US Ex Rel. Wilson v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER

Reversed by Supreme Court, March 30, 2010

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. 
KAREN T. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICT; CHEROKEE
COUNTY SOIL & WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICT; RICHARD
GREENE, in his individual capacity;
WILLIAM TIMPSON, in his individual
capacity; KEITH ORR, in his
individual and official capacities;
RAYMOND WILLIAMS, in his
individual capacity; DALE WIGGINS,
in his individual capacity; GERALD
 No. 07-1322
PHILLIPS, in his individual capacity;
ALLEN DEHART, in his individual
capacity; LLOYD MILLSAPS; JERRY
WILLIAMS, in his individual capacity;
BILLY BROWN, in his individual
capacity; LYNN CODY, in his
individual capacity; BILL TIPTON; C.
B. NEWTON, in his individual
capacity; EDDIE WOOD, in his
individual capacity; GRAHAM
COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees,
and

2 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL

GRAHAM COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS; CHEROKEE COUNTY
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
CHERIE GREENE; RICKY STILES; BETTY
JEAN ORR; JOYCE LANE; JIMMY ORR;
EUGENE MORROW; CHARLES LANE;
CHARLES LANEY; GEORGE POSTELL; 
LLOYD KISSLEBURG; TED ORR;
BERNICE ORR; JOHN DOE, JR.; JOHN
DOE CORPORATION; GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES, 1-99,
Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. 
KAREN T. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KEITH ORR, in his individual and
official capacities; JERRY WILLIAMS,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER  No. 07-1910
CONSERVATION DISTRICT; GRAHAM
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; CHEROKEE COUNTY
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICT; CHEROKEE COUNTY
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
RICHARD GREENE, in his individual
capacity; CHERIE GREENE; WILLIAM
TIMPSON, in his individual capacity;
RICKY STILES; BETTY JEAN ORR;

 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 3

RAYMOND WILLIAMS, in his 
individual capacity; DALE WIGGINS,
in his individual capacity; JOYCE
LANE; GERALD PHILLIPS, in his
individual capacity; ALLEN DEHART,
in his individual capacity; JIMMY
ORR; LLOYD MILLSAPS; BILLY
BROWN, in his individual capacity;
LYNN CODY, in his individual
capacity; EUGENE MORROW; CHARLES 
LANE; CHARLES LANEY; GEORGE
POSTELL; BILL TIPTON; LLOYD
KISSLEBURG; C. B. NEWTON, in his
individual capacity; EDDIE WOOD, in
his individual capacity; TED ORR;
BERNICE ORR; JOHN DOE, JR.; JOHN
DOE CORPORATION; GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES, 1-99; GRAHAM COUNTY,
Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Bryson City.
Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.
(2:01-cv-00019-LHT)

Argued: January 29, 2008

Decided: June 9, 2008

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Duncan joined.
4 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Mark Tucker Hurt, Abingdon, Virginia, for United States
of America ex rel. Karen T. Wilson. Christopher G. Browning, Jr.,
Solicitor General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, Raleigh, North Carolina; Zeyland G. McKinney, Jr., Robbins-
ville, North Carolina, for Graham County Soil & Water Conservation
District, Cherokee County Soil & Water Conservation District, Rich-
ard Greene, in his individual capacity, William Timpson, in his indi-
vidual capacity, Keith Orr, in his individual and official capacities,
Raymond Williams, in his individual capacity, Dale Wiggins, in his
individual capacity, Gerald Phillips, in his individual capacity, Allen
Dehart, in his individual capacity, Lloyd Millsaps, Jerry Williams, in
his individual capacity, Billy Brown, in his individual capacity, Lynn
Cody, in his individual capacity, Bill Tipton, C. B. Newton, in his
individual capacity, Eddie Wood, in his individual capacity, Graham
County. ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District,
Gerald Phillips, Allen Dehart, Lloyd Millsaps, Cherokee County Soil
& Water Conservation District, Bill Tipton, C. B. Newton and Eddie
Wood; Sean F. Perrin, WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE &
RICE, P.L.L.C., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Graham County, Ray-
mond Williams, Dale Wiggins and Lynn Cody; Roy Patton, Canton,
North Carolina, for Richard Greene and Billy Brown.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:

The central issue in this appeal is the scope of the "public disclo-
sure" jurisdictional bar contained in the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-33 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).1 Addressing an
1
A prior appeal in this case addressed the limitations period that gov-
erns retaliation claims brought under the False Claims Act. See Graham
County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
545 U.S. 409 (2005), reversing United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham
County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 367 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2004).
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 5
issue that has divided the circuit courts, the district court concluded
that certain audits and reports issued by state and local governmental
entities satisfied the requirements of the public disclosure bar and
therefore deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
We conclude that the public disclosure bar applies to federal adminis-
trative audits, reports, hearings or investigations, but not to those con-
ducted or issued by a state or local governmental entity. Factual
questions remain in this case, however, about whether an investiga-
tion and report issued by a federal agency satisfy certain other
requirements of the public disclosure bar, and those factual issues
must be resolved by the district court in the first instance. Accord-
ingly, we vacate the district court’s decision rejecting Wilson’s claims
and its decision denying the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees,
and we remand for further proceedings.

I.

A.

