Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRENDA EVANS, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
 No. 06-2252
EATON CORPORATION LONG TERM
DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson.
Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.
(8:05-cv-02575-HMH)

Argued: November 1, 2007

Decided: January 8, 2008

Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and
Claude M. HILTON, Senior United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Senior Judge Hilton joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jeffrey David Zimon, BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER,
COPLAN & ARONOFF, L.L.P., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant.
Robert Edward Hoskins, FOSTER LAW FIRM, L.L.P., Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellee. Anna K. Raske, BENESCH, FRIED-
2 EVANS v. EATON CORP.
LANDER, COPLAN & ARONOFF, L.L.P., Cleveland, Ohio, for
Appellant.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Eaton Corporation, a multinational manufacturing company that
funds and administers a long-term disability benefits plan for its
employees, terminated Brenda Evans’s benefits in 2004. She sued
under ERISA to recover them, and the district court, faced with sub-
stantial conflicting medical evidence and a good case on both sides,
concluded that Evans’s position was the stronger one. But Eaton was
entitled to an abuse of discretion standard of review, and the district
court’s judgment, though abuse of discretion in name, was de novo in
fact. We therefore reverse the district court’s award of benefits to
Evans and remand with directions that judgment be granted to Eaton.

I.

Under Eaton’s disability plan, a claimant’s illness or injury quali-
fies as a covered disability if "during the first 24 months of such dis-
ability . . . you are totally and continuously unable to perform the
essential duties of your regular position" and thereafter "you are
totally and continuously unable to engage in any occupation or per-
form any work for compensation or profit for which you are, or may
become, reasonably well fitted by reason of education, training or
experience — at Eaton Corporation or elsewhere."

Proving a claim requires "[o]bjective findings of a disability," such
as "physical examination findings," "diagnostic test results/imaging
studies," and "observation of anatomical, physiological or psychologi-
cal abnormalities." As with so many ERISA plans today, Eaton
reserves "discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits"
and "the power and discretion to determine all questions of fact . . .
arising in connection with the administration, interpretation and appli-
cation of the Plan." A third-party, Broadspire Services, Inc., was
Eaton’s claims administrator.
 EVANS v. EATON CORP. 3
In 1998, due to severe rheumatoid arthritis, Brenda Evans quit her
job as an order processor at Eaton and filed for long-term disability
benefits. Eaton paid without controversy through 2003. But that year,
Evans’s disability picture started to become cloudy. Her rheumatolog-
ist, Dr. Boyd, had prescribed a new arthritis medication, Enbrel,
which did her some considerable good: "This is the best she has felt
since I have been seeing her," Dr. Boyd’s notes from the time report.
"[The Enbrel] has helped her quite dramatically. She has very little
joint pain now."

From that point forth, medical ambiguity would be the theme of
Evans’s story. To start with, arthritis was no longer her only problem:
A car accident in 2002 had caused serious independent injuries to her
back, and Dr. Boyd did not see improvement on that front. Evans’s
other treating physician, a general practitioner named Dr. Murphy,
agreed both as to Evans’s arthritic improvement and continuing back
problems, and both doctors continued to certify that Evans was totally
disabled. On the other hand, an MRI and radiology exam from the
period indicated that the injuries to Evans’s back were not severe.
And in a questionnaire, Evans stated that she could cook, shop, do
laundry, wash dishes, and drive about seven miles a day.

