Williams v. Commonwealth

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, 1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan,
Koontz, and Kinser, JJ.

CARL LEE WILLIAMS
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 990774 March 3, 2000

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

In this appeal, we consider whether police officers

violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures and whether the evidence

was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for

murder, robbery, and statutory burglary.

I.

A grand jury in the City of Richmond indicted Carl Lee

Williams for the following offenses: murder in violation of

Code § 18.2-32, robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58, and

statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91. Williams

was tried at a bench trial in the Circuit Court for the City

of Richmond and found guilty of the charged offenses. The

circuit court fixed his punishment as follows: life

imprisonment for the murder conviction, life imprisonment for

the robbery conviction, and 20 years imprisonment for the

statutory burglary conviction. Williams appealed the circuit

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Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision
of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on
February 2, 2000.
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the

circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence

obtained from a warrantless search and seizure of his boots

that were in the possession of the Sheriff of the City of

Richmond. Williams also argued that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions. The Court of Appeals

affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, Williams v.

Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 297, 512 S.E.2d 133 (1999), and

Williams appeals.

II.

On Sunday morning, November 3, 1996, the victim, Leslie

Anne Coughenour, left her home in Henrico County and went to a

law office, where she was employed, at 416 West Franklin

Street in the City of Richmond. Coughenour had informed her

roommate, Andrea Melillo, that Coughenour would return to

their home on Sunday evening. When Melillo arrived at their

home about 8:00 p.m. that evening, she was concerned because

Coughenour was not there. Melillo made a telephone call to

Coughenour's office, but no one answered the telephone.

Around 10:30 p.m., Melillo went to Coughenour's office,

but she was unable to enter the building. Melillo observed

Coughenour's car parked in front of the building. Melillo

placed a note on the car, returned to her home, and waited for

Coughenour to arrive.

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 Sometime after midnight, Melillo placed a telephone call

to the Richmond Police Department, and it dispatched a police

officer who met her at Coughenour's office around 1:00 a.m.

The police officer checked the exterior of the building and

found nothing unusual.

Melillo returned to her home, and she made a telephone

call to a friend, who contacted Coughenour's employer, Carolyn

Carpenter. Carpenter met Richmond police officer Charles A.

Bishop and another officer at the building about 3:25 a.m.

Monday morning, November 4, 1996. When they entered the

building, they learned that the office alarm system was not

activated. However, an inner set of doors, which should have

been locked, was unlocked. The doors to a cabinet were open,

and certain items had been removed.

The officers walked up a stairway to the second floor of

the building. Officer Bishop opened the door to a storage

room, examined the room using his flashlight, and found

Coughenour's body situated in a swivel chair, which was tied

to a radiator. The body was bound to the chair with two sets

of ligatures. The victim's hands were tied to the chair, and

her ankles were also bound. The victim's head was covered

with a scarf. A plastic bag, which contained a rubber ball,

had been placed in the victim's mouth so tightly that the bag

filled the entire outer part of the victim's oral cavity. The

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victim's throat had been slashed. The victim's right wrist

had been cut, and a number of tendons and the radial artery

had been severed. Carpet on the floor below the victim's

right hand was soaked with blood. The victim had contusions

and abrasions to her head and had suffered a hemorrhage to her

brain caused by the infliction of blows to the side of her

head. She had bruises on her arm. Dr. Glen R. Groben, a

medical examiner, testified that the cause of Coughenour's

death was asphyxiation, with bleeding from the wrist as a

contributing factor. He opined that her death would have

occurred within three to five minutes after the plastic bag

had been forced into her mouth.

Melillo testified that when Coughenour left their home

about 11:45 a.m. on November 3, she had about ten dollars in

cash. She was wearing a gold rope chain bracelet, a gold

herringbone necklace, and a gold diamond and sapphire ring.

She also wore a diamond earring in her left ear and other

assorted earrings in both ears and a "Mickey Mouse" watch.

She had in her possession a laptop computer and a black and

gold Central Fidelity bank card which bore her name. The card

could be used to access a joint account that Coughenour and

Melillo shared. The police officers did not find any of these

items at the murder scene.

