Wright v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Group Benefits Plan

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 04-1986

MICHAEL J.M. WRIGHT,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO. GROUP BENEFITS PLAN, et al.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Oberdorfer,* Senior District Judge.

Stephen L. Raymond, for appellant.
John-Mark Turner, with Sheehan, Phinney, Bass + Green, P.A.,
on brief, for appellees.

March 25, 2005

*
Of the District of the District of Columbia, sitting by
designation.
 OBERDORFER, Senior District Judge. Plaintiff-appellant,

Michael J. M. Wright, appeals the district court’s entry of summary

judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, R. R. Donnelley & Sons

Co. Group Benefits Plan, and Hartford Life and Accident Insurance

Company (“Hartford”). Wright alleged that Hartford’s termination

of his short-term disability benefits, and its failure to grant his

long-term disability benefits, violated the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. For

the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Plan

In connection with his employment with financial services

firm R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company (“Donnelley”), Wright was

covered as a participant under Donnelley’s Group Benefits Plan (the

“Plan”). Benefits under the short term disability (“STD”) portion

of the Plan are administered by Hartford and funded by Donnelley

through a trust. App. at A150. Benefits under the long term

disability (“LTD”) portion of the Plan are administered by Hartford

and funded in full by an insurance policy issued by Hartford. Id.

The Plan states that, “Hartford has sole authority to approve or

reject claims according to the program rules, and follow through

with the ERISA appeals process.” Id. at A147. Benefits are not

payable unless, among other requirements, an employee submits

“proof of loss satisfactory to The Hartford.” Id. at A170.

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B. Wright’s Application for STD Benefits

On June 19, 2001, Wright took a medical leave from work,

claiming he was suffering from headaches and irregular memory loss

which prevented him from carrying out his job functions. See App.

at A111-A113. Wright subsequently applied for STD benefits in

accordance with the Plan’s provisions. Id. at A207. Wright

submitted Attending Physician Statements (“APS”) from his primary

care physician, Dr. Maurice B. Cohen, and his psychologist, Ron

Michaud, Ph.D. See id. at A188-89; id. at A210-11. Both Drs.

Michaud and Cohen reported that Wright’s subjective symptoms were

memory problems. See id. at A188-89; id. at A210-11. Dr. Cohen

recommended that Wright be kept out of work pending the results of

neuropsychological testing. Id. at A210-11. Dr. Michaud indicated

that Wright’s ability for sustained concentration “has severely

impaired current job performance.” Id. at A210-11. He declined to

indicate any specific psychiatric impairments, stating that it was

unclear if the “process is psychiatric or neurological.” Id.

Based on this information, Hartford granted Wright’s STD benefits

through July 29, 2001. Id. at A379. Pending results of the

neuropsychological testing, Hartford extended Wright’s STD benefits

through August 20, 2001. Id. at A380.

In a status report to Hartford, on August 20, 2001, Dr.

Cohen diagnosed Wright with memory loss and indicated the necessity

of additional neurological testing. See id. at A198-99. Dr. Cohen

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again recommended that Wright not return to work until an

appropriate diagnosis was made. Id. By letter dated August 24,

2001, Hartford notified Wright that it was extending his STD

benefits through September 23, 2001. Id. at A381. The letter

further stated:

If you remain disabled beyond September 23,
2001, your physician must submit supporting
medical information to our office. This must
include the specific results of your July 11
and August 28, 2001 tests. We will also
require an evaluation by your primary care
physician that addresses a specific diagnosis,
restrictions and limitations that prevent you
from returning to work, your treatment plan
and any changes in your treatment, and a
return to work plan.

Id.

On September 20, 2001, Dr. Cohen provided another update

to Hartford, explaining that Wright had difficulty finding a

neuropsychologist covered by his health insurance but finally was

able to schedule an appointment with Dr. Ann Avery for October 2,

2001.1 Id. at A248. Based on this information, Hartford extended

STD benefits until October 14, 2001, to allow time for his

physicians to review the results of Dr. Avery’s testing. See id.

at A196.

On October 15, 2001, after reviewing the results of Dr.

1
Wright also submitted a letter to Hartford detailing his
attempts to obtain formal testing and indicating that his health
carrier refused to approve full neuropsychological testing,
allowing Wright only an “initial set of tests.” Id. at A208-09.

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Avery’s neuropsychological assessment of Wright, Dr. Cohen

submitted a new APS to Hartford, which addressed for the first time

the level of Wright’s psychiatric impairments. See id. at A190-91.