In February 1995, a storm hit parts of western North Carolina,
causing extensive flooding and erosion. Defendants Graham County
and Cherokee County applied for assistance under the Emergency
Watershed Protection Program (the "EWP Program"), a federal disas-
ter assistance program operated by the United States Department of
Agriculture (the "USDA") and administered through the National
Resources Conservation Service (the "NRCS") and the United States
Forest Service. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 624.1 - 624.11 (2008). The NRCS
entered into agreements with the counties (the "EWP contracts")
under which the counties would perform or hire a contractor to per-
form the necessary clean-up and repair work, with the county bearing
25% of the costs and the USDA bearing the remaining costs.

The EWP contracts permitted the counties to coordinate and per-
form the clean-up through their soil and water conservation districts.
As to the EWP contracts that are relevant to this appeal, Graham
County and Cherokee County delegated the work to their soil and
water conservation districts. Rather than using their own employees,
the conservation districts decided to hire independent contractors to
perform the remediation work.
6 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
The EWP program required an NRCS employee to inspect all work
done and certify its compliance with the EWP contract before a
county could be reimbursed for the costs of the repair work. Typi-
cally, the NRCS’s government representative would fill out the reim-
bursement request based on job diaries and the like maintained by
those performing the work. The government representative would
submit the reimbursement form to the county for its approval and sig-
nature. The government inspector (also an NRCS employee) would
inspect the work and certify the claim for payment.

Defendant Richard Greene was the NRCS’s district conservationist
for the area encompassing Graham and Cherokee counties. Although
he was a federal employee, Greene worked out of the offices of the
Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District (the "Graham
Conservation District"). Greene was the government representative
for the Graham County and Cherokee County EWP contracts, and he
was also named one of the government inspectors for those contracts.
Defendant Bill Timpson, an NRCS soil conservationist, was also des-
ignated as a government inspector for the Graham County and Chero-
kee County EWP contracts.

As the government representative for the EWP contracts, Greene
was involved in the selection of a contractor to perform the work on
behalf of the counties. Greene had difficulty finding a contractor to
perform the Graham County EWP work within the time frame called
for by the EWP contract. Defendant and cross-appellant Keith Orr
was an employee of the Graham Conservation District. With the
approval of Graham County, the Graham Conservation District
awarded its EWP work to Orr. Orr was expected to perform the EWP
work on his own time, rather than during the hours he was working
for the Graham Conservation District, and the parties agreed that he
would be paid for the work as any other contractor would be paid.
Greene and other federal officials knew that Orr was a conservation
district employee and that he had been awarded the EWP work. At
Greene’s suggestion, the contract to perform Cherokee County’s
EWP work was awarded to defendant Billy Brown, a friend of
Greene’s.

Karen Wilson was a secretary for the Graham Conservation Dis-
trict. She contends that in her capacity as secretary, she learned of
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 7
irregularities in the performance of the EWP contracts by the Graham
Conservation District and by the Cherokee County Soil and Water
Conservation District (the "Cherokee Conservation District"). Wilson
was troubled by the fact Orr had been hired to perform Graham Coun-
ty’s EWP work, and she became suspicious of the arrangements
between Greene, Brown, Orr, and Timpson after Orr told her that the
men were splitting the proceeds of the EWP contract. One aspect of
the Cherokee County EWP work called for downed trees from the
affected area to be used to shore up eroded creek banks. Although
Greene told Wilson that the logs had been stolen, she later learned
that Greene had sold the logs to a lumbermill and kept the proceeds
for himself.2

In the summer of 1995, Wilson raised her concerns with various
county and conservation district officials. Wilson discussed her con-
cerns with two NRCS employees in November 1995 and sent a letter
setting out her concerns to the NRCS state office in December 1995.
In November 1996, Wilson was interviewed by an agent from the
USDA’s Office of Inspector General about the EWP contracts.

After learning of the problems with the EWP contracts, Graham
County officials began an investigation of their own. County officials
eventually determined that Orr had charged them for some EWP work
that had not been performed. Although the county officials involved
with the EWP contracts did not believe that using Orr as an indepen-
dent contractor was improper, a March 1996 report following an audit
performed by an accounting firm at the request of Graham County
(the "Audit Report") raised concerns about the county’s failure to
seek bids on the work to be performed under the EWP contract and
the use of Orr as an independent contractor receiving payment under
the EWP contracts. A May 1996 report prepared by the North Caro-
lina Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources (the
"DEHNR Report") noted the same problems identified in the Audit
Report.

2
Greene was later convicted in federal district court for misappropriat-
ing the logs and other acts of misconduct.
8 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
B.

In 2001, Wilson commenced this action under the False Claims
Act, naming as defendants (among others) Graham County, Cherokee
County, Graham Conservation District, Cherokee Conservation Dis-
trict, Greene, Orr, Brown, and Timpson. Wilson alleges that a con-
spiracy existed between Greene, Orr, Timpson, and Brown.
According to Wilson, the men agreed that Greene would funnel the
Graham County and Cherokee County EWP work to Brown and Orr
and that Greene and Timpson would inspect the work and approve the
bills for payment, with the money paid under the EWP contracts to
be shared among the co-conspirators. Wilson contends that the con-
spiracy effectively tainted the execution of the EWP agreements and
rendered the claims for reimbursement false within the meaning of the
False Claims Act.

