[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
____________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 05-13852 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 17, 2007
_____________
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 02-60199-CV-AJ
JOHN WATTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY,
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
MODESTO MAIDIQUE,
PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE OF DELRAY, a Florida corporation,
KAREN SOWERS-HOAG,
PHYLLIS SINGERMAN,
JOSEPH SALLUZZI,
FIU BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_____________
(August 17, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and HILL, Circuit Judges.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal by John Watts from the dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) of his amended complaint claiming, among other things, that because of
his religious beliefs he was terminated from a practicum position, which led to his
dismissal from a seminar and prevented him from earning his master’s degree at a
state university.
I.
Given the procedural posture of the case, we view the allegations in the
amended complaint in the light most favorable to Watts. While the true facts may
be other than those alleged, for present purposes it does not matter. The
allegations, construed favorably to Watts, are what count.
In 1995 Watts enrolled in the Master of Social Work program at Florida
International University, a state university. He was scheduled to graduate in May
of 1997. To complete the program and earn his degree, Watts had to take a course
called “Field Practicum II.” According to FIU’s graduate catalog, Field Practicum
II was a “516-clock hour supervised educational experience in an agency setting
designed to provide the student with an opportunity to develop and practice social
work skills in the student’s area of concentration.” Watts registered for the course,
paid his tuition, and was assigned to Fair Oaks Hospital, a private psychiatric
2
institution affiliated with FIU for purposes of the practicum. While in the
practicum Watts worked under the supervision of Phyllis Singerman, an FIU
graduate field instructor and advisor, and Joseph Salluzzi. Salluzzi was also a
field instructor, but it is unclear whether he worked for FIU or Fair Oaks. In the
spring of 1997, Watts was counseling a patient at Fair Oaks who “lacked a
diagnosis.” After questioning the patient, Watts, consistent with his training,
recommended that the patient join a bereavement support group. The patient
asked where she could find such a group. Watts, who had noticed on the patient’s
assessment form that she was Catholic, included “church” in the options he told
her about. Nothing he said violated any guidelines or requirements of the MSW
program.
Shortly thereafter, Watts received a letter on Fair Oaks letterhead which was
signed by Salluzzi and Singerman, terminating him from the practicum. This is
what it said:
This letter has been drafted in order to make John Watts aware of his
practicum termination at Fair Oaks Hospital on 4/1/97.
The decision has been based on inappropriate behavior related to
patients, regarding religion. This is the second such incident where
personal boundaries have intruded into professional conduct.
The first counseling was verbal, and included Phyllis L. Singerman
(Graduate Field Instructor) and Joseph Salluzzi (Field Instructor).
3
Salluzzi and Singerman also orally informed Watts that “his termination was due
to his religious speech.” As a result of his termination from the practicum, Watts
later received another letter dismissing him from “Field Practicum II,” the related
course in which he was enrolled at FIU. Because he was kicked out of the
practicum and the course, Watts could not earn his master’s degree at FIU.
According to Watts, Fair Oaks and Salluzzi “acted in such close concert
with the state, and the state approved their actions, that their actions are fairly
attributable to the state and they are deemed to be state actors for the purposes of
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”1
II.
Watts filed a lawsuit against FIU, the Board of Regents, the Board of
Trustees for FIU, the corporate entity that owns Fair Oaks, Singerman, Salluzzi,
and some others. The complaint asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 three claims that
the defendants’ actions had violated Watts’ constitutional rights to free speech,
1
In quoting these state action allegations from the amended complaint, we do not mean to
imply any view on their legal validity. The district court did not find it necessary to reach that
issue, and we decline to address it in the first instance. Instead, we will assume for present
purposes that Fair Oaks and Salluzzi were state actors and, accordingly, as an employee of Fair
Oaks during the practicum Watts was an employee of the state. We leave it to the district court
to determine in the first instance whether there actually was state action so that Watts was a
government employee.
4
free exercise of religion, and procedural due process. It also put forward twelve
state law claims.
In granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court did not
address their assertion that Fair Oaks and Salluzzi were not state actors for
purposes of the federal claims. Instead, the court ruled that the allegations failed
to state a claim for violation of federal law regardless of state action. As for the
state law claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
them and dismissed them without prejudice. Well, more or less. More about that
at the end of this opinion, but for now we turn to the federal claims.
III.
The district court reached its conclusion that Watts’ free speech claim
should be dismissed by applying the employee speech case of Pickering v. Board
of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 (1968), and its progeny.
The Pickering decision recognized that government “has interests as an employer
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”
Id. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734. Still, the Supreme Court “unequivocally rejected” the
notion that government employees relinquish their right to comment on matters of
public concern. Id. Because Pickering had spoken on an issue of public
5
importance and there was no evidence that he had knowingly or recklessly made
false statements, the Court held that the school board had infringed on his First
Amendment rights by dismissing him from public employment. Id. at 574, 88 S.
