This suit was brought by appellants, Willys-Overland Company of California and Automobile Insurance Company, against William Chapman, Mrs. W. E. Chapman, and W. S. Wiley, to recover the title and possession of an automobile, or, in the alternative, for its value and rent. The following áre substantially the facts in the case :
The Willys-Overland Company of California, a corporation, its place of business, San Francisco, owned the automobile in controversy. On the 3d day of July, 1916, said corporation, in the city of San Francisco, entered into a lease contract with Mrs. W. E. Chapman, then residing in San Francisco, the contract providing that the corporation leases to Mrs. Chapman, and Mrs. Chapman leases and hires from the corporation, the automobile; that Mrs. Chapman agrees to pay the corporation “for the rental hire and use” of the automobile the sum of $595 as follows: $200 cash, $40 on the 3d day of each following month for nine months, and $35 on the 3d day of the tenth month, with 6 per cent, interest then payable on the deferred rent payments. The lease terminated on the 3d day of May, 1917. Mrs. Chapman agreed not to dispose of the automobile, or take or allow it to be taken out of the state — the corporation retained the title. Mrs. Chapman by its terms took immediate possession, and was to retain possession so long as she complied with the terms of the contract. In the event Mrs. Chapman should fail to comply with the terms in any respect, the corporation, under the provision of the instrument, could take possession of the automobile, and all payments made to be applied as compensation for depreciation in value, for use and rental and as liquidated damages; Mrs. Chapman waiving all right to the money paid and the option to purchase. At the expiration of the lease term, the automobile should be returned to the corporation. In the event Mrs. Chapman had complied with the terms and conditions of the agreement, she should then have the right to purchase the automobile for the sum of $5, when the transfer and sale to her would take place. In the event of suit, Mrs. Chapman agreed to pay costs and attorney’s fees. The lease contract contained other features not necessary to state. Before suit filed, the Willys-Overland Company of California made an assignment of the lease agreement to the Automobile Insurance Company. About September 3, 1917, Mrs. Chapman and her husband, William Chapman, without the knowledge or consent of appellants or either of them, and with intent to convert the automobile to their own use, removed said automobile from San Francisco, Cal., to El Paso, Tex., and failed to further comply with the terms of the lease agreement, and in February, 1917, and without the knowledge or consent of appellants or either of them, sold and delivered at El Paso, Tex., said automobile to the Cadillac Sales Company. The Cadillac Sales Company thereafter sold and delivered said automobile to W. S. Wiley. Appellants used due diligence to locate and recover said automobile. The lease contract was not recorded nor required to be recorded in California, nor was it recorded'in Texas. Neither the Cadillac Sales Company nor Wiley had actual or constructive notice of the lease contract, and as to each of them the sales were for value received. Under the laws of the state of California, a married woman may contract the same as if she were a feme sole. The laws of California do not require the registration for any purpose of contracts for conditional sales of personal property, and said contract is good and enforceable in California under the laws of that- state. On locating the automobile in this state, appellants used due diligence in making demand for its possession, and, on refusal to deliver same, appellants employed an attorney and sequestrated the automobile. W. S. Wiley retained possession by giving replevin. bond *980with A. B. Ryan and Robert Homan as sureties. No rent for the use of the automobile, other than the $240 as agreed in the lease contract, has ever been paid to appellants or either of them. The value of the rent for the use of the automobile is $5 per day if rented by the day, or $25 per week if rented by the week.
The facts pleaded by appellants' and appel-lees were along the lines stated above, appellants praying for the title and possession of the automobile and, in the alternative, for its value, and for its rental value from date of conversion to date of judgment, and for costs including attorney’s fees. In addition to general demurrer, special exceptions, and general denial, appellee Wiley pleaded that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice; that the lease contract was a chattel mortgage and was not recorded in El Paso county, Tex.; and prayed that appellants take nothing by their suit. The trial before the court without a jury resulted in a judgment denying appellants the relief prayed for as against William Chapman and 'W. T. Wiley and the sureties on Wiley’s re-plevin bond; judgment for appellants against Mrs. Chapman for $500 with interest, and attorney’s fees; judgment in favor of William Chapman against appellants for the title and possession of the automobile and in favor of Wiley and sureties on the replevin bond for title and possession of the automobile, and in favor of William Chapman, Wiley, and sureties, against surety on appellant’s sequestration bond for all costs.
Opinion.
