Williams v. Midwest Employers Casualty Co.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-30432

Summary Calendar

JO ANN WILLIAMS, Individually,
on behalf of Willie E. Williams’ Estate,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MIDWEST EMPLOYERS CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants.

CAMPBELL E. WALLACE,

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana

March 8, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an interlocutory appeal of sanctions ordered under

Rule 11 and the inherent power of the court. Because the sanctions

order is neither a final judgment nor a reviewable collateral

order, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I
 This case arose out of a state law workers’ compensation

claim. In 1989, Willie Williams brought a claim against Spartech

Films for workers’ compensation. Spartech Films had an excess

indemnity policy issued by Midwest Employers Casualty Company

(“Midwest”). In 1991, Spartech’s workers’ compensation payments to

Mr. Williams ceased. Mr. Williams later received a default

judgment against Adams Plastics, Inc., from the Louisiana Office of

Workers’ Compensation. Adams Plastics did not pay the judgment.

In 1997, Mr. Williams brought a direct action against Midwest

as the insurer of Adams Plastics to collect his default judgment.

Midwest removed to federal court, where it then filed third-party

demands against Spartech Films and Adams Plastics, alleging that

they failed to comply with the terms of their policies. Mr.

Williams died in 1998, and Jo Ann Williams (“Williams”) substituted

in his place as plaintiff.

On June 7, 1999, Magistrate Judge Karen Hayes mediated a

settlement between Williams and Midwest. After hours of

negotiation, the parties drafted and signed a “Memorandum of

Settlement Agreement” that included arrangements for payments by

Midwest to Williams and assignments of rights by Williams to

Midwest. Over the next month and a half, revised versions of the

settlement agreement passed between the parties as disputes over

the meaning of the agreed-to settlement intensified. During this

time, Williams did not receive her insurance money from Midwest,

even though Louisiana law requires an insurer “to pay a settlement

2
within thirty days after an agreement is reduced to writing,”1 and

even though Wallace, in a letter to the court, had stated that

Midwest had tendered the funds to Williams.

On July 28, 1999, Williams filed a motion to enforce

settlement and for sanctions. In addition to levying sanctions

against Midwest, Magistrate Judge Hayes, citing various

misrepresentations made by Wallace to Williams and the court,

recommended sanctioning Wallace. The District Court, Judge Robert

G. James, ordered Wallace to show cause “why monetary sanctions

should not be imposed against him in this case pursuant to Rule 11

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Court’s inherent

powers.” After briefing, Judge James sanctioned Wallace in the

amount of $1,500.

Wallace appealed.

II

As a general rule, the federal Courts of Appeals have

jurisdiction only over appeals from “final decisions of the

district courts.”2 A decision is not final unless “it ends the

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but

execute the judgment.”3 In the case before us, no final judgment

has been entered; Midwest’s litigation continues.

1
See La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1220(A)(2) (2000).
2
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
3
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999)
(internal quotations omitted).

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 Nor is the sanctions order itself an appealable final

decision. Click v. Abilene National Bank4 held that sanctions

orders are not themselves appealable final decisions, nor are they

appealable collateral orders.5

Two subsequent cases created two exceptions to the rule

announced by Click: Markwell v. County of Bexar6 held that if the

sanctioned attorney has withdrawn from the case, he may appeal; and

Chavez v. M/V Medina Star7 held that if the party represented by

the sanctioned attorney is no longer party to the case, the

attorney may appeal. Neither exception applies here. Wallace

continues to represent Midwest. And although Williams (apparently)

has settled with Midwest, Midwest still has third-party claims

pending against its insureds. We have no jurisdiction over this

appeal.

III

Because we find that neither Markwell nor Chavez applies here,

we need not consider whether those decisions survive the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Cunningham v. Hamilton County.8

4
822 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1987).
5
Click applied this rule to sanctions levied under Rule 11,
Rule 37, or 28 U.S.C. § 1927, finding no reason to differentiate
between these types of sanctions. Id. at 545.
6
878 F.2d 899, 901 (5th Cir. 1989).
7
47 F.3d 153, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1995).
8
527 U.S. 198 (1999).

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Cunningham held that a Rule 37 sanctions order is not an appealable

final decision nor an appealable collateral order. Cunningham

emphasized that the appealability of a sanctions order should not

“turn on the attorney’s continued participation.”9 Cunningham

rejected the notion that an attorney’s withdrawal from involvement

in a case renders a sanction order against the attorney appealable.

It is therefore doubtful that the exceptions to Click created by

Markwell and Chavez survive Cunningham.10

The appeal is DISMISSED.

9
Id. at 209.
10
Although Cunningham involved Rule 37, rather than Rule 11,
sanctions, Click refused to distinguish between types of sanctions.
Click, 822 F.2d at 545.

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