Watts v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Agee
Argued at Salem, Virginia

JAMES EDMOND WATTS, A/K/A
JIMMY BRENNAN DOBSON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2816-00-3 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE
APRIL 30, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
Jonathan M. Apgar, Judge

Richard L. Derrico (Copenhaver, Ellett,
Cornelison & Derrico, on brief), for
appellant.

Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General
(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.

James Edward Watts (Watts) was convicted in a Roanoke City

Circuit Court bench trial of forging a public document in

violation of Code § 18.2-168. He was sentenced to serve a term

of eight months incarceration. On appeal, he contends the trial

court erred in failing to suppress statements he made to

sheriff's deputies while in custody. He alleges the statements

were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966). For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of

the trial court.
 I. BACKGROUND

On January 28, 2000, Watts was arrested on warrants for

kidnapping and abduction, and a magistrate committed him to the

Roanoke City Jail where Deputies Lanning, Allman and Watkins were

on duty.

Upon Watts' arrival at the jail, Deputy Lanning did the

initial intake. Deputy Lanning entered identifying information

on Watts, which he received from the arresting officer and the

arrest warrants, into the jail's computer database, and

fingerprinted Watts using a computerized fingerprinting system.

This process is standard operating procedure for all inmates upon

admittance to the jail. Deputy Lanning generated a fingerprint

card with the name "James Edmond Watts" printed at the top and

asked Watts to sign his name to the card.
Watts reviewed the card and informed the deputy, "That is

not my name." In response, Deputy Lanning instructed Watts to

"sign your true name." Watts proceeded to sign the card, in the

presence of Deputies Lanning and Allman, "----Dobson" (the first

name being illegible). Deputy Lanning noticed the discrepancy

and informed others in his department and the police that the

suspect had signed a name that was "different than what had been

printed out." Deputy Lanning had no further personal interaction

with Watts.

Watts was then directed to Deputy Watkins to be

"classif[ied] . . . into the general population of the jail,"

which is also a standard operating procedure for all inmates upon

admittance to the jail. When Watts arrived at Deputy Watkins'

duty station, the deputy had a committal card, which noted Watts

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was to be held by the Roanoke City Jail, and a jail card which

contained the name James Edmond Watts, an address, an

abbreviation of the charges against him, and a section to be

filled in on "jail housing."

Deputy Watkins' duty is to "determine what the safest

housing is for [the] inmate." This required him to "get a

background history, check on [his] record, check on [his] name,

stuff like that, get [] personal information, next of kin." The

questions to be asked are provided on a standard form, which the

deputy fills out. "The purpose of the questions is [the Roanoke

City Jail has] several housing areas in the jail, and we put

people into those housing areas based on, you know, . . . what

kind of security risk they are, or whether they have any things

that we need to protect them from . . . ."
As Deputy Watkins began this procedure, he "had the

information that there was a question about [Watts'] identity."

However, he did not know there was a problem with the fingerprint

card; in fact, he did not know for certain that Watts had already

been fingerprinted. Deputy Watkins testified that he was not

investigating a crime when he obtained answers from Watts for the

standard jail housing form.

When Deputy Watkins asked Watts for his name, Watts replied,

"Jimmy Brennan Dobson." He also gave the deputy a birthdate,

place of birth and criminal history that were inconsistent with

the record on file for "James Edmond Watts."

After completing all the questions on the standard form,

Deputy Watkins asked Watts to sign his name to the form that

contained the background information. Watts stated to Deputy

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Watkins that "he was not James Watts." Watts then informed

Deputy Watkins that other deputies were telling him to say that

he was James Watts and asked the deputy "what he should do."

Deputy Watkins "told him he should sign whatever his true, legal

name was, and [Watts] signed Jimmy [B.] Dobson, and he corrected

[the deputy's] spelling of the name."

Deputy Watkins then completed the classification process by

entering the name "James Dobson" into the jail's computer

database. Watching him, Watts asked the deputy what he was

doing. The deputy informed Watts that he "was going to put the

alias that he gave . . . in the computer, and . . . [he] was

going to have . . . [the] security staff confirm what his

identity was." Watts then said, "No, no, my name is James Watts.

Let me go on and sign it that way." Deputy Watkins refused to

allow Watts to amend the signature and turned the matter "over to

the Security Staff to run [Watts'] fingerprints again." 1

Deputy Watkins never informed Watts that he did not have to

sign the form or participate in the classification procedures.