[1] Appellants under four assignments of error, and several propositions under each, complain of the judgment rendered. We think we need not discuss in detail all of the questions presented. Were appellants, under the facts stated, entitled to judgment for the title and possession of the automobile as against Wiley? The contention of appellee Wiley is that, having purchased the automobile in El Paso county, Tex., from the Cadillac Sales Company, for value and without notice, actual or constructive (having no actual notice and the instrument under which appellants claim never having been recorded in El Paso county, Tex., or elsewhere in Texas), appellants should not recover against him; that while in California the lease contract is a conditional sale, and the laws of that state do not require its registration to give it effect as to innocent purchasers for value without notice; in Texas it is a chattel mortgage, and the statutes of this state and the decisions of the courts declaratory of the public policy of this state fix the status of such contracts and make them void as to third persons unless recorded; and that the Texas rule requiring registration applies alike to all such instruments, though executed and to be performed in California and effective there, to have effect here must be recorded here, for the reason that the instrument executed and to be performed in California has no extraterritorial effect. A great many cases, and some of the text-books we have examined, sustain appellant’s contention, especially the case of Adams v. Fellers, a South Carolina ease, reported in (88 S. C. 212, 70 S. E. 722) 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385, and the cases in the supplementary note reporting that case. We need not review that case nor the cases referred to in the note, as we think the Texas courts have adopted the opposite rule, holding that under circumstances, similar to those of this case, a purchaser for value without notice, of property brought into this state, obtained a good title. Our Supreme Court, in Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 235, held that the rule that the nature, validity, obligation, and interpretation of contracts should be determined by the lex loci contrac-tus, is not to be extended to the defeat, over our laws, of rights which occurred under them after the property was found within their jurisdiction. The principle of the rule as above stated, we think, is clearly announced in Crosby v. Huston, supra, and applied in the following cases: Sanger v. Jesse French Piano & Organ Co., 21 Tex. Civ. App. 523, 52 S. W. 621; Best v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank, 141 S. W. 334; Farmer v. Evans, 192 S. W. 342 — under facts very similar to this case. Under facts somewhat dissimilar to this case, the same principle is announced in Weider v. Maddox, 66 Tex. 377, 1 S. W. 168, 59 Am. Rep. 617, and Fowler v. Bell, 90 Tex. 150, 37 S. W. 1058, 39 L. R. A. 254, 59 Am. St. Rep. 788. While it is true that as a general rule a contract valid where made is valid everywhere and will be enforced everywhere, there is an exception to the rule as firmly fixed as the rule itself, to the effect that comity is not permitted to operate within a state to the prejudice of its government, in opposition to its settled policy or the interests of its citizens. The Legislature made no exception in favor of foreign conditional contracts or chattel mortgages executed and effective in other states, where the property embraced in such instrument is subsequently brought into this state and here sold, in enacting articles 5654 and 5655, Vernon’s Say les’ Civil Statutes.
[2, 3] By the third assignment, appellants complain of the judgment awarding title and possession, of the automobile to appellees on the ground that appellees’ pleading and prayer for relief is not sufficient to justify such judgment. Under the statute, the prayer for relief is an essential part of the petition. Burks v. Burks, 141 S. W. 337. The relief prayed for by appellee Wiley, other than in his cross-action, was that appellants take nothing by their suit. This was the proper prayer, and the judgment should have been that appellants take nothing by their suit. *981The judgment rendered is that Wiley and his sureties on the replevin bond, naming them, do. have and recover of and from appellants and its sureties the automobile in question. The judgment rendered, while not in proper form, is to the same effect as the judgment that should have been entered. We think the error is not reversible. 'As said by the court in McKee v. West, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 118 S. W. 1135, in a trespass to try title case, under a plea of not guilty, and where the appropriate judgment for defendant is that plaintiff take nothing by this suit, a further adjudication of title and right of possession would comprehend no more than that involved in an adjudication that plaintiff1 take nothing. See, also, French v. Olive, 67 Tex. 403, 3 S. W. 568. The assignment is overruled. The judgment will be reformed so as to read that appellants take nothing by their suit. To that extent only the assignment is sustained.
[4] By the fourth assignment, appellants complain of the judgment rendered in their favor against Mrs. Chapman. It is claimed that plaintiffs’ measure of damages for rent of the automobile should have been the market rental value, instead of 6 per cent, interest on the value of the automobile, as allowed by the court. Plaintiffs prayed for judgment against her for the market value of the automobile and rental value from September 3, 1916, to date of judgment, December 4, 1917. The court rendered judgment against Mrs. Chapman for $500, the value of the automobile, and six per cent, interest on said $500 from October 1, 1916, to the date of the judgment. Had plaintiffs recovered the automobile from Mrs. Chapman, the measure of their damages for rent would have been the market value during the time of its detention. But having recovered of Mrs. Chapman the value of the automobile rather than the automobile, the measure of the damages would be the 6 per cent, interest on the value recovered to the date of the judgment. The assignment is overruled.
Under the above-cited authorities of our courts, we hold that the court was not in error in rendering judgment in favor of appel-lee.
Judgment affirmed.
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