United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 4, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30115
_____________________
JAYSUKH ZALAWADIA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL; JAMES ZIGLAR; LYNNE
UNDERDOWN; BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondents-Appellees.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY and WIENER, Circuit Judges, and WALTER, District
Judge.*
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Jaysukh Zalawadia was deported to India while his habeas
appeal challenging the legality of the deportation order was
pending. This appeal requires us to determine the effect
deportation of a habeas petitioner has on (1) our ability to
exercise continued jurisdiction over that petition and (2) the
nature and scope of habeas relief available to an alien deported
under a defective deportation order. For the reasons explained
below, we hold that we have habeas jurisdiction over this petition.
*
District Judge, United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
We vacate this deportation order and also hold that, because of the
limited nature of habeas, we lack authority, in this habeas action,
to grant relief beyond simply vacating the defective order under
which he was deported. The petitioner, whose liberty interests and
rights are now no longer encumbered by the deportation order, must
turn to other procedural remedies, if any, for further relief.
I
Jaysukh Zalawadia, a native and citizen of India, was admitted
into the United States in September 1988. In 1995, he pleaded
guilty to a charge of burglary and felony theft and was sentenced
to two years probation and required to pay restitution. At the
time, his guilty plea had no immediate effect on his immigration
status. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as it then
existed, conviction of these offenses did not render him subject to
deportation; they were not deportable “aggravated felonies” as
defined by the Act1 nor did they meet the conditions necessary to
constitute deportable “crimes of moral turpitude.”2 These
1
The INA defined “aggravated felony” as “murder, any illicit
trafficking in any controlled substance (as defined in section . .
. including any drug trafficking crime . . . or any illicit
trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices . . . or any
crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment imposed
(regardless of any suspension of such imprisonment) is at least 5
years . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(1994 ed.).
2
Conviction of a crime of moral turpitude was a deportable
offense only when the conviction came within five years after the
original date of entry and resulted in confinement in prison for
one year or longer. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i). Zalawadia’s
conviction satisfies neither of these conditions.
2
convictions did create the possibility that Zalawadia could be
rendered inadmissible should he leave the country and attempt to
re-enter; under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 § U.S.C.
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), a lawful permanent resident who had been
convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” would be deemed
inadmissible should that resident leave the United States and later
seek reentry. However, the Supreme Court had interpreted this
condition only to apply to travel outside the United States that
was not “brief, casual or innocent.” Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374
U.S. 449 (1963) (holding that lawful permanent residents who travel
abroad should be admitted, even if otherwise inadmissible, if their
travel was “brief, casual, or innocent”). In addition, the INA
contained a provision granting the Attorney General of the United
States the broad discretion to admit aliens who were otherwise
excludable on the basis of a prior criminal conviction. Under §
212(c) of that act, any lawfully admitted alien “who temporarily
proceeded abroad voluntarily . . . and who [is] returning to a
lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven years” was eligible for
this discretionary waiver. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994
ed.). Thus, under the law as it then existed, Zalawadia’s criminal
conviction would affect his immigration status only if his travel
outside the United States was not “brief, casual or innocent” and
even then, he would be eligible to apply for discretionary relief
with the Attorney General could he prove seven years of
unrelinquished domicile.
3
The passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 had two specific effects on
Zalawadia’s immigration status. First, the IIRIRA’s amendments to
the INA ostensibly superseded the rule announced in Fleuti; under
the amended INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), as interpreted by
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), a lawful permanent resident
could be barred from reentry regardless of the nature of his travel
outside the country. See In Re Collado, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1061 (BIA
Dec. 18, 1997).3 In addition, the IIRIRA specifically repealed §
212(c), replacing it with § 240(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1259b. Zalawadia
was no longer eligible for a discretionary waiver from the Attorney
General under this new provision.4
Zalawadia soon felt the effects of these statutory changes.
In 1998, he briefly left the country on a business trip abroad.
Upon returning, because the INS had concluded that Fleuti’s rule no
3
It appears no court has yet reviewed the BIA’s determination
that Fleuti’s rule was superseded by statute. There is no need for
us to examine this conclusion in any detail, however, as it has not
been challenged here. All that is important in this case is that
immigration officials assumed that Fleuti no longer applied,
leading them to detain Zalawadia when he attempted to reenter the
country.
4
The new provision considerably restricted the class of aliens
eligible for discretionary relief from the Attorney General. Under
its terms, the Attorney General was barred from granting waivers to
aliens who, among other things, had been convicted of an aggravated
felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). The IIRIRA enlarged the definition
of offenses constituting aggravated felonies to include, inter
alia, burglary and theft offenses for which a one-year term of
imprisonment is imposed. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).
4
longer applied, he was treated as an arriving alien, detained, and
issued a Notice to Appear charging him with inadmissibility as a
result of his 1995 convictions. In the original removal
proceedings before an immigration judge, Zalawadia conceded
removability but requested cancellation of his removal order
pursuant to § 240A(a) of the INA -- the provision that had replaced
§ 212(c). The immigration judge found that Zalawadia’s convictions
prevented him from meeting the residency requirements for
cancellation of removal (seven years of unrelinquished lawful
domicile) and ordered him removed.
Zalawadia filed a timely appeal to the BIA. There, apparently
for the first time, he contended that he was entitled to claim
eligibility for a waiver under the old Immigration and Nationality
Act, § 212(c). That appeal was dismissed, because the BIA found
that the IIRIRA’s repeal of § 212(c) should be applied
retroactively. Zalawadia’s motion to reconsider and reopen was
also dismissed.
Zalawadia then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court.5 There, he contended that his detention
and removal order were illegal because the BIA had improperly
applied retroactively the provisions of the IIRIRA, thereby
5
Before filing his habeas petition, Zalawadia filed an appeal
of the BIA’s decision with this court and also sought a stay of
removal. We dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and
denied the stay motion. See Zalawadia v. INS, No. 99-60593 (5th
Cir. Oct. 21, 1999).
5
erroneously determining him to be ineligible for § 212(c) relief.
The habeas petition was dismissed, as was Zalawadia’s request for
a stay of the removal order. Zalawadia appealed to this court, but
while his appeal was pending, he was deported. We then dismissed
his appeal. That dismissal did not end this case, however.
