United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-50145.
Frank HOLT; Linda Holt, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
JTM INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant,
and
USPCI Inc., Defendant.
Aug. 7, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before GARWOOD, EMILIO M. GARZA and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Defendant JTM Industries, Inc. ("JTM") appeals from the
district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of
law. We reverse and dismiss the case with prejudice.
I
Plaintiffs Linda and Frank Holt were employees at JTM's
Limestone Facility ("Facility") in Jewett, Texas. After JTM
terminated Linda, she filed a charge of age discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Texas
Commission on Human Rights ("TCHR"). Approximately two weeks after
JTM received notice of Linda's administrative complaint, Frank was
placed on paid administrative leave. Frank was subsequently
offered another job with JTM in Atlanta which he accepted, but then
voluntarily quit after several weeks.
Linda and Frank Holt filed a complaint against JTM and its
1
parent corporation, USPCI, alleging, inter alia, violations of
their rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"). Specifically, the Holts alleged age discrimination,
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 621, and retaliation against Frank for
Linda's administrative complaint of age discrimination, pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 623(d). The claims that survived summary judgment were
tried before a jury. At the close of evidence, the district court
refused to submit any of the Holts' claims against USPCI to the
jury, denied JTM's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and
submitted the Holts' claims against JTM to the jury. The jury
rejected all of the Holts' claims against JTM, except for Frank's
claim of retaliation. The district court entered judgment in
conformity with the jury verdict, implicitly denying JTM's third
motion for judgment as a matter of law. JTM filed a timely notice
of appeal.
II
JTM argues that the district court erred in denying its
motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review a district
court's disposition of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de
novo. Wardlaw v. Inland Container Corp., 76 F.3d 1372, 1375 (5th
Cir.1996). We must consider all of the evidence "in the light and
with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed
to the motion." Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th
Cir.1969) (en banc). There must be a conflict of substantial
evidence to create a jury question. Id. at 375.
Section 623(d) of the ADEA protects employees from
2
retaliation for opposing acts of age discrimination, or for
charging, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under the ADEA. 29
U.S.C. § 623(d). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
retaliation under the ADEA by showing: (1) that he engaged in
activity protected by the ADEA; (2) that there was an adverse
employment action; and (3) that there was a causal connection
between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment decision. Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39,
42 (5th Cir.1992).
JTM alleges that the district court erred in denying its
motion for judgment as a matter of law because Frank did not engage
in an activity that is protected by the ADEA. Specifically, JTM
argues that Frank did not oppose JTM's practices which Linda
alleged were discriminatory, nor did he make a charge, testify,
assist or participate in any manner in Linda's age discrimination
complaint, as required under 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). The Holts do not
argue that Frank participated in Linda's filing a charge of age
discrimination. Instead, they argue that Linda's charge of age
discrimination, which is protected activity under the ADEA, should
be imputed to her husband Frank.
The plain language of § 623(d) prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an employee because "such individual" has
opposed a practice prohibited by the ADEA or has participated "in
any manner" in a proceeding under the ADEA. This section permits
third parties to sue under § 623(d) if they have engaged in the
3
enumerated conduct, even if the conduct was on behalf of another
employee's claim of discrimination. See Jones v. Flagship Intern.,
793 F.2d 714, 727 (5th Cir.1986) (acknowledging that "employee
opposition to discriminatory employment practices directed against
a fellow employee may constitute" protected activity under the
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1065, 107 S.Ct. 952, 93 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1987); Mandia v. ARCO
Chemical Co., 618 F.Supp. 1248, 1250 (W.D.Pa.1985) (holding that
husband could sue under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII
because he "participated, supported and aided his wife in filing"
EEOC charges of sexual harassment).1 The Holts urge an even
broader interpretation of § 623(d). They argue that an individual
suing for retaliation need not personally engage in any of the
enumerated conduct in § 623(d). Instead, the Holts contend that
once an employee's spouse engages in protected activity, the
non-complaining spouse automatically has standing to sue for
retaliation under § 623(d). This interpretation is necessary,
according to the Holts, to eliminate the risk that an employer will
discriminate against a complaining employee's spouse in retaliation
for the complaining employee's protected activities.