In January 2004, two of Broadspire’s in-house physicians reviewed
Evans’s 2003 medical records and concluded that she was no longer
disabled — though neither did they regard her as fully able. One
wrote, for instance, that Evans "would appear" to have "some use of
her hands, although perhaps not full use." The other, likewise noting
Evans’s limited movement and chronic back pain, found that her
"rheumatoid arthritis has stabilized" and her back pain did not "pre-
clude the claimant from performing sedentary job duties." Both indi-
cated that more information might be helpful, but on balance
recommended ending Evans’s benefits. That winter, Evans also took
a "Functional Capacity Evaluation," which concluded that she was
"capable of performing any job in the light category of work in an 8
hour period with occasional pushing, pulling, standing, walking,
climbing stairs and ladders, balancing, stooping, crouching, overhead
reaching, desk level reaching, and floor level reaching," and added
that "[h]er actual abilities to lift, sit, stand, walk and carry are greater
than her perceived abilities." Thus, on April 26, Broadspire sent
Evans a benefits cancellation letter.
4 EVANS v. EATON CORP.
Evans filed an appeal with Broadspire, and the steady current of
conflicting medical evidence and opinion continued. Three more
Broadspire physicians, one a rheumatologist, reviewed her file during
the appeal process; all three wrote substantial analyses of her condi-
tion and concluded that her infirmity was serious but not totally dis-
abling. In July, Broadspire denied the appeal, and Evans filed a
second, final appeal (the third review of her condition). This time she
supplemented her file with a recent x-ray and x-ray report document-
ing serious spinal problems, as well as a letter from Dr. Boyd:
"[T]here have been notes in my medical reports that have shown that
she has been better at times. Saying that she is better is not to say that
she is nearly normal or not to say that she is not disabled. One can
have a severe arthritic problem and get some improvement with medi-
cations and still be incapable functionally of working in a job. . . . I
do not think her situation will ever change and I think she will be dis-
abled long term."

Two new Broadspire physicians (one a rheumatologist) reviewed
the file, including the new materials, and after careful study con-
cluded that Evans could work: "Noteworthy is [the new] letter from
Dr. Boyd," the Broadspire rheumatologist remarked. "However, his
notes describe dramatic improvement and almost no synovitis. That
is not to say that the claimant is simply better but that she has very
low levels of disease. Thus there seems to be a contradiction between
the information being relayed in Dr. Boyd’s [letter] and what is being
relayed in his notes." In addition, Broadspire sent Evans’s file to an
anonymous rheumatologist from the Medical Review Institute of
America, who concurred with Broadspire’s in-house reviewers that
Evans could work. At the end of 2004, Eaton issued its final denial
letter.

Evans filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for South Caro-
lina in September 2005. See Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
(2000). But, presumably with a view to settlement, the parties agreed
to a stay of litigation. As the consent order explains, "[t]he Plaintiff
and the LTD Plan . . . have agreed to stay litigation to permit a recon-
sideration of the final appeal by the Plan Administrator. . . . Plaintiff
has indicated that she intends to undertake certain neurologi-
cal/orthopedic evaluations which she plans to submit to the Plan
 EVANS v. EATON CORP. 5
Administrator for this final determination reconsideration." Thus Dr.
Michael Bucci, a neurosurgeon and the third doctor to examine Evans
in person, met with her in April 2006. He found "joint deformity . . .
significantly painful to touch," "joint swelling," "diffuse [spinal] ten-
derness," "difficulty with toe and heel walking," and in sum, severe
rheumatoid arthritis and severe spinal stenosis: "I concur with her
rheumatologist that the lady is permanently and totally disabled at this
time."

Even at this stage, however, the medical opinion was not univocal.
Eaton forwarded Evans’s file to an independent medical reviewer, Dr.
Trangle, who took issue with Dr. Bucci’s report and concluded that
Evans was not disabled. Dr. Trangle found that, as of "the relevant
date of 5/31/04 . . . review of the records indicates that she had barely
detectable elevated rheumatoid factor markers." And "[i]n regards to
her lower back," the MRI scans and other records from 2003 and
2004 indicate "some spinal stenosis and some radiculopathy," but "it
was mild in nature." In July 2006, Eaton rejected Evans’s remanded
appeal, stating that the records given to Dr. Bucci were incomplete;
that Dr. Bucci incorrectly focused on Evans’s current medical condi-
tion ("I concur . . . that the lady is permanently and totally disabled
at this time.") rather than her condition when benefits were cut off in
2004; and that his view conflicted with Dr. Trangle’s. Litigation
resumed, and the parties agreed to have the court resolve the matter
on the basis of memoranda and a joint stipulation, with relevant docu-
ments attached.

