1. "The general rule at common law is that persons who are not parties to a suit can not file an intervention therein. There are some exceptions to this rule, as where an intervenor sets up some right that would be directly affected by the judgment; but in such a case the interest of the intervenor must be of such a direct and immediate character that he will either gain or lose by the direct effect of the judgment, and such interest must be created by the claim in suit, or a claim to a lien upon the property, or some part thereof, which is the subject-matter of the litigation."
2. The right given by the Code, § 6-401, to appeal, as a matter of right, from a judgment in a justice's court, does not apply where the appellant, as plaintiff, has recovered in a judgment all that is sued for; because by such judgment the plaintiff is not injured or aggrieved in the eyes of the law, and an appeal granted thereafter by the justice to a jury in his court is without provision of law, and is vain and nugatory.
3. Where after confession of judgment the defendant in a justice's court sought to appeal from the judgment to a jury in the superior court, and tendered a security bond and costs of court, but the justice refused to accept the appeal, stating that he had already granted the plaintiff an *Page 362 appeal to a jury in his court, and the defendant filed a mandamus proceeding in the superior court to require him to enter and transmit to that court its appeal, and the plaintiff submitted to the superior court an intervention, praying to be made a party in the mandamus proceeding, on the ground that she had a substantial interest to protect, namely, the right to have her appeal to a jury retained in the justice court, the court did not err, under the facts and the principles of law above announced, in disallowing the intervention and in making absolute the mandamus against the justice.
It is argued that she is entitled to such appeal even though she was the successful party in the confessed judgment, and notwithstanding that her dissatisfaction does not relate to the amount of recovery. We can not subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that the right given to a party to appeal from a judgment in the justice's court is predicated on the assumption that by the judgment complained of the appellant has failed entirely in the suit or has failed to recover the full amount sued for. To hold otherwise would be to run counter to the well-settled principle that no one will be heard to complain of a judgment, unless he has been injured or is aggrieved thereby. InLamar v. Lamar, 118 Ga. 684, 687 (45 S.E. 498), it was said: "It has, we believe, ever been the law, both in this State and in other jurisdiction, that a party not aggrieved by the judgment of a trial court is without legal right to except thereto, since he has of it no just cause of complaint. . . `In legal acceptation, a party is aggrieved by a judgment or decree when it operates on his rights of property, or bears directly upon his interest.' 2 Cyc. 233, and citations. As was pertinently remarked by Chief Justice Jackson in [Brown v. Atlanta,66 Ga. 71, 76]: `When a plaintiff in error brings a case here, he must show error which has hurt him. This court is not an expounder of theoretical law, but it administers practical law, and corrects only such errors as have practically wronged the complaining party."' See Bryan v. Rowland, 166 Ga. 719, 724 (144 S.E. 275); Georgia Music Operators Asso. v. FultonCounty, 184 Ga. 348, 350 (191 S.E. 117); Houchin Sales Co.v. Angert, 11 F.2d 115, 118; 2 Am. Jur. 943, § 152. In their brief counsel for the plaintiff in error recognize the principles of law above set forth, but contend that they have no application to the present case, because it is provided in the Code, § 6-401, that in a justice's court *Page 365 either party dissatisfied with the judgment of the justice may,as of right, enter an appeal to a jury in that court, under the same rule that regulates appeals therefrom to the superior court (§ 6-101), which provides: "In all civil cases tried and determined by a county judge or a justice of the peace, and on all confessions of judgments before either of said officers, where the sum or property claimed is more than $50 [as in the instant case], either party may, as a matter of right, enter an appeal to the superior court." But, as before pointed out, the only reasonable construction of such language is that the appeal provided for, as a matter of right, is as to one who has obtained by the judgment in his favor something less than that for which he sues. Where the party obtains all that he sues for, certainly he can not be said to be injured or aggrieved by the judgment. The substance of the judgment, and not the opinion of the party, determines whether or not he is aggrieved. The same reasoning which gives him no standing in an appellate court, where he does not show injury, applies with equal force to a situation where in a justice court the party appeals to a jury in that court from a judgment rendered after proof or confessed by his adversary. One complete victory in the same cause ought, in the eyes of the law, to satisfy a litigant. He needs no new declaration of the justness of his claim, though his adversary may, where the law so provides, seek a reversal of that judgment. Under the facts here presented, the appeal to a jury in the justice's court was without provision of law and was vain and nugatory. From this it follows that the intervention submitted in the superior court presented no right or interest of the pleader to be subserved or protected in the mandamus proceeding. The judge did not err in disallowing the intervention, and in making absolute the mandamus against the justice.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.