F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 27 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID WIRANSANE,
Petitioner,
v. No. 02-9555
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent,
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW
FOUNDATION,
Amicus Curiae.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(BIA NO. A76-386-237)
Carol B. Lehman, Lakewood, Colorado, for Petitioner.
Donald E. Keener, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., appeared by telephone conference
(Emily Anne Radford, Assistant Director, and Allen W. Hausman, Senior
Litigation Counsel, on the brief), for Respondent.
Mary A. Kenney, Nadine K. Wettstein, and Beth Werlin, American Immigration
Law Foundation, Washington, D.C., on the brief as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner.
Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
HARTZ , Circuit Judge.
Petitioner David Johanes Wiransane appeals a decision by an immigration
judge (IJ), affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), denying his
claims of eligibility for asylum and for restriction on removal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. A native and
citizen of Indonesia, Petitioner claims that he fears persecution in Indonesia
because of anti-Chinese riots that erupted in that country after his arrival in the
United States.
At a hearing on November 17, 1998, the IJ denied Petitioner’s claim. The
BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion on July 23, 2002. Petitioner
appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a), see Tsevegmid v.
Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2003), we reverse and remand for
further proceedings. The IJ failed to explain adequately why he discredited
Petitioner’s testimony that he was of Chinese ethnicity, improperly required that
Petitioner’s original motive for coming to the United States be a fear of
persecution, and failed to consider whether events in Indonesia could support a
well-founded fear of persecution or a finding of a clear probability of persecution.
-2-
I. BACKGROUND
A. Asylum and Withholding Law
An alien who fears persecution if returned to a particular country has two
possible means of relief under the INA: asylum and restriction on removal. 1
Tsevegmid, 336 F.3d at 1234. A grant of asylum permits the alien to remain in
this country; a restriction on removal forbids removal of the alien to the country
where persecution may occur. See INA §§ 208 & 241(b)(3), codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158 & 1231(b)(3); see also Tsevegmid, 336 F.3d at 1234. Asylum is within
the discretion of the Attorney General, while restriction on removal is granted to
qualified aliens as a matter of right. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
424 (1987).
1. Asylum
Under § 208(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), to be eligible for a
discretionary grant of asylum by the Attorney General, an alien must first
establish status as a refugee. See Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.
2002). The INA defines a refugee as “any person . . . outside [his] country of . . .
1
Restriction on removal was referred to as “withholding of removal” before
amendments to the INA made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
Although both parties and the IJ refer to withholding of removal, for the sake of
accuracy, and because this claim was filed after IIRIRA’s effective date, we will
use the term “restriction on removal” throughout this opinion.
-3-
nationality . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself . . . of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A).
An applicant can establish status as a refugee by showing he either (1) “has
a well-founded fear of future persecution,” Krastev, 292 F.3d at 1270 (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted), (2) “has suffered past persecution, which
gives rise to a [rebuttable] presumption [of] . . . a well-founded fear of future
persecution,” id. at 1270–71, or (3) has suffered “past persecution so severe as to
demonstrate compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return” to his
country of nationality, id., at 1271 (internal quotation marks omitted). Aliens
basing their asylum claims upon a well-founded fear of future persecution must
show both a genuine, subjective fear of persecution, and “an objective basis by
credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a
reasonable fear [of] . . . persecution.” Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1233
(10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although persecution is not defined in the INA, we have held that a finding
of persecution “requires the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ
(in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive” and must
-4-
entail “more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty.” Woldemeskel v.
INS, 257 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Such persecution may be inflicted by the government itself, or by a non-
governmental group that “the government is unwilling or unable to control.”
Batalova v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
It is not necessary for an asylum applicant to show that he has been or may
be singled out for persecution to establish that he has an objectively well-founded
fear of persecution; he may do so by demonstrating his membership in a group
determined by “race, religion, nationality . . . or political opinion” or “a particular
social group” subject to “a pattern or practice of persecution.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A); see also Woldemeskel, 257 F.3d at 1190. In other words,
“an applicant is permitted to show that a person in his position, as opposed to
himself specifically, could be subject to persecution.” Aliens and Nationality;
Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 53 Fed. Reg. 11,300 (Apr. 6,
1988).