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 An examination of the crime scene revealed that a window

in a men's restroom on the second floor of the building had

been broken. The window is adjacent to a fire escape. Broken

glass from the window had been placed in a trashcan in the

restroom. Occupants of the office building testified that the

window had not been in that condition on the Friday before

Coughenour's death. Additionally, a hole had been "knocked

in" a wall adjoining the room where the victim's body was

found. This damage did not exist on the Friday before the

victim's body was found. Tenants of the building reported

that two laptop computers, a computer printer, a black

portable compact disc player which contained a compact disc

entitled "Classical Cuts," a Rolodex address and telephone

card index, a small pair of Bushnell brand binoculars, a

small, folding multi-purpose tool, and $50 in cash were

missing.

The police investigators found an imprint of the bottom

of a boot on a plywood wall panel near the top of the stairs

on the second floor. Forensic detectives removed this piece

of plywood from the wall and forwarded it to a forensic

laboratory for an analysis.

On Saturday night, November 2, 1996, the evening before

Coughenour was last seen alive, Cherry A. Wright had a party

at her apartment in the Gilpin Court housing development in

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Richmond. Several persons, including the defendant, attended

the party. According to Wright, everyone was "drinking and

doing cocaine." The defendant became "frustrated" and "angry"

because he did not have any cocaine or money to purchase

cocaine. The defendant removed some of his clothing and

traded it for $10 or $15 worth of cocaine. Williams left

Wright's apartment at 2:00 a.m., November 3, 1996.

Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. on November 3, the defendant

returned to Wright's apartment. When she opened the door, the

defendant asked if she was alone. When she responded yes, he

entered her apartment and told her that he had a box he wished

to place in her closet. He also had a "liquor box" and a

compact disc player. Williams asked Wright did she "want to

party," he "pulled out some cocaine," "[h]e pulled out a

watch," and "he had a ring on his finger." He also had "a wad

of money." The ring that he was wearing looked like the ring

that had been taken from Coughenour. The defendant gave

Wright $25, a small quantity of cocaine, and a "Mickey Mouse"

watch which looked like Coughenour's watch. The portable

compact disc player that the defendant had taken to Wright's

apartment was similar to the compact disc player that had been

taken from the murder scene, and the compact disc player

contained a compact disc entitled "Classical Cuts," the

identical name of the compact disc that had been taken from

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the murder scene. The defendant also had a small pair of

Bushnell brand binoculars and a small hand tool that resembled

similar items removed from the building where the murder

occurred.

On Wednesday, November 6, 1996, the defendant returned to

Wright's apartment and told her "he was broke and that he

needed some more money . . . to get high." He directed her to

retrieve the box which he had hidden in her closet. He opened

the box, which contained two laptop computers and a computer

printer.

Wright's son, William Wright, found a black and gold

Central Fidelity bank card in Wright's apartment. When the

defendant saw that Wright's son had the card, the defendant

took the card and stated that "I thought I got rid of this."

Wright also observed that the defendant had a small card with

telephone numbers which resembled the Rolodex address and

telephone card that had been taken from the building where the

victim worked.

Cynthia Lafawn Tyler, a resident of the Gilpin Court

housing development, saw the defendant "a day or two" after

November 2, 1996. The defendant had a compact disc player

that she wanted to buy, but the defendant would not sell it to

her. The defendant reached in his pocket, "pulled out his own

[cocaine] and his own money. He flashed it." Tyler testified

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that the defendant's actions meant that he had his own money

and cocaine and that he did not need her money. The defendant

had a "Mickey Mouse" watch and a ring that looked like the

victim's ring. The defendant asked Tyler to take him to a 7-

Eleven store on Chamberlayne Avenue in Richmond because he

wanted to use an ATM machine that did not have a video camera

that recorded automated transactions. Someone used

Coughenour's ATM card to obtain $300 in cash, from the account

the victim shared with Melillo, utilizing ATM machines,

including the ATM machine at the 7-Eleven store where Tyler

had taken the defendant.

Guy Lee Robinson, another resident of the Gilpin Court

housing development, gave the defendant $150 worth of cocaine

in return for one of the laptop computers and a printer.

Robinson saw the "Mickey Mouse" watch that the defendant had

given to Wright. Later, Robinson's sister-in-law acquired the

watch. Robinson destroyed the watch and threw the computer

and printer in a creek when he learned that the defendant may

have taken these items from the building where Coughenour's

body was found.

The defendant was arrested for a parole violation and

placed in a jail. When he was released from jail, the

defendant had a conversation with Wright. Wright informed him

that people in the neighborhood had been talking and asking

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questions; so she asked him whether he had anything to do with

the lawyer. The defendant said "that it had to do — [do you]

want to know what happened with the lawyer?" Wright said no.