Dr. Cohen indicated an impairment of less severe than “[m]oderate

impairment in occupational functioning” but more severe than

“slight difficulty.” Id. Dr. Cohen also telephoned Hartford and

explained Dr. Avery’s tests showed that Wright’s “short term memory

is good” but that Wright had “weakness recalling long term events

and narriatives[sic].”2 Id. at A193. Dr. Cohen further reported

that an MRI was normal and there was no diagnosis for Wright yet.

Id. at A193. Hartford extended Wright’s STD benefits until October

28, 2001, pending the results of Wright’s examination by a new

psychiatrist, Dr. Clive D. Dalby.

On October 26, 2001, Dr. Dalby submitted an APS to

Hartford diagnosing Wright with Amnestic Syndrome Not Otherwise

Specified. Id. at A212-13. Dr. Dalby indicated that Wright

suffered “severe short term memory loss & thought blocking,” and

described this as causing a “moderate impairment in occupational

functioning,” but did not specify such limitation. Id.

C. Wright’s Application for LTD Benefits

Wright applied for LTD benefits on November 13, 2001.

Meanwhile, Hartford referred Wright’s STD claim to one of its

2
According to Dr. Avery’s findings, Wright’s memory was
generally good, though he had a below average score on a single
sub-test of delayed recall. Id. at A223.

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Behavioral Health Case Managers for review. The Case Manager noted

that “[t]he only thing we have with all of these tests that were

reportedly done is [Wright’s] self-reported memory loss . . . .

There are not other impairment[sic] noted and the info doesn’t

indicate how severe or mild that memory loss is as substantiated by

neuropsychological testing.” Id. at A282-83.

Concluding that there was no sufficient medical evidence

of the severity of Wright’s reported symptoms or any occupational

limitations, Hartford denied Wright’s STD benefits effective

October 28, 2001. See id. at A185-87. On the same day, Hartford

denied Wright’s LTD claim, because its conclusion that Wright was

not prevented from performing his job meant that one prerequisite

under the LTD portion of the Plan (disability throughout the 26-

week elimination period) was not satisfied. See id. at A214-16.

In its denial letters, Hartford specifically invited Wright to

submit “test results and reports which document deficits in short

term memory and how it affects your occupational functioning beyond

October 28, 2001.” See id. at A185-87; id. at A214-16.

D. Wright’s First Appeal

On December 3, 2001, Wright appealed Hartford’s initial

denial. See id. at A384-89. Wright provided explanatory

statements by himself and his wife as well as the

Neuropsychological Assessment of Dr. Avery dated October 2, 2001

and a December 6, 2001 letter of Dr. Dalby, indicating Dr. Dalby’s

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conclusion that Wright was disabled from performing his occupation.

See id.; id. at A222-24; id. at A220-21. Hartford considered this

additional evidence, as well as a job description submitted by

Wright’s employer. See id. at A217-19. By letter dated March 12,

2002, Hartford reaffirmed its denial, claiming that the documents

submitted did not provide any medical evidence regarding the

severity of any cognitive deficits suffered by Wright and, thus,

did not establish any specific occupational limitations. Id. at

A218. Hartford found the “results of the neuropsychological

testing is[sic] consistent with an ability to perform the essential

duties of [Wright’s] occupation.” Id.

E. Wright’s Second Appeal

Wright filed a second appeal on June 3, 2002, in which he

submitted an APS from a new neurologist, Dr. Bryan Lieberman. See

id. at A285-326. Dr. Lieberman diagnosed Wright with sleep apnea

and memory disorder. See id. at A355-56. In describing Wright’s

cognitive deficit, Dr. Lieberman termed it a “neurologic cognitive

disorder” including impaired memory, attention, and executive

function, as well as daytime somnolence, and fatigue. Id. Dr.

Lieberman concluded that the “above deficit disables [Wright] for

his job--working as a software engineer.” Id.

Hartford referred Wright’s entire file to two Independent

Medical Examiners at the University Disability Consortium for

review--Dr. Alvin McElveen, Neurologist, and Milton Jay, Ed.D,

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Neuropsychologist. Upon review of Wright’s case file, Dr. McElveen

concluded that sleep apnea had been documented; thus the medical

evidence “support[ed] cognitive impairment as a result of the

physical conditions present on 10/28/2001.” Dr. McElveen referred

to Dr. Jay’s report for an assessment of the effect of any

impairments on Wright’s cognitive functioning. Id. at A351. Dr.

