protect with
padding the concrete wall into which Wagner crashed, or enlarge the run-off area,
outside Corner 10. To succeed on this claim based on a very specific risk that
arguably contributed to Wagner’s injuries, Wagner was required to show, first,
that SFX acted, or failed to act, with a realization of the imminence of danger at
Corner 10. Wagner could have made this showing either through direct evidence
of SFX’s actual “knowledge of a dangerous condition” at Corner 10, or through
circumstantial evidence that SFX acted in “disregard of a high and excessive
degree of danger” at Corner 10, where that danger was “known [by SFX] or
apparent to a reasonable person” in SFX’s position. Lanning, 921 P.2d at 819.
While the jury was free to disregard or doubt the credibility of SFX’s
employees and former employees who testified that they were aware of no
-18-
previous crashes at Corner 10 and that they had no reason to believe that the
concrete wall in question would be an impact area, the jury was not free to infer
SFX’s knowledge of danger from an absence of evidence on the issue. Wagner
offered no testimony to the effect that there had ever been a crash in the area of
Corner 10, much less that the danger of such a crash was “known [by SFX] or
apparent to a reasonable person” in SFX’s position, Lanning, 921 P.2d at 819.
While Randy Bodtke testified that he saw two racers go off the track at Corner 10
during the practice sessions on August 7, he clarified on cross-examination that
one of the motorcycles at issue simply ran out of gas at that location and the other
had a mechanical problem, so that both had to be pushed off the track. Bodtke
then confirmed that he “saw no riders that had traveled all of this distance across
this grassy area and got down to where there was an impact with the wall.” (R.
vol. 6 at 1526.) Wagner offered no evidence that SFX knew or should have
known of the danger posed by the configuration of Corner 10.
Because there is no record evidence showing that SFX acted with “a
realization of the imminence of danger” when it did not take additional
precautions at Corner 10, we need not and do not reach the question of whether
SFX acted with “a reckless disregard [of] or complete indifference to the probable
consequences of” its conduct at Corner 10. Reeves, 969 P.2d at 256; see Lanning,
921 P.2d at 819 (“Without knowledge of a dangerous condition, indifference to
the consequences does not become a consideration.”). We conclude that in
-19-
construing the alleged risk and dangerous condition narrowly, a reasonable jury
could not have found SFX liable for wanton conduct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
However, we do observe that the general safety precaution that SFX took in
conjunction with staging this race and which we detailed earlier would generally
apply to Corner 10 as much as to other portions of the race track. Thus, even if
Wagner had put on evidene that SFX knew Corner 10 was dangerous, Wagner did
not show that SFX was “completely indifferent” to that danger.
c. Conclusion as to this issue
In this case, “all of the evidence in the record . . . [reveals] no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis,” Hysten, 530 F.3d at 1269, for a wanton conduct
claim under Kansas law. Under one theory of the case there was evidence that
SFX knew of the danger but it unquestionably took many steps to mitigate or
prevent injury, thereby precluding a jury conclusion that SFX cited “incomplete
indifference” to the danger. Under the other theory of the case, there was no
evidence that SFX knew or should have known if a specific risk presented
because of the configuration or operations at Corner 10, so once again, the jury
could not find wanton conduct. Consequently, SFX was entitled to JMOL, and
the district court erred in denying SFX’s Rule 50(b) motion.
B. Remaining issues on appeal
-20-
Having held that SFX is entitled to JMOL, we need not and do not reach
SFX’s challenge to jury instructions and to the district court’s denial of its motion
for new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of
SFX’s Rule 50(b) motion, VACATE the jury’s verdict on Wagner’s wanton
conduct claim, and REMAND to the district court with instructions to enter
judgment as a matter of law in favor of SFX. Wagner’s cross-appeal is dismissed
as moot, and the pending motion for certification to the Kansas Supreme Court is
denied as moot.
-21-
Wagner v. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc.
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2009-11-13
Citations: 586 F.3d 1237
Copy Citations