IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-11391
Conference Calendar
DARRYL WALLACE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHIRLEY BRUMFIELD; TIM CURRY, District Attorney,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:99-CV-643-J
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June 15, 2000
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Darryl Wallace, Texas inmate #636243, proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis (IFP), appeals the district court’s dismissal
as frivolous of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Wallace’s
motions for federal protection and for a handwriting analysis are
DENIED.
We review the dismissal of an IFP complaint as frivolous for
abuse of discretion. Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th
Cir. 1997). We review a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A de
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-11391
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novo. See Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998).
Wallace does not challenge the district court’s conclusion
that his claims against the district attorney are barred by the
doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity, and any challenge to
the dismissal would be frivolous. See Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d
279, 285 (5th Cir. 1994) (criminal prosecutors are entitled to
absolute immunity from claims asserted under § 1983 for actions
involving the prosecution and carrying of a case through the
judicial process); Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff
Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987)(when appellant fails to
identify error in district court’s analysis, it is the same as if
the appellant had not appealed that judgment).
Wallace’s cause of action under § 1983 concerning the
validity of his parole revocation proceedings has not yet
accrued. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 489 (1994);
Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
Heck extends to parole revocation hearings). The district court
did not err in dismissing Wallace’s allegations concerning
medical treatment and assault. See Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d
381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983)(personal involvement is essential
element of civil rights cause of action).
Wallace’s conclusional allegations that defendant Brumfield
conspired with his parole officer are insufficient to state a
claim under § 1983. See Sarmiento v. Texas Bd., 939 F.2d 1242,
1246 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991) (private person does not conspire with
state official, for purposes of § 1983, merely by invoking an
exercise of state official’s authority); Russel v. Millsap, 781
No. 99-11391
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F.2d 381, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1985) (conclusional allegations do not
state a § 1983 claim). The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
The affirmance of the district court’s dismissal as
frivolous counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996)(affirmance
of district court’s dismissal as frivolous counts as a single
strike). We caution Wallace that once he accumulates three
strikes, he may not proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal
filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless
he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) WARNING
ISSUED.