Jay concluded that, although sleep apnea had been confirmed by a

polysomnogram ordered by Dr. Lieberman, the medical evidence did

not confirm that the apnea was causing even “mild difficulties in

cognition secondary to interrupted sleep and subsequent fatigue.”

Id. at A338.

Based on the opinions of Drs. Jay and McElveen, the

additional medical records from Drs. Cohen and Lieberman, the

information submitted by Wright in his appeal, and all the other

information already in the claim file, Hartford reiterated its

denial on October 2, 2002. Hartford reasoned that even assuming

minor cognitive difficulties existed, none were severe enough to

prevent Wright from performing the essential functions of his

occupation. See id. at A352-54.

F. District Court

Wright filed suit in the United States District Court for

the District of New Hampshire on June 10, 2003. Wright claimed

that Hartford acted under an inherent conflict of interest because

it both administered and funded the LTD benefits. Wright also

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alleged that Hartford acted under an actual conflict of interest,

evidenced by its bad faith in handling Wright’s claims for STD and

LTD benefits. Hartford’s conflict of interest, according to

Wright, required a less deferential review of Hartford’s denial of

Wright’s benefits. Furthermore, even under deferential arbitrary

and capricious review, according to Wright, Hartford’s denials of

STD and LTD benefits were not based upon substantial evidence,

reasonably sufficient to support Hartford’s decisions.

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

February 4, 2004, and Wright filed a cross Motion for Summary

Judgment on March 8, 2004. After extensive oral argument, the

district court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

denied Wright’s Motion for Summary Judgment on June 17, 2004. The

district court considered but rejected Wright’s claim that Hartford

acted out of an improper financial motivation. The court similarly

rejected Wright’s other arguments for heightened scrutiny of

Hartford’s decisions. Applying the arbitrary and capricious

standard of review, the district court found that, despite some

contradictory evidence, substantial evidence existed to support

Hartford’s decision that any cognitive deficits were minor and not

disabling. The court entered a Final Judgment on June 18, 2004.

Wright filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 14, 2004.

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 II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo. See Boardman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 337

F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2003). The district court generally reviews

an ERISA plan administrator’s benefits determinations de novo.

Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 697-98 (1st Cir. 1992). If,

however, by its terms, the ERISA plan grants the plan administrator

discretionary authority in the determination of eligibility for

benefits, the administrator’s decision must be upheld unless it is

“arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”3 Doyle v. Paul

Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 1998).

The operative inquiry under arbitrary, capricious or

abuse of discretion review is “whether the aggregate evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could

support a rational determination that the plan administrator acted

arbitrarily in denying the claim for benefits.” Twomey v. Delta

Airlines Pension Plan, 328 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing

Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002)). A

decision to deny benefits to a beneficiary will be upheld if the

3
For purposes of reviewing benefit determinations by an ERISA
plan administrator, the arbitrary and capricious standard is
functionally equivalent to the abuse of discretion standard. See
Pari-Fasano v. ITT Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 320 F.3d 415,
419 (1st Cir. 2000). We refer to the relevant standard as “abuse
of discretion review.”

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administrator’s decision “[was] reasoned and supported by

substantial evidence.” Gannon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d

211, 213 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Boardman, 337 F.3d at 15

(holding that a district court can “overturn [an administrator’s]

termination decision only if ‘the insurer’s eligibility

determination was unreasonable in light of the information

available to it’”)(internal citation omitted). Evidence is

substantial when it is “reasonably sufficient to support a

conclusion.” Id. Evidence contrary to an administrator’s decision

does not make the decision unreasonable, provided substantial

evidence supports the decision. See Gannon, 360 F.3d at 213; see

also Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184 (“Sufficiency, of course, does not

disappear merely by reason of contradictory evidence.”).

In applying the arbitrary and capricious standard,

however, the existence of a conflict of interest on the part of the

administrator is a factor which must be considered. Firestone Tire

& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In this Circuit,

if a court concludes there is an improper motivation amounting to

a conflict of interest, the court “may cede a diminished degree of

deference--or no deference at all--to the administrator’s

determinations.” Leahy, 315 F.3d at 16. However, “[a] chimerical,

imagined, or conjectural conflict will not strip the fiduciary’s

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determination of the deference that otherwise would be due.”4 Id.