On November 30, 1996, the defendant was incarcerated at

the Richmond City Jail on an unrelated charge. When he was

processed as a prisoner, he was relieved of his property,

including his clothing, a strip search was conducted, and an

inventory was taken of his property. The only items that he

was allowed to keep were his socks and underwear.

In accordance with the Richmond Sheriff's policies and

procedures, each prisoner's property is placed in a separate

bag, and the prisoner's initials are affixed to the bag. A

prisoner does not have free access to the property. Fifteen

officers who work in the jail's quartermaster section have

access to any property seized from prisoners. The property is

returned to a prisoner when the prisoner is released from

custody. Lieutenant Clarence L. Jefferson, a deputy sheriff,

testified that prisoners' shoes are taken from them and

prisoners are issued "jail shoes" because hard-sole shoes or

street shoes have hard heels which are dangerous to officers

and inmates.

Richmond police detective James Hickman received a "tip"

that Williams' boot matched the boot impression that was found

at the scene of the crimes. The Richmond Sheriff's deputies

9
received a request to examine the defendant's boots from the

Richmond police officers. The deputy sheriffs gave the

defendant's boots to the police officers without a search

warrant.

Robert B. Hallett qualified as an expert witness on the

subject of shoe print impressions. He conducted tests on the

defendant's boots. Hallett testified that the boot impression

on the wall at the murder scene was either made by the

defendant's right boot or a boot that was identical in size,

shape, tread pattern, and the locations and configurations of

two cuts which had been inflicted on the bottom of the

defendant's boot by sharp objects. Even though there was a

deviation in general wear between the boot that left the

impression at the crime scene and the boot that was taken from

the defendant, Hallett testified that he had never seen two

different boots with such identical characteristics.

Richmond police detective James Hickman testified that

when he served the indictments upon the defendant, the

defendant stated that he had been in New York from October

through the end of December 1996. Richmond police sergeant

Gary Keith Ladin, however, testified that he saw the defendant

in Richmond on November 29, 1996.

Keitha Lasha Thomas, the defendant's girlfriend,

testified that while she was incarcerated at a correctional

10
facility in Goochland County, the defendant sent a letter to

her describing his crimes. The defendant stated, in the

letter, that he entered the building where the victim worked

when it was "dark outside" and that the victim arrived when

"it had got[ten] light." The defendant told Thomas that he

had taken some computers, the victim's ring, and a bank card

because she did not have much money. The defendant stated

that "he tried to smother the bitch but the bitch wouldn't die

fast enough." He stated that "he cut her throat. Then he

went on to say he cut her wrists."

The defendant testified that he did not commit the

crimes, but admitted possession of some of the stolen

property. He claimed that he obtained the stolen property and

the boots from a man whom he identified as Mark Cromartie.

The defendant denied that he told Detective Hickman that he

had been in New York from October through December and

insisted that he had said he had been in New York until the

end of November instead. The defendant also admitted that he

acquired money to purchase drugs by committing "B&E[s]."

III.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence

related to the examination of his boot. He argued that the

Richmond police officers violated his rights guaranteed by the

Fourth Amendment when the officers obtained his boots from the

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Richmond Sheriff and conducted tests on the boots. The

circuit court denied the defendant's motion, and the Court of

Appeals agreed with the circuit court's ruling. The defendant

makes the same argument on appeal. We disagree with the

defendant.

Initially, we observe that the Fourth Amendment protects

the privacy interests of persons. Katz v. United States, 389

U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967). In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.

170, 177 (1984), the Supreme Court stated that: "[s]ince Katz

. . . the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been

the question whether a person has a 'constitutionally

protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' Id., at 360

(Harlan, J., concurring). The Amendment does not protect the

merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those

'expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as

"reasonable."' Id., at 361."

In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), the

Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment required

that police officers obtain a search warrant before searching

an arrestee's clothing. Edwards was lawfully arrested and

charged with attempting to break into a post office. He was

taken to a local jail. An investigation revealed that the

perpetrator of the crime for which Edwards was charged had

attempted to gain entry into the post office through a wooden

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window which had been pried with a pry bar, thereby causing

paint chips to fall on a window sill and a wire mesh screen.

Edwards, 415 U.S. at 801-02.

Edwards spent the night in the jail. The next morning,

jail officials seized the clothing that he had been wearing at

the time of and since his arrest and held the clothing as

evidence. Examination of the clothing revealed paint chips

that matched the samples taken from the post office window.