Ct. at 1738.
By contrast, when public employees speak on matters of private concern,
the First Amendment protection is not as extensive. See generally Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 137, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). In the Connick case the Court
explained that while the state generally is prohibited from punishing the
expression of private sentiments:
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of
personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to
the employee’s behavior.
Id. at 147, 103 S. Ct. at 1690. The district court rightly found that Watts spoke on
a matter of private concern. His speech provided private counsel to a single
patient within the confines of a counseling session. If Pickering is the appropriate
yardstick, Watts loses.
Watts argues, however, that the standard to apply is not the Pickering test
but the one governing student speech that is set out in Tinker v. Des Moines
6
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969), and
its progeny. In that case the Supreme Court famously proclaimed that neither
students nor teachers “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Id. at 506, 89 S. Ct. at 736. Less famously,
the Court said that the First Amendment rights of students and teachers must be
“applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Id. In
that special light, school officials may be justified in prohibiting particular
expressions where there is a showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
would “materially and substantially interfere with . . . appropriate discipline in the
operation of a school.” Id. at 509, 89 S. Ct. at 738 (quotation marks omitted).
Watts argues that because he was a student, the state can only regulate his conduct
under the Tinker test, which limits the government’s power more than the
Pickering test does.
The assumption underlying Watts’ contention is that because the state has
some power to regulate his speech as a student of FIU, it cannot also exercise its
power to regulate his speech as an employee of Fair Oaks. Tinker gives the state a
limited power to restrict speech that materially and substantially interferes with the
operation of a school. Id. Pickering, as modified by Connick, provides the state a
broader power to regulate the private speech of its employees. Connick, 461 U.S.
7
at 147, 103 S. Ct. at 1690. Had Watts not been a student as well as a government
employee, the state plainly would have been entitled to the greater leeway the
Pickering test affords it. The fact that the state could have attempted to assert its
authority over Watts as a student, subject to the Tinker restrictions, does not
prevent the state from asserting its authority over him as an employee, subject to
the Pickering test instead. In any event, once Watts the employee was terminated
from his employment in the practicum, Watts the student could not complete the
course which included the practicum. Without that course he could not earn his
degree. The action that led to the results about which Watts complains is his
termination from employment in the practicum, and to that pivotal action the
Pickering test applies.
As we have already indicated, judged under Pickering, the termination of
Watts from the practicum because of what he said during the private counseling
session does not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The
district court correctly dismissed that claim.
IV.
The district court was also correct in dismissing the due process claim.
Assuming that Watts held a property right in his graduate school education, he has
not been denied constitutionally adequate due process. Because a violation of
8
procedural due process is not complete “unless and until [a] State fails to provide
due process . . . the state may cure a procedural deprivation by providing a later
procedural remedy.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Only when the state refuses to
provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation does a
constitutional violation become actionable. Id. The district court identified
several Florida administrative code sections and state court decisions indicating
that Watts could seek relief for his procedural deprivations in state court. Watts’
sole argument on appeal appears to be that an administrative appeal of his
dismissal would have been futile. Even if that is true, Watts has not presented any
reason to believe that he could not receive a procedural remedy through a state
court proceeding. For that reason, the dismissal of the due process claim was
proper.
V.
Watts has, however, pleaded a valid First Amendment free exercise of
religion claim. The district court dismissed this claim because it concluded that
Watts had not alleged that the termination of his practicum employment for his
statement to the counseling patient had substantially burdened his observation of a
central religious belief. That is the wrong standard. To plead a valid free exercise
9
claim, Watts must allege that the government has impermissibly burdened one of
his “sincerely held religious beliefs.” Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec.,
489 U.S. 829, 834, 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (1989). In numerous decisions,
beginning as far back as 1955, the Supreme Court has used the phrase “sincerely
held” to describe the type of religious belief or practice eligible for protection
under the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375,
377, 75 S. Ct. 392, 393 (1955); Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834, 109 S. Ct. at 1518. We
have used that “sincerely held” language as well. See, e.g., Benning v. Georgia,
391 F.3d 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Sincerely held” is different from “central,” and courts have rightly shied
away from attempting to gauge how central a sincerely held belief is to the
believer’s religion. It is true that in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989), the Supreme Court described the type of religious belief or
practice that the First Amendment shields from substantial government burden as
“a central religious belief or practice.” Id. at 699, 109 S. Ct. at 2148. After using
that phrase, however, the Court pulled back from it in the very next sentence,
stating: “It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular
beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations
of those creeds.” Id.
