United States v. Srivastava

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.  No. 07-4386
PRADEEP SRIVASTAVA,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:05-cr-00482-RWT)

Argued: March 19, 2008

Decided: September 3, 2008

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and
David R. HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge King
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Senior Judge
Hansen joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Stuart A. Berman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
2 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
Paula Marie Junghans, ZUCKERMAN & SPAEDER, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosen-
stein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. P. Andrew Torrez, ZUCKERMAN & SPAEDER,
L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

The government seeks relief, by way of this interlocutory
appeal, from the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered in
the District of Maryland on August 4, 2006, suppressing evi-
dence seized by federal officers from the residence and medi-
cal offices of Dr. Pradeep Srivastava pursuant to search
warrants issued by a magistrate judge. See United States v.
Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2006) (the "Suppres-
sion Ruling"). The government also appeals from the court’s
order of March 6, 2007, declining to reconsider its Suppres-
sion Ruling. See United States v. Srivastava, 476 F. Supp. 2d
509 (D. Md. 2007). Put succinctly, the government contends
that the evidence suppressed was constitutionally seized and
within the scope of the search warrants, and that the court’s
blanket suppression of all seized evidence was erroneous. As
explained below, we agree with the government that the Sup-
pression Ruling was legally unsound, and thus vacate and
remand.

I.

A.

In early 2003, a criminal investigation was initiated by the
Department of Health and Human Services (the "HHS"), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI"), and the govern-
ment’s Office of Personnel Management, into an alleged
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 3
health care fraud scheme involving Srivastava, a licensed car-
diologist practicing with two associates in Maryland. The fed-
eral authorities suspected that Srivastava and his associates
were involved in the submission of false claims to various
health care benefit programs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347.1
As a result, the authorities commenced an investigation into
Srivastava’s billing practices.

In March 2003, the fraud investigation had progressed to
the stage where Jason Marrero, an HHS agent specializing in
the investigation of health care fraud ("Agent Marrero"),
applied to a magistrate judge in the District of Maryland for
three search warrants. By Agent Marrero’s submission to the
judge, the government sought the seizure of the "fruits, evi-
dence and instrumentalities of false claims submissions" from
Srivastava’s medical offices in Greenbelt and Oxon Hill (the
"Greenbelt office" and the "Oxon Hill office," respectively),
and from his residence in Potomac (the "Potomac residence").
J.A. 31.2 The applications for the search warrants were sup-
ported by Agent Marrero’s nineteen-page affidavit (the "Affi-
davit"), in which he specified, inter alia, that Srivastava and
his medical practice group had defrauded health care benefit
programs in various ways: billing for medical services not
1
Section 1347 of Title 18 makes it an offense to
knowingly and willfully execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to execute, a
scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations, or promises, any of the money or property
owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care
benefit program,
in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care ben-
efits, items, or services.
18 U.S.C. § 1347 (emphasis added).
2
Citations herein to "J.A. ___" refer to the contents of the Joint Appen-
dix filed by the parties in this appeal.
4 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
rendered; billing for duplicate medical services through dif-
ferent insurers; specifying inappropriate diagnosis codes for
patient services on medical claims; improperly billing for
incidental services; and altering medical records. The Affida-
vit also described specific instances of false billing for ser-
vices not rendered, as well as for duplicate services, including
dollar amounts paid for excess reimbursements.

Significantly, the Affidavit made factual assertions indicat-
ing that documents and records related to Srivastava’s medi-
cal practice — constituting possible evidence of health care
fraud — would be found in the Potomac residence:

• A former employee of Srivastava, who was a
confidential informant in the fraud investigation,
confirmed that Srivastava "directed most of the
billing to health care benefit programs," and that
such programs "sent most payments and Explana-
tion of Benefit letters to Srivastava’s house," J.A.
42;

• Srivastava had the medical practice’s "insurance
billing done from [his] house," and the practice
submitted such billing to insurers both "by mail
and electronically by computer," id.; and

• Srivastava had "listed and currently lists [the
Potomac] residence . . . as the billing address for
claims submitted electronically to Medicare," id.
at 46.

On the basis of these and other facts spelled out in the Affida-
vit, Agent Marrero asserted "that there is probable cause to
believe that Srivastava’s [Greenbelt and Oxon Hill] offices
. . . and Srivastava’s [Potomac] residence . . . contain fruits,
evidence and instrumentalities of [health care fraud] and that
the items [sought] are fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of
the violation." Id. at 48.
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 5
On March 20, 2003, the magistrate judge issued three
search warrants, each accompanied by an identical two-page
"Attachment A," captioned "Items To Be Seized Pursuant To
A Search Warrant." J.A. 49-51.3 The warrants "commanded"
the searching officers, inter alia, to search the Greenbelt
office, the Oxon Hill office, and the Potomac residence on or
before March 27, 2003, and, if the property listed in Attach-
ment A "be found there to seize same." Id. at 49. Attachment
A introduced the list of documents and records to be seized
under each warrant as follows:

The following records including, but not limited to,
financial, business, patient, insurance and other
records related to the business of Dr. Pradeep
Srivastava [and his two associates], for the period
January 1, 1998 to Present, which may constitute
evidence of violations of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1347.