Edwards' clothing and evidence of the paint chips were

admitted in evidence at trial over Edwards' objection. Id. at

802.

The Supreme Court, approving the admission of the

evidence without a search warrant, held:

"With or without probable cause, the authorities
were entitled at that point [in the booking process]
not only to search Edwards' clothing but also to
take it from him and keep it in official custody.
There was testimony that this was the standard
practice in this city. The police were also
entitled to take from Edwards any evidence of the
crime in his immediate possession, including his
clothing."

Id. at 804-05. Moreover, the Supreme Court observed:

"Indeed, it is difficult to perceive what is
unreasonable about the police's examining and
holding as evidence those personal effects of the
accused that they already have in their lawful
custody as the result of a lawful arrest."

Id. at 806. Concluding, the Supreme Court stated in Edwards:

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 "'While the legal arrest of a person should not
destroy the privacy of his premises, it does — for
at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable
extent — take his own privacy out of the realm of
protection from police interest in weapons, means of
escape, and evidence.'"

Id. at 808-09 (quoting United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487,

493 (1970)).

We conclude that the defendant, Williams, had no

expectation of privacy in his boots that society is prepared

to recognize as reasonable. The boots were in the custody of

the Richmond City Sheriff pursuant to administrative booking

policies and procedures. We hold that when a person, such as

the defendant, has been lawfully arrested and his property has

been lawfully seized by law enforcement personnel pursuant to

that arrest, the arrestee has no reasonable expectation of

privacy in that property, and later examination of the

property by another law enforcement official does not violate

the Fourth Amendment. 2 See United States v. Turner, 28 F.3d

981, 983 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1158 (1995)

(postal service inspector's removal of a cap without a warrant

from defendant's property bag at a jail does not violate the

2
We find no merit in Williams' argument that Edwards is
not controlling because the clothing examined in Edwards
related to the charge for which Edwards had been arrested.
This distinction is legally insignificant because the
dispositive inquiry remains whether the defendant, Williams,
had an expectation of privacy in the seized items. The
defendant had no such expectation.

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defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because initial search and

seizure of defendant's personal items was lawful); United

States v. Thompson, 837 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988) (subsequent inspection of keys by

a federal agent did not unduly intrude upon defendant's

expectation of privacy when police lawfully viewed the keys

earlier at the time of inventory); United States v. Johnson,

820 F.2d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.

Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1049 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied

461 U.S. 936 (1983) ("once an item in an individual's

possession has been lawfully seized and searched, subsequent

searches of that item, so long as it remains in the legitimate

uninterrupted possession of the police, may be conducted

without a warrant"); United States v. Phillips, 607 F.2d 808,

809-10 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518,

524 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978)

(seizure of defendant's shoes six weeks after his arrest while

defendant was still in custody at the county jail did not

violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights); United States v.

Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 73 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420

U.S. 925 (1975) (federal agent can view money to compare

serial numbers when police seized the money after arresting

defendant on unrelated state charges and kept money in an

envelope in a jail safe for safekeeping apart from defendant's

15
other belongings); State v. Copridge, 918 P.2d 1247, 1251

(Kan. 1996); State v. Wheeler, 519 A.2d 289, 292 (N.H. 1986);

Contreras v. State, 838 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. App. 1992).

IV.

Williams argues that the evidence is insufficient to

support his convictions. We disagree.

Applying well-established principles of appellate review,

we must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences

fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the prevailing party below. Phan v.

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506, 508, 521 S.E.2d 282, 282 (1999);

Derr v. Commonwealth 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668

(1991). The burden is upon the Commonwealth, however, to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the

perpetrator of these crimes. Phan, 258 Va. at 511, 521 S.E.2d

at 284. Additionally, circumstantial evidence is as

competent, and entitled to the same weight, as direct

testimony, if that circumstantial evidence is sufficiently

convincing. Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 228, 294

S.E.2d 882, 890 (1982); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260,

272, 257 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972

(1980).

The evidence, which is summarized in Part II of this

opinion, and which we need not repeat here, was sufficient to

16
permit the circuit court to find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant was the perpetrator of these crimes.

Moreover, as we have already stated, the defendant admitted to

Thomas that he killed Coughenour and he asked Wright if she

wanted to know how the murder occurred. The defendant

admitted that he often committed "B&E[s]" when he needed money

to purchase cocaine. The defendant possessed property taken

from the scene of the murder soon after the crimes occurred.

V.

We find no merit in the defendant's remaining arguments.

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the

Court of Appeals.

Affirmed.

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