OPINION OP THE COURT BY
• This is a suit in equity for the rescission and cancellation of two certain deeds. The history of the transaction sought to he annulled is as follows so far as it is necessary to now refer to it. On and prior to April 17, 1886, Carrie Kaaukai was the owner of a certain tract of land situated at Kainakela, Honolulu, Oahu, described in B. P. 1969, L. C. A. 863; that at the same time the Rt. Bev. Dr. Herman Kockemann, Bishop of Olba, Yicar Apostolic of the Hawaiian Islands, as trustee for the Catholic Church of the Hawaiian Islands, was the owner of a certain tract of land situated at Kamakela, Honolulu, Oahu, the same being apaña 3 of B. P. 1985, L. C. A. 6245; that upon the said 17th day of April, 1886, each of said parties transferred to the other his or her lot by separate deeds for the consideration expressed in each deed of $1000. Each of the deeds purports to convey a fee simple title to the grantee and each contains full covenants of warranty. The complainants herein are the successors in interest of the said Carrie Kaaukai and the respondent herein is the successor in interest of the said Bishop Kockemann.
It is alleged in the bill of complaint that prior to the 17th day of April, 1886, it was mutually covenanted, understood and agreed between the parties to exchange their lands and that the deeds executed and delivered hv
' The purpose of this suit is to have a rescission of the transaction because of the mistake above set forth which the complainants claim operates as a legal fraud upon them. There is no allegation in the bill of complaint of actual fraud or of any intentional misrepresentation against the respondent or his predecessor. In fact the allegations in the bill expressly negative any such impli
The respondent interposed a demurrer to the bill of complaint which was sustained by the court below on the ground that the complainants have a full, adequate and complete remedy at law. From this decision complainants have appealed to this court and now urge (1) that the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer upon the above ground for the reason that the contract was made under a mutual mistake of a material fact; (2) where there is no actual fraud but a mutual mistake is shown it is equivalent to fraud in law, and (3) where there has been a breach of covenants by one party in the agreement to exchange property the other party may rescind the exchange.
The rule we think is that where a contract for the sale of land has been executed by an act of conveyance a court of equity will not rescind the contract on account of the mere defect of title except in a case of fraud or some other recognized equitable ground but will leave the party to his remedy upon the covenants in his deed. (Woodruff v. Bunce, 9 Paige 442, 443; Hart v. R. R., 65 Mo. 509; Beebe v. Swartwout, 8 Ill. 162, 185.) And in order to constitute a ground for a rescission of the contract because of fraudulent misrepresentations the misrepresentations must be of fact and not of law for a misrepresentation or mistake of law will not vitiate a contract where there is no misrepresentation of the facts. (See 10 Ency. U. S. Rep. 804; 1 Story Ch. 129, 25, 26; 20 Cyc. 19, 54; Burt v. Bowles, 69 Ind. 1; Ward v. Luneen, 25 Ill. App. 160.)
It cannot be doubted that there was a mutual mistake in reference to the title or ownership of a part of the land transferred to Mrs. Kaaukai but that the mistake was entirely one of law and not of fact is clearly shown by the records and the opinions of this court in Boeynaems v. Ah Leong, 21 Haw. 699, and Nahaolelua v. Heen, 20 Haw. 372; 613. These cases turn entirely on questions of law, no facts whatever being involved.
Long prior to the institution of this suit the transaction was completely executed. There is no allegation that the respondent is insolvent nor is there any allegation of actual fraud or of a mutual mistake of any material fact or any misrepresentation in respect thereto amounting to fraud, and of course.this cause cannot be maintained upon the theory that it was instituted to prevent a multiplicity of suits. In other words, there is nothing in the complaint which places the cause upon any of the known grounds calling for equitable interference. It seems plain to us that this is a case where the complainants have a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law for breach of the covenant of Warranty contained in the deed from Bishop Kockemann to Carrie Kaaukai.
The decree below sustaining the demurrer of respondent is affirmed.