Wilson also contends that some or all of the claims submitted by
the counties to the federal government for reimbursement under the
EWP program were false within the meaning of the False Claims Act
because: (1) the counties failed to seek bids as required by state law
before awarding the EWP work to Orr and Brown; (2) using Orr as
an independent contractor created a conflict of interest in violation of
the Code of Conduct submitted to the federal government by Graham
County; (3) the Graham County work performed by Orr was of poor
quality and did not meet the requirements of the EWP contracts; and
(4) Greene stole the Cherokee County logs with the knowledge of
Cherokee County officials, who permitted Greene to keep the pro-
ceeds as a sort of retroactive bribe.

The district court concluded that the Audit Report prepared by
local accountants at the request of Graham County and the DEHNR
Report were public disclosures of the information underlying Wil-
son’s claims. Because the False Claims Act strips courts of subject
matter jurisdiction over private claims based on information that has
been publicly disclosed, see 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West
2003), the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Wil-
son’s action. In the alternative, the district court concluded that for
various reasons, each of Wilson’s claims failed on the merits. The dis-
trict court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dants, but the court later denied the defendants’ requests for
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 9
attorneys’ fees. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(4) (authorizing award of
attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendants in qui tam action where the
government does not intervene if the court concludes the action "was
clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes
of harassment").

II.

The False Claims Act (the "FCA") was enacted "during the Civil
War in response to overcharges and other abuses by defense contrac-
tors, . . . [with the expectation that it] would help the government
uncover fraud and abuse by unleashing a posse of ad hoc deputies to
uncover and prosecute frauds against the government." Harrison v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The FCA imposes civil liability
(including treble damages and a fine of up to $10,000) on persons
who knowingly submit false claims to the government for payment or
conspire to use false claims to obtain payment from the government.
See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).

FCA actions against the false claimant may be brought by the gov-
ernment itself or by a private person (known as the "relator") on
behalf of the government. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730. Actions brought
by a relator are known as "qui tam" actions. See Vermont Agency of
Nat. Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1
(2000) ("Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means ‘who pur-
sues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’").
The government has the right to intervene in actions brought by a
relator, see 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730, but a successful relator receives a
share of any proceeds recovered in the action whether or not the gov-
ernment intervenes. See 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3730(d)(1)-(2). "A qui tam
relator [thus] is essentially a self-appointed private attorney general,
and his recovery is analogous to a lawyer’s contingent fee." United
States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer
Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992).

The FCA bars federal courts from exercising subject matter juris-
diction over certain qui tam actions. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v.
10 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1405-06 (2007). The only such bar
relevant to this case is the public disclosure bar, which provides that

(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations
or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing,
in a congressional, administrative, or Government Account-
ing Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from
the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original
source of the information.

(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source"
means an individual who has direct and independent knowl-
edge of the information on which the allegations are based
and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern-
ment before filing an action under this section which is
based on the information.

31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4) (West 2003).

The structure of the public disclosure bar thus requires courts to
answer three questions: Was there a public disclosure? If there was
a public disclosure, was the qui tam action based on the public disclo-
sure? If the action was based on the public disclosure, was the qui tam
plaintiff an original source? See Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech.,
Inc., 221 F.3d 580, 582 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Minnesota Ass’n of
Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1042
(8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853,
859 (7th Cir. 1999). If either of the first two questions is answered in
the negative, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
qui tam action. If the first two questions are answered in the affirma-
tive, however, subject matter jurisdiction exists only if the last ques-
tion is also answered affirmatively.

On appeal, Wilson contends that the Audit Report and DEHNR
Report do not qualify as public disclosures under the FCA and that
the district court therefore erred by concluding that these reports
deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. Although § 3730(e)(4)(A)
provides that an administrative report, audit, or investigation can
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 11
amount to a jurisdiction-stripping public disclosure, Wilson argues
that the statute applies only to federal administrative reports or audits.
Because the audit was conducted by local accountants at Graham
County’s request and the Audit Report was provided to Graham
County officials only, Wilson contends that there was no public dis-
closure within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A). Wilson likewise
argues that the DEHNR Report, which summarized a state investiga-
tion and was provided only to state and local officials, was not a pub-
lic disclosure within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A).

For their part, the defendants contend that the district court cor-
rectly determined that the public disclosure bar deprived it of subject
matter jurisdiction over Wilson’s claims. The defendants argue that
there is no language in § 3730(e)(4)(A) expressly limiting its reach to
federal rather than state administrative reports and audits, and they
note that the majority of the circuit courts considering the question
have rejected Wilson’s interpretation of the statute.

A.

"When interpreting a statute, the goal is always to ascertain and
implement the intent of Congress." Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d
132, 138 (4th Cir. 2003). "The first step of this process is to determine
whether the statutory language has a plain and unambiguous meaning.
If the statute is unambiguous and if the statutory scheme is coherent
and consistent, our inquiry ends there." Id.

