PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LENNY LYLE CAIN,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JERRY RONALD FLINCHUM, No. 07-4631
Defendant.
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
PANEL FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MARYLAND,
Amicus Supporting Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:06-cr-00551-RDB)
Argued: March 26, 2008
Decided: May 9, 2008
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, and
David C. NORTON, Chief United States District Judge for the
District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Williams
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Traxler and Judge Norton joined.
2 UNITED STATES v. CAIN
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Mythili Raman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Idus Jerome Dan-
iel, Jr., Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Martin Stanley Himeles, Jr.,
ZUCKERMAN & SPAEDER, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for
Amicus Supporting Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Christopher J. Romano, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellant. William K. Meyer, ZUCKERMAN &
SPAEDER, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus Supporting
Appellee.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Chief Judge:
The Government appeals the district court’s order granting Lenny
Lyle Cain’s motion to suppress inculpatory statements that he made
during an interview with law enforcement officers on November 30,
2006. The district court suppressed the statements because it con-
cluded that the Government violated Cain’s Sixth Amendment rights
by interviewing him without first contacting his court-appointed attor-
ney. The district court held that suppression was also warranted
because the Government’s interview of Cain violated the Criminal
Justice Act ("CJA"), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West 2000 & Supp.
2006), and the District of Maryland’s implementation of its CJA plan
(the "Plan"), which require that eligible criminal defendants be pro-
vided counsel as soon as possible after the initiation of adversarial
proceedings.
We reverse. Because Cain initiated the interview during which he
gave the inculpatory statements to the law enforcement agents, his
Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. Moreover, no "violation"
of the CJA or the Plan occurred, for the CJA and Plan provisions
requiring speedy appointment of counsel for eligible criminal defen-
dants do not prevent those defendants from voluntarily initiating con-
tact with law enforcement officers and making inculpatory statements
to those officers in the absence of the appointed CJA attorney.
UNITED STATES v. CAIN 3
I.
Because Cain prevailed on his suppression motion, we review the
facts in the light most favorable to him. United States v. Kimbrough,
477 F.3d 144, 147 (4th Cir. 2007).
A.
During the evening hours of November 28, 2006, Cain was arrested
as part of an undercover drug sting operation by U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Administration ("DEA") agents. After his arrest, the agents took
Cain to the Central Booking facility in Baltimore City to await his ini-
tial appearance, where he stayed for the night. Prior to his initial
appearance, Cain told the arresting agents that he wanted to cooperate
with them, suggesting that he could provide drugs to the agents if they
could get him out of jail.1
The next day, Cain made an initial appearance with his brother, a
co-defendant, before a federal magistrate judge. At this hearing, the
magistrate judge advised Cain of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), as well as of the nature of the crimes charged
against him. In response, Cain stated that he understood both his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel. Thereafter, Cain completed
a financial affidavit indicating the need for court-appointed counsel.
Because the Federal Public Defender was already representing his
co-defendant, the magistrate judge informed Cain that he would
arrange for him to be represented by another attorney pursuant to the
CJA. The magistrate judge then ordered Cain’s detention pending fur-
ther proceedings.
Immediately after this initial appearance, Cain again informed the
DEA agents that he wanted to speak with them in the hope that he and
his brother might be released. According to the Government, because
the U.S. Marshals needed to transport Cain back to the jail, the DEA
agents were unable to speak with Cain at that time.
1
Cain also moved to suppress these statements, but the district court
denied that motion. Because Cain does not appeal this aspect of the dis-
trict court’s decision, it is not before us.
