Wilkerson v. Stalder

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 14, 2003
_____________________________________
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 02-30516 Clerk
_____________________________________

ROBERT KING WILKERSON; ALBERT WOODFOX; HERMAN WALLACE

Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

RICHARD L. STALDER; ET AL

Defendants

RICHARD L. STALDER; BURL CAIN; TOM NORRIS; RICHARD PEABODY; R.
RACHAL; SAM SMITH; PAUL J. MYERS

Defendants - Appellants

__________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
__________________________________________________

Before KING, Chief Judge, DAVIS, Circuit Judge and ROSENTHAL*,
District Judge.

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

I.

Louisiana State Penitentiary officials challenge the

district court’s order denying in part their Motion to Dismiss on

grounds of qualified immunity a § 1983 suit filed against them

*
District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
by three inmates. The district court ruled that the evidence,

when viewed in a light most favorable to the inmates, showed that

the prison officials violated due process rights secured to the

inmates under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the law was

clearly established at the time of the violation. For the

reasons provided below, we affirm the district court’s denial of

the prison officials’ Motion to Dismiss.

II.

Robert Wilkerson, Albert Woodfox and Herman Wallace

(collectively “inmates”) sued a number of prison officials and

alleged that their confinement in extended lockdown for

approximately thirty years violates the Eighth Amendment’s

guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. They further

alleged that the “sham” reviews of their continued confinement in

extended lockdown violate their right to procedural due process

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The inmates sought

compensatory damages, punitive damages, and declaratory and

injunctive relief.

Before 1972, the inmates were sentenced to the custody of

the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

(“Corrections”) and were confined at the Louisiana State

Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana (“Angola”). The inmates named

as defendants seven officials, including the Secretary of

Corrections, the Warden and Deputy Warden of Angola, and other

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corrections officers (collectively “prison officials”).

Prison officials placed the inmates in extended lockdown in

1972. Wallace remains in lockdown. Wilkerson remained in

extended lockdown until his conviction was overturned in 2001.

Woodfox remains in extended lockdown and has been there

continuously except for a three year period when he was housed in

the county jail.

As the magistrate judge explained:

Extended lockdown is the effective equivalent
of solitary confinement. Prisoners in
extended lockdown remain alone in a cell
approximately 55 to 60 square feet in size of
[sic] 23 hours each day. One hour each day,
the prisoner may shower and walk along the
tier on which his cell is located. Three
times a week, weather permitting, the
prisoner may use this hour to exercise alone
in a fenced yard. Additional restrictions
are placed on generally available inmate
privileges including those pertaining to
personal property, reading materials, access
to legal resources, work and contact
visitation.

In contrast, inmates in the general prison
population live in a dormitory setting where
they can interact with one another. They
have educational opportunities, training and
other privileges that are not available to
inmates in extended lockdowm.

The inmates in extended lockdown appear before the Lockdown

Review Board (“Board”) every 90 days. The inmates allege that

they received only “sham” reviews before the Board. The inmates

insist that the Board members discussed immaterial matters such

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as hunting and fishing rather than the inmates’ cases. The

inmates alleged that when they attempted to discuss the merits of

their cases, a Board member told them that the Board hearing is

not the place to litigate. The inmates also alleged that the

Board members told them that they must remain in extended

lockdown due to the “nature of original reason for lockdown. ”

The inmates originally filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against the prison officials in a Louisiana state

district court. The prison officials removed the suit to

federal district court. Stalder, Cain and Norris promptly

filed a Motion to Dismiss and asserted qualified immunity.1

After being released from prison, Wilkerson filed an unopposed

motion to dismiss his claims for injunctive relief.

The prison officials’ motion was submitted to a magistrate

judge. In her report, the magistrate judge recommended that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be denied.2

The prison officials filed a timely Objection to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report, but the district court issued a ruling

adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report as the court’s opinion.

The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s analysis

1
The prison officials did not move to dismiss the inmates’
Eighth Amendment claim, so that claim remains in the trial court.
2
The magistrate judge recommended (and the district court
accepted that recommendation) that the suit against the Secretary
of Corrections be dismissed because of his lack of direct
involvement in providing process to the inmates.

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and denied the prison officials’ Motion to Dismiss on grounds of

qualified immunity. Applying Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472

(1995), the district court concluded that the confinement in

extended lockdown for the long duration experienced by these

prisoners presented an “atypical and significant hardship” and

“extraordinary circumstances” such that the pleadings established

that a liberty interest was implicated. The district court also

concluded that no reasonable officer could believe that such

confinement for an extended period of time approaching three

decades was not atypical under Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit

standards. The prison officials filed a timely notice of appeal.

III.

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial

of the prison officials’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion under the

collateral order doctrine. See Morin v. Caire,77 F.3d 116, 119

(5th Cir. 1996). We review the district court’s refusal to

dismiss the inmates’ Fourteenth Amendment claim on the basis of

qualified immunity de novo. See Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120

(5th Cir. 1996). Id. at 120.

IV.

In their appeal, the prison officials ask us to reverse the

portion of the district court’s ruling that denies them qualified

immunity on the inmates’ federal due process claim, state due

process claim, and claim for punitive damages. The only issue

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that requires discussion is the inmates’ Fourteenth Amendment due

process claim.3

A.

“Government officials performing discretionary functions

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

court must engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether an

official is entitled to qualified immunity. First, the court

must determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations make out a

violation of a clearly established constitutional right. If such

a right is shown, the court must determine if the right was

clearly established at the time of the events in question.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

B.