The district court’s opinion of October 2006, after reciting the
abuse of discretion standard of review, examined the evidence on
both sides in great detail. Most important to the district court, "the
only physicians who physically examined Evans . . . concluded that
she was totally disabled," and "[t]hese doctors’ conclusions," unlike
those of the reviewing physicians, "are substantial objective evidence
of disability under the Plan." Evans v. Eaton Corp., C.A. No. 8:05-
2575-HMH, 2006 WL 2997153, at *9-10 (D.S.C. Oct. 18, 2006). By
contrast, in the district court’s view, the reviewing physicians’ opin-
ions rested on weak foundations, such as Dr. Boyd’s notes recording
Evans’s improvement (which, Dr. Boyd explained, were never meant
to indicate that Evans was well enough to work), the functional capac-
ity evaluation (which proved no more than Evans’s ability to exert
6 EVANS v. EATON CORP.
herself for one day, not day in and day out), and Evans’s statements
that she could cook, wash dishes, do crafts, and drive (which also did
not prove an ability to work). Id. at *10-11.

In addition, the district court believed that the Medical Review
Institute physician’s report was confused on basic matters of fact
(such as whether Evans had ever been considered disabled), and Dr.
Trangle’s report was contradicted by most of the objective evidence
in the record. Id. at *12-14. Finally, Eaton could not in good faith set
aside Dr. Bucci’s conclusions after agreeing to a stay in order to get
them — especially for no better a reason than the obvious and
unavoidable fact, implicitly agreed to in the stay, that Dr. Bucci’s
examination in 2006 would focus on Evans’s condition in 2006. Id.
at *14-15. In sum, "Eaton abused its discretion in failing to find
Evans’ examining physicians’ opinions more credible than the opin-
ions of Dr. Trangle, Broadspire’s in-house physicians, and the [Medi-
cal Review Institute] reviewer." Id. at *14. Eaton timely appealed.

II.

This case turns on a faithful application of the abuse of discretion
standard of review, and so we begin with what is most crucial: a clear
understanding of what that standard is, and what such standards are
for.

A.

The purpose of standards of review is to focus reviewing courts
upon their proper role when passing on the conduct of other decision-
makers. Standards of review are thus an elemental expression of judi-
cial restraint, which, in their deferential varieties, safeguard the
superior vantage points of those entrusted with primary decisional
responsibility.1 The clear error standard, for example, protects district
courts’ primacy as triers of fact. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985). AEDPA’s reasonableness standards protect
state courts’ authority over state criminal convictions. See 28 U.S.C.
1
De novo review, by contrast, signals no need to protect the primacy
of another decisionmaker, because the reviewing court can perform the
task as capably as the decisionmaker under review.
 EVANS v. EATON CORP. 7
§ 2254(d) (2000). Chevron deference, like the Administrative Proce-
dure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious and substantial evidence stan-
dards, protects agencies’ authority in carrying out the missions for
which they are created. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Rational basis review protects the political choices of our govern-
ment’s elected branches. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 314 (1993) (calling the standard "a paradigm of judicial
restraint"). And trust law, to which ERISA is so intimately linked,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989),
uses the abuse of discretion standard to protect a fiduciary’s decisions
concerning the trust funds in his care. See 3 Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 87 (2007).

The precise definitions of these various standards, the nuances sep-
arating them from one another, "cannot be imprisoned within any
forms of words" for "we cannot escape, in relation to this problem,
the use of undefined defining terms." Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.). But what these and
other such standards share is the designation of a primary decision-
maker other than the reviewing court, and the instrument, deference,
with which that primacy is to be maintained.

B.

The undisputed standard of review in this case is abuse of discre-
tion. Although ERISA itself is silent on the standard for denials of
benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B), Firestone establishes that
a de novo standard applies "unless the benefit plan gives the adminis-
trator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan," in which case the exer-
cise of assigned discretion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 489
U.S. at 111, 115; see also Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d
335, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2000). In the instant case, the Plan’s language
giving Eaton "discretionary authority to determine eligibility for ben-
efits" and "the power and discretion to determine all questions of fact
. . . arising in connection with the administration, interpretation and
application of the Plan" is unambiguous, and Evans does not dispute
the standard it requires. Thus the district court functions in this con-
text as a deferential reviewing court with respect to the ERISA fidu-
8 EVANS v. EATON CORP.
ciary’s decision, and we review the district court’s decision de novo,
"employing the same standards applied by the district court in review-
ing the fiduciary’s decision." Stup v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 390 F.3d
301, 306-07 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).