Following his deportation and our dismissal of his appeal,
Zalawadia filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court, which was granted. The Supreme Court vacated this
court’s judgment in the light of INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001), a 2001 case holding, in relevant part, that the IIRIRA did
not apply retroactively. We then vacated the decision of the
district court and remanded for further consideration consistent
with St. Cyr.
After remand, a magistrate judge recommended that Zalawadia’s
habeas petition be denied because he had not accrued seven years of
unrelinquished lawful domicile at the time of the plea agreement in
his criminal case -- a precondition to eligibility for § 212(c)
relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.). In short, the
magistrate found that Zalawadia was not entitled to habeas relief
because the order of deportation did not violate Zalawadia’s rights
under the statute. The district court adopted the magistrate’s
recommendation and this appeal followed.
II
Zalawadia now contends that the district court erred in
considering the merits of his claim of eligibility for relief
6
instead of remanding the matter to the BIA (which had not had the
chance to consider his arguments on the seven-year domicile
requirement), as it should have under INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12
(2002).6 Accordingly, he urges us to grant habeas relief by
reversing and vacating the district court judgment and remanding to
that court with instructions that it remand the case to the BIA,
directing it to consider his claims under § 212(c).
In response, the government concedes that the district court
committed error in considering Zalawadia’s eligibility for relief
de novo; it concedes that, in accordance with Ventura, such
questions are for the BIA to determine in the first instance.
Irrespective of whether the district court erred in that respect,
its error is irrelevant to a determination of this appeal. More
fundamentally, the government contends that the district court had
no habeas jurisdiction to hear this case in the first place. It
asserts that because Zalawadia has been deported, he cannot satisfy
the “in custody” requirement for federal habeas jurisdiction.
Alternatively, the government contends that even if habeas
jurisdiction does exist, Zalawadia is still not entitled to any
relief as removed aliens are not authorized by statute or
6
In Ventura, the Supreme Court held that federal courts are
not generally empowered to conduct initial inquiries into matters
that statutes place primarily in agency hands. In such cases, the
agencies perform the role of initial factfinders; federal courts
may only properly involve themselves after the agencies have first
considered the underlying merits of the claim, and then only in an
appellate review fashion. 537 U.S. at 16-17.
7
regulation to apply for § 212(c) relief from abroad. We disagree
that we lack habeas jurisdiction. We do agree, however, that we do
not have authority as a habeas court to order the relief Zalawadia
seeks, albeit for different reasons than those urged by the
government. We hold that relief in this habeas proceeding is
limited to vacating the order of deportation.
III
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the district
court had habeas jurisdiction over this case. We hold that it did.
The government contends that habeas jurisdiction no longer
exists here because Zalawadia has been deported and is no longer in
custody; accordingly, it argues that he is unable to satisfy the
“in custody” requirement of federal habeas jurisdiction. This
argument, however, is foreclosed by our own precedent as well as
the unanimous precedent of our sister circuits.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the “in custody”
determination is made at the time the habeas petition is filed.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391
U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968). Moreover, this court has previously held
that this rule applies to petitioners who have been deported in the
same way it applies to any other habeas petitioner no longer in
custody. In Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 2000), rev’d
on other grounds, 533 U.S. 945 (2001), this court exercised habeas
jurisdiction over a deported alien where that alien had been in
custody at the time the suit was filed. When confronted with
8
similar facts, our sister circuits have reached the same
conclusion, uniformly holding that a deportation subsequent to the
filing of the petition in habeas corpus does not deprive the courts
of jurisdiction. See Leitao v. Reno, 311 F.3d 453, 455 (1st Cir.
2002); Chong v. District Director, INS, 264 F.3d 378 (3d Cir.
2001); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2002); Zegarra-
Gomez v. INS, 314 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
The government nevertheless objects to the district court
exercising jurisdiction, arguing that Zalawadia’s changed
condition, i.e., his deportation, has caused him to lose his “in
custody” status. It notes that the Supreme Court has never held
that a habeas petitioner’s “in custody” status, once established,
may never be lost as a result of an event occurring during the
pendency of the habeas litigation. Although this is certainly an
accurate statement of law, it incorrectly conflates habeas’ “in
custody” requirement with the requirement that a petition not be
moot. As the Supreme Court explained in Spencer, for a court to
exercise habeas jurisdiction over a petitioner no longer in
custody, the petitioner must demonstrate that he was in custody at
the time he filed the petition and that his subsequent release has
not rendered the petition moot, i.e., that he continues to present
a case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution.
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. The petitioner presents an Article III
controversy when he demonstrates “some concrete and continuing
9
injury other than the now-ended incarceration” -- a “collateral
consequence of the conviction.” Id. (internal quotations removed).
In Max-George, we dealt with a similar question. There, the
petitioner had been deported during the pendency of his habeas
petition. The government apparently conceded the fact that the
petitioner had filed the petition while in custody, but argued that
his subsequent deportation had rendered it moot. We rejected that
argument, finding that the petitioner continued to face a concrete
collateral consequence of his deportation -- a statutory ten-year
waiting period before he was eligible for reentry -- and therefore,
that the petition was not moot. Max-George, 205 F.3d at 196.
Other circuits have reached similar conclusions, holding that the
bar on readmission of a removed alien is a legally cognizable
collateral consequence that preserves a live controversy even after
deportation of the petitioner. See Leitao, 311 F.3d at 455; Chong,
264 F.3d at 385; Smith, 295 F.3d at 428; Zegarra-Gomez, 314 F.3d at
1127.
Here, it is undisputed that Zalawadia’s deportation bars him
from seeking reentry into the United States for a period of five
years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(I). This penalty constitutes
a cognizable collateral consequence; as such, his petition presents
a live case or controversy and is not moot. Accordingly, because
Zalawadia’s petition was filed when he was in custody and is not
moot, we hold that we have habeas jurisdiction this case.
