Weaver v. Missouri Pacific Railroad

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 97-40784
____________________

RICHARD K. WEAVER,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Doing Business as
Union Pacific Railroad Company; ET AL.,

Defendants,

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Doing Business as
Union Pacific Railroad Company; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas

August 21, 1998
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

Primarily at issue is whether compliance with the Locomotive

Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et. seq. (LIA)(formerly the

Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. § 23 et seq.), and regulations

promulgated thereto, regulating locomotive cabin conditions,

precludes finding negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability

Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. Because the district court did

not err in allowing the jury to consider such negligence, we

AFFIRM.
 I.

Richard Weaver was employed by Missouri Pacific Railroad as

the engineer of a train on the night of 12 June 1996; it was very

warm and humid. Because his locomotive did not have air

conditioning, Weaver opened the window in the cab.

As the train approached Pinehurst, Texas, Weaver noticed a

person standing in the tracks. After the person jumped to avoid

the train, Weaver, using one hand to blow the horn and the other on

the emergency brake valve in anticipation of stopping the train,

turned to see if the person had been hit. As Weaver was doing so,

Einar Ristroph threw a bottle through the open window, striking

Weaver in the head and rendering him unconscious.

Weaver and his wife filed this action against Missouri Pacific

d/b/a Union Pacific Railroad and Union Pacific Railroad

(collectively, the Railroad), claiming that, under the FELA, the

Railroad was negligent in failing to provide a safe place to work;

to warn of the danger that Ristroph posed; to provide air

conditioning for the locomotive; and to arrange the configuration

of locomotives on the train, so that the lead locomotive was

equipped with air conditioning. They also claimed violation of the

LIA, and the regulations promulgated under it, and presented state

law claims against Union Pacific and Ristroph.

In May 1997, in response to the Railroad’s summary judgment

motion, the district court ruled that Union Pacific was Weaver’s

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employer; FELA, his exclusive remedy against it. Consequently, all

of Weaver’s other claims were dismissed. And, because Mrs. Weaver

was not a proper FELA plaintiff, her claims against Union Pacific

were dismissed.

And, concerning Weaver’s FELA claims based upon lack of air

conditioning, protective screens, and ditch lights, the Railroad

had claimed preemption by the LIA. The district court denied

summary judgment on procedural grounds.

At trial, the Railroad moved for judgment as a matter of law,

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 50, contending, again, that Weaver’s

FELA claims were preempted by the LIA; or, at a minimum, that the

allegations could not form the basis for an LIA claim.

Subsequently, Weaver’s motion to dismiss all of the claims arising

out of the LIA was granted. Only his FELA claim was considered by

the jury.

Prior to the jury returning a verdict, Weaver and the Railroad

entered into a settlement agreement, approved by the district

court. It provided that, inter alia, if the jury returned a

verdict exceeding $749,000, Weaver’s recovery was limited to

$750,000, subject to appeal by the Railroad on the issue stated

infra.

The jury found in favor of Weaver, awarding him $1,591,000,

and attributing 95% fault to the Railroad and 5% to Ristroph.

II.

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 As limited by the settlement agreement, and stated in the

district court’s amended judgment, the sole issue is whether “the

District Court erred in allowing the jury to consider the question

of whether the [Railroad] was negligent in not equipping its

locomotive with air conditioning and/or screens because the jury’s

consideration of such conduct is preempted by the Locomotive

Inspection Act (Boiler Inspection Act)”. (Emphasis added.) We

review de novo the denial of judgment as a matter of law, viewing

all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant.

E.g., Hileman v. City of Dallas, Tex., 115 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir.

1997).

For starters, the Railroad concedes that the preemption

doctrine is not at issue; we are addressing the interaction of two

federal statutes. Cf. Texas Manufactured Housing Ass’n v. City of

Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1996) (Congress may

expressly or implicitly preempt state law), cert. denied, 117 S.

Ct. 2497 (1997). We also note that, in its appellate brief, the

Railroad fails to address protective screens, and instead focuses

solely on air conditioning.

The FELA provides, in relevant part:

Every common carrier by railroad engaging in
[interstate commerce] shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering any injury
while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce ... for such injury or death
resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or

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 employees of such carrier, or by reason of any
defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence, in its cars, [and] engines....

45 U.S.C. § 51.

“[T]o prevail under [FELA], a plaintiff must prove that (1)

the defendant is a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate

commerce; (2) he was employed by the defendant with duties

advancing such commerce; (3) his injuries were sustained while he

was so employed; and (4) his injuries resulted from the defendant’s

negligence.” Smith v. Medical and Surgical Clinic Ass’n, 118 F.3d

416, 419 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Fowler v. Seaboard Coastline R.R.