The inmates argue that the district court correctly applied

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), to the facts in this case.

In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that no state-created liberty

interest was implicated when an inmate was placed in

3
The inmates’ state due process claim follows the federal
due process claim. The district court chose to defer ruling on the
prison officials’ claim that the Prison Litigation Reform Act bars
the inmates’ claim for punitive damages until such time as
liability is found. Therefore, this issue is not properly before
the court on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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administrative segregation for thirty days for disciplinary

reasons. The Court explained:

Following Wolff, we recognize that States may
under certain circumstances create liberty
interests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause. But these interests will be
generally limited to freedom from restraint
which, while not exceeding the sentence in
such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its
own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.

Id. at 483-84.

The district court concluded that the State had imposed

“atypical and significant hardship” on these inmates sufficient

to implicate a liberty interest. The prison officials’ 12(b)(6)

motion was, of course, presented to the district court without

contextual facts concerning the reasons the inmates were

initially confined to extended lockdown or why they remained

confined in extended lockdown for such an inordinate period of

time. At argument, counsel informed us that Wallace and Woodfox

were placed in extended lockdown after being convicted in state

court of killing a prison guard. Wilkerson was placed in

extended lockdown after being convicted in state court of killing

a fellow inmate, and he was released from Angola after his

conviction was overturned in 2001. Assuming counsel’s

uncontradicted statement at oral argument is true, we surmise

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that the three inmates, following their convictions, were likely

classified as maximum custody inmates under the Louisiana

Department of Public Safety and Corrections regulations.4

Louisiana Dep’t of Public Safety and Corrections, Inmate

Classification, Sentencing, and Service Functions, § 5(C)(3)

(June 1998).

In resolving the nature of the liberty interest and the

process that is due for confinement of prisoners in extended

lockdown under these circumstances, it is crucial to know

whether, based on their crimes of conviction, the inmates’

confinement is the result of an initial classification by prison

officials as opposed to confinement for violations of less

serious prison disciplinary rules. Generally, courts are not

concerned with a prisoner’s initial classification level based on

4
“Maximum Custody” is defined as:
Assignment of an inmate to a cell based
upon the need to protect the inmate, other
inmates, the public, staff or the institution.
This includes temporary assignment to
Administrative Segregation or permanent
assignment to Disciplinary Detention/Extended
Lockdown and Working Cellblock and may include
Protective Custody/Extended Lockdown.

Louisiana Dep’t of Public Safety and Corrections, Inmate
Classification, Sentencing, and Service Functions, § 5(C)(3) (June
1998).

The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections has
developed a set of regulations to address “Inmate Classification,
Sentencing, and Service Functions” and an entirely different set of
regulations to address “Disciplinary Rules and Procedures for Adult
Inmates.”

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his criminal history before his incarceration. This circuit has

continued to hold post-Sandin that an inmate has no protectable

liberty interest in his classification. See Harper v. Showers,

174 F.3d (716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999); Whitley v. Hunt; 158 F.3d

882, 889 (5th Cir. 1998); Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581-82

(5th Cir. 1995) (citing Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909, 911

(5th Cir. 1983)) ("Classification of inmates in Louisiana is a

duty of the Louisiana Department of Corrections and an inmate has

no right to a particular classification under state law.").

“Classification of prisoners is a matter left to the discretion

of prison officials.” McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1250 (5th

Cir. 1990) (citing Wilkerson v. Maggio, supra). “[I]t is well

settled that ‘[p]rison officials must have broad discretion, free

from judicial intervention, in classifying prisoners in terms of

their custodial status’” Id. “Prison officials should be accorded

the widest possible deference in the application of policies and

practices designed to maintain security and preserve internal

order.” Id. at 1251 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547

(1979)).

Thus, if the inmates’ confinement in extended lockdown is

not the result of their initial classification, the Sandin test

would be triggered. In Sandin, the prisoner, Conner, directed

angry and foul language at a prison guard during a strip search.

As a result, he was placed in disciplinary segregation for thirty

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days as punishment for violating prison disciplinary rules.

Conner argued that he had a state-created liberty interest in

remaining free from segregation. The Court held that Conner’s

confinement in disciplinary segregation for thirty days “did not

present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a

State might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin at

486. Although the action taken by the prison officials was

punitive, it did not “present a dramatic departure from the basic

conditions of Conner’s indeterminate sentence.” Id. The Court

noted that the conditions imposed on Conner were essentially the

same as those imposed on inmates in administrative segregation

and protective custody. “Thus, Conner’s confinement did not

exceed, similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either

duration or degree of restriction.” Id. Other circuits have

applied the Sandin test to inmates placed in administrative

segregation for violations of prison disciplinary rules. Wagner

v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1997); Colon v. Howard, 215

F.3d 227 (2nd Cir. 2000); Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d

846 (1999); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (1997).

If, on remand, the district court determines that the Sandin

test is triggered, the district court must determine the

appropriate baseline against which to measure the inmates’

confinement in reviewing whether the inmates’ confinement is

“atypical.” See Hatch v. Columbia, supra; Wagner v. Hanks,

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supra.

Because the inmates’ Complaint does not allege whether the

inmates’ confinement in extended lockdown resulted from their

initial classification or from violations of prison rules, we

cannot determine whether the inmates have asserted facts that

would give rise to denial of a liberty interest. We therefore

AFFIRM the district court’s Order denying the prison officials’

Motion to Dismiss the inmates’ procedural due process claims

based on qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED.

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