Section 3730(e)(4)(A) lists the sources that may give rise to a
jurisdiction-stripping public disclosure: disclosures "in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investiga-
tion, or from the news media."3 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A). When
3
The list of disclosure sources is exclusive; a public disclosure of fraud
operates as a jurisdictional bar against a qui tam plaintiff’s action only
if the public disclosure is through one of the specified sources. See Eber-
hardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 870 (4th Cir.
1999); accord United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del., 123 F.3d
734, 744 (3d Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Rabushka v. Crane Co., 40
F.3d 1509, 1513 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994).
12 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
considering the scope of the public disclosure bar, courts often sepa-
rate the relevant language by clause, each of which addresses distinct
categories of potential disclosure sources, and then analyze the mean-
ing clause by clause. See, e.g., Eberhardt v. Integrated Design &
Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 870 (4th Cir. 1999) (grouping listed
sources into categories for purposes of statutory interpretation); see
also United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 917
(9th Cir. 2006) (same), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008). Thus, the
public disclosure bar strips federal courts of jurisdiction over qui tam
actions that are based upon the public disclosures in (1) "criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing[s]"; (2) "congressional, administrative,
or Government Accounting Office4 report[s], hearing[s], audit[s], or
investigation[s]"; and (3) "the news media." 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). The only category implicated in this case is the sec-
ond one, which strips federal courts of jurisdiction over qui tam
actions that are based on public disclosures in a congressional, admin-
istrative, or GAO report, hearing, audit, or investigation.

As far as the record reveals, there has been no congressional or
GAO action involving the transactions at issue in this case. The juris-
dictional question therefore turns upon whether the state- and county-
level investigations into and reports about the handling of the EWP
contracts can be considered administrative reports, audits, or investi-
gations within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A).
4
When § 3730(e)(4) was enacted, the official name for the GAO, the
familiar federal watchdog agency, was the "General Accounting Office."
While the statute speaks of the "Government Accounting Office," it is
generally understood that Congress was referring to the GAO. See 31
U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) n.3 (stating in footnote following the word
"Government": "So in original. Probably should be ‘General.’"); United
States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376,
387 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[T]his section refers to the General Accounting
Office as the ‘Government Accounting Office’. . . ."); see also United
States v. Catholic Healthcare West, 445 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2006);
United States ex rel. Gear v. Emergency Med. Assocs. of Ill., Inc., 436
F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2006). This statutory misnomer became some-
what less of a misnomer in 2004, when the GAO was renamed the "Gov-
ernment Accountability Office." See GAO Human Capital Reform Act
of 2004, Pub. L. 108-271, § 8(a), 118 Stat. 811, 814 (2004).
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 13
The few circuits to have considered this question have come to dif-
ferent conclusions. The Third Circuit thus far is alone in concluding
that the public disclosure of state administrative actions does not
amount to a public disclosure within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A),
see United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del., 123 F.3d 734,
745 (3d Cir. 1997), while the Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit
have concluded that § 3730(e)(4)(A) encompasses state as well as
federal administrative actions, see United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v.
Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1119 (2008); Battle v. Board of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 762 (11th Cir.
2006). In Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth
Circuit took the middle road, not quite agreeing with the Third Circuit
or with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. The Hays court "reject[ed]"
the particular manner in which the Third Circuit in Dunleavy had
parsed the statute. Id. at 988. However, the Hays court ultimately con-
cluded only that the Third Circuit’s holding was broader than neces-
sary, and the court held that state reports and audits could be public
disclosures, at least where reports and audits involved a cooperative
state-federal program. See id. at 989 ("[W]hile we do not disagree
with the Third Circuit’s decision in Dunleavy, we conclude the court
ruled more broadly than necessary in stating that a state agency dis-
closure may never be an administrative report or audit for purposes
of § 3730(e)(4)(A)." (internal quotation marks and alterations omit-
ted)).

This court has not previously considered whether state or local
administrative reports, audits, or investigations can be public disclo-
sures within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A). As the defendants point
out, the statute by its express terms does not limit its reach to federal
administrative reports or investigations. In our view, however, exami-
nation of the relevant language in context and consideration of the
structure of the statute leads to the conclusion that only federal
administrative reports, audits or investigations qualify as public dis-
closures under the FCA. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) ("It is a fundamental canon
of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) ("In determining the meaning of the
14 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to
the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.").

Of the three disclosure sources listed in clause two of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A), the first and third are clearly federal sources — con-
gressional or GAO reports, hearings, investigations, and audits.
Unlike those terms, there is nothing inherently federal about the word
"administrative," and Congress did not define the term in the FCA.
The placement of the word in the statute, however, provides strong
evidence of its intended meaning.

The interpretative maxim noscitur a sociis provides that "a word is
known by the company it keeps." S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of
Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The maxim "is invoked when a string of statutory terms raises
the implication that the words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "That sev-
eral items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting
the other items as possessing that attribute as well." Beecham v.
United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994).

In our view, the placement of "administrative" squarely in the mid-
dle of a list of obviously federal sources strongly suggests that "ad-
ministrative" should likewise be restricted to federal administrative
reports, hearings, audits, or investigations. As the Third Circuit
explained:

[Application of the noscitur a sociis] maxim leads to the
conclusion that "administrative" when read with the word
"report" refers only to those administrative reports that orig-
inate with the federal government. We take notice of the fact
that Congress and the Government Accounting Office are
entities of our federal government. We find it hard to
believe that the drafters of this provision intended the word
"administrative" to refer to both state and federal reports
when it lies sandwiched between modifiers which are
unquestionably federal in character.

Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745. Although courts must not apply interpre-
tative maxims "woodenly," Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 128
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 15
S. Ct. 831, 840 (2008), we believe that reliance on noscitur a sociis
is appropriate in this case.

