COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Coleman, *
Willis, Elder, Bray, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Baker
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
WELFORD V. WASHINGTON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0230-96-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
JANUARY 19, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
UPON A REHEARING EN BANC
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Robert W. Duling, Judge
Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender
(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on
brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Welford V. Washington appeals his convictions of possession
of heroin and of cocaine. He contends that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress evidence found when the police
seized him and entered his home. A panel of this Court reversed
the convictions. See Washington v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App.
657, 496 S.E.2d 135 (1998). Upon a rehearing en banc, we affirm
his convictions.
Reginald Ford was free on bond, but a felony capias had been
issued for his arrest. His bondsman received a tip from an
*
Judge Baker participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on July
31, 1998 and thereafter by his designation as senior judge
pursuant to Code § 17.1-400, recodifying Code § 17-116.01.
informant that Ford was at 2347 Bethel Street in Richmond, and
the bondsman contacted Officer Michael Moore for assistance.
Before going to that address, Officer Moore verified that a
capias was outstanding, but he did not obtain a copy of the
capias. He believed that Ford either had jumped or was about
ready to jump bail. Officer Moore did not determine Ford's
residence address and did not have a description of him. The
bondsman knew and could recognize Ford.
Two additional officers met Moore and the bondsman at 2347
Bethel Street. The additional officers learned that Ford was
supposed to be in the house. They only knew his name and did not
have a description. Officer Moore and the bondsman went to the
front door, and the other two went to the back door. Moore
knocked on the front door, and Officer Samuels, one of the
officers at the back door, heard the knocking.
Three to four seconds after the knocking began, the
defendant opened the back door "rather fast" and stepped out.
Officer Samuels placed his hands on the defendant and asked, "Mr.
Ford?" The defendant replied, "[N]o. I'm Welford Washington."
Samuels frisked him and then asked for identification. The
defendant said that his driver's license was inside and turned to
go back inside. Samuels stepped in front of him and entered the
house first as the second officer followed. As soon as they
entered the kitchen, the officers saw cocaine and heroin on the
kitchen table. They seized the drugs and arrested Washington.
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Ford was not in the residence.
The defendant contends the officers violated the Fourth
Amendment when they entered his residence without a search
warrant. We hold that the officers could go upon the property in
search of Ford, that they had reasonable belief the person
exiting the house was Ford, and that they could accompany that
person back into the house while they completed identifying him.
The officers did not violate the defendant's rights.
The police possessed a capias for Reginald Ford's arrest.
The capias was issued on probable cause, and it required all
police officers to arrest Ford if they found him. The bondsman
had pledged to produce Ford according to the terms of the bond.
The police officers possessed judicially mandated authority to
seize Ford while the bondsman had statutory authority to seize
and return him to the court. In exercising their authority,
either could lawfully approach any citizen and ask if he were
Ford or if he had information that would help them find Ford.
The officers did not implicate the Fourth Amendment when
they went to 2347 Bethel Street to find Ford. Not every
encounter that the police have with a member of the public is a
seizure. "[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in
another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer
some questions . . . ." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497
(1983) (citation omitted). "[O]ur recent decision in Royer . . .
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plainly implies that interrogation relating to one's identity or
a request for identification by the police does not, by itself,
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
Police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment when they
seize a person or search a person's home or effects. A seizure
occurs when by physical force or show of authority and submission
thereto, an individual's freedom of movement is restrained and
the person is not free to leave. See California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
The critical moment occurred when the defendant stepped out
the back door and the police confronted him. The officer seized
Washington when he placed his hands on the defendant. At that
instant, if the officers had reason to believe that the person
was Ford, they had the right to detain that person briefly and to
identify him. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). Cf.
White v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 662, 666-67, 492 S.E.2d 451,
453 (1997) (en banc). The issue is whether Officer Samuels had a
reasonable suspicion that Reginald Ford was coming out the back
door.
We need not address whether the officers believed that
criminal activity was occurring. The police were not
investigating a crime. The judge who issued the capias
determined that the person named in the warrant was engaging in
criminal conduct. The officers were executing lawful process, an
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arrest warrant. Their investigation was to find Ford. When they
gathered enough information to develop a reasonable, good-faith
belief that they had found Ford, they could seize that person.
