By the deed of the 6th of July 1870, Benjamin Young, the plaintiff, granted to Fayette Shaw, William Shaw and Brackley Shaw, co-partners in the name of F, Shaw & Bros., certain rights in his timber township, in the following language:
“Said Benjamin Young in consideration of the agreements and stipulations hereinafter written, does hereby give, grant, bargain, sell and convey and confirm unto the said F. Shaw & Bros., party of the second part, the exclusive right to enter upon and improve and clear the bed and banks of the stream called the Sisledobsis Stream, flowing from Sisledobsis Lake into Pocumpus Lake through my lands, lying in township No. 5, in the county of Washington, and to build dams and locks upon said stream, and rstraighten the course thereof, so as to make said stream navigable .for boats, steam-boats and scows of any size deemed advisable by said F. Shaw & Bros., and for this purpose to remove any earth, rocks or other material, and dig and excavate in and upon the bed ■and banks of said stream and the ground adjacent thereto, and to make canals through the same, if necessary for the purposes afore.said. And all the said improvements, locks, canals, erections or .excavations to use and improve, keep up and repair, with the right :and privilege for the purposes aforesaid, to pass and repass over and upon my lands there situated whenever necessary thereto. The said Shaw & Bros., not however by any of said improvements or operations, or the use thereof, to hinder or prevent the use of the mill privilege at the outlet of Sisledobsis Lake, nor to injure the same for milling purposes.”
This is followed by a grant'to the Shaws of the exclusive right
Then follows another grant by the plaintiff to the Shaws, for the consideration aforesaid, the right to cut and haul from said lands hemlock logs, timber and bark not exceeding one million feet of saw logs in any one year, for the term of ten years at the rate of $2.00 per thousand feet for the saw logs, including the bark therefrom. And the Shaws on their part covenant to cut and peel the quantity of logs required by said agreement and to pay for the same at the rate stipulated, on the first day of July of the year after the same was peeled.
Under this deed, the Shaws entered upon the plaintiff’s land, improved said stream, constructed canals and locks between said lakes, and cut from time to time the hemlock on the plaintiff’s land and peeled the bark, paying for the same according to the stipulations in their contract, until July 1, 1883, when they became insolvent and failed to pay the sum then due. They had used said stream and the canals and locks they constructed for transporting their bark and general merchandize in their boats and scows to that time. In July 1886, the Shaws conveyed all their right, title and interest, in said premises including bark peeled prior to 1883, then on the plaintiff’s land, to Charles W. Clement, trustee, to secure a debt for money borrowed. And it was agreed that he holds all the title that the Shaws could convoy in the property in dispute.
After the conveyance to the defendant Clement in 1886, the plaintiff gave to the Shaws and to Clement notice in writing that
There is no condition in the deed that the rights in the stream and the locks and canals, which the Shaws might erect under the grant, should be forfeited on failure to pay for the bark or logs as stipulated, nor that on failure to pay as stipulated, the title to the logs and bark cut should be forfeited to the plaintiff. True, there was a' covenant on the part of the Shaws to cut and pay for the logs and bark as stipulated. But there is no stipulation that a failure to keep that covenant should forfeit their rights to their erections upon the stream and the use of them for navigation.
We think it unquestionable that in 1886, when they conveyed to the defendant, they owned the bark which they had cut prior to 1883, and had a right to use the stream and their erections upon it for the purpose of .transporting the same to their tannery, or to a market; and that by the conveyance to the defendant he succeeded to their rights, and that the plaintiff had no right to close the navigation of the stream against him. In doing what he did, the defendant was not a trespasser.
¡Exceptions overruled.