IV
10
The government contends that even if we do have jurisdiction
over this matter, this court should affirm the district court’s
judgment because no statute or regulation authorizes an alien who
has been removed from the United States to apply for section 212(c)
relief. The government notes that according to federal regulations
governing the BIA, “a motion to reopen or to reconsider shall not
be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her
departure from the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). It
asserts that upon lawful execution of his removal order, the
removal case against Zalawadia, for all substantive purposes, was
completed. Accordingly, it argues that he is unable to bring this
claim before the BIA because federal regulations bar the BIA from
hearing it. This argument seems akin to a mootness argument --
that his removal mooted any claim for relief that might otherwise
be available to him.
In any event, finally resolving this particular question of
the federal regulation is not necessary in order to reach a
conclusion concerning Zalawadia’s habeas petition. The basic
question before this court on habeas review is a narrow one: was
Zalawadia’s detention illegal? If it was, we must grant his
petition and apply the appropriate remedy. By granting certiorari,
reversing, remanding, and citing St. Cyr, the Supreme Court has
already made clear that the deportation order under which Zalawadia
had been detained was legally flawed because the BIA improperly
11
applied the IIRIRA’s restrictive provisions retroactively. It
follows that, like St. Cyr, Zalawadia’s detention based on that
order, which deprived him of the discretionary benefits of the
applicable statute, was illegal. Moreover, as we have explained,
although Zalawadia has been released from detention, he still faces
concrete collateral consequences arising out of that illegal order.
Accordingly, Zalawadia is entitled to appropriate habeas relief
quite aside from how a particular government regulation may apply
to him now. The question is what relief is appropriate in this
habeas proceeding.
Zalawadia contends that the acknowledgment of the invalidity
of the order of deportation requires a remand to the BIA with
instructions to hold a new deportation proceeding in which
Zalawadia’s request for § 212(c) relief may be properly considered.
After examining his arguments, however, we conclude that the only
form of habeas relief appropriate here is for the district court to
vacate the original deportation order. Ordering any other relief
would be inconsistent with the limited authority a habeas court
possesses. We must underscore what this case is and what it is
not. This case is not the direct appeal of the BIA’s decision, in
which we could review the full scope of Zalawadia’s claims and
order the BIA to correct its mistakes. The IIRIRA has indeed
stripped us of such jurisdiction.7 This fact significantly narrows
7
Under the IIRIRA, habeas actions are the only avenue of
appeal open to an individual in Zalawadia’s position. The IIRIRA
12
the scope of our review and, by extension, the nature of the relief
available.
In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the
significant distinction between direct review and habeas review in
the immigration context. Specifically, the Court stated that “it
is the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates habeas
review from judicial review.” 533 U.S. at 312 (quoting Heikkila v.
Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 236 (1953)). The Court noted that the pre-
IIRIRA statutory regime allowed for direct review of immigration
decisions, observing that this type of review bestowed upon courts
the “broad authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief in
immigration cases.” Id. at 309. In contrast, in the wake of the
IIRIRA’s withdrawal of such direct review jurisdiction, the sole
form of review available to aliens protesting the legality of their
deportation is habeas. Id. Under this new, habeas-only regime,
“the limited role played by the courts” is “far narrower than the
judicial review authorized by the [the old statutory structure].”
Id. at 312.
Apart from acknowledging that “the scope of review on habeas
is considerably more limited than on [direct review],” St. Cyr did
specifically states that courts of appeals have no authority to
engage in direct review of a final order of deportation against an
alien who is removable by reason of committing a criminal offense
like the one Zalawadia committed here. See 8 U.S.C.A. §
1252(a)(2)(c). The Supreme Court has held that this statute did
not, however, preclude individuals from seeking habeas review of
such an order. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294-315.
13
not discuss precisely what those limits are. These limits,
however, are readily identified by examining the nature of habeas
corpus and analyzing Supreme Court case law in this field. As its
Latin meaning suggests, the writ of habeas corpus performs a
precise and specific function: it forces the government to justify
a decision to hold an individual in custody. “The very office of
the Great Writ, its only function, is to inquire into the legality
of the detention of one in custody.” Heflin v. United States, 358
U.S. 415, 421 (1959); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699
(2001) (holding that the “historic purpose of the writ [is] to
relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial”)
(quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in result)). A habeas court must thus confine the scope
of its review to considering the legality of the custody at issue.
Habeas exists “to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that
right is denied and a person confined, the federal court has the
power to release him. Indeed, it has no other power; . . . it can
act only on the body of the petitioner.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 430-31 (1963) (emphasis added). This means that, unlike
direct review where the correctness of a court or agency order is
comprehensively and directly before the court, a habeas court
reviews the correctness of such an order only insofar as it relates
to “detention simpliciter,” id. at 430. In other words, habeas is
not shorthand for direct review. Unlike direct review where courts
14
have “broad authority” to grant relief, St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 309,
habeas is not “a generally available federal remedy for every
violation of federal rights,” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s
Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982), nor can it “be utilized
to review a refusal to grant collateral administrative relief,
unrelated to the legality of custody.” Amanullah v. Nelson, 811
F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1987).
Habeas’ singular focus on the legality of detention not only
constrains the scope of a habeas court’s review, it constrains both
the class of individuals to whom the writ is available and the
nature of relief that court may afford if and when the writ issues.
As we previously indicated, only individuals who are in custody at
the time of filing may petition the court for habeas relief. The
relief available under the writ is similarly limited.
The traditional form of relief available under habeas is
discharge of the applicant from current physical custody. See,
e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n.12 (1980) (noting that
the “unique purpose of habeas corpus” is “to release the applicant
for the writ from unlawful confinement”). Habeas relief, however,
is not confined to this form alone; over the years, its mandate has
become broader. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968).
See also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973) (stating
that “habeas corpus relief is not limited to immediate release from
illegal custody”). Where an individual is no longer in custody
(but was at the time he filed the action), the Court has recognized
15
that the individual may be facing collateral legal restraints on
his liberty, flowing from the original order that placed him in
detention. Such restraints include legal ineligibility to serve on
a jury, vote, hold office or operate certain businesses. Spencer,
523 U.S. at 8. See also Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211,
221-23 (1946) (conviction rendered petitioner liable to deportation
and denial of naturalization, and ineligible to serve on a jury,
vote, or hold office); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954)
(conviction had been used to increase petitioner’s current sentence
under state recidivist law); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
633 n.2 (1968) (conviction rendered petitioner liable to revocation
of his license to operate luncheonette business). Where such
collateral consequences exist, the Court has indicated that an
appropriate remedy is to vacate or modify the underlying illegal
judgment or order under which the petitioner is detained.8
Thus, Supreme Court jurisprudence in this field indicates that
habeas relief relates directly to the underlying nature of the writ
itself -- undoing current or future legal restraints on a person’s
freedom flowing from an illegal detention. It cannot be utilized
to bootstrap other claims for relief unless necessary to assure or
to protect the right to the personal liberty interest that is at
issue. Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 17. In other words, habeas
8
The habeas remedy removes the disability that may be a bar to
the exercise of liberty interests; it does not order the deprived
benefit be automatically granted by the government.