If no conflict of interest is apparent, a court must proceed to

ensure that the decision was not objectively unreasonable in light

of the available evidence, recognizing that the existence of a

potential conflict of interest will affect the court’s

determination of what was reasonable conduct by the insurer under

the circumstances. Pari-Fasano, 230 F.3d at 419.

Here, there is no dispute that the Plan confers

discretion on the Plan Administrator. See App. at A147. The

parties disagree, however, as to whether Hartford labored under a

conflict of interest. Thus, before addressing the substantive

merits of the district court’s decision, it is necessary to

determine whether there was a conflict of interest, such that the

district court should have considered this as a factor in its

arbitrary and capricious review.

B. Conflict of Interest

Wright argues that Hartford labored under a conflict of

interest, as evidenced by (1) its dual status as payor of benefits

and administrator with respect to the LTD benefits and (2) other

factors that Wright claims evidence an “improper motivation.”

Upon a de novo review of the evidence, we conclude that

the district court properly rejected Wright’s claims that Hartford

4
The burden is on the claimant, here Wright, to demonstrate a
conflict of interest. Pari-Fasano, 230 F.3d at 418.

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acted under a conflict of interest.

1. Conflict Based on Status

Turning first to Wright’s structural conflict of interest

claim, the district court concluded that, although Hartford clearly

had a financial incentive to maximize profits with respect to the

LTD Plan, which it fully insured, the potential that it would deny

claims based on self-interest was not alone sufficient to alter the

standard of review. See App. at A89. Under the law of this

Circuit, “[t]he fact that [] the plan administrator[] will have to

pay [the plaintiff’s] claim[] out of its own assets does not change

[the arbitrary and capricious] standard of review.” Glista v. Unum

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 113, 125-26 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting

that simply because a plan administrator has to pay a claim does

not deprive the administrator of discretion when the terms of the

plan grant discretion); see also Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167

F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 1999); Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184.

In Pari-Fasano, the Court acknowledged that an insurer

“does have a conflict of sorts when a finding of eligibility means

that the insurer will have to pay benefits out of its own pocket,”

but determined that the market presents competing incentives that

substantially minimize the apparent conflict of interest. 230 F.3d

at 418. In Doyle, the Court identified the competing incentives,

explaining that employers have benefit plans to please employees

and, consequently, will not want to keep an overly tight-fisted

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insurer. 144 F.3d at 184. Thus, according to the Court, an

insurer could “hardly sell policies if it is too severe in

administering them.” Doe, 167 F.3d at 57.

Wright acknowledges this precedent but argues that the

rationale relied upon in these decisions overstates the ability of

market forces to minimize the apparent conflict. The district

court similarly was troubled by what it deemed the “false premise”

that an ERISA plan administrator that also has a financial stake in

the benefit decisions can act as a disinterested trustee. Bound by

well-established precedent, however, the court properly declined to

apply a less deferential standard due to the alleged structural

conflict.5

5
We also are bound by decisions of prior panels of this
Circuit, absent an opinion by the Supreme Court, an en banc opinion
of the Circuit or statutory overruling. See Iguarta-De La Rosa v.
United States, 386 F.3d 313, 313 (1st Cir. 2004). We are
nevertheless mindful that other circuits have rejected the market
forces rationale and specifically recognized a conflict of interest
when the insurer of an ERISA plan also serves as plan
administrator, although there is no consistent approach in
accordingly adjusting the standard of review. See, e.g., Fought v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that plan administrators acting under an inherent conflict of
interest have the burden of showing that their decision to deny
disability benefits is supported by substantial evidence); Davolt
v. Executive Comm. of O’Reilly Auto., 206 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir.
2000) (noting that de novo review may apply where “relationship
places the ERISA benefits plan administrator in a perpetual
conflict of interest”); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317,
1323 (9th Cir. 1995) (presuming conflict and shifting burden of
proof to insurer); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc.,
898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); Pinto v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co, 214 F.3d 377, 393 (3rd Cir. 2000) (adopting
sliding scale approach); Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Serv.,
3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co.,

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 2. Conflict Based on Improper Motivation