The Holts cite De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F.Supp. 573
(D.D.C.1978), as support for their position. The plaintiff in De
Medina sued under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII for
1
The anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII are
similar and "cases interpreting the latter provision are frequently
relied upon in interpreting the former." Shirley, 970 F.2d at 42
n. 5.
4
retaliation against her because of her husband's
anti-discrimination activities. De Medina, 444 F.Supp. at 574.
The district court concluded that "tolerance of third-party
reprisals would, no less than tolerance of direct reprisals, deter
persons from exercising their protected rights under Title VII,"
which would be contrary to legislative intent. Id. at 580.
Therefore, the court held that a plaintiff could sue for
retaliation for a relative's or friend's protected activities. It
is unclear from the district court's statement of facts whether the
plaintiff participated in any manner in her husband's activities.
To the extent that this case stands for the proposition that a
plaintiff automatically has standing to sue for retaliation when a
relative or friend engages in protected activity, we disagree.
Such a rule of automatic standing might eliminate the risk
that an employer will retaliate against an employee for their
spouse's protected activities. However, we conclude that such a
rule would contradict the plain language of the statute and will
rarely be necessary to protect employee spouses from retaliation.
Section 623(d) prohibits retaliation against an employee who has
opposed a discriminatory practice or has participated "in any
manner" in a proceeding under the ADEA. This broad language is
consistent with Congress's remedial goals in enacting the ADEA.
Congress intended the anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA to
enable employees to engage in protected activities without fear of
economic retaliation. See E.E.O.C. v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541,
544 (6th Cir.1993) (stating that the purpose of the ADEA "is to
5
prevent fear of economic retaliation from inducing employees
"quietly to accept [unlawful] conditions' ") (alteration in
original) (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361
U.S. 288, 292, 80 S.Ct. 332, 335, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960)). To
accomplish this goal, Congress drafted § 623(d) to give those
employees who oppose discriminatory practices or who participate
"in any manner in an investigation [or] proceeding" under the ADEA
automatic standing to sue if their employers retaliate against them
for their actions.
We recognize that there is a possible risk that an employer
will discriminate against a complaining employee's relative or
friend in retaliation for the complaining employee's actions.
However, we believe that the language that Congress has employed in
§ 623(d) will better protect employees against retaliation than we
could by trying to define the types of relationships that should
render automatic standing under § 623(d). If we hold that spouses
have automatic standing to sue their employers for retaliation, the
question then becomes, which other persons should have automatic
standing to guard against the risk of retaliation? In most cases,
the relatives and friends who are at risk for retaliation will have
participated in some manner in a co-worker's charge of
discrimination. The plain language of § 623(d) will protect these
employees from retaliation for their protected activities.
However, when an individual, spouse or otherwise, has not
participated "in any manner " in conduct that is protected by the
ADEA, we hold that he does not have automatic standing to sue for
6
retaliation under § 623(d) simply because his spouse has engaged in
protected activity.2
The evidence at trial revealed that Frank was not aware of
Linda's intent to file a charge of age discrimination against JTM
until a few days before she actually made the charge. He testified
that when TCHR mailed Linda a copy of the notice of the filing and
service of her complaint, he retrieved it from the post office and
looked at it with her. Frank's only other involvement with Linda's
protected activities involved carrying out his duties as an
employee. The TCHR served the notice of Linda's complaint on JTM
to Frank's attention as Plant Manager. Frank testified that he
never opened the notice, but he assumed that it contained Linda's
complaint. After receiving the notice, Frank called the Manager of
Human Resources for JTM, Debbie Bankston, and told her that JTM had
been served with papers from the TCHR. Frank testified that he
followed Ms. Bankston's orders and sent the notice via Federal
2
The only other circuit case that has addressed a similar
issue is not inconsistent with our interpretation of § 623(d).
Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a), the Sixth Circuit held that an employee is protected
from retaliation where the employee's representative opposes a
discriminatory practice. E.E.O.C. v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir.1993). The plaintiff in Ohio Edison alleged that his
employer had discriminated against him by withdrawing an offer of
reinstatement "because a co-employee engaged in protected activity
and protested [the plaintiff's] discriminatory discharge on his
behalf and threatened that a claim would be filed for the
discriminatory discharge." Id. at 546 (emphasis added). The fact
that the employee had engaged a "representative" to act on his
behalf to protest his discharge illustrates that the employee had
opposed a discriminatory employment practice, as required under the
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII. Therefore, unlike Frank
Holt, the plaintiff in Ohio Edison fell within the plain meaning of
the statute as one who has standing to sue for retaliation.
7
Express to JTM's Human Resources Department.
This evidence does not establish that Frank participated in
Linda's protected activities or that he opposed JTM's alleged
discriminatory practice. There is no evidence that Frank helped
Linda prepare her charge or that he assisted in any way in its
filing. At best, Frank was a passive observer of Linda's protected
activities. As such, he does not have standing to sue for
retaliation under § 623(d).
III
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the
district court and DISMISS the case with prejudice.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Frank Holt proved to the satisfaction of a jury that his
employer engaged in adverse employment actions against him in
retaliation for his wife's filing of a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
Nonetheless, the majority holds that Mr. Holt lacks "standing" to
sue under that Act's anti-retaliation provision because he did not
prove that he personally engaged in the protected conduct giving
rise to the employer's wrongful action. Because the majority
relies on the concept of standing as the basis of its reversal,
when at best it has presented an argument that Mr. Holt has no
cause of action under the statute; because the decision imposes a
rigid literalism in its interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision that undermines the purpose of the statute; and because
the opinion ignores relevant case law and agency decisions
8
construing the similar anti-retaliation provision of Title VII to
provide a cause of action for retaliation against an employee for
the protected activity of that employee's family member, I dissent.
The question of standing "[i]n essence ... is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves both
constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and
prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The
constitutional dimension of standing "imports justiciability:
whether the plaintiff has made out a "case or controversy' between
himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III." Id.,
422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2205. The Supreme Court has
formulated a three-part test to determine whether the plaintiff has
standing for purposes of Article III, requiring the plaintiff to
allege (1) an actual or threatened injury that is (2) traceable to
the conduct of the defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by
a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992);
see 6A Moore's Federal Practice § 57.11[2.-1], at 57-89. Because
the requirement of injury is part of the Article III constitutional
test for standing, Congress may not authorize suit in the absence
of an injury. Lujan, supra. However, as the Lujan Court noted,
Congress is empowered to create substantive rights and to authorize
suit for their enforcement and consequently may define an injury in
a way that provides the basis for standing even in the absence of
9
other injury to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1121, 71 L.Ed.2d 214
(1982).
In addition to the minimum constitutional requirements, the
Court has recognized other limits on the class of persons who may
invoke the federal judicial power. Warth, 422 U.S., at 499, 95
S.Ct., at 2205. These prudential considerations are self-imposed
judicial limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction and include
the following requirements: (1) that a litigant generally assert
his own and not another's interests; (2) that the federal courts
not adjudicate mere generalized grievances that are more
appropriately addressed by the representative branches of
government; and (3) that the plaintiff's alleged injury arguably
fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the law invoked.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82
L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500, 95 S.Ct. at 2205.
Although Congress may not remove the Article III requirement that
the plaintiff allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, it
can grant standing to persons who meet Article III requirements
even though they would otherwise be barred by prudential standing
considerations. Id. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206.
