It appearing that the bill of exceptions was not tendered within the time prescribed by law, the writ of error is dismissed.
The motions to dismiss are well taken, and must be sustained. The January term, 1939, of the superior court of Fulton County was necessarily adjourned before the beginning of the next term, which under the law convened on the first Monday in March, 1939 (Ga. L. 1905, p. 89), the calendar date being March 6. The bill of exceptions not having been tendered until April 7, 1939, it was not presented within thirty days from the adjournment of the term at which the judgments complained of were rendered, as required by law. Code, § 6-902; Forsyth v. Preer, 64 Ga. 281;Huff v. Brantley, 66 Ga. 599; Dietz v. Fahy,107 Ga. 325 (33 S.E. 51); Heery v. Burkhalter, 113 Ga. 1043 (39 S.E. 406); Jones v. State, 146 Ga. 8 (90 S.E. 280);Birmingham Finance Co. v. Chisolm, 162 Ga. 501 (134 S.E. 301); Whiteman v. Federal Land Bank, 185 Ga. 26 (193 S.E. 881). Except for the notation by the trial judge, "Tendered April 7/39," the motions to dismiss might be denied under the Code, § 6-1312; Moore v. Kelly Jones Co., 109 Ga. 798 (35 S.E. 168);Proctor v. Piedmont Portland Cement Co., 134 Ga. 391,394 (67 S.E. 942); Sweat v. Barnhill, 171 Ga. 294 (2) (155 S.E. 18). This notation, however, had the effect of contradicting the statement in the bill of exceptions that the plaintiff comes "within the time required by law," and showed affirmatively that such was not the case. See Jones v. State, supra; Friendship Primitive BaptistChurch v. Fuller, 180 Ga. 469 (179 S.E. 343); *Page 31 Coker v. Life Casualty Insurance Co. of Tenn.,180 Ga. 525 (179 S.E. 626).
Writ of error dismissed. All the Justices concur.