Since the warrant gave the officers probable cause to arrest, the
only issue is whether the officers had a reasonable and
good-faith belief that the defendant was Ford. See Shears v.
Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 399, 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996)
(citing United States v. McEachern, 675 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir.
1982)).
The informant's tip was unsubstantiated information about
Ford's location. "An informant's tip can provide the
justification for a Terry stop even if the informant's
reliability is unknown and certainly can do so if, as here, the
information is corroborated." United States v. Porter, 738 F.2d
622, 625 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984). In this
case, the officers raised their level of knowledge to reasonable
suspicion by corroborating the tip.
To give the tip some indicia of reliability, the officers
needed only to verify that the person detained was reasonably
believed to be the person whom they were to arrest pursuant to
the capias. Anonymous information sufficiently corroborated may
give reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop although the
unverified tip by itself would not justify a forcible stop. See
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990).
Partial corroboration has always been available to bolster
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the reliability of a tip and increase the accumulated knowledge
to the level of reasonable suspicion. If partial corroboration
can raise an unreliable tip to the point that it provides
probable cause, see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313
(1959); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983); Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. at 331, it can raise such a tip to the point it
provides reasonable suspicion.
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause not only in the
sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is
different in quantity or content than that
required to establish probable cause, but
also in the sense that reasonable suspicion
can arise from information that is less
reliable than that required to show probable
cause.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330.
Corroboration of the informant's tip could have been
accomplished many ways. In this case, Moore verified that there
was a capias for Ford, and he took the bondsman who could
identify Ford on sight with him. They went to the house to see
if Ford was there. The fugitive warrant gave the officer reason
to suspect that the person might flee. As soon as they knocked
on the front door, someone exited the back door rather fast. A
reasonable person could believe that these were the acts of a
person trying to flee the police. The police were looking for
just such a person at this address. The defendant's reaction to
the police knocking at the door provided articulable facts that
corroborated the tip and raised Officer Samuels' accumulated
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knowledge to the level of reasonable suspicion.
A single instance of attempted flight or furtive behavior by
a suspect is suggestive of guilt and provides a significant
reason to believe that the informant was correct and that
Reginald Ford was at the specified address. See Gregory v.
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 100, 109, 468 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1996)
("defendant's . . . behavior tended to support informer's
report"). "[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the
approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens
rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the
officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are
proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an
arrest." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968).
If articulable facts support a reasonable suspicion that a
person has committed a criminal offense, the police may stop that
person to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him
briefly while attempting to obtain additional information. See
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985). "A brief stop of a
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known
to the officer at the time." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
146 (1972) (citations omitted).
Officer Samuels had reasonable suspicion that Ford was the
person coming out the back door. He had the authority to detain
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briefly the person whom he suspected was Ford and to confirm his
identity. Although Washington gave his name, the officer was
entitled to verify this statement. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22;
Jones v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 14, 19, 334 S.E.2d 536, 540 (1985)
(questions about identity did not end when officer was handed
identification card that appeared to have been tampered with).
The next question is whether Samuels could accompany
Washington inside the dwelling without a search warrant.
"[W]arrantless entries into dwellings, followed by . . . arrests
therein, . . ., are presumed to be unreasonable, in Fourth
Amendment terms, casting upon the police a heavy burden of
proving justification by exigent circumstances." Verez v.
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752-53 (1985)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986). See
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
One of the situations that has been held sufficient to
justify a warrantless intrusion upon a citizen's personal privacy
is that "[o]nce an officer has lawfully stopped a suspect, he is
'authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to
protect [his and others'] personal safety and to maintain the
status quo during the course of the stop.'" Servis v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 519, 371 S.E.2d 156, 162 (1988)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 235 (1985)). As we noted in Servis, relying upon
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), frisking for weapons
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based upon the exigency of protecting an officer's safety is not
limited to a pat-down of the suspect but may extend to nearby
vehicles, as in Long, or rooms or premises to which the suspect
may retreat to secure a weapon, as in Servis. See 6 Va. App. at
520, 371 S.E.2d at 162-63.
Once the officer had reason to stop and identify the
defendant, he could stay with the defendant to keep him in sight.
See id. at 519, 371 S.E.2d at 162. This protects the police, an
important consideration during any investigatory detention. It
also maintains the status quo.