10
If those two sentences in Hernandez left any doubt about whether the
judiciary should determine the “centrality” of a specific belief, the Court removed
that doubt the next year in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). There, the Court
wrote: “It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of
religious beliefs before applying a ‘compelling interest’ test in the free exercise
field, than it would be for them to determine the ‘importance’ of ideas before
applying the ‘compelling interest’ test in the free speech field.” Id. at 886–87, 110
S. Ct. at 1604. The Court asked in Smith: “What principle of law or logic can be
brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is ‘central’
to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin
to the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious
claims.” Id. at 887, 110 S. Ct. at 1604 (some quotation marks omitted). It
concluded: “Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that
courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion
or the plausibility of a religious claim.” Id. While the Free Exercise Clause may
be aimed primarily at protecting “central” religious practices, it is beyond the
competence of the courts to determine the centrality of a particular religious belief
11
or practice. The test is sincerity, not centrality. And it is sincerity that Watts was
required to plead.
With what specificity must sincerity be pleaded? We have held many times
when discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, that “the pleadings are
construed broadly,” e.g., Levine v. World Fin. Network Nat’l Bank, 437 F.3d
1118, 1120 (11th Cir. 2006), and that the allegations in the complaint are viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, e.g., Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment,
Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). Of course, “a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). While Rule 12(b)(6) does not
permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because “it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable,” the “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
The Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of the pleading specificity
standard is that “stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest” the required element. Id. The standard is one of
“plausible grounds to infer.” Id. The Court has instructed us that the rule “does
not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,” but instead “simply
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
12
evidence of” the necessary element. Id. It is sufficient if the complaint succeeds
in “identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render [the element] plausible.”
Id.
Applying the teachings of Twombly and our decisions to the pleading issue
in this case, the question is whether Watts has alleged enough facts to suggest,
raise a reasonable expectation of, and render plausible the fact that he sincerely
held the religious belied that got him fired.
How do you plead sincerity of belief? One way is to state that the belief is,
in fact, your religious belief. Watts did that in paragraph twenty-six of the
amended complaint:
Mr. Watts is a Christian. He is not Catholic. Mr. Watts’ religious
beliefs include the belief that a patient who professes a religion is
entitled to be informed if the counselor is aware of a religious avenue
within the patient’s religion that will meet the appropriate therapy
protocol for the patient. Mr. Watts’ termination for his “religious
speech” evidences Defendants’ intent to compel Mr. Watts to act
contrary to his religious beliefs and constitutes a substantial burden
on the exercise of his religious beliefs.
The only fair reading of paragraph twenty-six is that Watts’ religion included the
sincere belief that a patient who herself professes religious faith is entitled to be
informed of religious avenues for therapy. That reading is reinforced by the
additional allegation that when Watts was fired for acting on that belief it was
13
done with the intent to compel him to act contrary to his religious beliefs and
imposes a substantial burden on them. If Watts was not sincere about the
religious belief that got him fired, firing him for acting according to it could not
have imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious beliefs, as he
has pleaded.
In Twombly terms, Watts has certainly alleged “enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest” that his religious belief was sincerely held, 127 S. Ct. at
1965, putting forward “plausible grounds to infer” that it was sincerely held, id.,
and “identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render [the sincerity of his
belief] plausible,” id. That is all that is required at this stage of the litigation.
Our dissenting colleague acknowledges that Watts has adequately pleaded
the sincerity of his belief, but believes that he has failed to plead sufficiently that
the belief is of a religious character. See infra at 26–27. We disagree with the
dissent’s position that Watts must plead facts sufficient for an objectively
reasonable person to conclude that his belief is religious in nature.
Initially, we question whether a plaintiff could ever plead or proffer
“objective” facts that his particular sincerely held belief is religious in nature.
Religion is by its nature subjective. As Kierkegaard wrote, “it is precisely in
objective analysis that one loses the infinite personal and passionate concern that
14
is the requisite condition for faith, its ubiquitous ingredient, wherein faith comes
into existence.”2 If Watts could explain or prove objectively why his religion
commanded the belief in question, it might no longer be a religious belief, or at
least not one rooted in faith.
We need not delve far into philosophy, however, because the Supreme
Court has at least twice instructed us not to engage in any “objective” test of
whether a particular belief is a religious one. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850 (1965). In the Thomas case, the Court wrote
that the resolution of whether a particular belief is religious in nature “is not to
turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question;
religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” 450 U.S. at 714, 101 S. Ct.
at 1430. It is difficult to gauge the objective reasonableness of a belief that need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.
The dissent characterizes Thomas as being about the verity of a plaintiff’s
purported religious beliefs rather than about whether those beliefs are religious in
2
Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, in 2 Classics of Philosophy:
Modern & Contemporary 907 (Louis P. Pojman ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1844).