Section 7(c) of the ADEA provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved
may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for
such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of
this Act...." 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (emphasis supplied). Through
this language, Congress indicated its intent to afford standing to
10
the full limits permitted under Article III. In Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 367,
34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972), the Supreme Court construed the term
"aggrieved person" in § 810 of the Fair Housing Act, which the Act
defined to include "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by
a discriminatory housing practice," 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), to
demonstrate a congressional intent to confer standing to the
fullest extent permitted by Article III of the United States
Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the
holding in Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3rd Cir.1971),
that the language of Title VII authorizing the filing of suits "by
a person claiming to be aggrieved" shows " "a congressional
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article
III of the Constitution.' " Trafficante, 409 U.S., at 209, 93
S.Ct. at 367 (quoting Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446). This court, in
turn, applied Trafficante to find that "the strong similarities
between the language, design, and purposes of Title VII and the
Fair Housing Act require that the phrase "a person claiming to be
aggrieved' in § 706 of Title VII must be construed in the same
manner that Trafficante construed the term "aggrieved person' in §
810 of the Fair Housing Act." EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626
F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir.1980) (citing EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d
439, 450-54 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct.
1468, 55 L.Ed.2d 506 (1978); Waters v. Heublein, 547 F.2d 466,
469-70 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988,
53 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1977)), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct.
11
3143, 69 L.Ed.2d 994 (1981). See also Fair Employment Council v.
BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1994) (citing Gray
v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C.Cir.1976)).
Following this line of reasoning, the pertinent language of
the ADEA, "[a]ny person aggrieved may bring a civil action," 29
U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), similarly indicates that Congress intended to
provide standing under the Act to the fullest extent available
under Article III. See Horne v. Firemen's Retirement System of St.
Louis, 69 F.3d 233, 235 (8th Cir.1995) (plaintiff satisfying
Article III requirements has standing under the ADEA); Barchers v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 765 F.Supp. 595, 596-97 (W.D.Mo.1991)
(same). Accordingly, any "person aggrieved" is required by the
ADEA to meet only the minimum constitutional standing requirements
of Article III. Mr. Holt clearly satisfies these minimal standing
requirements for he alleged (1) that he was injured (2) as a result
of the defendant's conduct and (3) a favorable decision granting
him compensatory and/or injunctive relief is likely to redress his
injuries.3
3
Even if prudential standing considerations were factors, Mr.
Holt has adequately established that he could clear these hurdles
as well. He has sued to redress injuries he personally suffered as
a result of the adverse employment actions his employer engaged in
through its retaliation against him for Mrs. Holt's protected
conduct, and thus cannot be said to be asserting the rights of
others. Similarly, he does not present a "generalized grievance,"
as he complains of specific harm the employer directed at him.
Although the majority does not undertake a standing analysis, its
determination that Mr. Holt does not have standing because he did
not prove involvement in his wife's protected activity appears best
explained as a conclusion that Mr. Holt is not within the "zone of
interests" protected by the ADEA. However, as the Supreme Court
pointed out in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n., 479 U.S. 388,
400 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. 750, 757 n. 16, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987), the
12
In finding that Mr. Holt lacks standing to sue, the majority
has confused the concepts of standing and cause of action. As the
Supreme Court explained in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.
18, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2274 n. 18, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979):
[S]tanding is a question of whether a plaintiff is
sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III
case or controversy, or at least to overcome prudential
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, see Warth v.
Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204, 45 L.Ed.2d 343
(1975); cause of action is a question of whether a particular
plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as
a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the
court....
In Davis, the Court determined that the appellate court had
confused the question of whether petitioner had standing with the
question of whether she had asserted a proper cause of action. The
Court observed that while "[t]he nature of petitioner's injury ...
is relevant to the determination of whether she has "alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
"zone of interest" test has primarily been applied in claims
brought under the Administrative Procedure Act and "is most
usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702 [of that
Act].... While inquiries into reviewability or prudential standing
in other contexts may bear some resemblance to a "zone of interest'
inquiry under the APA, it is not a test of universal application."
Nonetheless, assuming its applicability here, Mr. Holt, as an
employee within the meaning of the ADEA who has alleged injury to
himself from his employer's retaliatory conduct in violation of the
Act, clearly satisfies any requirement that he be arguably within
the zone of interest of the ADEA. The "zone of interest" test only
"denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in
the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress
intended to permit the suit." Id. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757; see
also City of Milwaukee v. Block, 823 F.2d 1158, 1165-66 (7th
Cir.1987) (discussing Clarke 's clarification of test).