2. Restriction on Removal
Applications for restriction on removal are governed by INA
§ 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), which requires an applicant to show
that his “life or freedom would be threatened in [his home] country because of
-5-
[his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” The Attorney General may not remove an alien if the alien is
able to establish “a clear probability of persecution” in the country to which he
would be returned. Tsevegmid, 336 F.3d at 1234. The standard of proof for
restriction on removal is “more demanding than the well-founded fear standard
applicable to an asylum claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
when an applicant fails to establish the objective component of a well-founded
fear of persecution, he necessarily fails to establish entitlement to restriction on
removal. See Batalova, 355 F.3d at 1255; Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1236 (IJ correctly
denied restriction on removal when “petitioners failed to meet the lower standard
of showing entitlement to asylum”).
C. Factual Background
1. Petitioner’s Background
Through his hearing testimony on November 17, 1998, and personal
documents he submitted to the IJ, Petitioner gave the following account of his life
before entering the United States: Petitioner was born in Bandung, Indonesia, in
1978, to Chinese parents. His father’s surname, as it appeared on Petitioner’s
birth certificate, was Chinese, though his mother’s was not—possibly due to a
legal requirement that ethnic Chinese adopt Indonesian names. See Human Rights
Watch, The Damaging Debate on Rapes of Ethnic Chinese Women (1998), R. at
-6-
314 (“More than twenty discriminatory laws and regulations are still in
force[,] . . . includ[ing] . . . a regulation obliging all ethnic Chinese to take
‘Indonesian’ names.”). Petitioner testified that his mother was Chinese and had
an alternate Chinese name.
During his early childhood Petitioner lived with his mother in her parents’
home and attended a Chinese-Christian school. At the age of seven, he moved
with his mother and her second husband, an American, to Japan. After this
marriage failed, Petitioner returned with his mother to Indonesia where they again
lived with his grandparents. When he was 13 or 14 years old, armed men broke
into his grandparents’ house and forcibly kicked out Petitioner and his mother,
after which they were essentially homeless for a year, living alternately in his
mother’s car and in the homes of various friends. Petitioner believed that during
this ordeal the police were looking for his mother and him, and trying to force
him to sign away his inheritance from his maternal grandparents. He then moved
with his mother to Holland, where, after an unsuccessful attempt at gaining
asylum that necessitated a side trip to Singapore, they settled for approximately
four years. His mother grew increasingly abusive, so he came to the United States
in September 1997 to get away from her.
-7-
2. Asylum Proceedings
Petitioner was taken into custody by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) on February 5, 1998, for entering the United States on a false
Belgian passport. He has not challenged his deportability, but has sought asylum
and restriction on removal. He also has not claimed past persecution, although
his Application for Asylum contains a few sentences describing the bizarre
circumstances surrounding the eviction of his mother and him from their home in
Indonesia, and he briefly testified about the matter at the hearing. Rather, he
asserts a well-founded fear of future persecution and a clear probability of
persecution based on “country-wide” anti-Chinese persecution in Indonesia.
Petitioner submitted in support of his testimony copies of his passport(s), a
letter verifying the contents of his birth certificate, school forms, and other
documentary information pertaining to his personal history. He also submitted (1)
a United States State Department Country Report on Indonesia for 1997, (2)
several Human Rights Watch reports on Indonesia, (3) dozens of newspaper and
other news media reports detailing attacks on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia leading
up to major riots in May 1998 and continuing past that date, and (4) Congressional
denunciation of the riots.
In his oral decision of November 17, 1998, the IJ ruled that Petitioner was
not a refugee within the meaning of INA § 208(a) because he failed to show a
-8-
“well-founded fear of persecution.” The IJ acknowledged that Petitioner had
submitted an official country report and “articles regarding the situation in
Indonesia,” Oral Decision at 2, but did not discuss their contents or refer to them
in his analysis. He described Petitioner’s fears as follows:
He indicates that he believes that if, in fact, he returned to Indonesia,
that he would be wanted by the police; that he is afraid to go back to
Indonesia because they discriminate a lot against ethnic Chinese; that
he believes people are looking for him because of his inheritance; that
he believes if returned to Indonesia, he would be killed or hurt by
these particular individuals.
Id. at 7. He then found that “[Petitioner’s] testimony was not sufficiently detailed,
consistent, or believable to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis
for his fears; and thus, cannot suffice to establish his eligibility for asylum without
further corroborating evidence.” Id. at 9. The IJ’s focus on Petitioner’s testimony
indicates that the IJ was considering only the testimony by Petitioner relating to
his particular circumstances—the eviction from his home and the pecuniary
motives for further violence against him.