If the list in clause two were entirely disjunctive, our analysis
might be different. Unless context dictates otherwise, a completely
disjunctive formulation (i.e., "item A OR item B OR item C") "indi-
cates an intent to give the nouns their separate, normal meanings,"
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73 (1984), and thus typically
makes reliance on noscitur a sociis inappropriate, see In re Continen-
tal Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that
"noscitur a sociis . . . is of little help where other evidence reveals that
Congress intended to treat the disputed term differently from its
neighbors"). Section 3730(e)(4)(A), however, uses the more typical
form of statutory listing, referring to "congressional, administrative,
or Government Accounting Office" reports, audits, and investigations.
This formulation does not indicate an attempt by Congress to treat
"congressional," "administrative," and "Government Accounting
Office" separately.

Moreover, the exclusively federal nature of the terms "congressio-
nal" and "Government Accounting Office" is immediately apparent,
and these clearly federal terms bookend the not-so-clearly federal
term, thus providing a very strong contextual cue about the meaning
of "administrative." See Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 839 (refusing to rely on nos-
citur a sociis when interpreting an exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity where "no relevant com-
mon attribute immediately appear[red]" among the categories listed in
the statutory exception and the exception did not contain "strong[ ]
contextual cues" that the listed categories should be interpreted simi-
larly).

The defendants, however, contend that limiting clause two to fed-
eral administrative reports, audits, or investigations would be incon-
sistent with the disclosure category of clause one, which addresses
disclosures in a "criminal, civil, or administrative hearing." This court
and others have understood clause one to encompass state as well as
federal hearings. See McElmurray v. Consolidated Gov’t of Augusta-
Richmond County, 501 F.3d 1244, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2007); United
States ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 332-33 (3d Cir.
2005); United States ex rel. Reagan v. East Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg’l
16 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
Healthcare Sys., 384 F.3d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 2004); A-1 Ambulance
Serv., Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1350
(4th Cir. 1994). The defendants contend that if a state hearing can sat-
isfy the requirements of § 3730(e)(4)(A), then a state audit, investiga-
tion, or report should likewise meet the requirements of the statute.
The essence of the defendants’ argument in this regard is set out in
a district court opinion upon which the defendants rely:

[L]imiting the word "administrative" to only federal admin-
istrative reports, audits and investigations is inconsistent
with the plain language of the phrase at issue as well as the
language and interpretation of the remaining portions of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). The immediately preceding phrase in that
statutory section provides that public disclosures include
any "criminal, civil, or administrative hearing," and courts
have consistently interpreted that phrase to include both
state and federal litigation and administrative hearings.
Likewise, this section of the FCA also gives public disclo-
sure status to "the news media" regardless of whether that
media is national, state, or local. There is no reason to con-
clude that Congress intended to limit administrative reports,
audits, and investigations to federal actions, while simulta-
neously allowing all state and local civil litigation, state and
local administrative hearings, and state and local news
media to be treated as public disclosures. To interpret the
statute so narrowly would have the anomalous result of
allowing public disclosure status to the most obscure local
news report and the most obscure state and local civil law-
suit or administrative hearing, but denying public disclosure
status to a formal public report of a state government agency
....

In re Nat. Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d. 1117, 1143-
44 (D. Wyo. 2006) (underscored emphasis added; footnote and cita-
tions omitted); see also Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 918 ("[T]he statute
would seem to be inconsistent if it included state and local adminis-
trative hearings as sources of public disclosures and then, in the next
breath, excluded state administrative reports as sources.").
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 17
Although we ultimately disagree with this approach to the statute,
we must admit that there is some force to the argument. The courts
have easily concluded that clause one applies to state-level hearings—
in fact, only one court thus far has explicitly addressed the possibility
that clause one should be limited to federal hearings, see A-1 Ambu-
lance Serv., 202 F.3d at 1244—and there is some logic and symmetry
to taking a similar approach to clause two.

Nonetheless, we believe that this analysis has its own shortcom-
ings. First of all, we note that both clause one and clause two refer
to administrative hearings: Clause one states that public disclosures
can occur in "criminal, civil, or administrative hearing[s]," and clause
two states that public disclosures can occur in "congressional, admin-
istrative, or Government Accounting Office report[s], hearing[s],
audit[s], or investigation[s]." 31 U.S.C.A. 3730(e)(4)(A). If clause
one and clause two both encompass state administrative hearings, as
the defendants contend, then there was no reason for Congress to
repeat the word "hearings" in clause two. See A-1 Ambulance Serv.,
202 F.3d at 1245 ("Dunleavy’s interpretation buttresses our conclu-
sion [that clause one is not limited to federal administrative hearings]
because one may presume that Congress acted intentionally in includ-
ing the modifying language in one clause, but omitting it in another.
It is unlikely that Congress would have referenced administrative
hearings twice in the same sentence, unless it intended to allude to
different contexts." (citation omitted)).5
5
Because courts have interpreted clause one to encompass state and
federal hearings, either interpretation of clause two yields some amount
of redundancy. Under the Dunleavy approach, the statute as interpreted
by the courts is redundant because federal administrative hearings would
qualify as sources of public disclosures under clause one or clause two.
Under the interpretation urged by the defendants, the statute unnecessar-
ily refers to administrative hearings in both clause one and clause two.
While we would of course prefer to avoid all redundancies, the redun-
dancy that exists under the Dunleavy approach is a latent one—that is,
the redundancy is a function of the interplay between the judicial inter-
pretations of clause one and clause two. The defendants’ approach to the
statute, however, creates a patent redundancy in the language affirma-
tively chosen by Congress. Given the choice between tolerating a
judicially-created redundancy or rendering redundant language chosen
by Congress, the former seems more consistent with traditional princi-
ples of statutory construction.
18 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
More importantly, however, to adopt the interpretative approach
urged by the defendants would require us to all but ignore the signifi-
cance of the inherently federal language chosen by Congress in clause
two. As reflected in the analysis of district court quoted above, the
defendants’ approach to the statute suggests that because neither
clause one nor clause two limit their reach to federal sources, we
therefore should not view clause two’s references to Congress and the
GAO as limiting the reach of clause two. We find this argument
unpersuasive.