Having rejected Wright’s structural conflict of interest

argument, the district court turned to an examination of Wright’s

claims that Hartford was improperly motivated, see Doyle, 144 F.3d

at 184, finding each unpersuasive. On appeal, Wright claims that

the district court erred in failing to find a conflict of interest

on the part of Hartford based on: (1) the timing of the benefit

denial, coming immediately before Hartford would be financially

exposed under the LTD plan; (2) the fact that the medical evidence

supporting Wright’s claim was never reviewed by a physician prior

to Hartford’s denial of the STD and LTD claims on November 29,

2001; (3) the fact that the same examiner made both the STD and LTD

benefit determinations; (4) the fact that Hartford did not have a

copy of Wright’s job description prior to its denial of STD and LTD

benefits on November 29, 2001; and (5) Hartford’s refusal to

fulfill Wright’s requests for certain documentary evidence

concerning his claim.

a. Timing of Denial of STD and LTD Benefits

Wright claims that the timing of the rejection of both

his STD and LTD benefits—-as the LTD benefit date was approaching—-

demonstrated an actual conflict of interest. According to Wright,

Hartford granted STD benefits to Wright when it did not have a

974 F.2d 631, 638-42 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); Van Boxel v. Journal
Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir.
1987) (same).

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financial stake in the payment of benefits and then denied benefits

to Wright as the time approached when Hartford would be financially

liable. After a thorough review of the evidence, however, the

district court found that it was apparent that the decision to

terminate benefits was based on the evolving state of plaintiff’s

medical record. This conclusion was amply supported by the

evidence.

Hartford granted Wright’s STD benefits beginning on June

27, 2001. See App. at A379. Hartford extended the STD benefits

until August 20, 2001, after being informed by Plaintiff’s primary

care physician, Dr. Cohen, that Wright had undergone or would be

undergoing neuropsychological testing shortly. See id. at A189;

id. at A201; id. at A380. During the summer and fall of 2001, no

test results were provided to Hartford. Hartford, nevertheless,

extended STD benefits to September 23, then to October 14, and

finally to October 28, 2001, based on Dr. Cohen’s statements that

Wright should not return to work until the results of

neuropsychological testing were known. See id. at A189; id. at

A197; id. at A248. During that time, Hartford consistently

informed Wright that it was awaiting the results of

neuropsychological testing that would document the severity of his

self-reported memory loss. See id. at A192-A200. Following Dr.

Avery’s Neuropsychological Assessment on October 2, 2001, Dr. Cohen

submitted an APS, indicating a level of impairment below that of

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“[l]imited in performing some occupational duties.” Id. at A191.

Dr. Cohen additionally reported to Hartford that the tests showed

that “short term memory is good” but that Wright had some “weakness

recalling long term events and narriatives[sic].” See id. at A193.

Dr. Cohen indicated that Wright’s MRI was normal. See id. Dr.

Dalby submitted an APS shortly thereafter, stating that Wright

suffered “severe short term memory loss.” This finding directly

contradicted the neuropsychological test results, as reported by

Dr. Cohen. See id. at A213.

Wright, thus, did not present a consistent

diagnosis or opinion on functional limitation. Hartford’s

decision to deny further benefits was reasonably based on evidence

indicating that Wright did not suffer the limitations in performing

his essential job functions that would qualify him for the

disability benefits. The timing of the denial of benefits did not

evidence an improper motivation on the part of Hartford, amounting

to a conflict of interest.

b. Denial of Benefits Initially Made Without
Review by Physician

Wright argues that Hartford did not have a physician

review his medical record before denying his STD and LTD claims on

November 29, 2001, evidencing that the decisions were based on an

actual conflict of interest. The district court properly rejected

this argument.

As Appellees indicate, courts have not required that an

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ERISA claimant’s medical records always be independently verified

by medical doctors as a prerequisite to a benefit determination.

See generally Brigham v. Sun Life, 317 F.3d 72, 85 (1st Cir. 2003)

(concluding administrator not required to conduct independent

medical evaluation when treating physician’s reports supported

finding of no disability).

Here, it is clear that the plan administrator reviewed

the documentation submitted by Wright’s primary care physician, Dr.

Cohen, who opined in his APS that Wright’s symptoms were not so

severe as to prevent him from performing occupational functions.

See App. at A245. Hartford was not acting in bad faith, or under

an improper motivation, in relying on Dr. Cohen’s conclusions to

deny benefits to Wright without an independent medical evaluation.

c. Use of Same Examiner for STD and LTD Benefit
Determinations

Wright argues that the same claims examiner denied both

the STD and LTD claims, thus indicating that there was no

“independence between Hartford’s STD and LTD departments.”

Appellant’s Br. at 28. The district court correctly determined

that the fact that the same examiner made both LTD and STD benefits

determinations did not demonstrate a conflict of interest.