Co., 638 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. Unit B February 1981)), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 1034 (1998). “What constitutes negligence for

[FELA’S] purposes is a federal question, not varying in accordance

with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state

and local laws for other purposes. Federal decisional law

formulating and applying the concept governs.” Urie v. Thompson,

337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949).

The Railroad contends that the LIA and its regulations

regarding locomotive cabin temperature and ventilation conditions

“totally occup[y] the field” of locomotive safety, pretermitting

liability under FELA for not installing the air conditioners and/or

protective screens.

The LIA provides, in relevant part:

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 A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used
a locomotive or tender on its railroad line
only when the locomotive or tender and its
parts and appurtenances—

(1) are in proper condition and
safe to operate without unnecessary
danger of personal injury;

(2) have been inspected as required
under this chapter and regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of
Transportation under this chapter;
and

(3) can withstand every test
prescribed by the Secretary under
this chapter.

49 U.S.C. § 20701.

Pursuant to the LIA, the Federal Railroad Administration

promulgated regulations establishing standards for locomotives.

The regulations at issue provide, in part: “[c]ab windows of the

lead locomotive shall provide an undistorted view of the right-of-

way for the crew from their normal position in the cab”, 49 C.F.R.

§ 229.119(b); and “[t]he cab shall be provided with proper

ventilation and with a heating arrangement that maintains a

temperature of at least 50 degrees Fahrenheit 6 inches above the

center of each seat in the cab”, 49 C.F.R. § 229.119(d)(1998).

The regulations do not require air conditioning and/or protective

screens.

The Railroad contends that, having complied with the

regulations regarding temperature and windows, and in that those

regulations do not require air conditioning and/or protective

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screens, its conduct cannot be considered negligent. In other

words, because the Railroad complied with these regulations, then,

according to the Railroad, the district court erred by allowing the

jury to consider negligence under FELA.

Interpreting the LIA’s predecessor, the BIA, our court has

stated that it “‘is a safety statute which is to be liberally

construed to afford protection to railroad employees’”. Gregory v.

Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 32 F.3d 160, 161 (5th Cir. 1994)

(quoting Oglesby v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 606

(9th Cir. 1993)). Moreover, commenting in Urie on the relationship

between the FELA and the BIA, the Supreme Court stated:

[T]he Safety Appliance Acts, together with the
Boiler Inspection Act, are substantively if
not in form amendments to the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act. They dispense, for
the purposes of employees’ suits, with the
necessity of proving that violations of the
safety statutes constitute negligence; and
making proof of such violations is effective
to show negligence as a matter of law. Thus
taken, as has been the consistent practice,
the Boiler Inspection Act ... cannot be
regarded as [a] statute[] wholly separate from
and independent of the Federal Employers’
Liability Act. They are rather supplemental
to it, having the purpose and effect of
facilitating employee recovery, not of
restricting such recovery or making it
impossible.

Urie, 337 U.S. at 1034.

Weaver asserted in his complaint that the Railroad should have

provided him with air conditioning and/or protective window screens

to protect him from known dangers. He presented evidence at trial

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that, during the period 1992-1996, there were 698 reported

shootings or stonings of Union Pacific Railroad locomotives, with

the greatest frequency from April through September. At the time

of Weaver’s injury, it was 90 degrees and very humid. And, at that

time, approximately 1000-1500 of the Railroad’s 4500 locomotives

were equipped with air conditioning.

The LIA regulations relied upon by the Railroad are not

premised on providing safety from such dangers; rather, their focus

is on ensuring proper ventilation, a minimum temperature, and an

undistorted view. See 49 C.F.R. § 229.119(b)(d)(1998). Restated,

compliance with these regulations, in the light of the evidence

presented at trial regarding the known dangers presented to

locomotive engineers traveling through the southern States in the

summer, does not address the safety of those engineers from known

dangers, such as stonings. In sum, in this regard, the LIA and

accompanying regulations do not totally occupy the field regarding

locomotive safety.

Accordingly, on the facts in this case, compliance with the

LIA and the accompanying regulations is not determinative of

negligence under FELA. See e.g., Mosco v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,

817 F.2d 1088, 1092 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987)

(Although plaintiff had no viable BIA claim, “it is possible that

he might have stated a meritorious FELA claim based on the same

facts.”). Therefore, on these facts, the district court did not

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err in allowing the jury to consider, under FELA, whether the

Railroad was negligent in not equipping its locomotive with air

conditioning and/or protective screens.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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