Deputy Watkins also never informed Watts that "he would get in

trouble if he signed a false name to [the] form," nor did he give

Watts the Miranda warnings at any time.
The next day, January 29, 2000, Watts was charged with

forgery of a public document: the January 28, 2000 fingerprint

card created by Deputy Lanning upon Watts' arrest for abduction

1
Deputy Watkins assumed Watts had been fingerprinted prior
to being escorted to his desk; however, he was not positive that
is how the processing procedure transpired. There was no
evidence that Deputy Watkins was aware that Deputy Lanning had
fingerprinted Watts or of what events had occurred prior to this
time between Watts and other members of the jail staff.
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and kidnapping. Watts was then fingerprinted by Deputy Allman on

the new charge. Deputy Allman instructed Watts to sign this

additional fingerprint card. The deputy did not ask any

questions of Watts nor did he have any further contact with him.

This second card bore the name "James Watts," and Watts signed it

as "James Watts."

Deputy Allman, who was aware of the circumstances giving

rise to the forgery charge, did not inform Watts that he had the

right to refuse to sign the fingerprint card nor did he provide

Watts with the Miranda warnings before asking Watts to sign the

card. Watts did not object to signing the card nor did he

challenge the printed name on the card.

Prior to trial on the charge of forgery of a public

document, Watts sought to suppress (1) the fingerprint card

executed on January 29, 2000, before Deputy Allman; (2) his

response to Deputy Watkins' question, "What is your name?"; (3)

the jail classification form completed by Deputy Watkins and

signed by Watts as "Jimmy B. Dobson"; (4) Watts' statement to

Deputy Watkins that other deputies were telling him to say that

he was James Watts; (5) his inquiry on "what he should do"; and

(6) his statement to Deputy Watkins that he was "James Watts."

Watts averred suppression of all the foregoing was required

because the deputies failed to advise him of his rights pursuant

to Miranda before obtaining the information.

The trial court granted Watts' motion to suppress the

January 29, 2000 fingerprint card, but otherwise denied his

motion. The trial court specifically held "there is a routine

booking question exception in Virginia." Its ruling to deny
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Watts' motion was based on that exception and a finding that

certain of Watts' statements were voluntary and spontaneous

utterances and, therefore, outside the scope of Miranda.

Subsequently, Watts was convicted of forging the January 28,

2000 fingerprint card, a public record under Code § 18.2-168.

Watts did not object to the testimony of Deputy Lanning regarding

what occurred during the January 28, 2000 fingerprinting or to

the introduction into evidence of the signature on the January

28, 2000 fingerprint card.
On November 13, 2000, the same day as Watts' sentencing

hearing, Watts filed a "Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and

Incorporated Memorandum," in which he argued for "a judgment of

acquittal based on the admission of evidence that should,

respectfully, have been suppressed." In this motion, Watts

argued that the trial court should have suppressed the January

28, 2000 fingerprint card. Watts contended that because the

deputy knew, or should have known, that Watts was about to lie

regarding his identity the deputy should have given him the
Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion for

acquittal and imposed sentence.

On appeal, Watts argues the trial court erred (1) in denying

his motion to suppress the jail classification documents and

statements made during the classification procedure and (2) the

January 28, 2000 fingerprint card and statements made during that

fingerprint procedure raised in his motion for judgment of

acquittal. Watts cites the failure of the deputies to give him

the Miranda warnings as the error requiring reversal. We

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disagree and affirm the decisions of the trial court for the

following reasons.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress,

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as the party that prevailed below, and grant to its

evidence "all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom." Giles

v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527, 532, 507 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998)

(citation omitted). In addition, we review the trial court's

findings of historical fact only for "clear error," but we review
de novo the trial court's application of defined legal standards

to the particular facts of a case. See Ford v. Commonwealth, 28

Va. App. 249, 255, 503 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1998); see also Ornelas

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996).

III. ANALYSIS

The Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination

serves to protect persons in all settings in
which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves. We have concluded
that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected
or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely. In order to combat these
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination, the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his
rights and the exercise of those rights must
be fully honored.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.

The safeguards, now commonly known as "Miranda warnings,"

are required only when a suspect is both in custody and subjected

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to interrogation; the warnings are not required where an

individual is simply in custody. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.

291, 300 (1980). "By custodial interrogation, we mean

questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person

has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom

of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

The term "interrogation" means either express questioning or its

functional equivalent. See Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445,

452-53, 423 S.E.2d 360, 365 (1992). The "functional equivalent"

of an interrogation is "any words or actions on the part of the

police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to

elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446

U.S. at 301 (emphasis added).

Citing the emphasized language in Innis, we held in Wright

v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 743, 348 S.E.2d 9 (1986), that law

enforcement officers need not administer Miranda warnings prior

to obtaining biographical information for a fingerprint card:

Under the facts presented here, we believe
that [the defendant's] statement concerning
his address [made on a fingerprint card] was
obtained as a result of conduct normally
attendant to arrest and custody. We also
note the total absence of any evidence that
the questioning here was intended or designed
to produce an incriminating response. For
these reasons, Miranda warnings were
unnecessary.