15
character. See infra at 32–33. That is not how we read the case. In its opinion
the Supreme Court takes to task the lower court for concluding that Thomas’
refusal to participate in the production of war materials was a “‘personal
philosophical choice rather than a religious choice.’” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714,
101 S. Ct. at 1430 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ind. 1979)). In doing so, the Court squarely
addresses the question of whether Thomas’ beliefs were “beliefs rooted in
religion” and explains how to go about “[t]he determination of what is a
‘religious’ belief or practice.” Id. It instructs us that the resolution of that
question does not turn on the judiciary’s perception of the particular belief or
practice. Id. Instead, “[t]he narrow function of a reviewing court in this context
is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated
his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his
religion.” Id. at 716, 101 S. Ct. at 1431. The honest (sincere) conviction that
counts is that of the plaintiff, not that of the court.
Applying the holding of Thomas, Watts must plead that he believes his
religion compels him to take the actions that resulted in his termination. He need
not plead now, or present later, “objective” evidence that his belief is of the type
16
that a judge would generally consider to be religious in nature. Watts is not on the
hook for our inability to understand his religious system.
We also are unpersuaded by the attempt to distinguish Seeger. See infra at
32 n.2. While acknowledging that the Supreme Court in Seeger recognized that
the First Amendment protects beliefs that are, in the claimant’s “own scheme of
things,” religious, 380 U.S. at 185, 85 S. Ct. at 863, the dissent argues that: “The
focus of the Seeger Court, however, was not the preclusion of any objective
weighing of whether a belief was religious, but rather, an attempt to harness any
extrajudicial weighing of the qualitative worth of any given religion,” see id. The
Seeger opinion does concern the latter point, but it also concerns the former. The
following passage from the opinion addresses both points:
As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86, 64 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1944): ‘Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to
some may be incomprehensible to others.’ Local boards and courts in
this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them
‘incomprehensible.’ Their task is to decide whether the beliefs
professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in
his own scheme of things, religious.
Id. at 184–85, 85 S. Ct. at 863.
Simply put, judges and juries must not inquire into the validity of a religious
doctrine, and the task of courts is to examine whether a plaintiff’s beliefs are, “in
17
his own scheme of things, religious.” Id. The question is not whether the
plaintiff’s beliefs are religious in the objective, reasonable person’s view, but
whether they are religious in the subjective, personal view of the plaintiff.
For all these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff need not prove the
objective reasonableness of his religious belief. But even if the dissent were
correct that at some point in this litigation Watts will need to tender objective
evidence of the nature of his belief, that point is not now. The district court
dismissed Watts’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). We are at the pleading stage, not
the proof stage.
The dissent says that we must “ask whether a reasonable person would
accept, without more, that [Watts’ belief] is a religious belief, rather than a
philosophical or professional belief,” and require Watts to set forth specific facts
supporting his position that it is a religious belief. See infra at 30–31. This
formulation sounds remarkably like the standard governing the adjudication of
motions for summary judgment, not motions to dismiss. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986) (“[I]n ruling on a
motion for summary judgment . . . [t]he question . . . is whether a jury could
reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his case . . . or that he did not.”);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992)
18
(“In response to a summary judgment motion . . . the plaintiff can no longer rest on
. . . ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ . . . ‘specific facts.’” (citations
omitted)). Even assuming that the questions posed by the dissent would be critical
at summary judgment or at trial, all that is required in a complaint is “a short and
plain statement of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Even if we agreed with the dissent’s objective-nature position, we would
disagree with its position that Watts’ specific allegation of his religious belief is
not enough because it is merely “a single statement assigning religious motivation
to [his] belief.” See infra at 37. How else does one plead a religious basis or
motivation for a belief except by asserting it in a statement in a complaint?
Surely, the alleged fact is not deficiently pleaded, as the dissent implies, merely
because it is stated only once—in a “single statement.” There is no basis in law or
logic for requiring a plaintiff to make the same allegation two or more times in a
complaint. Once is enough.
The dissent hints at how a plaintiff should demonstrate the religious nature
of a belief by citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972). See
infra at 31–32. Yoder did not concern pleading requirements. Instead, it involved
an appeal by the state from a lower court’s decision overturning a criminal
conviction for violating a compulsory school-attendance law. Id. at 207, 92 S. Ct.
19
at 1529. The Supreme Court examined whether “[t]he trial testimony showed that
respondents believed . . . that their children’s attendance at high school, public or
private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.” Id. at 209, 92 S. Ct.
1530. It concluded, after examining the evidence presented at trial, that the
respondents held a (subjective) belief that their opposition to the compulsory
attendance law was based on religion. Id. at 219, 92 S. Ct. at 1535. The evidence
presented at trial included “expert witnesses [who were] scholars on religion and
education” who presented the history of the Amish people “in some detail,
beginning with the Swiss Anabaptists of the 16th century.” Id. at 209–10, 92 S.