13
difficult constitutional questions,' ... [w]hether petitioner has
asserted a cause of action ... depends not on the quality or extent
of her injury, but on whether the class of litigants of which
petitioner is a member may use the courts to enforce the right at
issue." Id., 442 U.S. at 241 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. at 2274 n. 18
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 204, 82 S.Ct. at 703).
The majority's conclusion that a victim of adverse employment
actions conducted in retaliation for the protected activity of the
victim's family member lacks standing to sue unless the victim
alleges and proves actual involvement in the protected conduct is
more appropriately viewed as a determination that a victim who
suffers retaliatory actions for no reason other than his or her
relationship to the person engaging in protected conduct is not a
member of a class the ADEA is intended to protect and thus has no
cause of action. This conclusion relies on a rigid, literal
interpretation of the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision that
undermines the broad purposes of the statute.
Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 as part of an ongoing effort
to eradicate discrimination in the workplace. McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct.
879, 884, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995) (citing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Americans with
Disability Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) and the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)); see Hodgson v. First Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n of Broward County, Fl., 455 F.2d 818, 820
14
(5th Cir.1972). The ADEA, like most of these anti-discrimination
statutes, contemplates both agency and private action to enforce
its provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 626; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (ADA). As a means of
promoting its broad anti-discrimination goals, the Act prohibits an
employer from engaging in adverse employment action in retaliation
for its employee's protected conduct. See 29 U.S.C. 623(d); see,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12206 (ADA).
Under the ADEA, federal courts have discretion to "grant such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of [the Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); McKennon, --- U.S. at
----, 115 S.Ct. at 884.
The anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and similar
statutes clearly are intended to encourage the enforcement of
rights protected under the statutes. As this court has observed in
recognizing a claim for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, "[w]ere
we to protect retaliatory conduct, we would in effect be
discouraging the filing of meritorious civil rights suits and
sanctioning further discrimination against those persons willing to
risk their employer's vengeance by filing suits." Goff v.
Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir.1983). See also
EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088
(5th Cir.1987) (purpose of anti-retaliation provision of ADEA is
"to protect persons who "resort[ ] to the legal procedures that
Congress has established in order to right congressionally
recognized wrongs,' East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 340 (5th
15
Cir.1975)."); Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1214 (2nd
Cir.1993) ("The purpose of the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision is
to protect persons who initiate a suit to vindicate a right that
Congress has recognized as a wrong."); cf. Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292, 80 S.Ct. 332, 335, 4
L.Ed.2d 323 (1960) (observing in relation to anti-retaliation
provision of Fair Labor Standards Act that "[b]y the proscription
of retaliatory acts set forth in § 15(a)(3), and its enforcement in
equity by the Secretary pursuant to § 17, Congress sought to foster
a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of
the Act would be enhanced."); Jones v. Flagship International, 793
F.2d 714, 725 (5th Cir.1986) (recognizing that the provisions of
Title VII "must be construed broadly in order to give effect to
Congress' intent in eliminating invidious employment practices,"
and that "since the enforcement of Title VII rights necessarily
depends on the ability of individuals to present their grievances
without the threat of retaliatory conduct by their employers, rigid
enforcement of [Title VII's anti-retaliation provision] is
required."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 952, 93 L.Ed.2d
1001 (1987).
The jury in this case determined that the employer, JTM
Industries, Inc. (JTM), had replaced Frank Holt as plant manager in
retaliation for his wife's EEOC filing under the ADEA. The jury
thus found a causal connection between Mrs. Holt's EEOC filing and
the employer's replacement of Frank Holt. The majority's
determination that Mr. Holt nevertheless may not pursue a claim of
16
retaliation because he did not demonstrate that he personally was
engaged in protected conduct relies, as the majority admits, on a
strict reading of the anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA. That
provision, in pertinent part, provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ...
because such individual ... has opposed any practice made
unlawful by this section, or because such individual ... has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under
this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
The majority's reading of the provision flouts the clear
purpose of the ADEA's prohibition of retaliatory conduct to ensure
that claimants are secure to pursue their claims of discrimination.