4 UNITED STATES v. CAIN
On November 30, the day following his initial appearance, Cain
was returned to the courthouse so that he could meet with the DEA
agents as he had twice before requested. Two DEA agents and an
Assistant U.S. Attorney ("AUSA") were present at the meeting on
behalf of the Government. Cain did not have an attorney present with
him at the interview. At the time of the interview, the district court
had appointed the CJA Panel for the District of Maryland (the "CJA
Panel") to represent Cain. Although it is clear from the record that the
CJA panel appointed a specific CJA attorney to Cain at some point
on the day of the interview, the record does not reveal whether this
appointment occurred by the time the interview was conducted. In
any event, the Government did not notify the CJA Panel that Cain had
indicated his willingness to speak with the DEA agents and an AUSA.2
Before the interview began, the DEA agents re-apprised Cain of his
Miranda rights and told him that he was not required to make any
statements without counsel present. Despite these reminders, Cain
affirmed his desire to speak with the agents. Cain also signed a writ-
ten form acknowledging that he understood that the district court was
arranging to have an attorney to represent him, that he waived his
right to have an attorney present at the interview, and that it was at
his request that he was meeting with the Government without an
attorney present. After executing the waiver, Cain made numerous
statements to the agents implicating himself and others in drug traf-
ficking crimes. During the course of the interview, Cain identified his
Mexican cocaine supplier and admitted to having sold cocaine.
B.
On March 7, 2007, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of
Maryland returned a seven-count superseding indictment against
Cain, which included charges of a conspiracy to distribute five or
more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West
1999 & Supp. 2007), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
2
At the suppression hearing, the Government acknowledged that if
Cain had been represented by an Assistant Public Defender, it would
have attempted to contact that lawyer prior to interviewing Cain.
UNITED STATES v. CAIN 5
Thereafter, Cain moved to suppress the statements that he made to
the DEA agents on November 30, arguing that the Government vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment rights by interviewing him without first
trying to contact his CJA attorney. The district court held a hearing
on the motion on June 1, 2007 and, by written order on June 12,
granted Cain’s motion to suppress. The district court first concluded
that the Government violated Cain’s Sixth Amendment rights by
interviewing him without first contacting his attorney because Cain
had invoked his right to counsel at his initial appearance by request-
ing a CJA attorney at that time. In the alternative, the district court
held that suppression was warranted because the Government’s inter-
rogation of Cain violated the district court’s implementation of its
CJA plan.
The Government timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) (granting the
courts of appeals jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals by the United
States "from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or
excluding evidence").
II.
In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we
review the court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclu-
sions de novo. United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 410 (4th Cir.
2008).
A.
The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. A
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at
the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, which at least
includes the point of formal charge, indictment, information, prelimi-
nary hearing, or arraignment. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175
(1991).3
3
The parties do not dispute that Cain’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had both attached and been properly invoked before Cain gave
the inculpatory statements at issue.
6 UNITED STATES v. CAIN
In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), the Supreme Court
created a bright-line rule for deciding whether an accused who has
asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel has subsequently
waived that right so that the Government’s interrogation of him with-
out counsel present does not violate the Constitution. Adopting the
reasoning of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which had
announced an identical prophylactic rule in the Fifth Amendment
context, the Jackson Court held if a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has attached and the defendant has invoked that right,
law enforcement officers may not interrogate him unless the defen-
dant initiates the exchange with the officers and waives his right to
counsel. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. Thus, if the officers initiate contact
with the defendant, any waiver of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights is presumed invalid, and evidence obtained pursuant to such a
waiver is subject to suppression. Id.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S.
344 (1990), however, Jackson’s rule is inapposite when the defendant
initiates contact with law enforcement. According to the Harvey
Court, "nothing in the Sixth Amendment prevents a suspect charged
with a crime and represented by counsel from voluntarily choosing,
on his own to speak with police in the absence of an attorney." Id. at
352. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment proves no bar to an interro-
gation: (1) if it was the defendant, and not the Government, who initi-
ated the interrogation; and (2) if the defendant voluntarily waived his
right to counsel.
Cain does not contest these familiar Sixth Amendment principles.