Ct. at 1530. The respondents’ case was sufficiently detailed, in fact, that the
Supreme Court spent more than two thousand words summarizing the relevant
testimony. Id. at 209–13, 216–19, 92 S. Ct. 1530–35.
The Third Circuit decisions from which the dissent borrows its test likewise
discuss evidence presented after the pleading stage. In Africa v. Pennsylvania,
662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), the court affirmed the district court’s denial of an
injunction after it had conducted an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1025–26. In
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979), the court affirmed the entry of
summary judgment against a school district for violating the Establishment Clause
20
after the defendants “had filed numerous depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, and other affidavits.” Id. at 198.
We do not understand the dissent to suggest that future First Amendment
litigants should add two thousand words to their complaints, detailing the contours
of their religious beliefs. We have constantly preached to attorneys that they
should avoid repetitious allegations and averments in complaints, warning against
the reviled “shotgun pleadings” style. One of us has been particularly outspoken
on the subject, always ready with the verbal cudgel to pound on those who file
prolix and repetitious complaints, instead of the “short and plain statement of the
claim” contemplated by Rule 8. See, e.g., Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v.
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1296 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that this Court has addressed unwieldy pleadings “on numerous
occasions” and “always with great dismay”); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075,
1128–34 (11th Cir. 2001) (outlining in meticulous detail a district court’s
obligation not to permit duplicitous pleadings); Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of
Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that repetition of
allegations makes it “virtually impossible” to understand a complaint); Pelletier v.
Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991) (warning attorneys against forcing
the court to “sift through the facts” at the pleading stage).
21
Watts has stated in his amended complaint that his “religious beliefs include
the belief” at issue here. His representation is all that is necessary to raise the
possibility that his belief is a religious one “above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965; see Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184, 85 S. Ct. at 863 (“[T]he
claim of the [plaintiff] that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must
be given great weight.”). We are at a loss to understand how much more he could
say in his complaint and still adhere to the Rule 8 model of “a short and plain
statement of the claim.” Of course, Watts could conceivably be prevaricating
when he pleads that his belief is religious. Or maybe the defendants would say
that he is mistaken about his religious beliefs, taking the position that Samuel
Taylor Coleridge did when he wrote that: “You do not believe; you only believe
that you believe.”3 But it is these possibilities, and not Watts’ straightforward
allegations, that are too speculative to be dispositive at this state in the litigation.
Of course, in allowing this claim to proceed, we express or imply no view
on the ultimate merits, or lack of merit, of the claim. All we hold is that, if there is
state action, see supra note 1, this claim is entitled to proceed to the next step in
the litigation process.
3
Thomas Carlyle, The Hero as Priest (May 15, 1840), in On Heroes, Hero-Worship and
the Heroic in History 160 (Oxford Univ. Press 1974) (1841), quoting Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
better known for penning the Rime of the Ancient Mariner.
22
VI.
Although we are convinced that, subject to the state action question, Watts
has stated a claim for a violation of his free exercise rights, we affirm the district
court’s ruling that qualified immunity applies to the state defendants whom Watts
has sued in their individual capacities. The factual circumstances of this case are
unusual. There were no decisions in 1997 addressing the free exercise rights of
graduate students in a practicum. Watts seems to have admitted as much because
he urged us to craft a new constitutional standard for precisely this situation,
explaining that applying either employee speech or student speech cases to student
internships is like trying to put “the proverbial square peg in a round hole.” To
decide unusual cases courts sometimes have to cut down pegs and bore out holes,
but when such carpentry is necessary qualified immunity is appropriate. Because
the individual defendants were not on notice that they were violating Watts’
clearly established constitutional rights, the district court correctly granted them
summary judgment in their individual capacities.
VII.
There is one more matter we need to address. We said earlier in our opinion
that the district court “more or less” (our term) had declined to exercise
jurisdiction over the state law claims. Supra at 5. What the court did in its order
23
is state that in light of the dismissal of the federal claims, “I decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3),”
and “[t]hus, those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE”
(capitalization in original). But then the court said:
Because there may be an appeal, however, and in case I have erred in
dismissing any of the federal claims, I will alternatively address some
of the arguments made by the defendants as to the state law claims.
Should the Eleventh Circuit affirm the dismissal of the federal claims,
the following discussion will, of course, be nothing more than dicta
and not be binding in subsequent state proceedings.
The district court proceeded to explain why some of the pleaded state law
claims were not valid. Others it did not address on the merits. In the conclusion
of the order, however, the district court stated that while the federal claims were
dismissed with prejudice, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) it was declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the state law claims, which were “therefore DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE” (capitalization in original). It did not dismiss without
prejudice only some of the state law claims, but all of them.