Under the majority's approach, in the instances when both an ADEA
complainant and his or her relative work for the same employee, the
anti-retaliation provision would not prevent the employer from
taking adverse employment action against the family member, even
though such action would be motivated by the relative's obvious
connection to the complainant, thereby defeating a central purpose
of the statute. The literal meaning of the anti-retaliation
provision should not be used to undermine the clear purpose and
intent of the ADEA. As the Supreme Court has observed:
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that
a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if
reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of
the statute:
The general words used in the clause ... taken by
themselves, and literally construed, without regard to
the object in view, would seem to sanction the claim of
the plaintiff. But this mode of expounding a statute has
never been adopted by an enlightened tribunal because it
17
is evident that in many cases it would defeat the object
which the Legislature intended to accomplish. And it is
well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court
will not look merely to a particular clause in which
general words may be used, but will take in connection
with it the whole statute ... and the objects and policy
of the law....
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585, 103 S.Ct.
2017, 2025, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19
How. 183, 194, 15 L.Ed. 595 (1857)) (emphasis supplied in Bob Jones
). See also Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co., 762 F.2d 1275, 1278
(5th Cir.1985) ("literal statutory construction is inappropriate if
it would produce a result in conflict with the legislative purpose
clearly manifested in an entire statute or statutory scheme or with
clear legislative history.").
The federal anti-discrimination laws are to be liberally
construed to effectuate their remedial purposes. See, e.g.,
MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Center, 941 F.2d 1115,
1118 (10th Cir.1991) ("the ADEA is remedial and humanitarian
legislation and should be liberally interpreted to effectuate the
congressional purpose of ending age discrimination.") (quoting
Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir.1976), aff'd
434 U.S. 99, 98 S.Ct. 600, 54 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977)); Kale v.
Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746, 751 (1st Cir.1988) (same); Rabzak
v. County of Berks, 815 F.2d 17, 20 (3rd Cir.1987) (same);
Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir.1986) ("Title VII
should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate
the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness,
and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.") (quoting Rogers v.
18
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957,
92 S.Ct. 2058, 32 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972)). This canon of construction
holds true in the context of interpreting anti-retaliation
provisions. As the Sixth Circuit observed in EEOC v. Ohio Edison
Co., 7 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir.1993):
[C]ourts have routinely adopted interpretations of retaliation
provisions in employment statutes that might be viewed as
outside the literal terms of the statute in order to
effectuate Congress's clear purpose in proscribing. Contrary
to defendant's assertions, courts have frequently applied the
retaliation provisions of employment statutes to matters not
expressly covered by the literal terms of these statutes where
the policy behind the statute supports a non-exclusive reading
of the statutory language.
See also McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir.1996)
(eschewing a strict interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision to find that an employer violated that statute by
retaliating against the plaintiff-supervisor for failing to prevent
subordinates from filing complaints under the statute). In
McDonnell, Judge Posner, writing for the court, acknowledged that
the plaintiff's claim did not come with the literal terms of Title
VII's anti-retaliatory provision, but explained:
The reasons for this wording ... so far as we are able to
discover (there is no pertinent legislative history), is that
in the ordinary case an employer would have no reason to
retaliate against someone who did not file a compliant,
testify, etc. Generally one retaliates against someone
because of something he did rather than because of something
someone else did. Not always. There is such a thing as
collective punishment. But that possibility is unlikely to
have been in the forefront of congressional thinking when the
retaliation provision was drafted.
Id. (emphasis original). In concluding that the plaintiff had a
valid retaliation claim, the court observed that it does no great
violence to the statutory language to correct Congress's oversight
19
by construing the provision to recognize the plaintiff's claim.4
Id.