16
specifically is not a tool that can be broadly employed to restore
the habeas petitioner to his or her status quo ante beyond freeing
him from the restraints on liberty arising directly from the
illegal order or judgment. Thus, for example, a habeas court may
have the power to vacate a conviction on the basis of police or
prosecutorial misconduct; however, the habeas court would not have
the power to award damages for the time spent in prison or, for
example, to order a state agency to hold a reinstatement hearing
for the purposes of determining the rights to a job lost because of
the conviction. Although there may be other causes of action or
other procedural remedies under which such relief would be
available, it would not be under habeas, which, unlike remedies
involving the direct review of illegal or unconstitutional
government acts, has its essence in “detention simpliciter.” Fay,
372 U.S. at 430.
Therefore, Zalawadia’s contention that, in granting the writ,
the district court, in this proceeding, should order the BIA to
hold a new hearing to consider his rights under § 212 to determine
whether he should be deported anew is rejected as beyond the bounds
of reviewing his “detention simpliciter.” Having reached the
conclusion that vacating the deportation order is the beginning and
end of the habeas authority we have, we do not need to address
Zalawadia’s entitlement to other forms of relief in this habeas
17
action. These include his request that we order the INS to readmit
him into the country for the purposes of a § 212(c) hearing.9
We should be clear: In reaching this conclusion, we do not
suggest that Zalawadia has no way of obtaining other non-habeas
remedies. Once his removal order has been vacated, he may be
eligible to apply for reentry with the BIA. That question is not
before us, however. Once again, we are not engaging in direct
review. The only question presented in this habeas case concerns
the legality of the order upon which Zalawadia’s detention was
based. By acknowledging the illegality of that order and his
detention and by vacating the order, thereby removing the
cognizable collateral legal consequences of that detention, the
federal habeas court has answered and addressed this question.
V
We sum up: Because Zalawadia filed his habeas petition while
he was in custody and continues to face a collateral legal
consequence of the order placing him there, we hold that the
9
Our authority to order Zalawadia to be readmitted into the
country is not only constrained by the nature of habeas review;
this case also concerns subject matter in which courts are most
reluctant to involve themselves. The Supreme Court has long
recognized that power over aliens is “a fundamental sovereign
attribute . . . largely immune from judicial control,” Shaughnessy
v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953), and is “of a political
character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.”
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976). See also
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596-97 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The conditions for entry of every
alien . . . have been recognized as matters solely for the
responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this
Court to control.”).
18
district court had habeas jurisdiction. We also hold, however,
that a habeas court lacks the authority to grant the relief
Zalawadia seeks -- either to order the INS to readmit Zalawadia
into the country or to direct the BIA to conduct a new deportation
proceeding on Zalawadia’s behalf -- as either of these forms of
relief are beyond the discrete nature of a habeas action. The sole
remedy available under habeas here is for the district court to
vacate the removal order. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the
judgment of the district court denying habeas relief. We remand
with instructions that the district court enter an appropriate
order that vacates its judgment and grants the petition for habeas
corpus but only to the extent of vacating the BIA’s prior order of
deportation against Zalawadia.10
10
We fail to understand the dissent’s strenuous contention that
our holding in this case “render[s] nugatory the Supreme Court’s
express directive in its remand of this case to us.” Dissent at p.
1. In its succinct remand of this case, the Court stated:
“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of
INS v. St. Cyr.” Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 533 U.S. 943 (2001). The
cursory and non-specific nature of the remand in this case is
typical of other remands of cases pending on certiorari before the
Supreme Court that are affected by a Court decision issued in
another analogous case. In characteristic fashion, the remand here
simply directed lower courts to reconsider Zalawadia’s case in the
light of the recently-decided St. Cyr and, implicitly, to grant any
appropriate corresponding relief. This course is precisely what we
have followed in this case. We have determined that St. Cyr does
control, that the order of deportation issued against Zalawadia was
invalid, and that the appropriate form of corresponding relief is
the vacatur of this order. Thus, while the dissent may disagree
with our conclusions concerning whether vacatur is the appropriate
form of corresponding relief, there is simply no basis for its
contention that our decision is inconsistent or in any other way
“irreconcilable” with the Supreme Court’s remand in this case.
19
REVERSED, VACATED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Secondly, we are a bit baffled by the dissent’s claim that
Zalawadia is entitled to “more” habeas relief than we have granted
him. Indeed, we cannot conceive the form such additional relief
would take, short of ordering the defendants to readmit Zalawadia
into the country -- relief that the dissent explicitly concedes is
unavailable. The dissent’s proposed “additional” relief --
specifically, “an opportunity to plead his case to the BIA . . .
[and] seek 212(c) relief” -- is not additional at all: The best
result Zalawadia could obtain from such an opportunity is a BIA
ruling that he indeed had been entitled to a waiver of deportation,
that the order of deportation was error, and a corresponding order
vacating the erroneous deportation order against him; yet this is
precisely the relief we have already granted him -- the vacatur of
the deportation order. Thus, the dissent’s contention that we are
unjustifiably and improperly circumscribing the scope of habeas
remedies available to Zalawadia seems flawed and wrong.
20
WIENER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the panel majority’s conclusion that Mr. Zalawadia
satisfies the “in custody” requirement for federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction. With all due respect, however, I part company with
the panel majority when it proceeds to auto-emasculate the habeas
powers of federal courts by severely restricting the range of
remedies that I find to be available in habeas. Specifically, I
can find no statutory or jurisprudential support for the majority’s
conclusion that, even though we can and must vacate Mr. Zalawadia’s
removal order and remand his case to the district court, we are
powerless to instruct the district court to remand to the BIA for
it to consider affording him the opportunity to seek 212(c)
discretionary relief. And, I find distressing the unavoidable
conclusions that (1) the panel majority’s reasoning is wholly
irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s prior decision in this very
case, and (2) the effect of the panel majority’s cabining of the
remedial powers of federal habeas courts is to render nugatory the
Supreme Court’s express directive in its remand of this case to us.