It is notoriously difficult to venture a general definition of the term
"abuse of discretion," and none is canonical; indeed the term has dif-
ferent meanings in different legal contexts. See 1 Steven Alan Chil-
dress & Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review §§ 1.02, 4.21,
at 1-12, 4-131, 4-132 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining that the term "fights
simple definition" and has a "sliding contextual meaning" with "vary-
ing level[s] of deference"). In one sense, abuse of discretion is a term
of exquisite balance. The word "abuse" recognizes that authority can
be misused. The word "discretion" recognizes that the exercise of
authority is often impossible without some leeway for judgment. But
taken together, the two words convey an unmistakable message: that
as a matter of priority as well as sequence, discretion is first, and
review for abuse is only a posterior check on judgment which strays
too far from the mark.

The language of "in-bounds" and "out-of-bounds" thus becomes all
but irresistible in the abuse of discretion context, for the standard
draws a line — or rather, demarcates a region — between the unsup-
portable and the merely mistaken, between the legal error, disorder of
reason, severe lapse of judgment, and procedural failure that a review-
ing court may always correct, and the simple disagreement that, on
this standard, it may not. See Harry T. Edwards & Linda A. Elliott,
Federal Standards of Review 68 (2007) (listing an "erroneous view of
the law," "patently arbitrary application of the controlling law,"
"clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence," judgment call outside
"the range of choices permitted," and error "in the weighing process
by which [discretion is] exercised" as factors cabining the deference
owed on abuse of discretion review (internal quotations omitted)). At
its immovable core, the abuse of discretion standard requires a
reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary decision-
maker’s judgment that the court does not reverse merely because it
would have come to a different result in the first instance. See Henry
J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 754
(1982) ("[T]he trial judge has discretion in those cases where his rul-
ing will not be reversed simply because an appellate court dis-
 EVANS v. EATON CORP. 9
agrees."). The "deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion
review," Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997), is defer-
ence enough to appreciate reasonable disagreement.

C.

The ERISA context permits a still more particularized conception
of the abuse of discretion standard. First, in ERISA cases, the stan-
dard equates to reasonableness: We will not disturb an ERISA admin-
istrator’s discretionary decision if it is reasonable, and will reverse or
remand if it is not. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111; Booth, 201 F.3d at 342.
Second, the abuse of discretion standard is less deferential to adminis-
trators than an arbitrary and capricious standard would be; to be
unreasonable is not so extreme as to be irrational. See Firestone, 489
U.S. at 109-10; Booth, 201 F.3d at 341. Third, an administrator’s
decision is reasonable "if it is the result of a deliberate, principled rea-
soning process and if it is supported by substantial evidence." Bern-
stein v. CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 788 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation omitted). Fourth, the decision must reflect careful attention
to "the language of the plan," as well as the requirements of ERISA
itself. Booth, 201 F.3d at 342. One adds new assemblages of words
to this legal landscape with caution, but it seems on the whole that we
require ERISA administrators’ decisions to adhere both to the text of
ERISA and the plan to which they have contracted; to rest on good
evidence and sound reasoning; and to result from a fair and searching
process.2
2
In a vivid reminder of Judge Friendly’s adage that "there is not just
one standard of ‘abuse of discretion,’" Indiscretion About Discretion, 31
Emory L.J. at 783, Firestone remarks that "if a benefit plan gives discre-
tion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether
there is an abuse of discretion." 489 U.S. at 115 (internal quotation omit-
ted). Thus this circuit "lessen[s] the deference normally given under [an
abuse of discretion] standard . . . to the extent necessary to counteract
any influence unduly resulting" from an administrator’s conflict of inter-
est — but "in no case does the court deviate from the abuse of discretion
standard." Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir.
1997). The decision as to whether to lessen deference is not always a
simple one, compare Colucci v. Agfa Corp., 431 F.3d 170, 178-80 (4th
Cir. 2005), with Adams v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 177 Fed. Appx. 335,
343 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006), and is not fully briefed in this case. But the par-
ticular variation on the standard would not alter the result here, and we
proceed on the assumption that either variation could apply.
10 EVANS v. EATON CORP.
Under no formulation, however, may a court, faced with discretion-
ary language like that in the plan instrument in this case, forget its
duty of deference and its secondary rather than primary role in deter-
mining a claimant’s right to benefits. The abuse of discretion standard
in ERISA cases protects important values: the plan administrator’s
greater experience and familiarity with plan terms and provisions; the
enhanced prospects of achieving consistent application of those terms
and provisions that results; the desire of those who establish ERISA
plans to preserve at least some role in their administration; and the
importance of ensuring that funds which are not unlimited go to those
who, according to the terms of the plan, are truly deserving. Cf. Gil-
bertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 328 F.3d 625, 632 (10th Cir. 2003);
Johannssen v. District No. 1-Pacific Coast Dist., 292 F.3d 159, 169
(4th Cir. 2002); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426,
432 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Thus, the language of discretion in an ERISA
plan is a message to courts, counseling not judicial abdication, to be
sure, but a healthy measure of judicial restraint.