Further indicating that the IJ’s focus was on Petitioner’s particular situation,
rather than general ethnic violence, were two later comments in the IJ’s oral
opinion. First, the IJ recited the proposition that:
an alien [must] do more than show a threat of persecution in a
particular place or abode within the country. Rather, he must show
that the threat of persecution for him or her exists countrywide.
Again, the [Petitioner] has failed to do that today. There has been no
-9-
evidence [that] if he would relocate in Indonesia, that he would have
problems with the police or whatever.
Id. at 10. This observation would not be applicable to the general anti-Chinese
violence, which apparently was countrywide.
Second, the IJ’s concluding remarks emphasize Petitioner’s personal
situation:
[A]gain, he is telling me that people are out to kill him, that the police
are out to kill him. I really think there has to be some type of
evidence showing this particular matter. There has been none
whatsoever. I cannot imagine why the Indonesian police or anybody
in Indonesia would be after this particular gentleman, who is 20 years
of age—He has not been there for approximately six years now, since
he has been in Holland for four, and the United States for
approximately two—that anybody would be after him for any reason
whatsoever.
Id. at 11. The IJ’s only possible reference in his ruling to general anti-Chinese
violence in Indonesia was a comment on the apparent safety of Petitioner’s family
in Indonesia. Quoting from a headnote in In re A– E– M–, 21 I & N Dec. 1157
(BIA 1998), the proposition that “[t]he reasonableness of an alien’s fear of
persecution is reduced when his family remains in his native country unharmed for
a long period of time after his departure,” the IJ said :
He indicates that he has an uncle, an aunt, two cousins that still
remain in Indonesia. Again, if they were, in fact, ethnic Chinese, and
it was as bad as [Petitioner’s lawyer] indicates, they would probably
be gone from there. And, again, the Court feels that those people
have been there for quite some time and still remain there, as far as
the Court knows, as far as the evidence that was shown today.
-10-
Id. at 12.
Perhaps the IJ’s failure to address the anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia
was the result of the IJ’s discrediting Petitioner’s claims that he is Chinese. The IJ
said:
The Court would indicate that one of the things that [Petitioner] must
prove to the Court is that, in fact, he is in fact an ethnic Chinese. The
Court would indicate that from prior hearings that the Court has, in
fact, had regarding Indonesians, that the Court cannot tell whether
this gentleman is, in fact, ethnic Chinese or if he is not Indonesian.
The Court is not able to tell, and the Court would indicate that there is
not sufficient proof to show that in fact this gentleman is, in fact,
ethnic Chinese; that we have not received any evidence whatsoever,
other than his testimony that he is, in fact, of this particular race. The
Court is not satisfied with the evidence that was presented regarding
that particular matter.
Id. at 9.
As a third ground for decision, the IJ found that Petitioner did not come to
this country because of a fear of persecution:
The Court would also indicate that the [Petitioner] was, in fact,
living in Holland. . . . Yet, if he had fear of being persecuted in
Indonesia, he never applied for asylum there. He had all the
opportunity in the world to apply for asylum in that particular country
and never did so. He specifically stated that he came to the
United States, not because he feared persecution but because he
feared his mother. . . . There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that
that is true, but that is not sufficient to grant asylum in this particular
matter.
Id. at 9–10.
-11-
Having found that Petitioner was ineligible for asylum, the IJ also ruled that
Petitioner had failed to satisfy the clear-probability-of-persecution standard for
restriction on removal. The IJ therefore denied Petitioner’s asylum and restriction-
on-removal claims, but granted voluntary departure for December 17, 1998, see 8
U.S.C. § 1229c (providing for voluntary departure).
Petitioner timely appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decision
without opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7) on July 23, 2002. Petitioner
appeals, arguing that (1) the BIA’s affirmance without opinion violated due
process, (2) the IJ improperly rejected Petitioner’s claims deriving from alleged
anti-Chinese persecution in Indonesia, and (3) the IJ erred in failing to consider
the objective element of Petitioner’s asylum claim from Petitioner’s exact
perspective.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Due-Process Claim
Petitioner argues first that the BIA’s use of an affirmance without opinion
violated constitutional guarantees of procedural due process. We need not discuss
this argument, which we rejected in Yuk, 355 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004).