For these reasons, as fleshed out below, I must respectfully
dissent.
I. Analysis
The panel majority’s opinion is constructed on two proffered
foundations: (1) Our authority to grant Mr. Zalawadia relief is
limited to “undoing current or future legal restraints on [his]
freedom flowing from an illegal detention”11; and (2) because Mr.
Zalawadia has already been deported, the only such restraint
(“collateral consequence”) that we are empowered to remedy is the
statutory 5-year ban on re-entry —— ironically, the one consequence
that will be removed automatically when we vacate his removal
order.12 In combination, these two underpinnings are advanced by
the panel majority as supporting its ultimate conclusion that, even
though Mr. Zalawadia is entitled to habeas relief vel non, the only
specific relief that we are empowered to grant is vacatur of the
unlawful removal order under which he was, in fact, deported.
Satisfied that the panel majority has incorrectly assessed the
collateral consequences faced by Mr. Zalawadia as a result of his
removal, which flawed assessment fatally undermines the majority’s
application of the first of its foundational supports, I must
disagree strenuously with the opinion’s overly restrictive
conclusion regarding the nature and extent of the relief that we
have authority to fashion.
11
Opinion at p. 17.
12
See opinion at p. 2 (“[W]e lack authority in this habeas
action to grant relief beyond simply vacating the defective order
....The petitioner, whose liberty interests and rights are no
longer encumbered by the deportation order, must turn to other
procedural remedies, if any, for further relief.”).
22
1. Remaining “collateral consequences” of Zalawadia’s unlawful
removal
As the majority notes, a petitioner presents an Article III
case or controversy when he demonstrates that he suffers from
“collateral consequences” from a conviction despite an end to his
incarceration.13 Although it is true that our vacating Mr.
Zalawadia’s removal order will remove one such consequence —— the
5-year ban on re-entry that he would otherwise face —— vacatur
would do nothing to rectify the standard for readmission that he
would need to meet on his return. Specifically, at the time of his
removal proceedings Mr. Zalawadia should have been allowed to apply
for a waiver under former INA § 212(c), which allows an eligible
returning alien to be admitted “in the discretion of the Attorney
General.”14 This opportunity was improperly denied him through
retroactive application of IIRIRA. By contrast, when Mr. Zalawadia
applies for readmission following our vacatur of his removal order,
he will still be required to obtain a waiver to re-enter the
country; but he will not be permitted to try to do so under §
212(c) owing to IIRIRA. Instead, Mr. Zalawadia must apply for a
waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), which will require him to
demonstrate “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that [his]
denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to [his]
13
Opinion at p. 10; see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998).
14
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001).
23
United States citizen or lawfully resident...parent[s].”15 Clearly,
this is a different standard —— and, in practical terms, a much
higher hurdle —— for establishing eligibility for readmission.
That the standard Mr. Zalawadia would face in a 212(c) hearing
is discretionary is of no practical importance; the Supreme Court
itself noted in St. Cyr that its own precedent has long provided
that “a deportable alien [has] a right to challenge the Executive’s
failure to exercise the discretion authorized by the law.”16 And,
despite the discretionary nature of 212(c) relief (and the
mischaracterization by the panel majority), the only relief that
Mr. Zalawadia is now seeking is the opportunity to plead his case
to the BIA for an opportunity to seek 212(c) relief17 —— an
opportunity that was originally denied him through the illegal
retroactive application of IIRIRA. In other words, as a direct
result of the illegal removal proceedings to which he was
subjected, Mr. Zalawadia is now foreclosed from seeking relief
15
8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
16
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308.
17
Given that Mr. Zalawadia seeks not readmittance or even a
212(c) hearing, but only the opportunity to demonstrate to the BIA
his eligibility for such a hearing, his request is consistent with
the panel majority’s description of what habeas relief is designed
to do: “The habeas remedy removes the disability that may be a bar
to the exercise of liberty interests; it does not order the
deprived benefit be automatically granted by the government.”
Opinion at p. 17 n8.
24
under the more relaxed standard of § 212(c).18 This result is, to
me, indisputably a collateral legal consequence that flows from the
illegal removal order and is one that is not removed by simply
vacating that order.19 Elimination of that untoward collateral
consequence can only be achieved through equitable relief ——
namely, giving Mr. Zalawadia the opportunity to have his
eligibility for 212(c) relief argued at a hearing before the BIA.
The panel majority nevertheless asserts it is “baffled” by the
idea that Mr. Zalawadia could hope to obtain relief other than
vacating the removal order, insisting that any “additional” relief
granted would be superfluous in light of the practical effects of
the majority’s decision.20 As noted, this simply is not true, given
the higher standard Mr. Zalawadia must meet to be eligible for
admission under § 1182(h)(1)(B) instead of § 212(c). Furthermore,
the majority’s position underscores its confusion as to the
circumstances under which Mr. Zalawadia left the country and the
18
In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court noted that, historically, a
“substantial percentage” of 212(c) applications have been granted;
from 1989 to 1995, the percentage of successful applications was
51.5%, representing over 10,000 admitted aliens. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
at 296.
19
In Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 196 (2000), rev’d on
other grounds, 533 U.S. 945 (2001), we characterized a cognizable,
“concrete” collateral consequence as one which “change[s]
[petitioner’s] status with respect to his admissibility whether he
tries to return to the United States or not.” The higher standard
Mr. Zalawadia will face if he tries to return to the U.S. fits this
description.
20
Opinion at p. 20 n.10.
25
relief that he now seeks. Specifically, Mr. Zalawadia was detained
at the border after a brief trip abroad because of his 1995 theft
convictions. In pre-IIRIRA parlance, he was subjected to exclusion
proceedings, not deportation.21 As the Supreme Court explained in
St. Cyr —— discussing 212(c) relief in the context of deportation
proceedings —— successfully requesting such relief terminates those
proceedings and the alien “remains a permanent resident.”22
Presumably, a successful application for 212(c) relief would
function similarly in the context of exclusion (now removal)
proceedings; that is, those proceedings would be terminated and the
alien would be allowed to re-enter, remaining a permanent
resident.23
In the course of litigating to reach that result, Mr.
