Wilson v. Woods

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-60067

ARISTINE WILSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JOSEPH D. WOODS, MEYERS BAKERIES, INC.,
AND MCC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi

January 13, 1999

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Aristine Wilson challenges the district court’s

refusal to qualify her expert witness as an accident

reconstructionist. Finding that the district court did not abuse

its discretion, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

This case arose out of an automobile collision in which

Joseph D. Woods, an 18-wheel truck driver employed by MCC

Transportation Company, struck appellant’s automobile as it

proceeded forward after stopping at a highway intersection near

Yazoo City, Mississippi. Wilson sued the appellees in the Circuit
Court of Yazoo County and appellees removed the case to the

Southern District of Mississippi.

Appellant’s suit alleged that Woods was negligent per se

because he was exceeding the 55 mile per hour speed limit when the

accident occurred. To support her theory, the appellant moved to

qualify A. K. Rosenhan as an accident reconstruction expert.

Rosenhan was prepared to testify that, based upon information

contained in the accident report, his calculations determined that

Woods’s truck was traveling 63 miles per hour at the time of the

accident. The appellees objected that Rosenhan was not

sufficiently qualified as an accident reconstruction expert. The

district court sustained the objection and refused to admit the

testimony.

Without Rosenhan’s testimony, Wilson was unable to prove

that Woods exceeded the speed limit and accordingly, the jury

returned a verdict for the defendants. Wilson appeals on the sole

issue of the exclusion of Rosenhan’s testimony.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a trial court’s decision to exclude

expert testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. See

General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, ---, 118 S. Ct. 512, 515

(1997). Accordingly, we have recognized that district courts are

given “wide latitude in determining the admissibility of expert

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testimony, and the discretion of the trial judge . . . will not be

disturbed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous.” Watkins v.

Telsmith, Inc. 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Eiland

v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1995)

(internal quotations omitted)). In deciding whether the district

court abused its discretion in refusing to qualify appellant’s

expert witness, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786

(1993), and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

DISCUSSION

In Daubert, the Supreme Court instructed district courts

to function as gatekeepers and permit only reliable and relevant

expert testimony to be presented to the jury. See Daubert, 509

U.S. at 590-93, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96. District courts must be

assured that the proffered witness is qualified to testify by

virtue of his “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. A district court should refuse to

allow an expert witness to testify if it finds that the witness is

not qualified to testify in a particular field or on a given

subject. See Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., 80 F.3d

777, 781 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court makes preliminary

determinations whether the proposed expert witness is qualified .

. . under Rule 702.”).

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 To support her theory that Woods exceeded the posted

speed limit when the accident occurred, the appellant called

Rosenhan as an expert in accident reconstruction. Rosenhan earned

bachelor of science and master of science degrees in mechanical

engineering, but he never completed his doctorate degree. After

concluding his educational endeavors, Rosenhan taught courses in

mechanical engineering and industrial engineering at various

colleges and vocational schools. During the past 25 years, his

consulting work has concentrated on fire reconstruction and

investigation; however, he testified that he recently shifted his

professional emphasis to automobile accident reconstruction.

Wilson moved to qualify Rosenhan as an expert in accident

reconstruction. Before the court ruled on the motion, however, the

appellees conducted voir dire of Rosenhan, which revealed that 1)

although Rosenhan taught college level courses, he never held

professorial rank; 2) he never taught an accident reconstruction

course or any other course that involved automobile accident

reconstruction; 3) he had no degree or certification in accident

reconstruction (but he was enrolled in a correspondence course from

the Northwestern Traffic Institute); 4) he had not completed the

requirements for certification by the Association of Accident

Reconstructionists; and, 5) although he had testified in various

cases, one court had refused to qualify him as an expert in vehicle

accident reconstruction based on his lack of qualifications.

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Appellees argued Rosenhan was not sufficiently qualified to testify

as an expert in this case due to his lack of “training,”

“experience,” and “qualifications.” See Fed. R. Evid. 702.

The court also questioned Rosenhan and ascertained that

he 1) had never conducted any studies or experiments in the field

of accident reconstruction; 2) did not take any measurements or

collect any data from the accident scene in this case; 3) did not

examine the tires or other mechanical parts involved in the

accident; 4) based his calculations on publicly accessible data

published by the National Highway Transportation Safety

Administration; and, 5) was unable to show that his training or

experience as a mechanical engineer gave him expertise in the field

of accident reconstruction that was distinguishable from training

received by other mechanical engineers. Based on all these facts,

the court refused to qualify Rosenhan as an expert witness and

sustained the appellees’ objection, stating:

The court is concerned, as it has been directed to
be concerned, by Daubert and its progeny, about the
proliferation of so-called expert witnesses. This court
personally is not convinced that there is any such thing
as an accident reconstructionist as an expert field;
under the rules and guidelines set forth by the Supreme
Court in Daubert.

None of the people who seem to be testifying have
published in the field, have done experimentation in the
field; and other than getting a correspondence course
from this Northwestern Traffic Institute, which pads the
resume, none seem to have anything other than, in most
instances, a general scientific background.

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 [T]he court is familiar with Mr. Rosenhan, who has
testified in this court on other occasions as an expert
in the cause and origin of fires. He knows that field,
and I have had no hesitation in recognizing him as an
expert in those fields. He’s very good at what he does.
As a professional witness, he’s effective on the stand.
For that reason, he has branched out into the field of
accident reconstruction. And obviously, attorneys think
that he’s effective at what he does. That, however, does
not make him an expert in that field, even assuming that
the field is such.

Here, we don’t have simple physics questions. If we
did, according to Mr. Rosenhan’s testimony, then anyone
who has any background in physics and mathematics, which
any engineering graduate of any university in the country
would have, would be capable of looking at whatever
tables the government publishes and thereby become an
expert. I don’t think that’s what an expert is supposed
to be or is supposed to do in order to qualify as an
expert.

Wilson contends that the district court was predisposed

not to allow Rosenhan to testify as an expert in accident

reconstruction because, in addition to the aforementioned comments,

the judge stated that “I have never, at this stage, allowed, over

objection, anyone to testify as an accident reconstructionist. . .

. I don’t know that there is such a thing other than some

professional hired guns who go around and claim to be accident

reconstructionists.” Although this statement appears to illustrate

a bias against accident reconstructionists, the court did not base

its decision on the belief that accident reconstruction may be a

bogus scientific field. In fact, the court gave the appellant the

benefit of the doubt by expressly finding that “even assuming that

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the field” of accident reconstruction exists, Rosenhan was not

qualified as such an expert.

The district court’s finding that Rosenhan lacked the

requisite qualifications is supported in the record. Appellees’

voir dire and the court’s own questioning revealed significant

deficiencies in Rosenhan’s experience and professional training,

leading ineluctably to the impression that his “expertise” in

accident reconstruction was no greater than that of any other

individual with a general scientific background. In addition, the

court noted that Rosenhan had never taught accident reconstruction

courses, never experimented or conducted studies in the field, and

never published anything on the subject. To the extent that

accident reconstruction represents a specialized field of study, as

Wilson contends, the district court did not clearly err in finding

that Rosenhan had done little to acquire or practice the requisite

expertise. Because Rosenhan’s claimed professional status was

legitimately in doubt, the court appropriately exercised its

gatekeeping responsibility and did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to qualify the witness. The judgment of the district

court is accordingly AFFIRMED.

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