Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Briggs

Present: All the Justices

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 971020 February 27, 1998

MICHAEL R. BRIGGS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge

In this appeal, we consider whether the limitation of

liability in the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Code §§ 8.01-

195.1, et seq., applies to a judgment entered against the

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Michael R.

Briggs filed a motion for judgment against the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) alleging that he

was injured when a bus, operated by WMATA’s employee,

collided with Briggs’ motorcycle. The case was tried before

a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of Briggs in the

amount of $90,000.

WMATA filed a post-trial motion requesting that the

court reduce the verdict to $75,000 on the basis that WMATA

is an agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia and that an

interstate agreement, the Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Regulation Compact, permitted WMATA to invoke the

$75,000 limitation of tort liability contained in Code

§ 8.01-195.3. * The trial court denied WMATA’s motion and

entered a judgment in favor of Briggs in the amount of

*
Code § 8.01-195.3 was amended to permit a claimant to
recover a maximum of $100,000 if the claimant’s cause of
action accrued on or after July 1, 1993. Briggs’ cause of
$90,000. WMATA appeals.

Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia

entered into the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Regulation Compact with the consent of the United States

Congress. The purpose of this Compact, codified in Code

§§ 56-529 and –530, was to improve transit service in the

metropolitan area of Washington, D.C.

Section 80 of the Compact states:

“Liability for Contracts and Torts

80. The Authority shall be liable for its
contracts and for its torts and those of its
Directors, officers, employees and agent[s]
committed in the conduct of any proprietary
function, in accordance with the law of the
applicable signatory (including rules on conflict
of laws), but shall not be liable for any torts
occurring in the performance of a governmental
function. The exclusive remedy for such breach of
contracts and torts for which the Authority shall
be liable, as herein provided, shall be by suit
against the Authority. Nothing contained in this
Title shall be construed as a waiver by the
District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia and the
counties and cities within the Zone of any
immunity from suit.” (Emphasis added).

Code § 8.01-195.3, which is a part of the Virginia Tort

Claims Act, stated in relevant part:

“Subject to the provisions of this article, the
Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for money
only accruing on or after July 1, 1982, . . . on
account of damage to or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee while
acting within the scope of his employment under
circumstances where the Commonwealth . . . if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant
for such damage, loss, injury or death. However,
. . . the Commonwealth . . . shall [not] be liable
for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
action arose before the effective date of this amendment.
2
 damages. The amount recoverable by any claimant
shall not exceed (i) $25,000 for causes of action
accruing prior to July 1, 1988, $75,000 for causes
of action accruing on or after July 1, 1988, or
. . . (ii) the maximum limits of any liability
policy maintained to insure against such
negligence or other tort, if such policy is in
force at the time of the act or omission
complained of, whichever is greater, exclusive of
interest and costs.”

WMATA argues that it is an instrumentality of each of

the signatory jurisdictions, including Virginia, and, thus,

it is entitled to the benefit of the $75,000 limitation

contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act. Continuing,

WMATA says that “[a]s a matter of federal law, WMATA is

entitled to the same privileges and immunities as the

Commonwealth of Virginia including the liability cap

provided in . . . Code § 8.01-195.3.” Specifically, WMATA

contends that § 80 of the Compact permits it to invoke the

limitation of liability in Code § 8.01-195.3 because WMATA

is liable for its torts and those committed by its agents in

the conduct of a proprietary function “in accordance with

the law of the applicable signatory.” Relying upon that

phrase, WMATA argues that it is entitled to the protection

of the limitation of liability contained in the Virginia

Tort Claims Act.

Responding, Briggs argues that § 80 of the Compact

places no limitation on the amount of compensatory damages

that a plaintiff may recover from WMATA and that § 80 does

not incorporate the damage limitation contained in the

Virginia Tort Claims Act. We agree with Briggs.

3
 In PEPCO v. State Corporation Commission, 221 Va. 632,

635, 272 S.E.2d 214, 215 (1980), we held that WMATA is a

part of the State government. We observed:

“Title III, Article III, Section 4 of the
interstate compact provides that WMATA ‘is hereby
created, as an instrumentality and agency of each
of the signatory parties hereto’. Title III,
Article VII, Section 18(a), states that ‘[t]he
General Assembly of Virginia hereby authorizes and
designates the Authority as the agency to plan for
and provide transit facilities and services for
the area of Virginia encompassed within the
[compact] Zone.’ Two of the six members of
WMATA’s board of directors represent Virginia
. . . . WMATA is vested with the power of eminent
domain . . . . WMATA is funded, in part, by
Virginia through the Northern Virginia Transit
District Commission.” (alteration in original).

Even though WMATA is a part of the State government,

WMATA has expressly waived its right of sovereign immunity

for torts committed by its employees “in the conduct of any

proprietary function, in accordance with the law of the

applicable signatory (including rules on conflicts of laws)

. . . .” Code §§ 56-529 and –530. Section 80 of the

Compact does not contain any limitation on the amount of

compensatory damages that a plaintiff may recover from

WMATA, and § 80 does not mention or refer to the Virginia

Tort Claims Act.

Contrary to WMATA’s assertions, the phrase “in

accordance with the law of the applicable signatory”

contained in § 80 does not incorporate the limitation on

damages contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act. We are

of opinion this language means that courts in the

Commonwealth of Virginia must apply the substantive tort law
4
governing the conduct of a director, officer, employee, or

agent of WMATA who commits a tort while performing any

proprietary function.

In view of the foregoing, we need not consider WMATA’s

remaining contentions. Accordingly, the judgment of the

trial court will be

Affirmed.

5