Id. at 746, 348 S.E.2d at 12.

In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), a
four-justice plurality of the United States Supreme Court found

that the answers to biographical questions asked during booking

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"fall within a 'routine booking question' exception which exempts

from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the '"biographical

data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services."'" Id.

at 601. In a footnote, the plurality expounded on this concept:

"'[R]ecognizing a "booking exception" to Miranda does not mean,

of course, that any question asked during the booking process

falls within that exception. Without obtaining a waiver of the

suspect's Miranda rights, the police may not ask questions, even

during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory

admissions.'" Id. at 602 n.14 (plurality opinion).

Subsequent to Muniz, we held in Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28

Va. App. 187, 503 S.E.2d 233 (1998), that "[a]ssuming without

deciding that a routine booking exception exists in Virginia,"

the facts on that record took the custodial interrogation outside

the exception. Id. at 199, 503 S.E.2d at 238.

With this precedential background in mind, we now examine

each of the claimed Miranda violations alleged by Watts.

A. THE JANUARY 28, 2000 FINGERPRINT CARD

Watts alleges the January 28, 2000 fingerprint card, the

public document he was convicted of forging, should have been

suppressed by the trial court because he had not been given the
Miranda warnings prior to signing the card. We disagree.

Although our decision in Wright preceded the United States

Supreme Court's decision in Muniz, which used the phrase "routine

booking question exception," it is clear we were describing the

same principle: "'Police words or actions "normally attendant to

arrest and custody" do not constitute interrogation.'" Wright, 2

Va. App. at 746, 348 S.E.2d at 12 (quoting South Dakota v.

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Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15 (1982)). Accordingly, we hold

there is a routine booking question exception in Virginia, "which

exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the

biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial

services." Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601. The correctional system

requires the collection of such routine biographical information

in order to function at even the most basic level and avoid chaos

while administering some of society's most dangerous individuals.

However, the routine booking question exception "does not mean

. . . that any question asked during the booking process falls

within that exception. . . . [T]he police may not ask questions,

even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory

admissions." Id. at 602 n.14.

Deputy Lanning generated the January 28, 2000 fingerprint

card during the "booking" procedure upon Watts' arrival at the

city jail on the charges of kidnapping and abduction. There is

nothing in the record to suggest this process was anything but

routine and universal for all inmates. Deputy Lanning simply

fingerprinted Watts and instructed him to sign the fingerprint

card.

A review of the record clearly reveals that Deputy Lanning

did not subject Watts to any form of express questioning or its

functional equivalent. The deputy subsequently spoke to Watts

only when Watts asked him what name he should sign. Deputy

Lanning instructed Watts to sign "his true name." Deputy

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Lanning's response was not designed to elicit an incriminating

statement from Watts. 2

Wright clearly supports the finding that the fingerprint

card, including Watts' forged signature, and Watts' inquiry to

Deputy Lanning, were admissible in evidence without prior Miranda

warnings under the routine booking question exception. Moreover,

even if the exception did not apply, the Miranda warnings were

not required because neither Deputy Lanning's execution of the

fingerprint card nor his direction to Watts to sign the card were

actions designed to elicit an incriminating admission. The trial

court correctly denied Watts' motion for judgment of acquittal

regarding the statements made to Deputy Lanning and properly

admitted the fingerprint card into evidence.
B. STATEMENTS TO DEPUTY WATKINS

Watts also contends the admission of the jail classification

form bearing his false signature and his statements to Deputy

Watkins should have been suppressed for lack of Miranda warnings.

Yet, the classification form and Watts' statements to Deputy

Watkins were either in response to routine questions asked during

the booking procedure or those he made spontaneously. Therefore,

we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The absence of Miranda warnings during the inmate
classification procedure does not require suppression of the

statements unless the questions asked were designed to elicit an

2
In fact, Watts did not incriminate himself in any crime by
forging the card; rather he committed a crime. The purpose of
advising a suspect of the Miranda warnings is to protect that
suspect from unwarily incriminating himself based on prior acts,
not for the purpose of advising a suspect that he should avoid
committing a crime.
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incriminatory admission. Our review, therefore, requires us to

determine whether Deputy Watkins interrogated Watts, whether

expressly or by its functional equivalent. See Timbers, 28 Va.

App. at 194, 503 S.E.2d at 236 (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at

300-01).

The test is "'whether an objective
observer would view an officer's words or
actions as designed to elicit an
incriminating response.'" Timbers[], 28 Va.
App. [at] 196, 503 S.E.2d [at] 238 []
(quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App.
10, 15, 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). If a
statement is "not foreseeable, then it is
volunteered." Blain, 7 Va. App. at 15, 371
S.E.2d at 841.