Officer Samuels knew that Ford was a fugitive wanted for a
crime. He detained the person he reasonably suspected was trying
to evade the officers at the front door. The officer could not
reasonably be expected to allow that person to re-enter the
premises alone. Although Samuels could not have entered the
premises to search for weapons or contraband, he could accompany
the suspect inside solely to maintain the status quo and ensure
the officers' safety. See id.
Samuels reasonably suspected that Washington was Ford, a
person for whom he possessed a capias as a fugitive. Thus, not
only could Samuels enter the premises to maintain a safe
situation while identifying the person, Samuels could enter the
premises to prevent the suspected fugitive from escaping. Cf.
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (officer had
right based on exigencies of situation to pursue individual into
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private premises without a search warrant where officer had set
in motion an arrest outside). The subject of an arrest warrant
can be seized before entering or after leaving the home of a
third party. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221
(1981). The threshold of one's home may be private under the
common law of property, but it is a "public place" when
interpreting the Fourth Amendment. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 42.
That Samuels could have taken the defendant around to the
front door or had the bondsman come to the back door to identify
defendant does not detract from the propriety of what he did.
"The reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect
does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory
techniques." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).
"[D]efining what means are 'least intrusive' is a virtually
unmanageable and unbounded task." United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 694 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring). When
"evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable,
common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid
criteria." Id. at 685. The test is whether the police methods
were calculated to confirm or dispel the suspicion quickly and
with minimal intrusion upon the person detained. See Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 856-57, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323
(1993).
Officer Samuels possessed reasonable suspicion to detain the
person he reasonably thought was Ford while verifying his
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identity. Samuels had the right to accompany Washington into the
home to prevent him from fleeing and to ensure the officers'
safety. The contraband was not the fruit of an illegal entry or
illegal search because the officers immediately observed it in
the kitchen in open view. We affirm the trial court's decision.
Affirmed.
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Benton, J., dissenting.
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Contrary to the majority's ruling, I believe the officers' entry
into Welford Washington's residence violated Washington's Fourth
Amendment rights. For this reason, I would reverse the trial
judge's refusal to suppress the seized evidence.
I.
A bondsman informed Officer Michael Moore that he had
received a tip from an informant that Reginald Ford, for whom a
capias had been issued, could be found at 2347 Bethel Street.
Although Officer Moore verified that a capias was outstanding, he
did not obtain a copy of the capias. Additionally, Moore never
independently confirmed Ford's address and did not obtain a
physical description of him. Only the bondsman could identify
Ford. Based upon the limited information he had received, Moore
believed Ford "had either jumped or was about ready to jump
[bail]."
At 10:30 a.m., Officer Samuels and Sergeant Kemp met Moore
and the bondsman at 2347 Bethel Street, which was Welford
Washington's residence. Samuels testified that he was told that
Ford "was supposed" to be in the residence. He knew only Ford's
name, and he did not have a physical description of Ford.
Samuels knew only that a capias had been issued, "that it was a
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bondsman's bail piece [and that] the bondsman was there to pick
[Ford] up." Although he did not know whether Ford had originally
been charged with a felony or a misdemeanor and he had not been
told that Ford was dangerous, Samuels testified that he "take[s]
everybody to be dangerous."
Samuels and Kemp went to the back door of Washington's
residence. With the bondsman accompanying him, Moore went to the
front door and knocked on the door. Moore did not see anyone
look out of a window and did not hear any activity in the
residence.
Samuels testified that he heard Moore knock on the front
door. Three to four seconds after Moore knocked, Washington
opened the back door and stepped out. Samuels testified that
Washington opened the door "rather fast." Samuels placed his
hands on Washington and said, "Mr. Ford." Washington replied,
"[N]o. I'm Welford Washington." Samuels then frisked Washington
and asked Washington for identification. Washington said his
driver's license was inside the residence and turned to go
inside. Samuels went into the house in front of Washington.
Sergeant Kemp followed. When Samuels entered the kitchen, he saw
"syringes with cocaine and heroin" residue and baggies of white
powder. He arrested Washington. Ford was not in the residence.
The trial judge ruled that Samuels' detention of Washington
and "limited intrusion" into Washington's residence were lawful.
II.