Preliminarily, we note that in this country there is no "federal"
news media, nor for that matter is there any "state" news media from
which "federal" news media could be distinguished. Of course, some
news media are national in scope and reach while others are local, but
"national" in this context cannot be equated with "federal." It thus
seems inappropriate to draw significance from the statute’s failure to
attach any qualification or limitation to public disclosures that are
made by the news media.

More generally, however, we believe the defendants’ interpretation
of clause two is contrary to the basic principle that, where possible,
courts should give effect to every word in a statute. See, e.g., Clinch-
field Coal Co. v. Harris, 149 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1998). If Con-
gress had intended clause two to encompass state audits, reports, or
investigations, it could have saved a few words by referring to disclo-
sures in governmental audits, reports, or investigations, a phrasing
that avoids the use of words that are inherently and exclusively fed-
eral in nature. Congress instead provided that the jurisdictional bar
applies to disclosures in a "congressional, administrative, or Govern-
ment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation." We
believe this use of inherently federal modifiers was deliberate and sig-
nificant, and that it would be improper to discount its significance
simply because there is no similar limiting language in clause one or
clause three. Cf., e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983) ("Where Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is gener-
ally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion." (internal quotation marks and alter-
ation omitted)).
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 19
We would not be the first court to observe that the FCA’s public
disclosure bar is far from a model of careful draftsmanship. See Mist-
ick PBT, 186 F.3d at 387, 388 (stating that § 3730(e)(4)(A) "does not
reflect careful drafting or a precise use of language," and describing
it as "syntactically ambiguous"); United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-
Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("Virtually every court of appeals that has considered the public dis-
closure bar explicitly or implicitly agrees on one thing, however: the
language of the statute is not so plain as to clearly describe which
cases Congress intended to bar."). While it may not be the strongest
of interpretative principles, we nonetheless believe that the noscitur
a sociis principle is the best tool short of a secret decoder ring with
which to gain insight into the meaning of this murky statute.

And when we consider the congressional fine-tuning of the FCA
over the years, we believe it provides further support for the under-
standing of the statute suggested by application of noscitur a sociis.
Since the enactment of the FCA, Congress twice has passed major
revisions intended to strike the proper balance "between encouraging
private citizen involvement in exposing fraud against the government
while preventing opportunistic suits by private persons who became
aware of fraud but played no part in exposing it." United States ex rel.
Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 1995).

Perhaps the most notorious of these opportunistic (or "parasitic"
suits6) is United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
In Hess, because there was no statutory language prohibiting it, the
Supreme Court upheld a verdict in favor of a qui tam relator who cop-
ied his information about fraud by a government contractor directly
from the allegations in a criminal indictment brought by the federal
government against that contractor. See id. at 546-48.
6
"[P]arasitic lawsuits copied from preexisting indictments or based
upon congressional investigations . . . not only diminished the govern-
ment’s ultimate recovery without contributing any new information, but
the rush to the courthouse put pressure on the government to make hasty
decisions regarding whether to prosecute civil actions." United States ex
rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
20 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
In response to Hess, Congress in 1943 amended the FCA to deprive
courts of jurisdiction over qui tam actions that were based on evi-
dence or information in the government’s possession when the qui
tam action is filed. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 680. While the 1943
amendments did close the door to parasitic actions, the amendments
likewise closed the door to the very claims the qui tam provisions
were originally intended to encourage — claims brought by "those
whistleblowers who furnished evidence or information to the govern-
ment in the first place." Id. Congress eventually realized that by
"eliminat[ing] the financial incentive to expose frauds against the
government," the 1943 amendments "had killed the goose that laid the
golden egg" and resulted in a dramatic decrease in the use of qui tam
actions to combat fraud. Id. Congress amended the FCA in 1986,
again aiming for "the golden mean between adequate incentives for
whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and dis-
couragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant infor-
mation to contribute of their own." United States ex rel. Springfield
Terminal Ry Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The
1986 amendments, among other things, eliminated the government-
knowledge jurisdictional bar that had been added to the FCA in 1943
and replaced it with the public-disclosure bar at issue in this action.
See id. at 651.

In our view, the defendants’ interpretation of the statute becomes
untenable when we recognize that the public-disclosure bar was the
product of Congress’s repeated efforts to further the "twin goals of
rejecting suits which the government is capable of pursuing itself,
while promoting those which the government is not equipped to bring
on its own." Id.; see also United States ex rel. LaCorte v. Wagner,
185 F.3d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that with the 1986
amendments to the FCA, "Congress struck a careful balance between
encouraging citizens to report fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits").