Zalawadia has contended, successfully, that the BIA improperly
applied IIRIRA retroactively to foreclose the possibility of 212(c)
relief. What he seeks now, however, is a BIA determination of his
eligibility for such relief, in accordance with INS v. Ventura.
The “best result Zalawadia could obtain” from a BIA hearing, then,
21
IIRIRA combined exclusion and deportation proceedings into
a single, broader category, “removal proceedings,” which
encompasses both.
22
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 295.
23
That successfully requesting 212(c) relief would entail
readmittance, and not just vacating any illegal removal orders
against an individual, also appears to be true, given the text of
the statute. As discussed, former § 212(c) indicates that eligible
returning aliens “may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney
General.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 295 (emphasis added).
26
is not “vacating the erroneous deportation order against him,”24 but
rather a ruling that he meets the statutory requirements for 212(c)
eligibility. Then, obviously, the Attorney General would need to
make the discretionary decision on whether Mr. Zalawadia should be
admitted. But the Attorney General is vested with the statutory
authority to do just that, provided Mr. Zalawadia is found eligible
by the BIA; indeed, under St. Cyr, the Attorney General is
obligated to do so. 25 The panel majority’s characterization of a
remand with instructions as “additional” to vacating the removal
order (as opposed to “different”) only muddies the water. As
discussed, a remand would simply be equitable relief designed to
eliminate a collateral consequence of the district court’s
admittedly illegal retroactive application of IIRIRA.
2. Would our granting any habeas relief beyond vacating the
original order exceed our power as a habeas court?
I fail to see anything about the relief requested in this case
that makes it different from other species of equitable relief that
are generally authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and which have been
previously fashioned by habeas courts. On the first point, § 2243
mandates that we “dispose of [habeas petitions] as law and justice
require”; the Supreme Court has long interpreted that phrase to
encompass a wide range of remedies26 and recognized that the Great
24
Opinion at p. 20 n.10.
25
See note 6, supra, and accompanying text.
26
See, e.g., notes 19-20, infra, and accompanying text.
27
Writ is governed by equitable principles.27 On the second point,
although it is true that our precedent contains no exact analogues
to the current case —— indeed, it was produced by the unique
convergence of wildly disparate factors —— federal courts have
fashioned relief similar to (and, sometimes, more onerous than) the
remand with instructions that Mr. Zalawadia seeks.
For example, in Osborn v. Shillinger, the Tenth Circuit upheld
a district court order (entered in a habeas proceeding) allowing a
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, enter a new one, and be
tried and sentenced —— before a different state court judge in a
different venue.28 In considering the State’s contention that the
conditions imposed by the district court exceeded its authority,
the Tenth Circuit quoted the “law and justice” language of § 2243
and concluded that it “[did] not believe the lower court abused its
broad discretion in requiring that new state proceedings be held
27
See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995)(“[T]he
Court has adhered to the principle that habeas corpus is, at its
core, an equitable remedy.”)(Partially abrogated, on other grounds,
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996);
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 699 (1993)(“Concerns for
equity...resonate throughout our habeas jurisprudence.”); Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986)(“In decisions of the past two
or three decades,...the Court has reaffirmed that ‘habeas corpus
has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable
principles.’” quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), citing
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 573
(1953)(dissenting opinion)).
28
861 F.2d 612, 630 (10th Cir. 1988).
28
under [those] circumstances....”29 Similarly, in Dowd v. United
States ex rel. Cook, the Supreme Court quoted § 2243 and ordered
that “[o]n remand, the District Court should enter such orders as
are appropriate to allow the State a reasonable time in which to
afford respondent the full appellate review he would have received
but for the suppression of his papers....”30
It is certainly true that typically —— and in both the cases
noted above —— the remand order is tied to the possibility of the
prisoner’s release, and could be labeled a conditional grant of the
writ.31 It is also true that our arsenal of equitable remedies does
not contain the “big stick” of the threat of granting outright
release (or, in this situation, its analogue, forced readmission)
available to compel the district court or the BIA to comply with
our remand instructions, as is typically the case. But this is
more a function of the confluence of factors that led to the
29
Id. The Tenth Circuit also held in Capps v. Sullivan, 13
F.3d 350, 352 (1993) that “barring a new trial is a permissible
form of judgment” in a habeas case, when “necessary to protect the
purpose of habeas corpus jurisdiction when the error forming the
basis for the relief cannot be corrected in further proceedings.”
The court explained that “the district court had the power to grant
any form of relief necessary....” Id. (emphasis added).
30
340 U.S. 206, 210 (1951)(emphasis added).
31
In fact, in Osborn, the Tenth Circuit characterized the
relief in just this way, stating that it “view[ed] the district
court’s ‘remand’ order as, in effect, the issuance of a conditional
writ.” Osborn, 861 F.2d at 630.
29
strange procedural posture of this case,32 and is not determinative
of our authority to provide appropriate equitable relief. My point
is that, in the aforementioned cases as well as in many others, the
habeas courts remanded with specific instructions equitably crafted
to remedy the collateral effects of the defective procedures at
issue.33 This we can do: Even though we do not enjoy the leverage
of the threat of forced readmission to enforce an order to remand
to the BIA for a hearing, the district court would still be bound
to accept our decision.34
In my view, though, the most convincing evidence that we do
have the power to remand with such instructions —— the “proof” of
32
Specifically, this case arises out of the landmark
immigration reform that occurred in 1996, coupled with the district
court’s illegal retroactive application of that law, the
government’s decision to deport while Mr. Zalawadia’s habeas appeal
was still pending, and the district court’s subsequent ignorance of
INS v. Ventura. These factors have combined to create a fact
pattern that is not easily found in our existing jurisprudence, and
unlikely to reoccur in the future.