This is a pretty unusual approach, and we have no precedent exactly on
point about how to handle it. We are sympathetic with the district court’s desire to
move things along should any part of its order addressing the federal claims be
reversed on appeal, but at the same time the court did begin and end its discussion
24
of the state law claims with clear statements indicating that all of them were being
dismissed without prejudice. The decisive point for us is that the most efficient
way to handle this situation is to let the state law claims travel as a group and
avoid any piecemeal appellate consideration of them. A lot can happen to a case
on remand, and it may be that some or all of the state law claims are mooted or fall
by the wayside for one reason or another. We will vacate the judgment as to all of
them and remand them to the district court for further proceedings in light of our
reversal of its judgment as to the federal free exercise claim. Obviously, we are
not implying any view as to the merits of any of the state law claims.
VIII.
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed with
prejudice the federal free speech and procedural due process claims, but the
judgment is VACATED AND THE CASE IS REMANDED for further
proceedings insofar as the federal free exercise and all of the state law claims are
concerned.
25
HILL, Circuit Judge, concurring:
My colleagues debate well. Concluding that the complaint does not
affirmatively show that the appellant may not have a case, I concur in the opinion
prepared for us by Judge Carnes.
Now, perhaps, the fact contentions will be developed and, if they should not
be in dispute, the court can rule on existing, and not merely alleged, facts. Then,
that ruling will determine something of value to the litigants – the resolution of the
disagreement.
That is, after all, what the judicial branch is said to be about.
26
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Although the majority is correct in holding that Watts must allege the
impermissible burden of a “sincerely held religious belief,” Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t
of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834, 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1518, 103 L. Ed. 2d 914
(1989), in determining that Watts pleaded a valid free exercise claim, the majority
conflates what are two distinct analyses under the First Amendment. As I set forth
below, free exercise jurisprudence requires that a plaintiff plead both sincerity and
the religious character of the plaintiff’s belief. Because I conclude that Watts
failed to plead sufficient facts supporting the religious character of the belief for
which he seeks First Amendment protection, I respectfully dissent.
While a plaintiff seeking free exercise protection under the First
Amendment must allege a sincerely held belief, sincerity alone is not enough – the
belief must also be religious. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2225, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472
(1993); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004). Federal case
law is replete with examples of courts articulating the threshold free exercise
requirements as a two-part analysis. See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531, 113 S. Ct.
at 2226–27 (noting that the Court “must consider” the plaintiffs’ free exercise
claim because no question existed as to the plaintiffs’ sincerity and the practice of
27
animal sacrifice was a religious belief); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
185, 85 S. Ct. 850, 863, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965) (describing a court’s
responsibility as deciding whether a plaintiff’s beliefs are “sincerely held” and
religious) (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86, 64 S. Ct. 882, 886, 88
L. Ed. 1148 (1944)); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[T]he First Amendment . . . requires [a court] to determine whether the asserted
belief . . . is religious and sincerely held.”); Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499,
1504 (11th Cir. 1987) (“A claimant meets this initial burden, therefore, if he or she
proves that the beliefs are truly held and religious in nature.”); Sutton v. Rasheed,
323 F.3d 236, 251 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Only beliefs which are both sincerely held and
religious in nature are protected under the First Amendment.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[O]nly
sincerely held beliefs which are ‘rooted in religion’ are protected by the free
exercise clause.” (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment
Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 713, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1429, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624
(1981))); Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (“This two-pronged
command expressly delineates the contours of our inquiry – beliefs must be
sincerely held and religious in nature to be accorded first amendment protection.”)
(footnote omitted); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting
28
“two basic criteria” for free exercise protection: (1) that the proffered belief be
“sincerely held” and (2) that the claim be rooted in religious belief and not secular
concerns). In other words, in order for Watts to plead a proper free exercise claim,
his complaint must not only allege sincerity of belief but also the religious
character of that belief.
As the majority notes, the Supreme Court recently articulated the pleading
standard applicable in the Rule 12(b)(6) context in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, __ U.S. __, __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964– 65 (2007). Under the current
pleading regime, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory grounds for relief.
See id. at 1964–65 (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels or conclusions . . . . ” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Any “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” will not pass 12(b)(6) muster. Id. at 1965. For our purposes, then, in order
to survive a motion to dismiss, Watts must allege facts pertaining to both his
sincerity and the religious character of his belief that are sufficient to raise his
right to relief “above the speculative level.” Id. These alleged facts, of course, are
viewed in the light most favorable to Watts. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist.,
446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir. 2006).