Information about federal investigations and audits is easily avail-
able to the members of the Department of Justice charged with
enforcing the FCA. Prohibiting qui tam actions based on public dis-
closure of these federal investigations is completely consistent with
the goal of discouraging actions that the government is capable of
pursuing itself. We cannot conclude, however, that information about
most state and local investigations, audits, or reports is particularly
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 21
likely to come to the attention of the federal government. State or
local audits and investigations often involve a small number of public
employees and address issues that directly affect a very small segment
of the local population. The general public often is not aware that an
audit or investigation is being conducted, and the outcome of the audit
or investigation may receive little or no publicity. Moreover, there is
no central location (like a county courthouse with a searchable
docket) where information about such proceedings is kept and made
available to the public. The likelihood of the federal government
learning about the audit or investigation or the underlying information
is thus very small.

Because the federal government is unlikely to learn about state and
local investigations, a large number of fraudulent claims against the
government would go unremedied without the financial incentives
offered by the qui tam provisions of the FCA. If the public-disclosure
bar were to encompass investigations and reports at the state and local
level, as the defendants contend, the effect would be to discourage
private actions that the federal government is not capable of pursuing
on its own, thus frustrating rather than furthering the goals of the
FCA.

Accordingly, given the grammatical structure of § 3730(e)(4)(A),
we agree with the Third Circuit that the phrase "congressional, admin-
istrative, or [GAO] report, hearing, audit, or investigation" is properly
understood to include only federal administrative reports, hearings,
audits, or investigations.7 Because the Audit Report was prepared by
7
Although it is not dispositive, we note that the United States inter-
vened on appeal in Hays to urge the Eighth Circuit to follow the Third
Circuit’s decision in Dunleavy. See Brief for the United States of Amer-
ica as Intervenor, 2002 WL 32181440, at *38-41 (May 2002). At the
invitation of the Supreme Court, the United States also filed an amicus
brief in connection with the petition for certiorari filed after the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Bly-Magee. The United States again expressed sup-
port for the Third Circuit’s reading of the public disclosure bar but rec-
ommended that the Supreme Court wait for further developments in the
law before reviewing the issue. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, 2007 WL 4613626, at *7 (Dec. 21, 2007). The Supreme Court
denied the certiorari petition. See United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v.
Premo, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008).
22 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
the county and the DEHNR Report was produced by the state, the
reports were not public disclosures within the meaning of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). The district court therefore erred in concluding that
these reports worked to deprive it of subject matter jurisdiction over
Wilson’s qui tam action.

B.

As previously noted, Wilson in November 1996 cooperated with a
federal investigation into the Cherokee and Graham County EWP
contracts, speaking on multiple occasions to an agent from the
USDA’s Office of Inspector General. The USDA eventually issued a
report in which it concluded that while there were problems with the
administration of the Graham and Cherokee EWP contracts, there was
no conspiracy between Greene, Orr, Timpson, and Brown. Although
it is not entirely clear, it appears from the district court’s order that
the court also viewed this investigation and report as a public disclo-
sure that deprived it of jurisdiction over Wilson’s action. Neither Wil-
son nor the defendants in their briefs devote much attention to the
USDA investigation or report. Nonetheless, because the FCA’s public
disclosure bar is jurisdictional, we are obliged to consider the issue
on our own. See Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1406.

Because the USDA investigation and report were conducted and
issued by a federal agency, they qualify as an administrative hearing
or report under our reading of § 3730(e)(4)(A). There are, however,
additional questions that must be resolved as part of the public disclo-
sure inquiry: whether the investigation or report were publicly dis-
closed, and if so, whether the claims asserted in Wilson’s qui tam
complaint were "based upon" the public disclosure.

(1)

The mere existence of an administrative investigation or report is
not enough to trigger the jurisdictional bar of § 3730(e)(4)(A).
Instead, the investigation or report amounts to a jurisdiction-stripping
public disclosure only if the investigation or report is in fact publicly
disclosed. See, e.g., Grayson, 221 F.3d at 582; Siller, 21 F.3d at 1350.
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 23
The district court did not expressly find that either the USDA
investigation or report were publicly disclosed, and the record does
not contain sufficient evidence on this point that would permit this
court to determine as a matter of law whether the investigation or
report were publicly disclosed. We must therefore remand to permit
the district court to make the necessary factual finding.

(2)

A federal administrative investigation or report will operate as a
bar to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over a qui tam action
only if the qui tam claims are "based upon the public disclosure" of
the allegations in the report. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis
added).

Most circuits have held that "a qui tam suit is ‘based upon’ a public
disclosure whenever the allegations in the suit and in the disclosure
are the same, ‘regardless of where the relator obtained his informa-
tion.’" Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys.
Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1044-47 (8th Cir. 2002) (adopting majority
rule and collecting cases). In this circuit, however, a qui tam action
is based upon publicly disclosed allegations only if the qui tam plain-
tiff’s allegations were actually derived from the public disclosure
itself:

To "base upon" means to "use as a basis for." Rather plainly,
therefore, a relator’s action is "based upon" a public disclo-
sure of allegations only where the relator has actually
derived from that disclosure the allegations upon which his
qui tam action is based.

Siller, 21 F.3d at 1348; accord United States ex rel. Fowler v. Care-
mark RX, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2007). Under Siller,
a qui tam action will not be barred if the plaintiff’s claims are similar
or even identical to the publicly disclosed allegations, so long as the
plaintiff had independent knowledge of the facts and did not derive
his allegations from the public disclosure itself.

