A collision occurred between a motorcycle and an automobile at the crossing of Capps street, running east and west, and Jennings avenue, running north and south, two public streets of the city of Fort Worth. Woody McKesson was driving the motorcycle, and Raymond Adams was riding on the rear seat of the machine and was killed in the accident. H. A. Williams was driving the automobile.
Raymond Adams was survived by his parents, W. R. Adams and wife, Cornelia Adams, who recovered a judgment against Williams for the sum of $3,000, based on allegations in plaintiffs’ petition and findings of the jury that the collision and death of their son was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant, Williams, in certain particulars not necessary to be stated in view of our conclusions hereinafter shown. Williams has appealed.
In addition to a general and special denial of the allegations- in plaintiffs’ petition, defendant specially pleaded a written contract of settlement which was executed by the parties to the suit on the day after the accident, which was introduced in evidence and is as follows:
“Fort Worth, Texas, April 19th, 1933.
“In the accident in which a motorcycle crashed into the front part of the automo*952bile owned and operated by H. A. Williams, in which accident Raymond Adams was killed, it has been agreed, that while said Williams does not agree that he was responsible for any phase of said accident, in view of the impoverished and unfortunate family, he has agreed to pay funeral expenses of said Adams, provided the parents and kin agree to release him from any and all liability in the cause and circumstances of his death.
“Witnesses:
“Mrs. M. W. Reid
“[Signed] H. A. Williams,
“This 20th day of April, 1933.
‘Mrs. S. W. Ray W. R. Adams “Mrs. W. R. Adams.”
The evidence shows that defendant performed his obligation in that contract.
By supplemental petition, plaintiffs alleged that they executed that contract not knowing that it was a release, and were induced to sign the same by representations made to them by the defendant that the instrument was merely a statement that plaintiffs would not institute a criminal prosecution against him for killfilg -their son.
Following is the only issue submitted to the jury bearing on that defense, with the finding of the jury thereon:
“Special Issue No. 31:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Adams, signed the release which has been introduced in evidence in this casé that they signed the same without full knowledge of the contents of said instrument ?
“Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
“Answer: Yes.”
The court refused to submit the following special issues that were requested by the plaintiffs:
“10. Was the release signed by the plaintiffs herein intended by them to be a full and complete settlement and discharge of all liabilities of the defendant? Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
“11. Did the defendant, H. A. Williams, when presenting the release to the plaintiffs tell them that it was an agreement not to prosecute him on a criminal charge ? Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.
“12. If you have found that the defendant did tell the plaintiffs that the release signed by them was an agreement not to prosecute him on a criminal charge did plaintiffs believe the statement so made by the defendant and rely upon the same? Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.”
But plaintiffs have not filed any cross assignment of error here to that action of the court and therefore are in no position to complain of that ruling, since it cannot be said that the refusal of those requested issues presents fundamental error. 3 Tex.Jur. § 569, p. 802. Furthermore, it is shown by uncontradicted testimony that plaintiffs were given ample opportunity to read the agreement before they signed it.
According to the well-settled rule of law announced in 10 Tex.Jur. § 57, page 98, and 30 Tex.Jur. § 10, p. 806, and section 11, p. 807, and the multitude of decisions cited in support of the text, the finding of the jury, that plaintiffs signed the release “without full knowledge of the contents of the instrument,” was insufficient to avoid the force of that contract as a complete bar to their suit.
Accordingly, we sustain the assignment of error to the refusal of the trial court to render a judgment in favor of the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. Hence, the judgment in plaintiffs’ favor is reversed and judgment is here rendered denying plaintiffs the relief prayed for, without the determination of the merits of other assignments of error, which is unnecessary.