B. Claims Based on Anti-Chinese Persecution
Petitioner’s claims for asylum and restriction on removal are based on the
threat of anti-Chinese persecution in Indonesia. The IJ rejected both claims on the
-12-
ground that Petitioner had not established his Chinese ethnicity. The IJ also
apparently rejected Petitioner’s asylum claim on the ground that Petitioner did not
come to this country because of a fear of persecution. The IJ did not address
whether the events in Indonesia would either support a well-founded fear of
persecution by someone of Chinese ethnicity or establish a clear probability of
persecution of such a person. As we now proceed to discuss, we hold that the IJ
(1) did not adequately explain his rejection of Petitioner’s claim to be Chinese and
(2) incorrectly assumed that eligibility for asylum requires that the applicant have
come to the United States out of fear of persecution. We therefore reverse the IJ’s
ruling and remand for further proceedings. At the proceedings it may be necessary
to address the threat of persecution in Indonesia to persons of Chinese ethnicity.
1. Standard of Review
“Where . . . the BIA summarily affirms or adopts an immigration judge’s
decision, this court reviews the judge’s analysis as if it were the BIA’s.”
Tsevegmid, 336 F.3d at 1235. Our standard of review is highly deferential: “We
review the IJ’s resolution of the initial refugee status question under a substantial
evidence standard.” Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1233. In other words, the IJ’s adverse
asylum decision “must be upheld if supported by reasonable, substantial and
probative evidence on the record as a whole.” Krastev, 292 F.3d at 1275.
-13-
Application of this standard to credibility findings takes on a special
importance in asylum cases because of the inherent difficulties a purported refugee
may have in obtaining documentation to back up his claims. See, e.g.,
Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 215–16 (3d Cir. 1998). In recognition of the
problem, the regulations governing the establishment of asylum eligibility provide
that an applicant’s testimony, “if credible . . . may be sufficient to sustain the
[applicant’s] burden of proof without corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a); see
Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 53
Fed. Reg. 11,300 (Apr. 6, 1988) (noting that this rule, originally proposed as 8
C.F.R. § 208.12(a), 52 Fed. Reg. 32, 552 (Aug. 28, 1987), “was drafted to
recognize that the flight or defection of a bona fide refugee from a country that
engages in widespread persecution may leave him in a difficult position to
corroborate his claim.”).
Accordingly, we have joined several other circuits in requiring that an IJ
generally must give “specific, cogent” reasons for an adverse credibility finding.
See Sviridov v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 722, 727 (10th Cir. 2004); El Moraghy v.
Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 205 (1st Cir. 2003); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297,
307 (2d Cir. 2003); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003); Figeroa v.
INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th
Cir. 2004); Nyama v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 812, 817 (8th Cir. 2004); He v. Ashcroft,
-14-
328 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2003). “Adverse credibility determinations based on
speculation or conjecture . . . are reversible.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272
(3d Cir. 2002). We will reject an adverse credibility finding for which an IJ gives
virtually no reasoning. See Figeroa, 886 F.2d at 79 (“the BIA offered no reason
whatsoever for disbelieving [petitioner]”). Even when an IJ might have had a
reason based on the record for rejecting testimony, it is insufficient if he does not
present that reason in his decision. See, e.g., El Moraghy, 331 F.3d at 205 (“It
may be that the IJ believed [petitioner] not to be credible, which was the
conclusion of the initial interviewing officer. If so, the IJ neither made such a
finding, nor explained the basis in evidence for such a finding, both of which are
basic errors.”).
2. Credibility of Petitioner’s Testimony Regarding Ethnicity
As recounted above, the IJ did not credit Petitioner’s claim that he was
ethnically Chinese, saying: “[W]e have not received any evidence whatsoever,
other than his testimony that he is, in fact, of this particular race. The Court is not
satisfied with the evidence that was presented regarding that particular matter.”
Oral Decision at 9. We hold that the IJ failed to state a substantial basis for
rejecting Petitioner’s claim that he is ethnically Chinese. The IJ did not provide
any reasoning for finding Petitioner’s testimony, on its own, insufficient to
establish his ethnicity. Corroborating documentary evidence is not required. See
-15-
Kourski v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that under 8
C.F.R. § 208.13, “[f]ailure to tender a birth certificate to prove that one was a
Russian Jew would . . . not be decisive evidence that one was not Jewish”); In re
S–M–J–, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 at *9. We remand for a redetermination of
Petitioner’s claim that he is ethnically Chinese.
