White v. United States Probation Office

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided July 28, 1998

No. 97-5353

Larry N. White,

Appellant

v.

United States Probation Office, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv0183)

---------

On Motion for Summary Affirmance

---------

Larry N. White, pro se.

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, R. Craig Law-
rence, Assistant United States Attorney, and Stephen R.
Martin II, Special Assistant United States Attorney, were on
the motion for summary affirmance for the appellees.

Before: Williams, Ginsburg, and Randolph, Circuit
Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: The main question presented by this appeal is
whether a claim for damages under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
s 552(a), can be brought by a federal prisoner in order
collaterally to attack his sentence. We hold that such a claim
is not cognizable under the Privacy Act unless the sentence
has been invalidated in a prior proceeding.

After Larry N. White was convicted of conspiracy to pos-
sess and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846, he
brought this action under the Privacy Act claiming that the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the U.S. Parole Commis-
sion, and certain individuals refused to correct inaccurate
statements in his presentence report regarding the applicable
law under which he was sentenced. White claims that as a
result of this inaccuracy, he is ineligible for parole and is
required to serve more time in prison than he would have if
he had been sentenced under the appropriate law. He seeks
damages and an order directing the BOP to amend its
records. In dismissing the action, the district court noted
that White previously challenged his sentence on direct ap-
peal, see U.S. v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1990), and in
motions to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2255,
and stated that it was "unaware of any authority that would
sanction plaintiff's use of the Privacy Act to attack collaterally
the actions of the sentencing court."

The Privacy Act permits a suit for damages if an agency's
violation of s 552a(e)(5) results in a determination adverse to
the individual. See 5 U.S.C. ss 552a(g)(1)(C), (g)(4). The
Act also gives an individual the right to request amendment
of his records. 5 U.S.C. s 552a(d). Under regulations, how-
ever, presentence reports and BOP inmate records systems
are exempt from the amendment provisions of the Act. See
28 C.F.R. ss 16.51(c), 16.97(a); Deters v. United States Pa-
role Comm'n, 85 F.3d 655, 658 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Accord-

ingly, White is barred from seeking amendment of his presen-
tence report.

Nor is White entitled to money damages for the alleged
"inaccuracies" in calculating his sentence. He does not allege
that there are inaccurate factual statements in the presen-
tence report, see Deters, 85 F.3d at 660; Sellers v. Bureau of
Prisons, 959 F.2d 307, 309-10 (D.C. Cir. 1992); rather he
essentially contests that portion of the report consisting of
legal conclusions that aided the sentencing court in computing
the length of his sentence. As a result, his complaint must be
viewed as a challenge to the duration of his sentence. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the
Supreme Court held that a claim for damages under 42
U.S.C. s 1983 that challenges the fact or duration of a
prisoner's conviction or confinement is not cognizable unless
that conviction or confinement has been invalidated in a
separate proceeding. A plaintiff who seeks to recover dam-
ages for allegedly unconstitutional confinement (or any other
harm caused by actions the unlawfulness of which would
render his sentence invalid) must prove that the sentence has
been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive or-
der, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. The
rationale of Heck has been applied to damage claims against
federal officials in actions under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), see Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1340 (D.C. Cir.
1996), and to a claim for damages brought by a state prisoner
challenging the validity of disciplinary proceedings used to
deprive him of good-time credits, thereby delaying his re-
lease, see Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1588-89 (1997).

We conclude that White's suit, which seeks damages in
conjunction with a challenge to the length of his confinement,
is governed by Preiser and Heck. Because a judgment in
favor of White on his challenge to the legal conclusions in his

presentence report would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his sentence, which has not been invalidated in a prior
proceeding, his complaint for damages under the Privacy Act
must be dismissed. Accordingly, the motion for summary
affirmance is

Granted.