It is with these principles in mind that we examine the facts at
hand.

III.

The most striking feature of the medical evidence in this case is its
cross-cutting ambiguity. On Eaton’s side, the plan’s definition of "dis-
ability" is demanding: a claimant must be "totally . . . unable to
engage in any" paid work for which the claimant "may become" capa-
ble. Dr. Boyd, who was perhaps Evans’s strongest advocate, insisted
that Evans satisfied that definition, but to some degree his own
remarks ("She has very little joint pain now.") undercut that insis-
tence. And no fewer than nine physicians reviewed Evans’s file in the
course of an initial benefits decision, two appeals, and a remand; all
agreed that she did not meet the definition. The quantity is both
impressive and, taken by itself, insufficient: As Evans argues, an
ERISA administrator cannot prevail merely by multiplying deficient
medical opinions, nor by arraying an abundance of low-quality opin-
ions against a few high-quality ones. But the opinions in this case are
not deficient; the nine reviewing physicians’ reports, which are in the
record, show every sign of reasoned judgment and good faith.
 EVANS v. EATON CORP. 11
Broadspire rheumatologist Yvonne Sherrer’s two reports are repre-
sentative of the set. We note first their measured tone, which
acknowledges Evans’s serious medical problems without a hint of
dismissiveness: "[T]his claimant has had substantial disease," she
writes, and further examination "is recommended," but Evans also
shows "excellent response to therapy" and currently "mild disease
limited to the upper extremities only." Second, the substance of Dr.
Sherrer’s reasoning is analytical rather than rote, and she addresses a
thorough and balanced array of medical evidence: "The first x-rays,"
she writes, showed "some evolution of existent erosions" but no "sub-
stantial new change"; three years later, "[r]epeat x-rays of the same
areas" also showed "no substantial new changes"; therefore, "these
records document stability in x-ray findings . . . ." Third, Dr. Sherrer’s
conclusions are coherent in themselves and consistent with other
reviewers, finding Evans in sum to have "seropositive rheumatoid
arthritis" that has "responded to therapy," and "degenerative changes
of the cervical and lumbar spine" that, while serious, are not severe
enough to "render the claimant incapable of any occupation." Finally,
although Dr. Sherrer’s reports themselves are not what the Plan char-
acterizes as "[o]bjective findings of a disability," they are based on
such findings, including: notes from Evans’s treating physicians; x-
rays and x-ray reports; a radiology exam and MRI; and the Functional
Capacity Evaluation. With eight other physicians submitting reports
that display, on the whole, the same virtues of tone, reasoning, and
evidence, no one could deny that Eaton’s evidence was substantial
and its process principled.

