delivered the opinion of the court.
Although not alleged in the complaint, it was assumed at the argument, and we shall assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that the provisions of the law governing the manner of levying, assessing, and collecting taxes, apportioning state revenues among the several counties, and requiring them to make the necessary levy, have been fully complied with by both the State and plaintiff county. The questions presented for consideration are, therefore, (1) whether the act providing the manner of apportioning state revenues among the several counties is constitutional; and (2) if not, whether plaintiff is entitled to any relief by this suit.
The several constitutional provisions, so far as applicable, are as follows:
“The legislative assembly shall provide by law for uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation; and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes, as may be specially exempted by law.” Article IX, Section 1.
“The legislative assembly shall provide for raising revenue sufficient to defray the expenses of the State for each fiscal year, and also a sufficient sum to pay the interest on the State debt, if there be any.” Article IX, Section 2.
“Whenever the expenses of any fiscal year shall exceed the income the legislative assembly shall provide for levying a tax for the ensuing fiscal year, sufficient with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency, as well as the estimated expense of the ensuing fiscal year.” Article IX, Section 6.
In 1907 the legislature passed an act for the levy and collection of taxes (Laws 1907, p. 453), section 8 of
1. In pursuance of these several provisions of law, the Governor, Secretary of State, and State Treasurer, acting jointly, in January, 1908, ascertained the amount of money to be raised during that year for state purposes, and apportioned the same among the counties in the manner provided in section 9, and the Secretary of State duly notified the county clerk of plaintiff county of such apportionment. After receiving notice thereof, and in January, 1908, the county court of plaintiff county, as required by section 1 of the act of 1907, made a tax levy for that year sufficient to raise the necessary money for county purposes and the amount so apportioned to the county by the State officers. The assessment roll, with the tax duly extended thereon, was delivered to the sheriff for the collection of the tax, and, after a sufficient amount had been collected and paid over to the county treasurer to satisfy the first installment due the State, the county commenced this suit to restrain and enjoin the treasurer from paying the money over, on the ground that the law under which the apportionment was made is unconstitutional and void, because such apportionment was not made on an equal and uniform rate throughout the State. The constitution requires the legislature to provide for an equal and uniform valuation of property for taxation by public officers, at regular intervals, and an equal and uniform rate of taxation upon the basis of such valuation, until the period arises for making it anew. Perfect uniformity and equality in the valuation of property is unattainable. Approximation is all that can be had, and, unless the method adopted by law for that purpose is clearly inadequate to secure the result, the courts cannot interfere.
3. Thus the Constitution of Illinois prescribes that the general assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to his or her property, and it was held that one class of counties could not be taxed at a higher rate for State purposes than another class that happened to be more largely in debt. Ramsey v. Hoeger, 76 Ill. 432. The constitutional provisions of Indiana are the same as ours. It is held in that State that a tax must be equal and uniform throughout the territory in which it is laid, whether state, county, or city, and consequently a law imposing a tax on one township for the erection of a county courthouse and jail therein was void, because it was for a county purpose, and not uniform throughout the entire county. Board of Commissioners of Jackson County v. State ex rel, 155 Ind. 604 (58 N. E. 1037). The same principles would seem to apply to a tax for state purposes, and it is therefore difficult to formulate a satisfactory reason why the constitutional provisions invoked in the case, requiring equality and uniformity in the rate of taxation, should not apply to the State when it endeavors to raise money by an exercise of the taxing powers. It is true the general scheme of assessing and collecting taxes in this State creates the relation of debtor and creditor between the county and the State, for the amount of state revenues apportioned to the county, to the extent that it becomes a liability against the county for which an action may be maintained, and for which the county may be charged, whether it collects the tax or not. State v. Baker County, 24 Or. 141 (33 Pac. 530);
4. Every burden which the State imposes upon its citizens with a view to a revenue is levied under the power of taxation, whether called a tax or some other name. Cooley, Const. Lim. § 713.
5. Nor has the State such control over the funds of a county that it may divert the money received from the citizens of one county by taxation for the benefit of the citizens of another.
6. The money thus acquired is not the property of the county in the sense in which property of a private person or corporation is regarded, but is public property and within constitutional limits subject to legislative control.
• 7. A county may, therefore, be required by law to apply all or part of its funds to any legitimate public purpose, so long as it does not conflict with some constitutional provision. 27 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 ed.), 868; People ex rel. City of Springfield v. Power, County Judge, 25 111. 187; Sangamon County v. City of Springfield, 63 111. 66; Brown v. Commissioners, 100 N. C. 92 (5 S. E. 178) ; Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 3; State ex rel. v. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo. 546; People v. Alameda County, 26 Cal. 647; Commissioners of Ottawa County v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234 (27 Am. Rep. 101) ; Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y. 608. But the citizens of one public corporation cannot be compelled to pay the debts or obligations of another. Simon V. Northup, 27 Or. 487 (40 Pac. 560: 30 L. R. A. 171).
8. And such would seem to be the effect of a law imposing an unequal rate of taxation for state purposes. It may be, and perhaps is, true that the basis of appor
9. Mr. High says:
“It may be laid down as a general rule that equity will not interfere by injunction with the collection of a tax which is alleged to be illegal or void merely becausePage 133of its illegality, hardship, or irregularity, but there must be some special circumstances attending the threatened injury to distinguish it from a mere trespass, and thus to bring the, case within some recognized head of equity jurisprudence; otherwise the person aggrieved will be left to his remedy at law.” Hill, Injunctions, § 485.
10. The reason of this doctrine is that the levying of a tax is a legislative, and not a judicial, question, and a court of equity has no power to apportion the tax or make a new assessment. It is therefore hampered in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the necessity of enjoining the tax complained of, in whole or in part, without any power of doing complete justice by making or causing to.be made a new assessment or apportionment, or any principle it may deem to be the right one. It is necessary that the taxes, without which the State could not exist, should be regularly and promptly paid into the treasury, and therefore no court of equity will allow an injunction to issue to restrain the collection of a tax, except upon a clear showing of some grounds of equitable relief other than the illegality or irregularity of the tax, leaving the aggrieved party to his remedy at law.
11. Now the county court, of plaintiff county, treated the apportionment of State taxes made by the State officers as a valid obligation against the county for the purpose of levying and collecting the money from the taxpayers with which to discharge it. The money has been collected and paid into the county treasury, and the county cannot be permitted, under such circumstances, to interfere by injunctive process to prevent its payment to the State.
12. A county is not a private corporation, and its rights are not to be determined by the law applicable to such a corporation. It is merely a political agent of the State, created by law for governmental purposes, and is charged with the performance of certain duties for and on behalf of the State, among which is the levy and
13. A public officer or agent of the State who receives money for it, cannot refuse to pay it on the ground that it was illegally exacted from the person from whom collected. Commonwealth v. City of Philadelphia, 27 Pa. 497; Placer County v. Astin, 8 Cal. 303; Waters v. State, 1 Gill (Md.), 302; O’Neal v. Board of School Commissioners, 27 Md. 227; People v. Myers, 59 Hun. 617 (13 N. Y. Supp. 182); People v. Williams, 3 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.), 338.
It follows from these views that the decree of the court below must be reversed and one entered here dismissing the complaint.
Reversed : Dismissed.