The same holds true here. Situations in which spouses or
other related parties work for the same employer do not occur with
great frequency. The majority recognizes "a possible risk that an
employer will discriminate against a complaining employee's
relative or friend in retaliation for the complaining employee's
actions." Op. at ----. Nonetheless, my colleagues deem the risk
trivial compared to the potential harm of having courts "trying to
define the types of relationships that should render automatic
standing under § 623(d)." Id. at ---- - ----. The majority's
concerns about involving the courts in assessing what relationships
give rise to "standing" are both overblown and misplaced—the
ultimate focus in a retaliation claim such as this is not upon
whether a particular relationship exists between the victim of
retaliation and the individual who has engaged in protected
conduct; rather, the crucial issue is whether there is a causal
connection between the employer's adverse employment action against
the victim and the protected conduct engaged in by the relative or
friend. There is little reason to worry that a recognition of
claims such as Mr. Holt's will overburden federal judges when in
reality all that would be required is a simple modification of the
4
The opinion additionally observed that the plaintiff's
"passive opposition" to the employer's desire that he prevent his
subordinates from filing discrimination complaints could be
construed as "opposition" to an unlawful practice and
"participation" in protected conduct plainly covered by the
anti-retaliation provision. McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 262.
20
prima facie case applied to establish retaliation: Instead of
requiring the plaintiff to prove "(1) that he engaged in activity
protected by the ADEA; (2) that an adverse employment action
occurred; and (3) that a causal link between the participation in
the protected activity and the adverse employment decision exists,"
Ray v. Iuka Special Mun. Separate School Dist., 51 F.3d 1246, 1249
(5th Cir.1995) (citing Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d
39, 42 (5th Cir.1992), the plaintiff would have to show (1) that an
employee engaged in activity protected by the ADEA; (2) that an
adverse employment action occurred to the plaintiff; and (3) that
a causal link between the participation in the protected activity
and the adverse employment decision exists. In this case, the jury
found that JTM replaced Frank Holt because his wife had filed an
EEOC claim.5 To condone such retaliation because it fails to fall
squarely within the literal terms of the anti-retaliation
provision, despite the ADEA's design to prohibit retaliation in
5
The trial court's instructions on the retaliation claim were
as follows:
As to Frank Holt's retaliation claim, he must prove
the following elements by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1. That his wife filed a charge of discrimination
against Defendant:
2. That he was removed from the position of
Manager; and
3. That there was a causal connection between his
wife's filing a charge of discrimination and his
removal as Manager.
Record, Vol. XI, at 838.
21
order to promote the free exercise of rights protected under that
Act, elevates form over substance and permits employers to evade
the reach of the statute by making relatives or friends of
complaining parties the "whipping boys" for the protected conduct
of others.
Finally, the majority decision flies in the face of agency and
federal court decisions that hold that the parallel
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII prohibits the type of
conduct in which JTM engaged here. Although the majority
acknowledges that "the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and
Title VII are similar and "cases interpreting the latter provision
are frequently relied upon in interpreting the former.' " Op. at
----, n. 1 (quoting Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39,
42 n. 5 (5th Cir.1992)),6 it ignores the overwhelming weight of
decisions construing the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII to
provide a cause of action where an employer retaliates against the
plaintiff because of the protected conduct of a friend or relative.
As early as 1975, the EEOC recognized a violation of Title VII
when an employer discharged a husband in retaliation for his wife's
6
The relevant provision of Title VII provides, in pertinent
part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment ... because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
title, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
22
EEOC claim. EEOC Dec. No. 76-33 (Sept. 11, 1975), 1973-1983 CCH
EEOC Dec. ¶ 6626. In a subsequent case, the agency specifically
held that it had jurisdiction to investigate a claim that the
charging party had been discharged in retaliation for his wife's
filing a charge of discrimination against the employer. EEOC Dec.