The evidence on Evans’s side was substantial too. First, there is no
dispute that she was disabled at one point — even on Eaton’s strict
definition of the term. Second, there is no dispute that she remains,
and has never ceased to be, impaired. Third, the news that her arthritis
shows real improvement with a new medication is by itself an inade-
quate reason to cut off benefits when she started from such a low
point; as Dr. Boyd argued, she might improve considerably and still
remain disabled, nor can one forget that her back problems persisted
even as her arthritis improved. Fourth, various diagnostic tests,
including bloodwork and an x-ray and x-ray report, substantiated
Evans’s claims. Fifth and most significantly, every doctor who exam-
ined Evans in person concluded that she was disabled.
12 EVANS v. EATON CORP.
Dr. Murphy, for example, reviewing Evans’s response to Enbrel in
July 2003 — well before there was any indication that her benefits
might be terminated — wrote: "[H]er arthritis symptoms have
improved dramatically except for her back pain and hip pain. This has
not improved at all." At the end of 2003 (still prior to the threat of
a benefits termination), he completed a comprehensive medical evalu-
ation documenting an array of medical problems: "She has seroposi-
tive, non erosive rheumatoid arthritis which has been very
symptomatic. . . . She has a chronic pain syndrome involving the right
upper extremity after an injury and chronic low back pain which is
a combination of post traumatic changes, lumbar facet arthritis and
spinal stenosis. She has a history of hypertension, vasomotor instabil-
ity, normocytic anemia, significant dependent edema which is getting
worse over time and recurrent breast cysts. She has pain in the knees
and hips, especially with walking. It’s very painful to bend or to reach
overhead. . . ." True, as Eaton points out, the Supreme Court has
rejected the "treating physician rule" in ERISA cases: "[C]ourts have
no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special
weight to the opinions of a claimant’s physician; nor may courts
impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when
they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician’s
evaluation." Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822,
834 (2003). But that point may not be decisive when Eaton’s own
Plan elevates treating physicians’ in-person examinations to the status
of "[o]bjective findings of a disability," nor need it negate Dr. Bucci’s
view (since he was an examining but not a treating physician). Surely
a reasonable person could find Evans disabled on such evidence.

Given this state of affairs, the parties pick endlessly at each other’s
evidence. Evans argues, for example, that "although Dr. Sherrer did
consider the October 2004 x-rays she did not consider the abnormal
blood test of April 22, 2004"; Eaton counters that "Dr. Bucci’s report
failed to interpret the October 2004 x-ray and made no findings
regarding the April 2004 lab results." Appellee’s Brief 32 (emphasis
in original); Appellant’s Reply Brief 16. Such point/counterpoint
shows what a close case this was, and thus how very important the
abuse of discretion standard — which, like other such standards, bites
mainly in close cases — should have been. The district court should
have acknowledged the essential equipoise and stayed its hand. Elliott
v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 606 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is not an
 EVANS v. EATON CORP. 13
abuse of discretion for a plan fiduciary to deny disability pension ben-
efits where conflicting medical reports were presented."). Instead, the
court joined the fray, purportedly applying an abuse of discretion
standard but actually re-weighing the evidence for itself.