There are no statutory or regulatory provisions under

ERISA requiring independence, and Wright cites to no authority

indicating that such an overlap makes benefits decisions suspect.

Furthermore, it is clear that the claims administrator reviewed the

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medical evidence submitted by Wright and based the benefits

determination largely on the conclusions of Wright’s own physician,

Dr. Cohen. See App. at A245.

d. Hartford Did Not have a Copy of Wright’s Job
Description Before Denying Benefits

Wright claims that Hartford’s failure to obtain a copy of

his job description before denying benefits on November 29, 2001

evidences Hartford’s bad faith. The district court properly

rejected this argument.

It was Wright’s burden to provide evidence that he was

unable to perform the duties of his occupation. See Boardman, 337

F.3d at 16. An integral part of that evidence would be a statement

of what his job required. Wright never submitted such a statement.

Instead, Hartford actively sought out and obtained a copy of

Wright’s job description during the review process.6 See App. at

A102-103.

e. Hartford’s Refusal to Fulfill Wright’s Requests for
Certain Documentary Evidence

Wright claims that Hartford declined to provide him with

a transcript of a telephone conversation between them, and with a

6
Wright also contends that Hartford’s criticism of Dr. Dalby’s
conclusion that Wright was disabled from performing his job because
Dr. Dalby was not aware of Wright’s job description evidenced
Hartford’s improper motivation. Although Dr. Dalby indicated to
Hartford that he was aware that Wright’s job required giving
presentations, see App. at A273, the district court properly found
no indication of bad faith in Hartford’s concern about Dr. Dalby’s
lack of information about the specific requirements of the
occupation for which Wright claimed disability.

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copy of the Summary Detail Report--which contained summaries of

Hartford’s communications with Wright, his doctors, and among

examiners--despite his written requests. Hartford responds that it

did provide one requested telephone transcript and that a second

one was requested for an occasion when, in fact, only a recorded

message had been left on Wright’s voicemail. As for the Summary

Detail Report, Hartford indicates that the substance thereof was

either already known to Wright, or was communicated to him in

letters, telephone conversations and copies of his claim file from

Hartford.

It appears that Hartford did provide adequate documentary

evidence to Wright, and we decline to interpret the omission of the

Summary Detail Report as an indication of bad faith.

Wright, thus, failed to establish any improper

motivations on the part of Hartford, amounting to a conflict of

interest. Accordingly, the district court properly reviewed the

substantive merits of Wright’s claims under an arbitrary and

capricious standard.

C. Review of Denial of Wright’s STD and LTD Claims

Wright argues that even under the deferential arbitrary

and capricious standard Hartford’s denial of Wright’s STD and LTD

benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically,

Wright claims that Dr. Lieberman’s diagnosis of sleep apnea, along

with his opinion that Wright was totally disabled, “cannot

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reasonably be diminished by any other evidence in Mr. Wright’s

file.” Appellant’s Br. at 32.

The district court found that there was not substantial

disagreement that Wright suffered from sleep apnea or that Wright’s

memory was generally average or above, except for some limited

areas--causing some impairment to his cognitive capacities. See

App. at A93. The district court noted, however, that based on the

entire medical record there was disagreement among all the

physicians (including Wright’s treating physicians and Hartford’s

independent medical examiners) as to the extent of the impairment

and the impact on Wright’s ability to perform his essential job

functions. Id.; see Matias-Correa v. Pfizer, Inc., 345 F.3d 7, 12

(1st Cir. 2003) (noting that it is not the court’s role to evaluate

how much weight an insurer should have accorded the opinion of an

independent medical consultant relative to the opinions of a

claimant’s own physicians). The district court reasoned that

although there was conflicting medical evidence, there was

sufficient evidence that Wright’s impairments were minor and not

disabling according to the STD and LTD Plan provisions. Id.; see

also Vlass v. Raytheon Employees Disability Trust, 244 F.3d 27, 30

(1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of contradictory evidence does

not, in itself, make the administrator’s decision arbitrary.”).

Mindful of the deferential nature of arbitrary and

capricious or abuse of discretion review, we conclude that the

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district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we agree with the lower

court’s conclusion that the termination of Wright’s STD benefits

and denial of Wright’s LTD benefits, as a matter of law, did not

violate ERISA. We therefore affirm the summary judgment dismissing

Wright’s action.

AFFIRMED.

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