This is an action for libel. The defendant has demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The plaintiff alleges that he is the proprietor of a hotel known as the Columbia Hotel
Although the complaint alleges that the • article “ was published of and concerning the plaintiff,” it. is apparent, on inspection, that but very little of the article was concerning the plaintiff. On a demurrer, such an allegation must be rejected when the facts stated are at variance with the allegation. Fleisehmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231; Wellman v. Sun Printing & Pub. Co., 66 Hun, 334.
The complaint further alleges the meaning of said article as understood and meant to be understood by the friends, acquaintances and patrons of plaintiff and the readers of the paper, and also “ that said article held up- and subjected this plaintiff to public ridicule, hatred and contempt and to deprive bfm of public confidence and social intercourse and to injure and destroy his business,” also that by the publication, of the article “ the plaintiff has suffered greatly and has been and still is greatly injured in his good name, fame and credit, the plaintiff has been brought into public ridicule, scorn, scandal and disgrace, and held up to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, besides has suffered great
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant, by demurring, has admitted all the allegations in the complaint, including those contained in the innuendo. I think this proposition is untenable. A demurrer admits such facts only as are properly pleaded, and not conclusions of fact or of law. The pleader’s inferences or deductions from the facts pleaded or the construction he puts upon the facts pleaded are not admitted. The office of an innuendo is to apply what has been already expressed and not to enlarge or change its meaning. It cannot extend the meaning beyond what the words and the facts with wMch they are connected justify, and, on a demurrer, must be rejected when not justified by the antecedent facts. Fleischmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231; Brown v. Moore, 90 Hun, 169. It is only when the language is ambiguous and permits of different constructions, any one of which makes it defamatory, that a question is presented for the jury to decide in what sense it was intended. When the words are ambiguous and admit of but one sense, the court must determine whether or not they are libelous. Woodruff v. Bradstreet Co., 116 N. Y. 217; Moore v. Francis, 121 id. 202. It is, therefore, the duty of the court, if the language is not of doubtful import, to determine whether or not it is actionable. It is clear from the reading of the article that the words are unambiguous and admit of but one construction. We are not here concerned with the 'article, so far as it relates exclusively to the company, for if that portion of it were libelous, it would give no right of action to the plaintiff. Our consideration must be directed to that portion of the article which relates to, or with which the plaintiff is connected. So far as he is concerned, we are convinced that it contains nothing which is libelous. There is an entire absence of any statements concerning Tn'm which tend to expose him to disgrace, ridicule or obloquy, or wMch affect or prejudice him in his business as a hotelkeeper. There is no charge or intimation that the guests referred to were dishonest, or that the members of the company were improper characters whose presence would tend to bring the plaintiff’s hotel into disrepute and injuriously affect its patronage. The only statements in the article in relation to the plaintiff in connection with the company are, in substance, that they were guests at his hotel, whom he lodged, but for whom he refused to provide food 'and
No facts showing special damage are alleged and the statements in respect to the plaintiff are not libelous per se.
The demurrer should be sustained, with costs.
Demurrer sustained, with costs.