Id. at 50. Attachment A then specified in some detail ten cate-
gories of things that were to be seized, including personnel
records; health care benefit program manuals and documenta-
tion; correspondence between medical office personnel and
health care benefits program personnel; documents relating to
investigations of the medical group’s billing practices; records
of complaints about patient treatment; records of certain spec-
ified patients; computer files or programs related to the other
materials identified; plus calendars, appointment books, corre-
spondence, passports, photographs, and other documents indi-
cating Srivastava’s whereabouts during the period under
investigation. Id. at 50-51. Importantly, category 2 of Attach-
ment A commanded the seizure of "[f]inancial records,
including but not limited to accounting records, tax records,
3
Only one of the three search warrants — for the Oxon Hill office —
is contained in the Joint Appendix filed by the parties. It is undisputed,
however, that the three warrants, except for describing the place to be
searched, are materially identical.
6 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
accounts receivable logs and ledgers, banking records, and
other records reflecting income and expenditures of the busi-
ness." Id. at 50.4
4
The other nine categories of documents and records commanded to be
seized were, as described in Attachment A of the search warrants, the fol-
lowing:
1. Personnel records for all current and former employees,
including but not limited to lists of employee names,
employee resumes, employee time sheets, job applications,
job training records, profession[al] certifications, and pay-
roll records.
***
3. Health care benefit program training manuals, regulations,
bulletins, reports, notices, pamphlets, and correspondence
concerning proper billing and documentation procedures,
and any documentation regarding instructions for billing
health care benefit programs.
4. Correspondence, memoranda, and notes of conversations,
including but not limited to those relating to communica-
tions between medical office personnel and personnel for
health care benefit programs.
5. Any and all records indicating [Dr.] Pradeep Srivastava’s
[or his associates’] locations and activities during the period
January 1, 1998 to the present, including but not limited to
calend[a]rs, appointment books, correspondence, passports,
visas, photographs and other documents.
6. Any documents [ ]including but not limited to reports, cor-
respondence, memorandums, work papers, interview notes
and other notes relating to any internal or external investi-
gation, audit, or other review of the billing/medical practice
of Dr. Pradeep Srivastava, to include [his associates].
7. Records of complaints, including but not limited to com-
plaints concerning the treatment provided by [Dr.] Pradeep
Srivastava [or his associates].
8. All information and/or data, pertaining to records described
in this Attachment above, stored in the form of magnetic or
electrical coding on computer media or on media capable of
being read by a computer or with the aid of computer
related equipment. This media includes but is not limited to
floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, video cassettes, and any
other media which is capable of storing magnetic coding.
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 7
B.

On March 21, 2003, HHS and FBI agents simultaneously
executed the search warrants at the three specified locations.
Prior to the searches being conducted, Agent Marrero briefed
the executing officers on what was to be done, summarizing
for them the contents of the warrants and the Affidavit. Two
of the searches — those conducted at the Greenbelt office and
the Potomac residence — yielded the seizure of documents
and records that are specifically implicated in this appeal.5

From the Potomac residence, the officers seized, inter alia,
copies of the tax returns of Dr. Srivastava and his wife; stock
brokerage account records; information about the construction
of a second home; bank records relating to several family
financial transactions; travel information; Srivastava’s wallet;
unopened mail; credit cards; Indian currency; a pharmacy
card; and checks from various banks. From the Greenbelt
office, the agents seized, inter alia, copies of bank remittance

9. Computer codes and programs, computer software, instruc-
tional manuals, operating instructions and sources of infor-
mation, to the extent that they are necessary to extract and
copy any of the information set forth in paragraphs 1
through 8 above.
10. All patient records and documentation relating to the Medi-
care beneficiaries and private health care insurance sub-
scribers listed below. This includes complete medical files,
patient appointment books, patient billing records, office
sign-in sheets, explanation of benefits (EOBs), and tele-
phone messages in any form. [Several pages of Medicare
beneficiaries and insurance subscribers were thereafter
identified.
J.A. 50-51.
5
Although a substantial group of documents and records were also
seized in the third search (of the Oxon Hill office), and are also encom-
passed in the Suppression Ruling, the government does not presently pro-
pose to utilize them at trial.
8 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
records relating to the State Bank of India (collectively, the
"Bank of India Transfers"). The Bank of India Transfers
reflected, inter alia, that Srivastava had, over a period of sev-
eral months in 1999 and 2000, transferred more than $4 mil-
lion to the State Bank of India.

In April 2003, after the searches had been completed, the
government returned to Srivastava approximately 80% of the
documents and records seized from the Potomac residence.6
During the same time frame, Agent Marrero provided the
United States Attorney with a copy of the Bank of India
Transfers, which were also provided to the Internal Revenue
Service (the "IRS"). IRS agents thereafter concluded that the
Bank of India Transfers indicated a likely failure to disclose
a foreign financial account.7 After obtaining other information
relating to the Transfers — for example, that Srivastava had
not acknowledged any foreign bank accounts on his 1999,
2000, and 2001 personal income tax returns — the IRS initi-
ated an investigation of Srivastava for possible reporting vio-
lations. This investigation ultimately led to his indictment for
tax fraud.
6
The return to Srivastava in April 2003 of approximately 80% of the
things seized from the Potomac residence resulted from an agreement
between the parties. In returning those records, the government did not
concede that they had been improperly seized. By their agreement in this
regard, the lawyers apparently obviated the need for preindictment pro-
ceedings under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
infra note 20. As a result, the suppression issues were not litigated until
early 2006.
7
As mandated by Treasury Department regulations, a report must be
filed with the IRS by any person in and doing business in the United
States, who possesses an interest in or authority over a foreign financial
account exceeding $10,000 during a calendar year. See 31 C.F.R.
§§ 103.24, 103.27(c); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5315(c) (authorizing Secretary
of Treasury to prescribe reporting requirements); id. § 5322 (providing
criminal penalties for willful violations of Treasury Department regula-
tions, such as those mandating foreign financial account reports).
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 9
C.

On October 12, 2005, Srivastava was indicted by a grand
jury in the District of Maryland on two counts of tax evasion,
in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, plus one count of making
false statements on a tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1).8 According to the indictment, Srivastava had con-
cealed more than $40 million in capital gains on investments
in technology stocks and stock options, and underpaid his
income taxes for tax years 1998 and 1999 by more than $16
million. The indictment alleges, inter alia, that:

• Srivastava invested a substantial portion of
income from his medical practice in stocks and
stock options, but failed to provide important
information relating to his stock and stock
options trading to the accountant who prepared
his tax returns;

• As a consequence of those omissions, the
accountant prepared, and Srivastava filed, tax
returns that resulted in an underpayment of taxes
in 1998 by approximately $165,000, and in 1999
by more than $16 million;

• In 2000, Srivastava’s portfolio substantially
declined in value, and he failed to disclose short-
term capital losses of approximately $ 10.8 mil-
lion. Although nondisclosure of these losses did
not affect his taxes due and owing for 2000, it
served to conceal his unreported short-term capi-
tal gains for 1998 and 1999.

In January 2006, following his indictment, Srivastava filed
a suppression motion challenging the constitutionality of the
seizures that had been made nearly three years earlier, pursu-
8
The indictment is found at J.A. 7-26.
10 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
ant to the search warrants. In that motion, Srivastava con-
tended, inter alia, that documents and records seized in the
searches were of a personal nature and not subject to seizure,
and that the seized documents and records exceeded the scope
of the warrants.9 Responding to the suppression motion, the
government advised the court that it possessed approximately
twenty-five documents and records — all seized from the
Potomac residence — that it intended to use as trial evidence
(collectively, the "Potomac Documents"). Several of the Poto-
mac Documents had been seized from Srivastava’s bedroom
in the Potomac residence, including:

• An IRS Form 1099 for tax year 1999 found in an
envelope marked as "1999 Final";10

• Several documents from an envelope dated Octo-
ber 15, 1996, including multiple IRS Forms 1099
for tax year 1998, a handwritten document
describing "Bank Interest Payment," and a state-
ment and fax relating to accounts with "Mesirow
Financial Inc./Bentley-Lawrence Securities";11
and
9
In his effort to suppress the evidence seized under the warrants,
Srivastava also sought an evidentiary hearing in the district court, pursuant
to Franks v. Delaware, maintaining that the Affidavit had affirmatively
omitted material information. See 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) ("[W]here
the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false state-
ment knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly
false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.").
At a March 27, 2006 hearing conducted on the suppression motion, the
district court denied Srivastava’s request for a Franks hearing, after deter-
mining that the magistrate judge had not been misled by the Affidavit.
10
An IRS Form 1099 is used to report various types of income — other
than wages, salaries, and tips — to the IRS. Such income includes, inter
alia, dividends and distributions, interest, government payments, payments
to independent contractors, and miscellaneous income.
11
Although several Potomac Documents discovered in the Potomac resi-
dence were found in folders dated 1996, the Documents seized sufficiently
related to the pertinent time frame.
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 11
• Several documents from a folder labeled "1996
Tax Info.," including IRS Forms 1099 for tax
years 1997 and 1999, spreadsheets for accounts
variously labeled "Options Transactions" and
"Stock Transactions," a "Schedule of Realized
Gains and Losses" dated October 14, 1999, and
a 1999 "Tax Reporting Statement."12

Several other Potomac Documents that the prosecution seeks
to utilize at trial were found in a shoe box marked "Tax
Return Info 2000," seized from an office on the first floor of
the Potomac residence. The documents from the shoe box
included:

• A fax (dated October 8, 2001) from Srivastava’s
accountant requesting items needed to complete
Srivastava’s 2000 tax return;

• A spreadsheet labeled "Accounts of Dr. Pradeep
Srivastava/Stock Transactions — 8/25/99 to
12/31/99 By Bentley Lawrence Account"; and

• A handwritten document with information about
various bank accounts and transactions.

In opposing the suppression motion, the government alter-
natively advised that, if the court suppressed the Potomac
Documents, it intended to utilize at trial the Bank of India
Transfers seized from the Greenbelt office, "to explain the
independent source for [the IRS case agent’s] investigation
and the inevitable discovery of the brokerage, bank and other
evidence supporting the tax charges." J.A. 110. The Bank of
India Transfers included the following:
12
Intermingled with the financial records discovered in one of the fold-
ers located in the bedroom of the Potomac residence were other records
of Srivastava’s medical practice, including a client master list, employee
time sheets, and a memorandum relating to employee leave and vacation
time. The government does not propose to offer those items into evidence.
12 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
• A letter from Srivastava, dated December 16,
1999, printed on the medical practice letterhead
of "Pradeep Srivastava, M.D., F.A.C.C." and an
associate, and faxed by the Greenbelt office man-
ager to the State Bank of India in New York,
directing a wire transfer of the sum of $150,000
for deposit in Srivastava’s account with the State
Bank of India in New Delhi;

• A fax cover and confirmation sheet dated Decem-
ber 16, 1999, also on the medical practice letter-
head; and

• Remittance confirmations of various dates from
the State Bank of India regarding the $150,000
deposit and seven other deposits totalling more
than $4 million.

On June 9, 2006, the court conducted an evidentiary hear-
ing on Srivastava’s contentions regarding the scope of the
search warrants and the constitutionality of their execution. At
the hearing, the court heard testimony from Agent Marrero
and an IRS agent, as well as argument concerning whether the
seized documents and records were within the scope of the
warrants. Srivastava contended, inter alia, that although such
documents and records may have financial significance, they
did not relate to his medical practice, were not evidence of
health care fraud, and thus were not within the ambit of the
warrants. The government maintained to the contrary, arguing
that the seized documents and records plainly fell within the
scope of the warrants and that the suppression motion should
be denied.

D.

On August 4, 2006, the district court issued its Suppression
Ruling, ordering the suppression of the Potomac Documents,
the Bank of India Transfers, and all other evidence seized in
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 13
the three searches. In so ruling, the court first determined that
"in order to fall within the scope of the warrant, a financial
record not only had to have some relationship to Dr.
Srivastava’s business, but it also was subject to the require-
ment that it may constitute evidence that health care fraud had
been committed." United States v. Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d
385, 393 (D. Md. 2006). Next, the court analyzed whether, in
view of the foregoing, the seizures of the Potomac Documents
and the Bank of India Transfers were within the scope of the
search warrants issued for the Potomac residence and the
Greenbelt office, respectively. The court then concluded that
the Potomac Documents had been improperly seized, because
they "neither tended to show violations of the health care
fraud statute, nor related to the business of Dr. Srivastava." Id.
at 395. Turning to the Bank of India Transfers seized from the
Greenbelt office, the court determined that, although they "ar-
guably may have related to the business of Dr. Srivastava,"
nothing on their face "connotes or suggests evidence of health
care fraud." Id. The Affidavit, the court emphasized, failed to
discuss the handling of any financial proceeds of a fraud
scheme, which, it observed, is a federal crime (i.e., money
laundering) distinct from the federal offense of health care
fraud. Id. at 396. The court thus concluded that, as with its
suppression of the Potomac Documents, suppression of the
Bank of India Transfers was constitutionally required.

Finally, the court considered the question of whether a
blanket suppression of all of the seized evidence was war-
ranted, concluding that

[e]ven if . . . some of the documents at issue here
were within the scope of the warrant, these docu-
ments would be excluded as well because the con-
duct of the agents who executed this warrant was so
inappropriate as to warrant the exclusion of all evi-
dence seized on March 21, 2003.
14 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 396-97. The court premised its
blanket suppression ruling on two primary bases: first, its con-
clusion that execution of the warrants contravened the Fourth
Amendment, specifically with respect to the quantity and
character of the documents and records seized (including
those voluntarily returned to Srivastava by the government);
and, second, the testimony of Agent Marrero at the June 9,
2006 hearing, indicating (in the court’s words) that he "did
not consider himself to be limited to seizing business items
only, or records that tended to show evidence of violations of
the health care fraud statute." Id. at 397.13 The court thus sup-
pressed all of the documents and records seized in the three
searches. In so ruling, the court reasoned that such a blanket
suppression was warranted because of Marrero’s flagrantly
excessive view of the scope of the warrants, and because such
a view was not justified by either practical considerations or
good-faith mistake. See id. at 400.14 The Suppression Ruling
thus barred the government from utilizing at trial (1) the Poto-
mac Documents, (2) the Bank of India Transfers, and (3) all
other documents and records seized under the warrants.

The government thereafter sought reconsideration of the
Suppression Ruling, which the district court denied on March
13
In the Suppression Ruling, the court observed that Agent Marrero had
provided astonishing testimony in which he indicated that he
inserted [the substantive introductory language] merely as a "go
by," and that he did not consider it to limit his actions in any way.
When asked if it was true that he "didn’t give much thought to
what this meant" and whether he "just thought it was some boiler-
plate that ought to be" in the warrant, [Agent] Marrero agreed
"for the most part," stating only that he "knew it was used before
so it was appropriate language."
Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
14
The Suppression Ruling also concluded that the documents and
records that the government proposed to utilize at trial were not otherwise
admissible under either the inevitable discovery or independent source
exceptions to a Fourth Amendment violation. See Srivastava, 444 F. Supp.
2d at 401-12.
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 15
12, 2007. See United States v. Srivastava, 476 F. Supp. 2d
509 (D. Md. 2007). In denying reconsideration, the court reit-
erated the Suppression Ruling’s interpretation of the scope of
the warrants, its bases for suppressing the Potomac Docu-
ments and the Bank of India Transfers, and the reasons for its
blanket suppression of all the seized evidence. See id. at 512-
14.

The government disagrees with the Suppression Ruling and
the denial of its motion to reconsider, maintaining that those
decisions were erroneous and undermine its effort to prose-
cute the tax fraud indictment pending against Srivastava. As
a result, the government pursues this interlocutory appeal, and
Srivastava’s trial has been held in abeyance pending the
appeal’s resolution. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3731.15

II.

A.

Legal determinations made by a district court with respect
to a suppression issue, including interpretations of the scope
of a search warrant, are reviewed de novo on appeal. See
United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 470 (4th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Hurd, 499 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2007)
("Whether a search is within the scope of a warrant is a ques-
tion of law subject to de novo review."). In conducting such
a de novo review, we are obliged to assess the contents of a
search warrant and its supporting affidavits "in a common-
sense and realistic fashion," eschewing "[t]echnical require-
ments of elaborate specificity." United States v. Ventresca,
15
In accordance with the jurisdictional predicate of 18 U.S.C. § 3731,
the United States Attorney has certified that this interlocutory appeal "is
not taken for purposes of delay" and that the evidence excluded by the
Suppression Ruling "is a substantial proof of a fact material in the pro-
ceeding." J.A. 725.
16 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); see also United States v. Angelos,
433 F.3d 738, 745 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gorman,
104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1996).

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s blanket
suppression of seized evidence. See United States v. Borro-
meo, 954 F.2d 245, 246 (4th Cir. 1992). We recognize that a
district court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes
an error of law. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100
(1996); United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir.
2005) ("By definition, a court abuses its discretion when it
makes an error of law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In analyzing the constitutionality of a search warrant’s execu-
tion, we must conduct an "objective assessment of the [exe-
cuting] officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting him at the time," rather than make a subjective
evaluation of "the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the
challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S.
463, 470-71 (1985).

B.

This appeal obligates us to assess, in a pretrial context, the
Suppression Ruling made by the district court in connection
with the tax fraud prosecution pending against Srivastava.
The appeal implicates questions related to the warranted
searches of Srivastava’s Potomac residence and Greenbelt
office. Such questions arise under the Fourth Amendment,
which protects individuals against unreasonable searches and
seizures conducted by the authorities, specifying its guarantee
in the following terms:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 17
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The review of Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues
in our Court is not an uncommon occurrence. In most of these
instances, however, the issues arise from circumstances where
the authorities have conducted warrantless searches and sei-
zures of private property. As such, we are regularly called
upon to assess an array of constitutional issues that arise from
warrantless searches and seizures, in a wide range of circum-
stances. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (explaining "plain view" warrantless seizures); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (authorizing warrantless
searches incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(approving warrantless searches and seizures incident to "stop
and frisk" situations); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (explaining "hot pursuit" principle of warrantless
searches and seizures).

Our Court — as well as the Supreme Court and other judi-
cial bodies — has consistently encouraged the authorities to
act prudently in the Fourth Amendment context, and, when
the circumstances permit, to seek and secure the authorization
of a judicial officer — in the form of a warrant — before con-
ducting a search or seizure. See Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 106 (in
explaining judiciary’s strong preference for warranted
searches and seizures, observing that, "in a doubtful or mar-
ginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
without one it would fall"); see also United States v. Ser-
vance, 394 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[L]aw enforce-
ment officers are encouraged to act pursuant to judicial
sanction, and searches and seizures carried out pursuant to
duly issued search warrants ‘carry a presumption of legality.’"
(quoting Anglin v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 439 F.2d 1342, 1346
(4th Cir. 1971))). In this case, the government contends that
its agents acted both prudently and reasonably. The officers
18 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
first prepared an extensive and detailed Affidavit demonstrat-
ing probable cause for the searches and seizures they sought
to carry out and then sought and secured the magistrate
judge’s authorization for the seizures.

By its Suppression Ruling, the district court determined
that the search warrants authorized the seizure of only those
"documents that related to Dr. Srivastava’s business and that
may show in some way that health care fraud had been com-
mitted." United States v. Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392
(D. Md. 2006). This conclusion provides the foundation for
the issues presented in this appeal. First, the government
asserts that the court erred in concluding that the Potomac
Documents were not related to Srivastava’s medical practice,
were not likely to constitute evidence of health care fraud, and
thus were not within the scope of the warrants. Second, the
government maintains that the court erred in concluding that
the Bank of India Transfers, although "legitimately appear-
[ing] to be records of the business," were not evidence of
health care fraud, and thus also not within the ambit of the
warrants. Id. at 396. Finally, the government maintains that,
in these circumstances, the warrants were properly executed
and the blanket suppression ruling is legally defective.

III.

In disposing of this appeal, we first assess whether the
scope of the search warrants includes the two groups of docu-
ments that the government intends to use at trial: (1) the Poto-
mac Documents and (2) the Bank of India Transfers. We then
analyze whether the court’s blanket suppression of all the
seized evidence was legally justified.

A.

We begin our analysis with the government’s contention
that the district court misconstrued the scope of the search
warrant for the Potomac residence. In this regard, the court
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 19
determined that the Affidavit demonstrated probable cause
that documents and records relating to Srivastava’s medical
practice, and that may constitute evidence of health care
fraud, would be found in the residence. See United States v.
Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392-93 (D. Md. 2006). Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that the warrant did not autho-
rize the seizure of the Potomac Documents found there,
because they were neither business-related nor evidence of
health care fraud. Id. at 395-96.

1.

As the Suppression Ruling recognized, the Affidavit made
compelling assertions that documents and records relating to
Srivastava’s medical practice — and that may constitute evi-
dence of health care fraud — would be found in the Potomac
residence. Indeed, Srivastava conducted a substantial part of
his medical practice from the Potomac residence: claims for
medical services were submitted to health care benefit pro-
grams from the residence; the residence was used as the bill-
ing address for the medical practice; and the practice received
payments from such programs, both electronically and by
mail, at the residence. In these circumstances, the magistrate
judge was unquestionably justified in issuing the search war-
rant for the Potomac residence, commanding the officers to
seize a broad range of things, "including, but not limited to,
financial, business, patient, insurance and other records
related to the business of Dr. Pradeep Srivastava . . . which
may constitute evidence of [health care fraud]." J.A. 50
(emphasis added). The Affidavit established that documents
and records sought from the residence — specifically (as
identified in category 2 of Attachment A) Srivastava’s
"[f]inancial records, including but not limited to accounting
records, tax records, accounts receivable logs and ledgers,
banking records, and other records reflecting income and
expenditures of the business" — related to his medical prac-
tice and constituted evidence of health care fraud. Id. (empha-
sis added). Finally, the categories of items designated for
20 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
seizure extended to (as identified in Category 5) Srivastava’s
"calend[a]rs, appointment books, correspondence, passports,
visas, photographs and other documents." Id. at 51.

2.

We turn next to the issue of whether the Potomac Docu-
ments were within the scope of the search warrant for the
Potomac residence. As the Supreme Court has mandated, and
our sister courts of appeals have recognized, a search warrant
is not to be assessed in a hypertechnical manner. See United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (explaining that
"[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity once
exacted under common law pleadings" are not applicable in
Fourth Amendment context); see also United States v. Ange-
los, 433 F.3d 738, 745 (10th Cir. 2006) ("We review de novo
the scope of the search warrant at issue, employing a standard
of practical accuracy rather than technical precision." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d
272, 275 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[T]here is no room in the midst of
a criminal investigation for hypertechnical reading or inter-
pretation of a search warrant." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Instead, as the Supreme Court explained in Ventresca,
we must simply assess such issues "in a commonsense and
realistic fashion." 380 U.S. at 108; see also Gorman, 104 F.3d
at 275 ("Plain reading and common sense are the landmarks
for the execution and interpretation of the language of a
search warrant." (internal quotation marks omitted)).16
16
Although our Court has, on many occasions, applied Ventresca’s
"commonsense and realistic fashion" principle in analyzing the sufficiency
of supporting affidavits, we do not appear to have specifically utilized this
principle in assessing the scope of a search warrant. On this point, how-
ever, we readily agree with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, see Gorman, 104
F.3d at 275; Angelos, 433 F.3d at 745, and apply the Ventresca principle
to our assessment of the seizures being challenged, eschewing a hypert-
echnical approach to these issues.
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 21
As the district court concluded in its Suppression Ruling,
"in order to fall within the scope of the warrant, [the Potomac
Documents] not only had to have some relationship to Dr.
Srivastava’s business," but were also "subject to the require-
ment that [they] may constitute evidence that health care
fraud had been committed." See Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d
at 393. Accordingly, we analyze whether the Potomac Docu-
ments were related to Dr. Srivastava’s medical practice and
whether they may constitute evidence of health care fraud,
beginning with their relationship to his business.

a.

Although Srivastava argues on appeal that the search war-
rant for the Potomac residence limited the authorized seizures
to those documents and records that are "related to the busi-
ness" (i.e., the medical practice), this contention does not
undermine the constitutionality of the seizure of the Potomac
Documents. Of note, Srivastava’s medical practice operated
as a "Subchapter S" corporation, under which his portion of
the practice’s income was passed through and taxed directly
to him as an individual.17 In such circumstances, it is difficult
to realistically define a bright line between "personal financial
records" and "business records," as Srivastava implores us to
do. Rather, it is consistent with both common sense and real-
ism to deem the financial records relating to the medical prac-
tice as being nearly synonymous with the financial records of
Srivastava individually. By way of example, with respect to
the Potomac Documents seized from Srivastava’s bedroom:

• The IRS Form 1099 for tax year 1999 found in
an envelope marked "1099 Final" constituted a
financial record, as specified in category 2 of
17
A corporation that elects to be taxed under Subchapter S, see 26
U.S.C. §§ 1361-63, pays no federal income tax, but passes all its income
and losses through to its shareholders. Those shareholders then report the
income or losses on their individual tax returns.
22 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
Attachment A. Under law, an IRS Form 1099
reflects income paid to a taxpayer. In this
instance, the Form reflected certain interest
income paid to Srivastava in 1999, which also, in
these circumstances, reasonably related to his
business of practicing medicine; and

• Additional IRS Forms 1099 for tax year 1998
(found in the envelope dated October 15, 1996)
and for tax years 1997 and 1999 (from the folder
marked "1996 Tax Info.") likewise constituted
financial records related to Srivastava and his
medical practice, specified for seizure under
Attachment A.

Assessed in a de novo context, the balance of the Potomac
Documents also were within the ambit of the financial records
specified for seizure in category 2 of Attachment A. More
specifically, those records — reflecting stock and option
transactions and banking activities — related to the receipt of
Srivastava’s income and, thus, also reasonably related to his
medical practice. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the dis-
trict court that such documents were outside the scope of the
warrant for being non-business related.

b.

We next consider the Suppression Ruling’s conclusion that
the Potomac Documents were not within the scope of the
search warrant for the Potomac residence because they failed
to satisfy the magistrate judge’s requirement that things could
only be seized if they "may constitute evidence that health
care fraud had been committed." Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d
at 393. In this regard, we emphasize that the warrant’s man-
date was only that seized items "relate[ ] to the business" of
Dr. Srivastava and "may constitute evidence of [health care
fraud]." J.A. 50 (emphasis added). Thus, we must conduct our
de novo assessment with this mandate in mind. Pursuant to
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 23
the warrant, documents or records to be seized were not
required, on their face, to necessarily constitute evidence of
health care fraud — rather, they only potentially had to be
evidence of such fraud. And, in the context of a fraud investi-
gation, the relevant evidence will in many instances be frag-
mentary, discovered in bits and pieces, and thus difficult to
either identify or secure. Standing alone, a particular docu-
ment may appear innocuous or entirely innocent, and yet be
an important piece of the jigsaw puzzle that investigators
must assemble. The complexity of a fraud scheme, however,
should not be permitted to confer some advantage on the sus-
pected wrongdoer. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
481 n.10 (1976) ("The complexity of an illegal scheme may
not be used as a shield to avoid detection when the State has
demonstrated probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and probable cause to believe that evidence of this
crime is in the suspect’s possession.").

Here, the Affidavit demonstrated probable cause that
Srivastava’s medical practice had submitted fraudulent claims
to health care benefit programs from the Potomac residence,
suggesting that the executing officers were likely to encounter
a "paper puzzle" in carrying out the command of the warrant.
For example, a piece of the fraud puzzle in this case included
Srivastava’s financial records, such as IRS Forms 1099
reflecting his income. Cf. United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d
1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that financial
records were pieces of "paper puzzle" verifying fraudulent
kickback scheme). Indeed, a time-honored concept in white-
collar and fraud investigations is simply to "follow the
money." See, e.g., David M. Nissman, Follow the Money: A
Guide to Financial and Money Laundering Investigations
(2005). That principle is particularly applicable here, and it is
deserving of emphasis. The possession or transfer of "large
sums of money, and the manner in which those funds were
acquired [are] highly relevant to proof of [a] scheme to
24 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
defraud." United States v. Shamy, 656 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir.
1981).18

Having made a de novo assessment of the scope of the war-
rant for the Potomac residence — and having done so in a
non-hypertechnical, common-sense, and realistic manner —
we are satisfied that the Potomac Documents were within the
scope of its specifications. The Affidavit spelled out a com-
plex fraud scheme, and the warrant specified that things
related to Srivastava’s medical practice, and that may consti-
tute evidence of health care fraud, would be discovered in the
residence. In these circumstances, we are simply unable to
rule that the Potomac Documents could not constitute evi-
dence of health care fraud. As a result, the seizure of the Poto-
mac Documents was consistent with the scope of the warrant
and the mandate of the Fourth Amendment.

B.

Turning to the government’s contention that the Bank of
India Transfers were within the scope of the search warrant
issued for the Greenbelt office, we conclude that they were
also erroneously suppressed by the district court. In this
regard, the Suppression Ruling recognized that the Bank of
India Transfers "legitimately appeared to be records of the
business." Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 396. Nevertheless,
the court concluded that the warrant for the Greenbelt office
did not authorize the seizure of the Transfers because they did
not constitute evidence of health care fraud. In so ruling, the
court determined that the Affidavit failed to show probable
cause for seizure of the Transfers as financial proceeds evi-
dence, emphasizing that there had been no discussion in the
18
The reasoning underlying this point — that evidence of the possession
and transfer of large sums of money can, in the proper context, be a strong
indicia of fraud — is further emphasized by our analysis of the district
court’s erroneous suppression of the Bank of India Transfers. See infra
Part III.B.
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 25
Affidavit of "what Dr. Srivastava may have done with the
monies he received as payment for his procedures," or "how
[he] handled his banking." Id. Furthermore, the court
observed that concerns for the proceeds of Dr. Srivastava’s
alleged crimes would involve money laundering activities,
which are "distinct from health care fraud." Id.

To the contrary, in following the money, the financial
records of a suspect may well be highly probative of viola-
tions of a federal fraud statute. See Shamy, 656 F.2d at 958
(concluding that, in mail fraud investigation — in the words
of Judge Haynsworth — "large sums of money, and the man-
ner in which those funds were acquired were highly relevant
to proof of the scheme to defraud"). Indeed, the health care
fraud statute provides that it may be violated by a person who
"obtain[s] . . . money or property" by means of false or fraud-
ulent pretenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (emphasis added). In the
context of a fraud investigation, the financial and accounting
records of the suspects — and, as here, records reflecting the
overseas transfer of large sums of money by a prime suspect
— are potentially compelling evidence that the scheme has
been conducted and carried out, and that, in the terms of
§ 1347, "money or property" has been obtained as the result
of false or fraudulent billing practices.19

Consequently, and consistent with our conclusion that the
Potomac Documents were subject to seizure under the search
warrant for the Potomac residence, the Bank of India Trans-
fers were sufficiently designated for seizure by the warrant for
the Greenbelt office. As recognized by the district court, the
19
If a false or fraudulent billing scheme has been conducted in connec-
tion with a medical practice, multiple federal fraud statutes are potentially
implicated. For example, federal fraud offenses that might be pursued on
the basis of a factual scenario arising from a health care fraud scheme
include, inter alia, mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C.
§ 1343), tax fraud (26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206), and health care fraud (18
U.S.C. § 1347). Health care fraud is simply one species of such a scheme,
which Congress saw fit to combat through its 1996 enactment of § 1347.
26 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
Transfers "legitimately appeared to be records of the busi-
ness." Srivastava, 444 F.3d at 396. Furthermore, the posses-
sion and transfer of large sums of money — more than $4
million transferred overseas by Srivastava to a bank in India
— could readily be deemed evidence of the fraud scheme
described in the Affidavit. Simply put, the possession and
transfer to another country of such large sums was, even when
viewed favorably to Srivastava, very suspicious. And, from
the standpoint of the executing officers, it was compelling
evidence of a potential health care fraud offense (i.e., obtain-
ing, by false and fraudulent pretenses, the money or property
of a health care benefit program). As a result, we also reject
the district court’s restrictive interpretation of the scope of the
warrant for the Greenbelt office, and conclude that the seizure
of the Bank of India Transfers was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.

C.

Finally, having determined that the Potomac Documents
and the Bank of India Transfers were within the ambit of the
search warrants for the Potomac residence and the Greenbelt
office, we assess the government’s challenge to the blanket
suppression of all the seized evidence. In that respect, the dis-
trict court found that the warrants had been so flagrantly and
unconstitutionally executed that a blanket suppression was
justified. We have consistently recognized, however, that,
"[a]s a general rule, if officers executing a search warrant
exceed the scope of the warrant, only the improperly-seized
evidence will be suppressed; the properly-seized evidence
remains admissible." United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d
542, 556 (4th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Shilling,
826 F.2d 1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[t]he
exclusionary rule does not compel suppression of evidence
properly covered by a warrant merely because other material
not covered by the warrant was taken during the same
search"). We have also recognized that only extraordinary cir-
cumstances — such as when "the warrant application merely
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 27
serves as a subterfuge masking the officers’ lack of probable
cause," or if "the officers flagrantly disregard[ ] the terms of
the warrant" by "engag[ing] in a fishing expedition for the
discovery of incriminating evidence" — will justify the sup-
pression of lawfully seized evidence. United States v. Uzen-
ski, 434 F.3d 690, 706 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

By its Suppression Ruling, the district court determined
that a blanket suppression was justified because, inter alia, the
executing officers had "approached the searches of Dr.
Srivastava’s home and offices in a way that flagrantly
exceeded the specific limitations of the warrants, and . . .
grossly exceeded the scope of the warrants in their execu-
tion." Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 401. The court also con-
cluded that a blanket suppression was warranted, "[e]ven if
. . . some of the documents at issue . . . were within the scope
of the warrant." Id. at 396. Notwithstanding the court’s expla-
nation, we are unable to identify any extraordinary circum-
stances that might support this ruling. And, in any event, our
conclusions that the Potomac Documents and the Bank of
India Transfers were constitutionally seized substantially
undercuts the blanket suppression ruling. For example, the
court’s finding that Agent Marrero thought "he had limitless
power to seize virtually anything from Dr. Srivastava’s home
and business" is derived from its understanding that Marrero
"intended to seize personal financial records," id. at 397 — an
intention not inconsistent with our de novo determination on
the scope of the warrants. See supra Part III.A-B.

Even assuming — as the district court found — that Agent
Marrero believed that the terms of the search warrants were
"meaningless," and did not limit his conduct in any way, such
an assumption does not support the blanket suppression rul-
ing. Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 398-99. Simply put, a con-
stitutional violation does not arise when the actions of the
executing officers are objectively reasonable and within the
ambit of warrants issued by a judicial officer. As a result, the
28 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
subjective views of Agent Marrero were not relevant — the
proper test is an objective one. See Maryland v. Macon, 472
U.S. 463, 470 (1985) ("Whether a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the offi-
cer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual
state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken."
(internal citations omitted)); see also Martin v. Gentile, 849
F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that executing offi-
cer’s actions must be assessed for objective reasonableness
"in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, with-
out regard to his own subjective intent or motivation").
Although we might sympathize with the court’s view that
Marrero’s testimony was disconcerting, his personal opinions
were an improper basis for the blanket suppression ruling.20

In these circumstances, the district court made errors of law
in its blanket suppression of the seized evidence, necessarily
abusing its discretion in that regard. See Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); United States v. Ebersole,
411 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2005) ("By definition, a court
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." (internal
20
The Suppression Ruling also invoked the government’s voluntary
return of approximately 80% of the documents and records seized from
the Potomac residence, see supra note 6, to support its finding that the
officers had flagrantly disregarded the scope of the search warrants. See
Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 399 n.16. To the contrary, the voluntary
return of property seized under a valid warrant does not give rise to an
adverse inference or tend to establish that the initial seizure was unconsti-
tutional. Significantly, the return resulted from an agreement of the par-
ties, apparently obviating the need for a court proceeding under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) (authorizing person aggrieved by
unlawful seizure or "by the deprivation of property," to seek property’s
return). And, Rule 41(g) contemplates that returned property may be
admissible in later proceedings, authorizing the court to "impose reason-
able conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later pro-
ceedings."
 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 29
quotation marks omitted)). As a result, the blanket suppres-
sion ruling also constituted reversible error.21

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the Suppression Rul-
ing and remand for such other and further proceedings as may
be appropriate.

VACATED AND REMANDED

21
Because we are satisfied that the Potomac Documents and the Bank
of India Transfers were within the scope of the search warrants, we need
not address the government’s final contention — that the evidence gener-
ated during the IRS investigation was derived from an independent source.