Gates v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 352, 355-56, 516 S.E.2d 731,

733 (1999). Pursuant to this standard, we hold that Deputy

Watkins did not interrogate Watts and, therefore, the trial court

was not required to suppress Watts' statements or the jail

classification form.

Deputy Watkins merely asked Watts standard biographical

questions contained on a procedural form related to his arrest,

custody, and placement in inmate housing, a universal

incarceration procedure. The questions were not designed to

elicit an incriminating response, but to ascertain the most

suitable division of the jail in which to place Watts for his and

others' protection. There is no evidence in the record that

Deputy Watkins acted in any way other than to "book" Watts. At

the time of his interaction with Watts, Deputy Watkins knew a

question had arisen at some point as to Watts' true identity.

However, he did not know that the suspect had forged the

fingerprinting card taken by Deputy Lanning.

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 The inquiries and admission made by Watts were made

voluntarily, without prompting, and not made in response to any

interrogation by Deputy Watkins within the meaning of the Miranda

decision. Watts' offer to re-sign the jail classification form

with the name "James Watts" was also a spontaneous remark not

made in response to anything asked by Watkins. Where a suspect

in custody makes spontaneous admissions, which are not a product

of interrogation, the statements are admissible and their

admission does not violate the suspect's right against

self-incrimination. See Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 484,

490, 323 S.E.2d 567, 570-71 (1984).

We are not persuaded by Watts' argument that Timbers, 28 Va.

App. 187, 503 S.E.2d 233, requires us to reverse the trial

court's decision. Timbers is clearly distinguishable from the

case at bar.

In Timbers, the defendant was arrested for possession of

cocaine and was taken to the sheriff's office where Deputy

MacFall asked her for identifying information, including her

name, birthdate and Social Security number. The defendant

informed the deputy that her name was "Gwendolyn Ann Timbers."

After being fingerprinted, the defendant signed the name "Gwendy

Timbers," to the fingerprint card and a Central Criminal Records

Exchange (CCRE) form. Subsequently, while Timbers was in a

holding cell, a woman came into the lobby of the sheriff's office

and left an item of clothing for "Kelly Timbers." Deputy MacFall

testified that he immediately went

"to the holding cell where we had Ms. Timbers
and questioned her as to what her real
identity was." When asked to specify his
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 actions, [Deputy] MacFall testified as
follows: "I went to the holding cell door, I
called her by the name of Kelly Timbers and
she looked at me. And I told her if she was
Kelly Timbers, that she needed to come forth
with that information."

Id. at 191, 503 S.E.2d at 235. Timbers acknowledged that she was

actually "Kelly Timbers." She was not advised of the Miranda

warnings at any point prior to this acknowledgement. Timbers was

then charged with forgery of the fingerprint card and the CCRE

form, and of giving false information to a police officer. Id.

at 192, 503 S.E.2d at 235.
Applying the objective person standard from Blain, 7 Va.

App. 10, 371 S.E.2d 838, we held the deputy's statements to

Timbers while in the holding cell constituted interrogation.

After learning that Timbers' real name was probably Kelly Timbers

rather than "Gwendolyn Timbers," the deputy intentionally went to

the holding cell door and called her by the name "Kelly Timbers."

He sought to investigate what he believed to be a false

information crime.

In the first testimony he gave on the issue,
[Deputy] MacFall described this exchange as
"question[ing] her as to what her real
identity was." After appellant looked at
[Deputy] MacFall, [Deputy] MacFall told her
that if she was Kelly Timbers, she needed to
admit that fact. [Deputy] MacFall testified
that in response to these statements,
[Timbers] "came clean to me and said that she
was actually Kelly Yvette Timbers." A
reasonable observer would view [Deputy]
MacFall's statements as designed to elicit
[Timbers'] incriminating statement that she
was, in fact, Kelly Timbers.
Timbers, 28 Va. App. at 197, 503 S.E.2d at 237. We, therefore,

held her admission to being Kelly Timbers should have been

suppressed.

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 Deputy MacFall's inquiries to Timbers constituted

interrogation in violation of Miranda because the officer was

clearly investigating a prior criminal act and intended to elicit

an incriminating response from Timbers. Deputy MacFall's

inquiries to Timbers were not those to which all inmates were

subjected as a matter of course for basic inmate processing. By

contrast, Deputy Watkins' inquiries to Watts were all routine

booking questions common to all inmates and necessitated as a

matter of course in order to operate the jail and make adequate

arrangements for the inmate's incarceration. Deputy Watkins was

not in the process of investigating a crime, but simply trying to

classify Watts into the inmate population.
Since Watts was not subjected to a custodial interrogation,

the Miranda decision does not protect his answers during the

booking process and his spontaneous remarks. The trial court did

not err in refusing to suppress them.

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

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