29
My dissent from the majority’s determination that Watts pleaded facts
sufficient for a free exercise claim arises not so much from what was said, but
rather, what was left unsaid. To the extent that the majority finds that Watts
alleged facts that render it plausible that he acted on the basis of a sincere belief, I
have no quibble. At the pleading stage, the sincerity requirement for a valid free
exercise claim is a subjective question best left for the broader and closer scrutiny
possible in later proceedings. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381, 75
S. Ct. 392, 396, 99 L. Ed. 428 (1955) (describing the sincerity analysis in
conscientious objector cases as “purely a subjective question”). Because the
question of whether a plaintiff alleges a sincere belief is subjective – i.e., we
assess sincerity with reference to the individual plaintiff’s state of mind – absent
the unlikely event of contravening facts in the complaint itself, viewing the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will normally
survive 12(b)(6) dismissal regarding the sincerity prong. The subjectivity of the
sincerity question allows a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss simply by
avowing that the given belief is sincere. There are no other facts that Watts need
allege to support a plausible claim of his sincerity under Twombly. See Twombly,
127 S. Ct. at 1965.
30
Although the subjectivity latent in the sincerity analysis may confer a wider
ambit of protection from 12(b)(6) dismissal, the same cannot be said for the
analysis of the religious character of a plaintiff’s beliefs. Unlike the assessment of
a plaintiff’s sincerity, a court’s assessment of whether a plaintiff alleged facts
sufficient to support a claimed religious belief is an objective question. That is,
once we agree that Watts properly alleged a sincere belief, we must ask whether a
reasonable person would deem his professed belief a religious belief. Confronted
by the complaint before us, that assessment requires us to ask whether a
reasonable person1 would accept, without more, that “the belief that a patient who
professes a religion is entitled to be informed if the counselor is aware of a
religious avenue within the patient’s religion that will meet the appropriate therapy
protocol for the patient” is a religious belief, rather than a philosophical or
professional belief. I dissent because I do not believe that Watts alleged sufficient
facts under Twombly to state a religious belief.
Maintaining that a valid free exercise claim must involve a religious belief
may seem an exercise in stating the obvious – but on the facts before us, to ignore
1
I am in full agreement with the majority’s contention that Watts need not plead now, or
present later, objective evidence that “his belief is of the type that a judge would generally
consider to be religious in nature.” Presiding judges do not import their own perspectives onto
an analysis of a plaintiff’s free exercise pleadings.
31
the requirement that the plaintiff’s belief be religious in character would be to set
aside the precise reason for which I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Watts’s claim. Determining what constitutes a “religious” belief is, admittedly, a
delicate process. Despite that difficulty, as the Supreme Court stated in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972), “the very concept
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.” Id. at
215–16, 92 S. Ct. at 1533. It is necessary, then, to maintain the analysis of
whether a plaintiff properly pleaded a religious belief alongside a separate analysis
of the plaintiff’s sincerity. Sincerity is not a euphemism for religious ardor. If that
were the case, any sincere act is sacrosanct – and potentially subject to
constitutional protection. To interpret the First Amendment in such a fashion
would stretch the scope of free exercise claims to an untenable degree.
In maintaining the necessity of following the distinct components of the
constitutional test for a valid free exercise claim – a subjective inquiry as to the
plaintiff’s sincerity and an objective2 inquiry as to whether the belief is religious in
2
A handful of courts have cited to language in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85
S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965), suggesting that the task of a court faced with a free exercise
claim is to determine whether the beliefs are, in the claimant’s “own scheme of things,” religious.
Id. at 185, 85 S. Ct. at 863; see, e.g., Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293
F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1981) (“A
court’s task is to decide whether the beliefs avowed are: (1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in
32
character – I want to be clear as to what I am not maintaining as our free exercise
jurisprudence. I am not suggesting an objective inquiry into the verity or validity
of a plaintiff’s purported religious belief; such speculation has been uniformly
rejected. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714, 101 S. Ct. at 1430 (“[T]he resolution
of [what constitutes a religious belief] is not to turn upon a judicial perception of
the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection.”); Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87, 64 S. Ct. at 887 (“The religious
views espoused by [the plaintiffs] might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to
most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with
finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs
of any sect.”); Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 166 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976)
(noting that federal courts are “powerless . . . to evaluate the logic or validity of
beliefs found religious and sincerely held”);3 Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157 (“It cannot
nature, in the claimant’s scheme of things.”). The focus of the Seeger Court, however, was not
the preclusion of any objective weighing of whether a belief was religious, but rather, an attempt
to harness any extrajudicial weighing of the qualitative worth of any given religion. See Seeger,
380 U.S. at 184–85, 85 S. Ct. 863 (“Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be
put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as
life to some may be incomprehensible to others.” (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
86j, 64 S. Ct. 882, 886, 88 L. Ed. 1148 (1944))).