And Cain acknowledges that a DEA agent testified that Cain advised
him that he wanted to speak to the agents in the hope that he and his
brother could avoid time in jail. But Cain argues that it is unclear
from the record whether he offered to speak to the agents on his own
accord or whether he merely responded to the agents’ suggestion that
he could help himself as well as his brother by speaking to the Gov-
ernment sooner rather than later. In light of this purported factual
ambiguity, Cain contends that his statements must be suppressed
under Jackson. We disagree.
The district court found that Cain initiated contact with the Govern-
ment, a factual finding that is in no way clearly erroneous on the
UNITED STATES v. CAIN 7
record presented. Indeed, the record clearly demonstrates that Cain
requested to speak with the Government on at least two occasions: (1)
on November 29, 2006, prior to his initial appearance; and (2) on
November 30, 2006, the day after his initial appearance. Moreover,
on November 30, 2006, before his interview with the Government,
Cain signed a statement acknowledging that "he requested to speak
with the law enforcement agents and the Assistant United States
Attorney." (J.A. at 109-11.) The evidence also establishes that Cain
was advised of his right not to speak with the Government without an
attorney present on at least three different occasions.4
Despite its finding that Cain initiated contact with the Government,
the district court held that Cain’s Sixth Amendment rights had been
violated because "upon request for court-appointed counsel by Defen-
dant Cain, any subsequent interview without seeking the presence of
that counsel is violative of his Sixth Amendment rights." (J.A. at
115.) We can find no basis for this purported constitutional holding
in the Supreme Court’s or our precedents. To the contrary, the district
court’s conclusion runs afoul of the well-settled rule that where a
defendant initiates contact with law enforcement officers, he may val-
idly waive his Sixth Amendment rights, and submit to Government
interrogation, even if he is represented by an attorney. Harvey, 494
U.S. at 352. As the Supreme Court explained in Patterson v. Illinois:
Preserving the integrity of the accused’s choice to communi-
cate with police only through counsel is the essence of
Edwards and its progeny — not barring an accused from
making an initial election as to whether he will face the
State’s officers during questioning with the aid of counsel,
or go it alone. If an accused knowingly and intelligently pur-
sues the latter course, we see no reason why the uncoun-
seled statements he makes must be excluded at his trial.
4
These occasions include: (1) by the magistrate judge at the initial
appearance; (2) by the DEA agents, who repeatedly informed Cain that
he did not have to speak with them and then formally read Cain his
Miranda rights; and (3) in the written waiver form that was signed by
Cain before his interview, which not only advised him of his right to
counsel, but also informed him that the district court was obtaining an
attorney for him.
8 UNITED STATES v. CAIN
487 U.S. 285, 291 (1998) (emphasis added and omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).5
Patterson’s rationale directly applies here. It is clear that Cain
desired to speak to the DEA agents both before and after his initial
appearance, as evidenced by his multiple requests for a meeting with
them and by his execution of the waiver form provided by the agents.
As much as the Sixth Amendment prevents the Government from ini-
tiating contact with and interrogating a defendant who has invoked his
right to counsel, it permits a defendant to initiate contact with and
give statements to the Government on his own accord. See e.g., Mur-
phy v. Holland, 845 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
admission of certain inculpatory statements of the defendant did not
violate his Sixth Amendment rights, even though he had been
arraigned and requested counsel, because the defendant initiated the
conversation with law enforcement and properly waived his Sixth
Amendment rights); United States v. Garlewicz, 493 F.3d 933, 937
(8th Cir. 2007) (same).
In summary, we think it is clear that Cain initiated the November
30 interview with law enforcement officials during which he made the
inculpatory statements he now argues should be suppressed. As such,
his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.
B.
Having determined that Cain’s Sixth Amendment rights were not
violated, we turn to consider the district court’s alternative holding
that even if no constitutional violation occurred, suppression of the
statements was warranted nonetheless. Acting pursuant to its supervi-
sory authority, the district court also suppressed Cain’s statements on
the ground that the Government violated the court’s implementation
5
On appeal, Cain does not argue that he did not knowingly and intelli-
gently waive his right to counsel. The Criminal Justice Act Panel for the
District of Maryland, acting as amicus curiae, however, argues that
Cain’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not knowing
and intelligent because Cain did not have an opportunity to exercise that
right. This argument is without merit.