33
See, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1991)
(“We reverse...and remand with instructions to return the case to
the District Court to enter an order directing the State of Florida
to initiate appropriate proceedings in state court so that Parker’s
death sentence may be reconsidered in light of the entire record of
his trial and sentencing hearing and the trial judge’s findings.”);
Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 52 (1992) (“We reverse...and remand
with instructions to return the case to the District Court to enter
an order granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless
the State of Arizona within a reasonable period of time either
corrects the constitutional error...or vacates the sentence and
imposes a lesser sentence consistent with law.”).
34
Just as we, of course, are bound to follow the Supreme
Court’s directions on remand —— something that, as I discuss infra,
the panel majority opinion fails to do.
30
this particular “pudding” —— lies in the Supreme Court’s original
decision and order in this very case. Remember, it was back in
October 1999 that Mr. Zalawadia first filed his habeas petition,
listing four causes of action, including erroneous denial of a §
212(c) hearing (not relief). After the district court dismissed
that petition for lack of jurisdiction —— and we dismissed Mr.
Zalawadia’s appeal for the same reason —— the Supreme Court granted
his petition for certiorari and considered his case. At that time,
his case was in exactly the same posture as it is today, i.e., the
Supreme Court was not considering a “direct appeal of [a] BIA[]
decision,”35 but rather was acting pursuant to its habeas authority.
According to the panel majority, this means that the Court was
obligated to “confine the scope of its review to considering the
legality of the custody at issue.”36 To the panel majority, the
Supreme Court then enjoyed no more authority —— but no less —— than
we do now when it comes to granting appropriate relief under the
writ.
Thus, under the panel majority’s logic, the Supreme Court had
only one form of relief open to it after it considered Mr.
Zalawadia’s habeas appeal, viz., to vacate the illegal removal
order. According to the panel majority, any other relief would be
“beyond the bounds of reviewing Zalawadia’s ‘detention
35
Opinion at p. 13.
36
Opinion at p. 15.
31
simpliciter.’”37 This is so, insists the panel majority, because
“[t]he only question presented in [a] habeas case concerns the
legality of the order upon which [the] detention was based. By
acknowledging the illegality of [the] order...and by vacating the
order...the federal habeas court has answered and addressed this
question.”38 In fact, because the issue decided by the Supreme
Court was but one of four causes of action that formed the basis of
Mr. Zalawadia’s habeas petition, it is all the more obvious under
the majority’s reasoning that the only remedy open to the Court
would be to vacate the removal order. After all, the Supreme Court
had “already made clear that the deportation order under which
Zalawadia had been detained was legally flawed.”39 Thus, according
to the panel majority’s “logic”, there was neither the need nor the
authority to remand with instructions. Yet that is precisely what
the Supreme Court did!
I emphasize that the situation as it existed then is
indistinguishable from what we face now: (1) The Supreme Court was
sitting as a habeas court; (2) it had already determined that the
prior proceedings were tainted —— at that stage, by retroactive
application of IIRIRA; and (3) it remanded to us with instructions
to correct the defect, i.e., for “further consideration in light of
37
Opinion at p. 18.
38
Opinion at p. 19.
39
Opinion at p. 12.
32
INS v. St. Cyr.”40 In exact parallel: (1) We are sitting as a
habeas court; (2) we have already determined —— through nothing
less than the government’s own concession41 —— that the prior
proceedings were tainted, this time through the district court’s
failure to adhere to INS v. Ventura;42 and (3) Mr. Zalawadia asks
only that we remand to the district court with instructions that it
remand to the BIA for a hearing on his 212(c) eligibility,43 which
40
Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 121 S.Ct. 2581 (2001)(citation
omitted).
41
In its appellate brief, the government concedes: “Should the
Court find that Zalawadia may continue to litigate his section
212(c) claim, the Government agrees that the case should be
remanded to the Board to decide Zalawadia’s section 212(c)
eligibility in the first instance.”
42
537 U.S. 12 (2002).
43
The panel majority asserts that Mr. Zalawadia requested that
we readmit him for the purposes of a § 212(c) hearing (see Opinion
at p. 18), but the fact is that he did not . Mr. Zalawadia’s
request for relief in both his original and reply briefs is simple:
He “requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s decision
and remand his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals for further
consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v.
St. Cyr, or in the alternative, find that [he] is eligible for
212(c) relief and order that this matter be remanded to the [BIA]
with instructions to hold a hearing on 212(c) relief.” Mr.
Zalawadia raised the possibility of readmittance for the purpose of
attending a 212(c) hearing only in his reply brief in response to
the government’s arguments that (1) BIA regulations precluded Mr.
Zalawadia from continuing his case and (2) the government was
“aware of no authority holding that removed aliens, such as
Zalawadia, have a ‘right’ to continue to litigate claims for
discretionary relief under former section 212(c) from abroad.”
Similarly, at oral argument this subject was addressed after
questioning by the panel on the point. Setting aside for the
moment that it is far from certain that Mr. Zalawadia would be
required to attend such a hearing, as he is ably represented by
counsel, the fact is that his appeal focuses exclusively on the
district court’s improper consideration (and ultimate denial) of
33
would cure the defect and would essentially be (as a comparison
point to the relief earlier granted by the Supreme Court) “further
consideration in light of Ventura.” When the panel majority states
that we are without power to do this because of the nature of the
writ, it is telling the Supreme Court —— unwittingly, I am sure ——
that it was without such power when it first considered Mr.
Zalawadia’s habeas petition. Even unintentionally, this is
audacious.
The Supreme Court cannot conceivably agree with the panel
majority’s assessment, however, because in remanding to us with
instructions the Court did precisely what the panel majority
insists no federal court can do.44 This further buttresses my
unequivocal belief that (1) merely vacating Mr. Zalawadia’s removal
order does not remove all of the collateral legal consequences of
his illegal detention, and (2) federal courts sitting as habeas
courts do have the power to fashion appropriate equitable relief ——
such as, in this case, remanding with instructions to remand to the
BIA —— to eliminate such collateral consequences. Indeed, federal
courts have done so for decades.45
his eligibility for 212(c) relief: The question of his readmission
has never been before us.
44
I note, also, that the Court’s remand in this case could not
be termed a conditional grant of the writ; i.e., the Court did not
say “conduct proceedings consistent with St. Cyr or release or
readmit the petitioner”; it simply remanded with instructions, just
as Mr. Zalawadia requests that we do now.
