Plaintiffs contend that a clause in an agreement they entered into with defendants constituted an
The trial court weighed the evidence as to the parties’ intent, examined the document, and found that an option, rather than a right of first refusal was intended by the parties. Defendants have appealed, assigning error to the court’s finding.
The questioned clause recited
the second parties [defendants] do give and grant to the first parties [plaintiffs] the first exclusive right and option to purchase the above described premises, after the erection of the said five unit apartment building . . .
(Italics ours.)
Whatever ambiguity, if any, on the face of the agreement has been resolved by the trial court’s finding as to the true intention of the parties. There being substantial evidence to support the finding, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959). Further, the option was conditioned only upon the erection of the building (which is conceded). See Willenbrock v. Latulippe, 125 Wash. 168, 215 P. 330 (1923). Upon the fulfillment of the condition— the completion of the building — the option became absolute and exercisable at plaintiffs’ discretion. Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., 33 Wn.2d 169, 205 P.2d 597 (1949). Plaintiffs did exercise their option and the trial court decreed specific performance thereof. On defendant’s appeal, we cannot order otherwise.
By way of cross-appeal, however, plaintiffs have assigned error to the court’s refusal to allow a 7 per cent discount in the agreed price of the property. The agreement provides, in part:
The gross price shall be the sum of Fifty-Two Thousand Dollars ($52,000) less seven per cent (7%) . . .
Plaintiff, Robert F. Wright, is a real estate broker who, with an associate broker, acquired the property in 1966. Subsequently, title to the property was turned over
Judgment affirmed.
Pearson and Armstrong, JJ., concur.