UNITED STATES v. CAIN 9
of the district court’s CJA Plan by interviewing Cain without first
contacting the CJA Panel.
A federal court’s inherent or supervisory power permits it "to
supervise the administration of criminal justice among the parties
before the bar" and to "exclude evidence taken from the defendant by
willful disobedience of law." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,
735, n.7 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in origi-
nal). The "inherent power to refuse to receive material evidence[,
however,] is a power that must be sparingly exercised." Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (emphasis added). Accord-
ingly, we review the district court’s use of the exclusionary rule to
remedy statutory violations for abuse of discretion. Westberry v. Gis-
laved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999).
To protect the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel
in criminal prosecutions, Congress passed the CJA in 1964, which
ensures that "defendants who are financially unable to afford trial ser-
vices necessary to an adequate defense are provided them in accor-
dance with the Sixth Amendment." United States v. Barcelon, 833
F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Heath v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 788 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). Pursuant to the CJA,
the District of Maryland established its CJA Plan to facilitate the
appointment of counsel for financially-eligible defendants. In accor-
dance with the CJA’s charge that a "person for whom counsel is
appointed shall be represented at every stage of the proceeding from
his initial appearance before the United States magistrate judge or the
court through appeal," 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(c), the district’s CJA
Plan provides that counsel "shall be provided to eligible persons as
soon as feasible." (J.A. at 123.)
Relying on these provisions, the district court concluded that
Cain’s statements should be suppressed because the Government vio-
lated the district court’s implementation of the Plan by interviewing
Cain without first contacting the CJA Panel. This conclusion seems
to amount to a holding that the Government’s actions here violated
the spirit of the CJA and the district’s implementing Plan.6 We
6
The parties have not cited and we are not aware of any case ordering
suppression of evidence for a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A.
10 UNITED STATES v. CAIN
believe the district court abused its discretion in reaching this conclu-
sion.
To be sure, the CJA establishes the broad institutional framework
for appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants, thereby
ensuring that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is safeguarded.
But the CJA in no way circumscribes a defendant’s ability to volun-
tarily initiate contact with law enforcement officers and speak with
them about the charges that he faces. Moreover, the Government is
not obligated, by the Constitution or the CJA, to stall a defendant
eager to confess or speak with law enforcement officers until his
attorney arrives. The CJA and the district’s CJA Plan simply do not
limit the types of investigative steps that the Government may take
after counsel is appointed. Here, Cain freely spoke to the DEA agents
and AUSA after twice requesting a meeting with the Government and
signing a waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights. In the face of Cain’s
clear willingness to speak to the law enforcement agents, it was not
incumbent on the Government to sit on its hands simply because the
machinery of the CJA-appointment process had already been set in
motion. Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discre-
tion in suppressing Cain’s statements pursuant to its supervisory pow-
ers.7
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order
7
Amicus Curiae also contends that the Government’s interrogation pol-
icy for CJA defendants violates the Equal Protection guarantees of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it treats CJA defendants
differently with respect to a fundamental constitutional right based on
their poverty. This contention is based on the CJA Panel’s assertion that
if a defendant is represented by retained counsel or the Office of the Fed-
eral Public Defender, the Government notifies counsel before meeting
with the defendant, but if a defendant is represented by the CJA Panel
and the defendant initiates an interview before the CJA Panel has desig-
nated a specific attorney, the Government does not contact the CJA Panel
to learn if a CJA Panel attorney has been designated, or to expedite that
designation. Like Amicus Curiae’s alternate argument, see supra note 5,
this argument is likewise without merit.
UNITED STATES v. CAIN 11
granting Cain’s motion to suppress his November 30, 2006 statements
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED