Wilson v. Johnson

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LEE O. WILSON, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.


GENE JOHNSON, Director of
Department of Corrections; DORIS No. 07-6347
EWING, Court and Legal Supervisor;
EDWARD MEEKS, Superintendent
Cold Springs Work Center,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-00165-LMB)

Argued: March 18, 2008

Decided: July 25, 2008

Before MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and
David R. HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Michael joined. Senior Judge Hansen
wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Katherine Crawford, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Stephen R.
2 WILSON v. JOHNSON
McCullough, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIR-
GINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Erwin
Chemerinsky, James E. Coleman, Jr.; Students Sachin Bansal, Vir-
ginia Duke, Catherine Tucker, Kish Vinayagamoorthy, DUKE UNI-
VERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General of Virginia, Wil-
liam E. Thro, State Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

OPINION

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

The Appellant, Lee O. Wilson, Jr., ("Wilson") appeals the district
court’s decision to dismiss his 42 U.S.C. § 19831 action against the
Virginia Department of Corrections. Wilson claims that he is entitled
to monetary damages for unconstitutional imprisonment because Vir-
ginia improperly extended the length of his prison sentence. The dis-
trict court, citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), dismissed Wilson’s wrong-
ful incarceration claim sua sponte stating that a "§ 1983 damages
claim for unconstitutional imprisonment is not appropriate unless and
until plaintiff’s conviction or sentence ‘has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribu-
nal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by
a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.’" (J.A. 14.) This mandate is referred to as the "favorable ter-
mination" requirement.

Wilson contends that his § 1983 action is proper because success
on that claim will not impugn his underlying conviction or sentence.
1
Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
 WILSON v. JOHNSON 3
Assuming, as we must, that Wilson’s well-pleaded allegations are
true, we agree that his claim is viable and as such, the district court’s
decision is reversed and remanded.

I.

Wilson was arrested on March 24, 2005, for grand larceny of a
motor vehicle. On July 26, 2005, he pled guilty to the lesser charge
of being an accessory after the fact. Consistent with Wilson’s plea
agreement, the Virginia state court sentenced him to twelve months
imprisonment, six months of which was suspended due to time
served. According to the Virginia Department of Corrections’
("VDOC") Uniform Commitment Report, Wilson’s release date was
April 21, 2006. (J.A. 6.) However, on March 15, 2006, the VDOC
changed Wilson’s release date to July 17, 2006. Wilson filed griev-
ances with the prison administration disputing his additional impris-
onment. The VDOC did not initiate any formal administrative
proceedings to resolve Wilson’s complaint. After Wilson was
released from prison,2 he sued, seeking monetary damages of
$105,000 for wrongful imprisonment. The district court dismissed
Wilson’s claim without prejudice, holding that Heck’s favorable ter-
mination requirement barred his § 1983 claim and stating that Wilson
"may resubmit his claims to this Court in a [habeas petition]." (J.A.
15.) Wilson appeals.
2
After his release, Wilson was imprisoned again on an unrelated
charge. During this imprisonment, Wilson filed this § 1983 claim along
with a habeas claim. In the habeas petition, Wilson argued, inter alia,
that the VDOC improperly extended his accessory after the fact sentence.
The Virginia Circuit Court dismissed Wilson’s habeas petition, finding
that the VDOC properly calculated Wilson’s sentence. The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The VDOC argued in
a motion to stay prior to oral argument, and in a motion to dismiss after
oral argument, that the Virginia Circuit Court’s decision resolved the
underlying factual issue in this case, thus mooting Wilson’s claim.
Because the issue before us is limited to the legal question of whether
Wilson’s § 1983 claim is cognizable, we leave the issue of whether the
Virginia Circuit Court’s decision moots Wilson’s claim for the district
court to determine on remand. As such, the VDOC’s motion to dismiss
is denied.
4 WILSON v. JOHNSON
II.

The VDOC contends that Wilson’s § 1983 claim is not cognizable
because: (1) Wilson failed to satisfy Heck’s favorable termination
requirement prior to filing his claim, and (2) even if Heck did not bar
Wilson’s claim, because the VDOC properly calculated his sentence,
Wilson’s claim is moot.3 Wilson argues that a § 1983 action is the
proper vehicle to bring his wrongful imprisonment claim because a
habeas action would have been inappropriate as he does not seek
release from custody. Thus, whether Wilson’s § 1983 claim for
wrongful imprisonment, filed after his sentence expired, is cogniza-
ble, is the sole issue before this Court. We review the district court’s
decision to dismiss Wilson’s claim due to lack of subject matter juris-
diction, a question of law, de novo, see e.g., Church v. Attorney Gen-
eral of Com. of Va., 125 F.3d 210, 215 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1997), taking
all of his allegations "in the light most favorable to [him]." Giarra-
tano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

Although the convergence of habeas and § 1983 actions has been
addressed by the Supreme Court on several occasions, as the VDOC
admits, it has sent "mixed signals" as to when an inmate or former
inmate can pursue a § 1983 claim. (Appellee’s Br. 4.) In Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), a group of state prisoners filed a
§ 1983 action alleging that the New York State Department of Cor-
rectional Services’ denial of good-time credits violated their constitu-
tional right to due process. The prisoners sought an injunction to force
the prison to restore the credits, a remedy which would have reduced
the prisoners’ sentences. Despite the "literal applicability" of § 1983,
the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claim
because the prisoners’ "challenge is just as close to the core of habeas
corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction, for it goes directly
to the constitutionality of his physical confinement itself and seeks
either immediate release from that confinement or the shortening of
its duration." Id. at 489. Because the plaintiffs "sought no [monetary]
damages, but only equitable relief-restoration of their good-time cred-
its," id. at 494, the Supreme Court expressly limited its holding to the
equitable relief sought by the prisoners.
3
See note 2, supra.
 WILSON v. JOHNSON 5
Subsequently, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), an
inmate filed a § 1983 class action on behalf of himself and other
inmates, alleging inter alia, that the disciplinary proceedings at the
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex violated their due process
rights. Like the plaintiffs in Preiser, the prisoners complained that the
prison had improperly denied them good-time credits and sought
injunctive relief. The Wolff inmates, however, also sought damages.
In holding that Preiser precluded injunctive relief—i.e., the restora-
tion of good-time credits, the Supreme Court confirmed the propriety
of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim:

habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy for
damages claims, which, if not frivolous and of sufficient
substance to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court,
could be pressed under § 1983 along with suits challenging
the conditions of confinement rather than the fact or length
of custody.

Id. at 554. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court
erred by not determining "the validity of the procedures employed for
imposing sanctions, including loss of good . . . [because] a declaratory
judgment as a predicate to a damages award would not be barred by
Preiser." Id. at 554-55.

Two decades after Wolff, the Supreme Court, in Heck, considered
a prisoner’s § 1983 claim seeking monetary damages from the state
because (1) state officers participated in an "unlawful, unreasonable,
and arbitrary investigation leading to [his] arrest," (2) state officers
"knowingly destroyed" exculpatory evidence, and (3) "an illegal and
unlawful voice identification procedure" was relied upon at trial.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Recogniz-
ing that Preiser provided an "unreliable, if not an unintelligible,
guide," id. at 482, as to whether a § 1983 claim for monetary damages
is proper when it fails to challenge the "lawfulness of conviction or
confinement," id. at 483, and concluding that Wolff "recognized a
§ 1983 claim for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the
wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits)," id. at 482-483, the
Court analyzed the issue as a matter of first impression. After reiterat-
ing that § 1983 claims, unlike petitions for habeas corpus, do not
require administrative exhaustion, the Court held that when a plain-
6 WILSON v. JOHNSON
tiff’s claims challenge "the lawfulness of conviction or confinement,"
id. at 483, they are simply not "cognizable as § 1983 claims" id.,
because:

[w]e think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstand-
ing criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions
that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawful-
ness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always
applied to actions for malicious prosecution.

Id. at 486 (emphasis added). Heck’s holding precludes a prisoner from
a collateral attack that may result in two inconsistent results—for
example, a valid criminal conviction and a valid civil judgment under
§ 1983 for monetary damages due to unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment.4 Although not essential to its holding, the Supreme
Court extended its analysis a step further by concluding that "the prin-
ciple barring collateral attacks . . . is not rendered inapplicable by the
fortuity that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated." Id. at 489
n. 10.

Justice Souter’s concurrence in Heck, joined by three Justices, rec-
ognized that the majority opinion could be interpreted to "risk the
rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas stat-
ute, individuals not ‘in custody’ for habeas purposes," id. at 500, thus
preventing them from accessing a federal forum.

If these individuals (people who were merely fined, for
example, or who have completed short terms of imprison-
ment, probation, or parole, or who discover (through no
fault of their own) a constitutional violation after full expira-
tion of their sentences), like state prisoners, were required
to show the prior invalidation of their convictions or sen-
tences in order to obtain § 1983 damages for unconstitu-
tional conviction or imprisonment, the result would be to
deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal
rights to those who cannot first obtain a favorable state rul-
4
An additional reason for the rule is to preclude undue federal interfer-
ence with states’ administration of justice.
 WILSON v. JOHNSON 7
ing. The reason, of course, is that individuals not in custody
cannot invoke federal habeas jurisdiction, the only statutory
mechanism besides § 1983 by which individuals may sue
state officials in federal court for violating federal rights.
That would be an untoward result.

Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent
a statutory edict to the contrary or a restriction within the common
law, the reach of § 1983 should not be compromised. Indeed, the
Court has given "full effect [to the language of § 1983 by] recogniz-
ing that § 1983 provides a remedy, to be broadly construed, against
all forms of official violation of federally protected rights." Id. at 502
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, we "[sh]ould
not cast doubt on the ability of an individual unaffected by the habeas
statute to take advantage of the broad reach of § 1983." Id. at 503.

Heck and its predecessors limited our inquiry to whether a prison-
er’s § 1983 action, "even if successful," id. at 487, would compromise
the validity of his underlying sentence. Four years later, however, five
members of the Supreme Court found Heck’s "favorable termination"
requirement inapplicable to a released inmate’s § 1983 claim, since
this was the only avenue by which he could access a federal forum.
See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998). In Spencer, the defendant
filed a federal habeas claim averring that his due process rights were
violated because his parole was improperly revoked. The district court
dismissed the claim as moot because the defendant was released from
prison before the district court decided his habeas claim. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, who also authored the Court’s
opinion in Heck, affirmed the district court’s decision.

Justice Souter, joined by three other colleagues (O’Connor, Gins-
burg,5 and Breyer, JJ.), concurred with the reasoning of the majority
5
Justice Ginsburg, in addition to joining Justice Souter’s concurrence,
wrote a separate concurrence in which she stated, "I have come to agree
with Justice SOUTER’s reasoning: Individuals without recourse to the
habeas statute because they are not ‘in custody’ (people merely fined or
whose sentences have been fully served, for example) fit within § 1983’s
(‘broad reach.’" Id. at 21-22 (emphasis in original).
8 WILSON v. JOHNSON
opinion, but more importantly, articulated an additional reason for
why the correct result was reached:

Now, as then, we are forced to recognize that any applica-
tion of the favorable-termination requirement to § 1983 suits
brought by plaintiffs not in custody would produce a patent
anomaly: a given claim for relief from unconstitutional
injury would be placed beyond the scope of § 1983 if
brought by a convict free of custody (as, in this case, follow-
ing service of a full term of imprisonment), when exactly
the same claim could be redressed if brought by a former
prisoner who had succeeded in cutting his custody short
through habeas.

The better view, then, is that a former prisoner, no longer ‘in
custody,’ may bring a § 1983 action establishing the uncon-
stitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being
bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it
would be impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy.

Id. at 20-21. Justice Stevens dissented, agreeing with the four concur-
ring judges that "[g]iven the Court’s holding that [Spencer] does not
have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice
SOUTER explains, that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983." Id. at 25 n. 8 (emphasis in original).

Both parties readily recognize that the circuits are split on this
issue. Four circuits regard the five justice plurality in Spencer as
dicta, and continue to interpret Heck as barring individuals from filing
virtually all § 1983 claims unless the favorable termination require-
ment is met.6 On the other hand, five circuits have held that the Spen-
cer plurality’s view allows a plaintiff to obtain relief under § 1983
6
See e.g., Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1998); Randell
v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Entzi v. Redmann, 485
F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); and Fuchs v. Mercer County, 260 Fed.
Appx. 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2008) but cf. Mendoza v. Meisel, 270 Fed.
Appx. 105, 107 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that "Heck does not bar a § 1983
claim where the plaintiff is unable to challenge his conditions of confine-
ment through a petition for federal habeas corpus.").
 WILSON v. JOHNSON 9
when it is no longer possible to meet the favorable termination
requirement via a habeas action.7

As evidenced by the circuit split, the Supreme Court has yet to con-
clusively decide if a former inmate can file a § 1983 claim when his
habeas avenue to federal court has been foreclosed. See Muhammad
v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2004) (recognizing, without
deciding, that "[m]embers of the Court have expressed the view that
unavailability of habeas for other reasons may also dispense with the
Heck requirement.") Even the four judge concurrence in Spencer
admitted that Heck’s "favorable-termination requirement [can be
interpreted as] an element of any § 1983 action alleging unconstitu-
tional conviction, whether or not leading to confinement and whether
or not any confinement continued when the § 1983 action was filed."
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 19.

Because Wilson’s § 1983 claim seeks damages for past confine-
ment, he does not fall squarely within the holdings of Preiser, Wolff,
Heck or Spencer. Thus, while Supreme Court dicta in Heck and Spen-
cer provides grist for circuits on both sides of this dilemma, we are
left with no directly applicable precedent upon which to rely. We
believe that the reasoning employed by the plurality in Spencer must
prevail in a case, like Wilson’s, where an individual would be left
without any access to federal court if his § 1983 claim was barred.
Indeed, the reach and intent of the habeas remedy would not be cir-
cumscribed by Wilson’s § 1983 claim since he filed it after the expi-
ration of his sentence.8 Additionally, the sweeping breadth, "high
7
See e.g., Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999);
Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001); Nonette v. Small, 316
F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2002); Harden v. Patake, 320 F.3d 1289, 1298
(11th Cir. 2003); and Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender
Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 2007) ("We are persuaded by the
logic of those circuits that have held that Heck’s favorable-termination
requirement cannot be imposed against § 1983 plaintiffs who lack a
habeas option for the vindication of their federal rights.").
8
While Wilson concedes that filing a petition for habeas corpus was
theoretically possible, he argues that complying with habeas’ administra-
tive exhaustion requirement during the additional confinement was
impossible. The plaintiffs in Preiser and Wolff admittedly could have
10 WILSON v. JOHNSON
purposes," and "unique[ness]" of § 1983 would be compromised in an
unprincipled manner if it could not be applied here. Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985) (overruled on other grounds). If a prisoner
could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief, and after release,
was prevented from filing a § 1983 claim, § 1983’s purpose of pro-
viding litigants with "a uniquely federal remedy against incursions
under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the Nations," id. at 271-272 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted), would be severely imperiled. Bar-
ring Wilson’s claim would leave him without access to any judicial
forum in which to seek relief for his alleged wrongful imprisonment.
Quite simply, we do not believe that a habeas ineligible former pris-
oner seeking redress for denial of his most precious right — freedom
— should be left without access to a federal court.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand it for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

filed habeas claims. The fact that a prisoner could have filed a habeas is
an issue in which courts have taken a keen interest. For example, in Pow-
ers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.
2007), the Sixth Circuit held that "a § 1983 plaintiff is entitled to a Heck
exception if the plaintiff was precluded as a matter of law from seeking
habeas redress, but not entitled to such an exception if the plaintiff could
have sought and obtained habeas review while still in prison but failed
to do so." Id. at 601 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
Powers, the defendant only spent one day in jail, thus precluding him
from filing a habeas petition as a practical matter. In Leather v. Eyck, 180
F.3d. 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit held that Heck did not
bar an individual’s § 1983 claim alleging selective prosecution because
his criminal sentence only involved paying a monetary fine.
 WILSON v. JOHNSON 11
HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The Heck1 favorable termination requirement is more than dicta
that we, as an inferior court, can choose to ignore. Despite the views
of the then-five sitting justices (now reduced to four on the current
Court) expressed in Spencer,2 the Supreme Court has not made any
exceptions to the favorable termination requirement, and we are
bound to enforce the requirement where it applies. Because Wilson’s
§ 1983 claim "necessarily require[s] [Wilson] to prove the unlawful-
ness of his . . . confinement," Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, I would affirm
the district court’s dismissal. I therefore respectfully dissent.

This court’s opinion properly articulates Heck’s holding that claims
challenging the lawfulness of a defendant’s conviction or his confine-
ment are simply not cognizable under § 1983, and that the holding
applies to "Ԥ 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plain-
tiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.’" (See
supra at 6, quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 (emphasis omitted)). As
articulated by the Supreme Court, that holding is unqualified. See,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 ("We hold that, in
order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawful-
ness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [overturned].")
(footnote omitted). Rather than apply Heck’s holding to Wilson’s
§ 1983 claim, this court’s opinion then goes into a discussion of the
views of five of the then-sitting justices espoused in Spencer about
the effect of Heck on claimants who lack a justiciable habeas claim.
Spencer involved the issue of whether a habeas claim became moot
when the claimant was released from prison during the pendency of
the habeas claim. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 3. Spencer had not filed a
§ 1983 claim. The only relevance § 1983 had to the Spencer case was
Spencer’s argument that his habeas claim should not be moot because
Heck would preclude a later § 1983 claim, leaving him with no
1
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
2
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998). Notably, this court’s opinion
elevates these views to that of a "plurality," (supra at 9), even though the
Supreme Court itself has recognized them for what they are—the views
of five justices in Spencer articulated in concurrences and a dissent, see
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004).
12 WILSON v. JOHNSON
recourse. The majority opinion, which was joined in full by the con-
curring opinions, rejected that argument, calling it "a great non sequi-
tur, unless one believes (as we do not) that a § 1983 action for
damages must always and everywhere be available." Id. at 17. The
discussion in Justice Souter’s concurrence is nothing more than an
expression of his views about whether the habeas claimant ought to
be able to bring a § 1983 claim after his habeas claim became moot,
an issue not then before the Court.

Our panel’s opinion in this case then determines, without elabora-
tion, that this case is not directly controlled by Heck "[b]ecause Wil-
son’s claim seeks damages for past confinement." (See supra at 9.)
That factual distinction notwithstanding, Heck’s holding, as well as its
reasoning, clearly covers Wilson’s § 1983 claim. In rejecting Justice
Souter’s suggestion that a § 1983 claim might lie where the claimant
has no available habeas remedy, Justice Scalia, writing for the major-
ity in Heck, reinforced the purpose behind its holding by stating that
"the principle barring collateral attacks-a longstanding and deeply
rooted feature of both the common law and our own jurisprudence-is
not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a convicted criminal is
no longer incarcerated." Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 n.10. In my view,
although Heck did not involve a claim based on past confinement, this
statement is part of the core holding of Heck by which we are bound.
See Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Absent
a decision of the Court that explicitly overrules what we understand
to be the holding of Heck [referring to the statement in footnote 10],
however, we decline to depart from that rule."), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 1714 (2008); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 & n.3 (1st
Cir. 1998) (describing Heck’s "core holding" as requiring the "annul-
ment of the underlying conviction" before a § 1983 claim could be
brought in a case where habeas was unavailable due to the inmate’s
death). The importance of avoiding inconsistent results between a
criminal conviction and sentence on the one hand and a civil constitu-
tional tort action on the other is not lessened just because the defen-
dant/claimant is no longer incarcerated.

The Supreme Court has reinforced the continuing validity of the
Heck favorable termination requirement since Spencer. In explaining
the intersection between habeas claims and § 1983 claims, the
Supreme Court stated that "[s]ome cases are hybrids, with a prisoner
 WILSON v. JOHNSON 13
seeking relief unavailable in habeas, notably damages, but on allega-
tions that not only support a claim for recompense, but imply the
invalidity either of an underlying conviction or of a particular ground
for denying release short of serving the maximum term of confine-
ment." Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750-51. In those hybrid situations, a
defendant must still establish favorable termination of his underlying
conviction or sentence before being allowed to bring a § 1983 claim
seeking damages for the alleged deprivation of his constitutional
rights. Id. at 751. This case fits squarely within the favorable termina-
tion requirement as expressly articulated by the Supreme Court thus
far.

Even if the views of the members of the Supreme Court have
changed, we are bound to follow the holdings of the Supreme Court
until the Court holds differently. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
237 (1997) ("[I]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in
a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly
controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions." (internal marks omitted)); Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d
442, 445-49 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (applying the rule from Agos-
tini and following Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987),
even though the case at hand was factually distinguishable from Fin-
ley and the Supreme Court had noted, but not ruled on, the same fac-
tual distinction in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1100 (1998). That Justice Ginsburg changed
her mind between Heck and Spencer does not change the fact that we,
as an inferior court, must continue to follow the holdings of the
Supreme Court, not the views as espoused by the varying justices on
issues not before the Court. See United States v. Chase, 466 F.3d 310,
315-16 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[Although] the overruling of Almendarez-
Torres may be imminent, see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13,
27-28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (‘Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s
subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the
Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly
decided.’), . . . until such overruling occurs, we must follow the deci-
sion when it controls." (citing Agostini)). We hold no charter to carve
exceptions out of Supreme Court stone even if the winds of changing
views have eroded it. Judicial restraint, as well as respect for prece-
14 WILSON v. JOHNSON
dent and our place within the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, coun-
sel that we must continue to apply the Heck favorable termination
requirement where applicable, and without exception, until the
Supreme Court tells us otherwise.

I respectfully dissent.