3
This circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
33
be gainsaid that the judiciary is singularly ill-equipped to sit in judgment on the
verity of an adherent’s religious beliefs.”). There is a distinct difference, however,
between questioning the veracity or reasonableness of a claim and questioning
whether the belief is objectively “religious.” The latter is a foundational
component of determining whether a plaintiff has pleaded a First Amendment free
exercise claim. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216, 92 S. Ct. at 1533 (declaring that if the
Amish plaintiffs asserted their claims due to their rejection of “contemporary
secular values,” such claims would rest on a basis that was “philosophical and
personal rather than religious,” and would “not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses”). It cannot be the case that plaintiffs may go to trial on a free exercise
claim merely by pronouncing that they possess a “sincere and religious belief”
related to an act for which they seek First Amendment protection.
What, then, must a plaintiff plead with regard to the religious character of a
belief in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss? Although no bright-line
rule can exist, free exercise case law offers some insight. The Third Circuit, in
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir.1981), suggested three “useful
indicia” as to what might characterize a religious belief: (1) an engagement with
“fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable
matters”; (2) existence as a component of a “belief-system as opposed to an
34
isolated teaching”; and (3) the possible presence of “certain formal and external
signs.” Africa, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197, 207–10 (3d Cir. 1979). Although these “indicia” certainly do not
represent an exhaustive list of features defining a religious belief, “it is important
to have some objective guidelines in order to avoid Ad hoc justice.” Malnak, 592
F.2d at 210 (emphasis added).
On close questions, determining whether a plaintiff has pleaded a religious
belief will undoubtedly require a nuanced consideration of the complaint.
Naturally, not every complaint setting forth a free exercise claim will require a
particularly searching analysis. For example, a Mormon plaintiff seeking
protection for actions related to a belief that individuals ought to be baptized
posthumously may not need to plead much more than a statement of that belief –
baptism is a well-known theological sacrament. Cf. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834, 109
S. Ct. 1517–18 (concluding that the plaintiff’s refusal to work on Sunday was due
to a religious belief although he was not a member of a particular religious sect).
Other proffered beliefs, however, may present a more tenuous case as to
their religious character. Where a plaintiff alleges a belief that seems to be “far
more the product of a secular philosophy than of a religious orientation,” or where
the motivating concerns appear to be personal or social, rather than “spiritual or
35
other-worldly,” a free exercise claim cannot go forward. Africa, 662 F.2d
1033–34 (arguing that if the plaintiff’s concern that he be given a raw food diet
was considered “religious,” the First Amendment might need to protect a “host of
individuals and organizations who espouse personal and secular ideologies”).
Furthermore, although affiliation with a specific religious denomination or
institution greatly simplifies the question of whether a particular belief is religious,
lack of such membership is not dispositive. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834, 109 S. Ct. at
1517–18 (“[W]e reject the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious
organization.”). That said, however, with closer questions – such as those that are
outside recognized religious denominations or fail to point toward known
theological tenets – a plaintiff, in order to raise plausible grounds for a free
exercise claim, must allege more facts to support that claim.
Turning now to the complaint before us, I cannot say that Watts’s belief that
the Catholic patient he encountered in the spring of 1997 was entitled to hear
“church” among bereavement support group options constitutes a religious belief.
It may very well be the case that Watts is religious; it may very well be that he
often acts upon particular religious beliefs. Membership in a given religious
tradition, however, does not automatically grant the adherents of that religion First
36
Amendment protection. The particular belief Watts alleges must also be religious
in character – but his complaint seems to allege a belief similar to those that could
have been taken from the pages of a professional patient advocacy journal.
The only reference Watts makes to the religious character of his belief is the
conclusory statement that his “religious beliefs include the belief that a patient
who professes a religion is entitled to be informed if the counselor is aware of a
religious avenue within the patient’s religion that will meet the appropriate therapy
protocol for the patient.” This bare assertion would fail even under a broad notice
pleading standard, which we have declared is not so liberal as to encompass
“wholly conclusory allegations.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d
1250, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp.,
289 F.3d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2002) (vacated on other grounds)). That being the
case, a single statement assigning religious motivation to the belief that a patient
ought to be informed of an “appropriate therapy protocol” compatible with the
patient’s religion is clearly insufficient to constitute a viable free exercise claim
under Twombly. The complaint, indeed, later states that “Mr. Watts was
terminated from the Practicum because of private religious speech that was
consistent with his training.” The nominal attachment of religious belief onto an
otherwise secular and professional decision (i.e., the decision to inform a patient
37
of a religious avenue for bereavement counseling) does not issue a carte blanche
for free exercise protection.
In conclusion, I would find no error in the district court’s dismissal of the
free exercise claim in this case. Although our limited window into the facts
suggests that the decision to terminate Watts may have been disproportionate, the
federal courts can provide no remedy for the claims presented, and I would affirm
the district court.
38