77-34 (Aug. 16, 1977), 1973-1983 CCH EEOC Dec. ¶ 6581. The agency
observed that while the language of Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision does not directly determine the question of jurisdiction,
"[t]he language does manifest a congressional intent to extend
coverage over a broad base of activities," and acknowledged that
"where it can be shown that an employer discriminated against an
individual because he or she was related to a person who filed a
charge, it is clear that the employer's intent is to retaliate
against the person who filed the charge." Id. Consequently, the
agency concluded that "discrimination against an employee because
he or she has a familial relationship with a person who has filed
a charge of discrimination is violative of Section 704(a) of Title
VII." Id.
Additionally, the agency has formally articulated its position
on retaliation. Section 614 of its Interpretative Manual, in
pertinent part, provides:
§ 614.1 Introduction
(A) General—Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, is intended to provide
"exceptionally broad protection" for protestors of
discriminatory employment practices. See Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004-1005, 2 EPD § 10,011
(5th Cir.1969). Section 4(d) of the ADEA is virtually
identical to § 704(a) and provides the same protection....
(footnote omitted).
23
* * * * * *
§ 614.3 Essential Elements of a Retaliation Violation
* * * * * *
b) Opposition or Participation
* * * * * *
... [A]s to both opposition and participation, the
retaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADEA also prohibit
retaliation against someone so closely related to the person
exercising his/her statutory rights that it would discourage
or prevent the person from exercising those rights. Clark v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 28 EPD § 32,500, (E.D.La.1982),
1982 WL 2277 (E.D.La.); see also Commission Decision No. 76-
33, CCH EEOC Decisions (1983) § 6626.
2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 614, at 614.0001 & 614.0008-614.0009
(Apr. 1988).
Further, federal courts addressing this issue have uniformly
concluded that an employer violates Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision by taking adverse employment action against an employee
because of the protected activity of a family member or friend. In
McKenzie v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 906 F.Supp. 572, 575
(D.Colo.1995), the court concluded that the plaintiff-husband had
a cause of action for his employer's adverse action against him in
retaliation for his wife's protected activity, observing that "[a]s
other courts have held ... the antireprisal provision of Title VII
precludes an employer from discriminating against an individual
because that person's spouse has engaged in protected activity."
Id. (citing Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1989); De Medina
v. Reinhardt, 444 F.Supp. 573 (D.D.C.1978)). See also Turman v.
Robertshaw Control Co., 869 F.Supp. 934, 941 (N.D.Ga.1994)
(recognizing that "[i]n a case of an alleged retaliation for
24
participation in a protected activity by a close relative who is a
co-employee, the first element of the prima facie case is modified
to require the plaintiff to show that the relative was engaged in
statutorily protected expression."); Clark v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., Civ. No. 79-7, 1982 WL 2277, at *7 (E.D.La. Feb. 2,
1982) (finding prima facie case where plaintiff received reprimand
allegedly in retaliation for his son's EEOC filing); De Medina v.
Reinhardt, 444 F.Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C.1978) (acknowledging that
Title VII does not expressly consider the possibility of
third-party reprisals, but concluding that "[s]ince third-party
reprisals would, no less than the tolerance of direct reprisals,
deter persons from exercising their protected rights under Title
VII, the Court must conclude, as has the only other court to
consider the issue, Kornbluh v. Stearns & Foster Co., 73 F.R.D.
307, 312 (N.D.Ohio 1976), that section 2000e-3 proscribes the
alleged retaliation of which plaintiff complains."). Cf. McDonnell
v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir.1996) (construing Title VII
to permit suit by one complaining of retaliation either for being
suspected of engaging in or for failing to prevent another from
engaging in protected conduct); EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d
541, 545-46 (6th Cir.1993) (broadly construing statutory language
that "he has opposed any practice" to mean the plaintiff or his
agent); Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1989)
(permitting husband's claim of retaliation against him for wife's
EEOC filing to "piggy back" on wife's charge of retaliation).
The majority ignores the reality that the threat of
25
retaliatory action against a family member or friend is a
substantial deterrent to the free exercise of rights protected
under the ADEA. The majority opinion thus permits the very conduct
that the anti-retaliation provision is designed to prevent.
Because I do not believe that this narrow reading of the provision
is justified, I dissent.
26