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On appeal, we review de novo the trial judge's determination
that reasonable suspicion existed to detain Washington. See
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 674, 682, 496 S.E.2d 143,
147 (1998). To justify a Terry detention, a "police officer must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
When a detention is based on an informant's tip, "[t]he informant
must provide some basis for his knowledge [of the facts he
reported] before the police officer relies upon it as being
reliable enough to support an investigatory stop." Beckner v.
Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 533, 537, 425 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1993).
In addition, "[s]ignificant aspects of the informer's information
must be independently corroborated . . . to give 'some degree of
reliability to the . . . allegation' of the informant." Bulatko
v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 135, 137, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993)
(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)).
Clearly, the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion that
Ford was at 2347 Bethel Street, that Washington was Ford, or that
Washington was engaging in criminal activity. The evidence
proved that Washington resided at 2347 Bethel Street. No
evidence established the basis of the unknown informant's
asserted knowledge that Ford could be found at Washington's
residence. The bondsman could not create legal justification to
stop Washington merely by communicating to the police the
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bondsman's informant's unsubstantiated tip that Ford might be in
the residence. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232
(1985) (ruling that if a communication "has been issued in the
absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective
reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment"); United States
v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that if
a police officer does not have a reasonable basis to conduct an
investigative stop "he could not create justification simply by
relaying a direction to a fellow officer to make the stop").
Furthermore, no evidence established that either the
informant or the bondsman was a reliable informant. The United
States Supreme Court has held that the police may rely on
information from an anonymous tipster to briefly detain a suspect
only if the information from the anonymous tipster is
"sufficiently corroborated" to provide an indicia of reliability.
White, 496 U.S. at 331. In White, which the Supreme Court
itself described as "a close case," id. at 332, the Court found
indicia of reliability because of the following:
[T]he independent corroboration by the police
of significant aspects of the informer's
predictions imparted some degree of
reliability to the other allegations made by
the caller.
[It is] also important that, as in
[Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)],
"the anonymous [tip] contained a range of
details relating not just to easily obtained
facts and conditions existing at the time of
the tip, but to future actions of third
parties ordinarily not easily predicted."
Id., at 245.
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Id. at 332.
Clearly, the lesson to be gleaned from White, Gates, and
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), is that a tip from
an anonymous source does not gain indicia of reliability merely
because the police decide to act upon the tip. The Supreme Court
has never lowered the bar to the level that the majority now
deems acceptable. In this case, the officers corroborated no
information supplied by the bondsman's unknown, anonymous
informant. The record contains no evidence, apart from the
unsubstantiated and uncorroborated informant's tip, that Ford
might have been in or near the residence. The officers acted
upon the tip and by so acting set in motion circumstances that
they deemed suspicious. When the officers knocked on the door, a
man emerged from the residence. The emergence of an unknown male
from the residence does not, to my mind, constitute
corroboration, especially when the officers possessed no ability
to recognize Ford and the man who emerged immediately identified
himself.
None of the officers attempted to determine Ford's address
1
or determine who resided at 2347 Bethel Street. Because neither
1
In fact, the failure of the officers to take reasonable
steps to corroborate the information supplied by the bondsman
demonstrates the fallacy of the majority's position. Had the
officers first determined who resided at 2347 Bethel Street,
obtained a description of Ford, determined the purpose for which
the capias had been issued - all perfectly reasonable steps to
take - the incident may never have occurred. Rather than condemn
the officers' failure to investigate before acting, the majority
rewards their conduct and, by so doing, denigrates the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
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the informant's reliability nor the basis for the informant's
knowledge was established, the officers lacked a reasonable
suspicion to believe that Ford was in the residence at 2347
Bethel Street. See McGhee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 203,
487 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1997) (en banc). See also State v. Rubert,
612 P.2d 771 (Or. App. 1980).
The uncontroverted testimony established that none of the
officers had a physical description of Ford. Lacking a physical
description of Ford, Samuels lacked a reasonable suspicion to
believe that Washington was Ford. He simply speculated that
Washington might be Ford. The uncorroborated, unsubstantiated
informant's tip was not enough, alone, to provide Samuels with
reasonable suspicion to believe that Ford was in the residence or
that any man in the residence might be Ford. Furthermore,
Washington promptly identified himself to Samuels by stating that
his name was Welford Washington.