Whether a qui tam plaintiff’s FCA claims were derived from a pub-
lic disclosure as defined in § 3730(e)(4)(A) is a question of fact, see
24 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
Siller, 21 F.3d at 1349, but it is not clear from the district court’s
order that the court made the required factual finding. Although the
district court in its order recited the "derived from" standard, the dis-
trict court never explicitly held that Wilson’s claims were derived
from any of the documents that the district court viewed as public dis-
closures, much less that her claims were derived from the USDA
investigation or report. If anything, the district court’s abbreviated
analysis seems to suggest that the court in fact applied the broader
"based on" standard used in other circuits rather than Siller’s more
stringent "derived from" standard.

In a portion of the opinion focusing on the effect of the county-
issued Audit Report, the district court stated that, "to the extent that
any allegations of the complaint overlap this information, the jurisdic-
tional bar would apply unless Wilson shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that she was an original source of the information upon
which these statements were based." J.A. 1750. As noted above, we
held in Siller that the mere similarity of the plaintiff’s allegations to
the public allegations is irrelevant; what matters is whether the plain-
tiff actually derived her claims from the public disclosure itself. By
focusing on whether Wilson’s allegations merely overlapped the alle-
gations of the Audit Report, it appears that the district court applied
the wrong standard when determining whether the public-disclosure
bar applied.

Because the district court made no findings as to whether the
USDA investigation or report was publicly disclosed or whether Wil-
son’s claims were derived from the USDA investigation or report, we
cannot at this juncture determine whether the public-disclosure bar
applies. Accordingly, we must vacate the district court’s decision and
remand to give the district court the opportunity to make the neces-
sary factual determinations. See Siller, 21 F.3d at 1349 ("[B]ecause
the district court made no finding on whether Siller actually derived
his allegations from the SSI suit, a finding necessary to the conclusion
that Siller’s action was ‘based upon’ that suit, we . . . vacate the por-
tion of the district court’s order dismissing Siller’s action so as to
enable the court to address this factual question on remand."); see
also United States ex rel. Boothe v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 496
F.3d 1169, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Because the application of the
‘based upon’ and ‘original source’ tests turn on important factual
 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL 25
questions, ones on which we have no record before us, we think the
appropriate course is to remand the matter for the district court’s con-
sideration in the first instance."); United States v. A.D. Roe Co., 186
F.3d 717, 726 (6th Cir. 1999) (vacating and remanding so that district
court could make necessary factual findings as to whether qui tam
plaintiff’s claims were based on publicly disclosed information).

On remand, the district court shall permit the parties to submit
additional evidence as may be necessary for the court to make the fac-
tual determinations upon which the jurisdictional questions turn. If the
district court determines that the USDA investigation or report was
publicly disclosed and that Wilson’s claims were derived from those
public disclosures, the court must then determine whether Wilson is
an original source as to any of her claims. When considering these
jurisdictional questions, the district court should keep in mind that, as
the Supreme Court made clear in Rockwell, it is not enough for a qui
tam plaintiff to show that jurisdiction exists over one of her claims.
Instead, a qui tam plaintiff must establish that jurisdiction exists over
each individual claim. See Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1410 ("Section
3730(e)(4) does not permit jurisdiction in gross just because a relator
is an original source with respect to some claim. . . . [A] plaintiff’s
decision to join all of his or her claims in a single lawsuit should not
rescue claims that would have been doomed by section (e)(4) if they
had been asserted in a separate action. And likewise, this joinder
should not result in the dismissal of claims that would have otherwise
survived." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court’s
analysis should thus proceed on a claim-by-claim basis, individually
addressing "each reasonably discrete claim of fraud" and explaining
whether the court has jurisdiction over that claim. Boothe, 496 F.3d
at 1177.

III.

As mentioned previously, the district court, in an alternative ruling,
addressed and rejected Wilson’s claims on the merits. While we
appreciate the district court’s concern for judicial economy, it was
error for the court to address the merits of Wilson’s claims after con-
cluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See
Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct.
1184, 1191 (2007) ("Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at
26 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL
all in any cause; it may not assume jurisdiction for the purpose of
deciding the merits of the case." (internal quotation marks omitted));
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) ("Article
III generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction
over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case."). And
because we cannot yet determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists, we similarly are unable to consider the merits of the appeal or
cross-appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s decisions
granting judgment to the defendants and denying attorneys’ fees to
the cross-appellants, and we remand for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

If on remand the district court again concludes that the public dis-
closure bar applies and deprives the court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, then the court should not consider the merits of Wilson’s claims.
If, however, the court concludes that it has jurisdiction over some or
all of Wilson’s claims, the district court may then proceed to consider
the merits of those claims. If the court believes that its prior opinion
rejecting Wilson’s claims on the merits sufficiently addresses all rele-
vant issues, the court may issue an opinion adopting the relevant por-
tions of the prior opinion. And if the district court rejects Wilson’s
claims on jurisdictional grounds or on the merits, it should again con-
sider the defendants’ requests for attorneys’ fees, and the court may
adopt its prior analysis of the fee request or address the issue anew.
We emphasize, however, that nothing in our mandate should be read
to preclude the district court from considering the merits of the qui
tam claims anew or, if the court deems it appropriate, permitting the
parties to submit additional evidence or argument supporting their
claims.

VACATED AND REMANDED