45
See, e.g., notes 19-20, supra, and accompanying text.
34
Several of the cases relied on by the panel majority are so
factually distinguishable from the instant case that they provide
no real support for the majority opinion’s assessment of the limits
of our authority. In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services
Agency, for example, the petitioner sought the following forms of
relief: (1) invalidation of a state statute that had terminated her
parental rights, (2) a declaration that she was the legal parent of
the children at issue, and (3) an order releasing the children to
her custody.46 Notably, this request was unrelated to imposed
custody of any sort: Petitioner had never been “in custody,” and
the Court noted that her children were “not in the ‘custody’ of the
State in the sense in which that term has been used by this Court
in determining the availability of the writ of habeas corpus.”47
In that context, it is hardly surprising that the Court stated that
habeas is not “a generally available federal remedy for every
violation of federal rights.”48 It was the custody issue, however,
46
458 U.S. 502, 506 (1982).
47
Id. at 510.
48
Id.
35
that was determinative,49 and that issue is not (as the panel
majority concedes) a factor in the instant case.
Similarly, in Amanullah v. Nelson, cited by the panel majority
on pages 15 and 17, the First Circuit noted that habeas corpus
“cannot be utilized to review a refusal to grant collateral
administrative relief, unrelated to the legality of custody,”50 and,
in that case, “the appellants [had] not shown that their detention
violates the law.”51 Those two facts led ineluctably to the
conclusion that the appellants in Amanullah were not entitled to
the relief they sought —— a mandate to conduct evidentiary
hearings. The instant case is diametrically opposite on both
counts: The collateral consequence under discussion here arises
directly from Mr. Zalawadia’s detention, the illegality of which
has already been established by the Supreme Court. It was
precisely the illegality identified by the Court —— the district
court’s improperly foreclosing any possibility of 212(c) relief ——
that caused the injury for which Mr. Zalawadia now seeks redress.
49
The district court had originally held that “the custody
maintained by the Respondent over the three Lehman children is not
that type of custody to which the federal habeas corpus remedy may
be addressed.” See Lehman, 458 U.S. at 506 (quoting Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency, Civ. No. 79-65, (MD Pa.
1979)). The Third Circuit affirmed the district court dismissal,
and the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit.
50
Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1987)
(emphasis added) (quoting 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration
Law and Procedure. § 8.7(h) (Revised ed. and Cum. Supp. 1986).
51
Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 17 (emphasis added).
36
This leads to my final point: The panel majority’s opinion
renders illusory all prior decisions in this case —— including the
Supreme Court’s! The Court remanded for proceedings consistent
with St. Cyr, but the district court’s purported conduct of such
proceedings on remand itself violated the mandate of INS v.
Ventura.52 Identically, our refusal to remand with instructions for
further remand to the BIA now (because of our purported inability
to employ the very same form of relief that the Supreme Court has
already employed in this very case) means that the appropriate
adjudicative body —— the BIA —— will never have determined Mr.
Zalawadia’s eligibility to apply for relief —— thereby violating
Ventura yet again. In turn, this means that Mr. Zalawadia will
never have had a full and fair hearing on that question —— a direct
52
Herein lies the flaw in the panel majority’s contention that
vacating the removal order alone comports with the Supreme Court’s
remand in this case. See opinion at p. 20, n.10. Although
“cursory and non-specific,” I think it obvious that the Court’s
directive that (in the panel majority’s words) “lower courts ...
reconsider Zalawadia’s case in the light of the recently-decided
St. Cyr” dictates, at a minimum, that any district court
reconsideration be consistent with the Constitution, existing law,
and Supreme Court precedent. In this case, as noted and as the
government has conceded, the district court improperly decided the
question of Mr. Zalawadia’s 212(c) eligibility. The district court
was not empowered to make that decision. Therefore, when it did
so, it deprived Mr. Zalawadia of a reconsideration consistent with
St. Cyr. Under the panel majority’s reasoning, any reconsideration
by the district court would meet the dictates of the Supreme Court
remand, regardless of whether that reconsideration offended the
Constitution or was otherwise illegal. With all due respect, I
must wonder whether the panel majority would still consider the
district court’s reconsideration in line with the Supreme Court
remand if the district court had disposed of Mr. Zalawadia’s case
by, say, flipping a coin.
37
violation of the Supreme Court’s remand in his case for proceedings
consistent with St. Cyr.53
II. Conclusion
In my opinion, this case boils down to several interrelated
fallacies. First, we do not remove all of the collateral
consequences of Mr. Zalawadia’s defective removal order simply by
vacating that order; he would still be subject to what is, in
reality, a standard to gain eligibility for reentry that we raise
to an impossibly high level, i.e., a hurdle markedly higher than
that applicable in a 212(c) hearing. Second, under principles of
equity, habeas courts have often remanded with instructions to
remedy constitutionally defective proceedings, yet the majority
prevents us from doing that. Third, the Supreme Court’s remand in
this very case —— embodying as it does the exact form of relief Mr.
Zalawadia now requests and the panel majority denies —— confirms
that we absolutely do have the power to order the kind of equitable
relief for which he asks. Fourth, remanding on the unduly limited
basis set forth by the panel majority eviscerates the Supreme
Court’s decision in this case and fails to follow the overarching
53
Undermining the Supreme Court’s remand in this way not only
violates an intuitive understanding of how we should honor Supreme
Court decisions, but specific Supreme Court precedent as well:
“When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review....” Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509
U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
38
maxim that we dispose of habeas petitions “as law and justice
require.”
On this last point, I would note that by doing nothing more
than vacating Mr. Zalawadia’s removal order, we give him no real
relief at all, as we neither remedy the constitutional violation
that the Supreme Court has already determined took place nor give
Mr. Zalawadia the opportunity to erase the collateral legal
consequences of that constitutional violation. In short, Mr.
Zalawadia “is suffering, and will continue to suffer, serious
disabilities because of the law’s complexities and not because of
his fault....There is no need in the statute, the Constitution, or
sound jurisprudence for denying to petitioner his ultimate day in
court.”54 This is why I am constrained, with respect, to dissent.
54
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968).
39
Zalawadia v. Ashcroft
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 2004-06-04
Citations: 371 F.3d 292
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