The fact that Washington opened the rear door of the
residence after Moore knocked on the front door is insufficient
to justify a detention of Washington. No evidence proved that
Moore announced his presence or that Washington knew a police
officer was at the front door. No evidence proved where
Washington was located in his house when Moore knocked.
Washington testified that he opened the rear door because he
believed the knock was at that door. Indeed, the reasonableness
of his response in opening the rear door is buttressed by the
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fact that two police officers were at that door.
Washington's appearance at the rear door could give rise "to
no more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
"hunch"'" concerning his intentions. Deer v. Commonwealth, 17
Va. App. 730, 736, 441 S.E.2d 33, 37 (1994) (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 27). The officer's knock at a door caused Washington to
respond. Washington opened a door; he did not leave through a
window. Any conclusion that he opened the door to escape is pure
speculation. Furthermore, even if Samuels suspected that
Washington intended to flee, "flight alone may not supply
sufficient reason to suspect a person of criminal activity."
Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 303, 456 S.E.2d 534, 536
(1995). In the absence of any particular information, Samuels
lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Washington, when
he opened the door, was fleeing, was involved in a criminal
offense, or was armed and dangerous.
The majority asserts that the officers acted in good faith.
I respectfully disagree. The officers had no basis, reasonable
or otherwise, to conclude that the person who opened the door at
Washington's residence was Ford. They had never seen Ford and
had no description of Ford. They had no reliable information
that Ford was in the residence. The officers cannot bootstrap
reasonable suspicion from good faith reliance on a tip totally
devoid of any indicia of reliability. Certainly, good faith is
not established by ignorance or even innocent disregard of
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well-established Fourth Amendment principles. The officers had
no authority to detain any man they met at the residence on the
chance they might be lucky and find Ford.
"Th[e] demand for specificity in the information upon which
police action is predicated is the central teaching of [the
United States Supreme] Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18. Based upon the scant, unverified
information provided by the informant, I would hold that Samuels
lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe that Ford could be found
at 2347 Bethel Street, that Washington was Ford, or that
Washington was involved in a criminal offense. Accordingly, the
detention and frisk of Washington was unlawful.
III.
Citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196
(1987), the Commonwealth initially argued at the three-judge
panel hearing that the officers had a "limited authority to enter
[Washington's residence] pursuant to the capias." I disagree.
Even if the police had been armed with an arrest warrant for Ford
and had a reasonable basis to believe he was in the residence,
they still would have needed a search warrant to lawfully enter
Washington's residence to arrest Ford. "[T]he entry into a home
[of a person not named in an arrest warrant] to . . . make an
arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done
pursuant to a [search] warrant." Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 211 (1981).
The Fourth Amendment protects the
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individual's privacy in a variety of
settings. In none is the zone of privacy
more clearly defined than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home -- a zone that finds its
roots in clear and specific constitutional
terms: "The right of the people to be secure
in their . . . houses . . . shall not be
violated." That language unequivocally
establishes the proposition that "[a]t the
very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands
the right of a [person] to retreat into his
[or her] own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion." In
terms that apply equally to seizures of
property and to seizures of persons, the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house. Absent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (citation
omitted). Thus, "to the extent that [an arrest warrant] is
invoked as authority to enter the homes of third parties," that
entry is violative of the Fourth Amendment rights of those third
parties. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220.
At the en banc hearing, the Commonwealth abandoned that
argument and contended that Samuels' entry into the residence was
justified because of "the potential for danger." No evidence
supports that argument. In fact, the officers had no information
that Washington's residence was Ford's home. When the officers
went to Washington's residence, none of them knew whether Ford
had originally been charged with a felony or a misdemeanor. They
only knew that a capias had been issued for Ford's detention.
Indeed, the trial judge found that "Officer Samuels did not know
whether it was a felony warrant or not, and I know there was a
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capias, but I don't know . . . what the capias was for, other
than failure to appear."
Samuels justified his entry on the grounds that he "needed
to know who [Washington] was" and that he considers "everybody to
be dangerous." Thus, by Samuels' own testimony, his detention of
Washington supplied the basis for concluding danger existed and
the justification for the search of and entry into Washington's
residence. Until today, that generalized, subjective judgment
has never been sufficient to justify a warrantless search of or
entry into a private residence.