Whole paragraphs of the court’s opinion, for instance, go to attack-
ing the Functional Capacity Evaluation and other physical evidence
in Eaton’s favor. Even more of the opinion goes to scrutinizing the
work of the twelve doctors involved in some detail, ultimately con-
cluding that Evans’s three examining physicians were "substantially
more persuasive" than Eaton’s nine reviewing physicians. Evans,
2006 WL 2997153, at *8. This language of greater and lesser persua-
siveness rings off-key in the abuse of discretion context. It is certainly
possible that the evidence on each side of a disability dispute might
be so lopsided that a decision for the less persuasive one is an abuse
of discretion. But the evidence in this case was close, and the district
court’s revealing language is persistent: "Eaton abused its discretion
in failing to afford greater weight to the physical examination findings
of Evans’ examining physicians." Id. at *10. "[T]he opinions of the
non-examining physicians are not persuasive." Id. "Broadspire’s in-
house physician reviewers are not as credible as Evans’ examining
physicians . . . ." Id. at *11. "[T]he [Medical Review Institute]
reviewer is not as credible as Evans’ examining physicians." Id. at
*12. "Likewise, Dr. Trangle’s opinion is not persuasive, and Eaton
abused its discretion in crediting Dr. Trangle’s opinion over the opin-
ions of Evans’ examining physicians." Id. at *13. Most vividly:
"[T]he court finds that Eaton abused its discretion in failing to find
Evans’ examining physicians’ opinions more credible than the opin-
ions of Dr. Trangle, Broadspire’s in-house physicians, and the [Medi-
cal Review Institute] reviewer." Id. at *14. These phrases belong in
the voice of a primary factfinder; here they betray a misunderstanding
of the district court’s reviewing role.

It bears emphasis that the district court’s view as to the superiority
of the evidence in Evans’s favor was not an unreasonable one. Were
we reviewing the district court’s own decision for abuse of discretion,
we would sustain it. But we are reviewing the plan administrator’s
ruling under that standard, and its decision was not an abuse of discre-
tion in any sense. Where an ERISA administrator rejects a claim to
benefits on the strength of substantial evidence, careful and coherent
14 EVANS v. EATON CORP.
reasoning, faithful adherence to the letter of ERISA and the language
in the plan, and a fair and searching process, there can be no abuse
of discretion — even if another, and arguably a better, decisionmaker
might have come to a different, and arguably a better, result.

Finally, Donovon v. Eaton Corp., 462 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2006),
featured the same defendant, the same plan, and the same general
issue as this case. The panel there affirmed the district court’s deci-
sion for the claimant, according to Evans, because it regarded Eaton
as "picking and choosing" medical evidence in its own favor. Appel-
lee’s Brief 28. Consistency, Evans argues, demands the same conclu-
sion from us. But "picking and choosing" is just a pejorative label for
"selecting," and what rightly offended the Donovon court was not
Eaton’s selectivity (which is part of a plan administrator’s job), but
its "wholesale disregard" of evidence in the claimant’s favor.
Donovon, 462 F.3d at 329. Here, by contrast, Eaton addressed the evi-
dence in Evans’s favor thoughtfully and at length. The benefits can-
cellation letter of April 2004, for example, gave due regard to the
evidence in Evans’s favor: "[Y]ou have a history of rheumatoid
arthritis," Broadspire wrote, "but recent notes indicate that you had a
decrease in your symptoms and are doing well on Enbrel." As to
Evans’s back, an MRI "revealed degenerative disk disease," but no
"functional impairment that would preclude you from performing sed-
entary job duties." Eaton’s assessment of the evidence in this case
was fair, and it is entitled to the deference that is the result of careful
work.

IV.

So standards of review do matter, for in every context they keep
judges within the limits of their role and preserve other decision-
makers’ functions against judicial intrusion. But deference has a par-
ticular significance in the context of ERISA. ERISA’s preamble refers
to the "interests of employees and their beneficiaries" no fewer than
four times in three paragraphs, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); no one
doubts that the statute exists to protect employees’ access to benefits,
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113. And yet a cavalier approach to the defer-
ence owed ERISA fiduciaries who contract for it would likely dis-
serve that purpose, whatever the call on our compassion in a
particular case, for the fact is that the "price [of greater coverage]
 EVANS v. EATON CORP. 15
would almost certainly [be] lower benefits levels and lower levels of
plan formation." John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks
Trusts, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 207, 213. For more than thirty years, then,
courts have balanced the need to ensure that individual claimants get
the benefits to which they are entitled with the need to protect
employees and their beneficiaries as a group from a contraction in the
total pool of benefits available. At any point, Congress could have
intervened. But the delicate balance persists. The district court lost
sight of this balance. We therefore reverse the district court’s award
of benefits to Evans and remand with directions that judgment be
granted to Eaton.

REVERSED AND REMANDED