Because the IJ found that Petitioner had not established his Chinese
ethnicity, the IJ did not proceed to examine the evidence that persons of Chinese
ethnicity face persecution in Indonesia. Nor did the government address the matter
in its brief to this court. (Although the IJ mentioned that any claim of a threat to
Petitioner on the basis of his ethnicity was undercut by the fact that he still had
family living in Indonesia, there is no evidence of this in the record. All that is
known of Petitioner’s family in Indonesia is his testimony that the only relatives
he might still have there are his uncle’s family, with whom he does not “have any
contact . . . at all.” R. at 110.) If on remand Petitioner is found to be ethnically
Chinese, it will then be necessary to make the findings regarding persecution that
are required to resolve Petitioner’s claims for asylum and restriction on removal.
We note that because more than five years have passed since Petitioner’s original
asylum hearing, current conditions in Indonesia may be taken into account in
resolving this issue. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17–18 (2002) (ordering
remand of asylum case to BIA for consideration of changed country conditions);
-16-
Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 313 (2d Cir. 2003) (after concluding that IJ
had made a baseless credibility determination at asylum hearing, remanding the
case “to allow the IJ to reach the secondary question of country conditions” in
light of evidence on current country conditions). Subsequent events in Indonesia
may well undercut Petitioner’s claims. See, e.g., Limerta v. Ashcroft, No. 02-
9576, 88 Fed. Appx. 363, 366 (10th Cir. 2004); Lauw v. Ashcroft, No. 02-4225,
2003 U.S. LEXIS App. 22742 at *5 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2003).
2. Subjective Fear of Persecution
As an alternative ground for rejecting Petitioner’s asylum claim, the IJ
apparently found that Petitioner lacked a subjective fear of persecution. (There is
no requirement of a subjective fear for a restriction-on-removal claim, but the
objective standard for restriction on removal—a clear probability of
persecution—is more stringent than the objective standard for refugee standing for
purposes of asylum—that the fear of persecution be well-founded.)
The IJ found that Petitioner came to the United States to escape his mother,
not out of fear of persecution in Indonesia. This finding is undisputed. But it is
legally irrelevant.
An applicant need not have fled his home country out of fear of persecution
to qualify as a refugee. INA § 101(a)(42)(A) simply defines the term “refugee” as
“any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or . . . any
-17-
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country” for statutorily protected reasons. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). The definition omits any reference to or
requirement of flight, and thereby renders irrelevant why the applicant left his
country of origin. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin & Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 1109 (4th ed. 1998)
(“The current statutory definition of ‘refugee’ (in INA § 101(a)(42)(A)), like the
UN definition from which it is derived, contains no . . . requirement” that
“beneficiaries . . . show that they ‘fled’ because of a fear of persecution.”).
Indeed, the federal courts—including this circuit—often address (and grant)
refugee claims based on fear of persecution that arise only once petitioners are in
the United States. See, e.g., Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1225 (considering asylum claim
based on coup in Cambodia after petitioner’s departure for vacation in the
United States); Motamedi v. INS, 713 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1983) (remanding
asylum claim to BIA for consideration of new evidence; Iranian petitioner came to
United States as student prior to Iranian Revolution, and based claims of fear on
anti-Khomeini demonstrations in which he participated while in the United States);
Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1068 (3d. Cir. 1997) (granting refugee status to and
vacating denial of withholding of removal from head of Chinese technical
-18-
delegation who sought asylum for failing to report intended defection of members
of delegation who announced that intention only after arrival in the United States);
see generally Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States 35 (3d. ed.
1999) (“The Board and the courts have considered various claims to protection
based on events that occur after the applicant’s departure from her country.”).
Here, neither the IJ nor the government has suggested that Petitioner now
lacks a subjective fear of persecution in Indonesia based on his ethnicity. Thus,
we remand for a finding on that matter.
C. Reasonable-Person Standard
Petitioner’s final argument is that the IJ erred in failing to consider whether
a reasonable person in Petitioner’s exact position would have had a well-founded
fear of persecution upon return to Indonesia. Petitioner argues that in determining
whether he had an objective fear of persecution upon returning to Indonesia, the IJ
should have taken into account that (i) he was the victim of a break-in at age 13 or
14; (ii) he received only limited secondary education, and (iii) he was allegedly
abused by his mother. But none of these factors has any logical connection to
whether it was reasonable for Petitioner to fear persecution in Indonesia on the
basis of his ethnicity. Accordingly, we reject this argument.
-19-
III. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE and REMAND to the BIA for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision.
-20-