In upholding the officer's warrantless entry into
Washington's residence, the majority fails to recognize that even
if Samuels had a legitimate need to verify Washington's assertion
that he was not Ford, Samuels was not privileged to enter
Washington's residence. Washington identified himself to
Samuels. The bondsman, who could identify Ford, was on the
scene. In view of these circumstances, the conclusion easily and
necessarily follows that the officers unreasonably entered
Washington's residence. "'Nothing is more clear than that the
Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon
the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions
be termed "arrests" or "investigatory detentions."'" Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214-15 (1979) (citation omitted). "[T]he
Fourth Amendment's command that searches be 'reasonable' requires
that when the State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our
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society recognizes a significantly heightened privacy interest, a
more substantial justification is required to make the search
'reasonable.'" Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985). "At
the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a
[person] to retreat into his [or her] own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). "It is axiomatic that the
'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (citation omitted). Because
of the sanctity of the home, "neither reasonable suspicion nor
probable cause would suffice to permit the officers to make a
warrantless entry into a person's house for the purpose of
obtaining fingerprint identification." Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S
811, 817 (1985). That the identification the officers sought was
of another form does nothing to legitimize their entry.
The other basis that the majority relies upon to justify the
entry, the officer's safety, is also unconvincing. Samuels
lacked a reasonable basis to conclude that Washington was
dangerous. Nothing about Washington or his conduct indicated
that he posed a danger to the officers. Samuels' generalized
belief that everyone is dangerous did not allow him to enter
Washington's residence at his whim. "[A]n officer may not
justify a protective search by using legitimate safety concerns
to bootstrap his or her lack of sufficient suspicion of criminal
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activity." Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 80, 92, 502
S.E.2d 151, 157 (1998). Furthermore, it is clear that "any
exigency arising from [Washington's] retreat was created solely
by the police action in knocking on [Washington's] door." State
v. Morse, 480 A.2d 183, 186 (N.H. 1984). "Where agents create
the exigency themselves, warrantless activity is per se
unreasonable and we require suppression of any evidence obtained
thereby." United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 328 (5th Cir.
1984). See also United States v. Roselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.
1974) (agents knocking at apartment door and identifying
themselves as police officers unnecessarily created emergency
situation).
Because Samuels was not justified in stopping Washington in
the first instance, his entry into Washington's house and search
of the kitchen cannot be justified by fear that arose during the
stop. Although this Court ruled in Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.
App. 507, 519, 371 S.E.2d 156, 162 (1988), that "[o]nce an
officer has lawfully stopped a suspect, he is 'authorized to take
such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect [his and
others'] personal safety," that rule cannot be used to justify
the officer's entry into the residence of a person who is not
wanted for a criminal offense solely because a police officer
suspects that the person may be someone else.
The state attempts to bootstrap the police
officers' entry into Defendant's [home] by
merging two independent doctrines i.e., the
stop and frisk doctrine with the emergency
doctrine, in order to fill the gaps of one
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doctrine with the arguably permissible scope
of another. Thus, their "emergency" or
exigent circumstance, is, in their words, the
need to "neutralize" the area for their own
protection while carrying on the questioning.
We decline the invitation to stretch either
of these doctrines in order to justify the
police officers' actions based on the facts
presented here. Such a modification or
blending of the two doctrines would create an
exception to the warrant requirement which
would effectively swallow the rule.
The very purpose of our constitutional
provision was to protect a person's home from
governmental intrusions. This right against
intrusion should be stringently protected by
the courts. As such, any exceptions to the
warrant requirement should be narrowly and
carefully drawn. The state's proposed rule
that police officers, having authority to
encounter a defendant and make reasonable
inquiry, are thereby entitled to enter a
defendant's premises in order to serve the
needs of their safety, would be contrary to
this principle of carefully drawn exceptions.
We are mindful of the dangers inherent in the
work of police officers. The potential for
violence exists in all confrontations between
police and private citizens. But a remote
possibility of harm to the police officers
cannot justify a warrantless entry into the
private recesses of one's house.
State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802, 812 (Or. 1983) (citations omitted).
For these reasons, I would reverse the trial judge's refusal
to suppress the evidence. The illegal entry and search of
Washington's house was a product of the illegal detention and
resulted in the unlawful acquisition of evidence. That evidence
should have been suppressed. See Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.
App. 639, 651, 347 S.E.2d 175, 182 (1986).
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