PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
NICOLE M. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 07-2094
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC,
Defendant-Appellant.
NICOLE M. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 07-2098
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
NICOLE M. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 07-2100
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC,
Defendant-Appellant.
2 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge.
(1:06-cv-01336)
Argued: December 4, 2008
Decided: March 16, 2009
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and AGEE,
Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by pub-
lished opinion. Chief Judge Williams wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Shedd and Judge Agee joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Barry Goheen, KING & SPALDING, LLP,
Atlanta, Georgia, for Equifax Information Services, LLC.
Alexander Hugo Blankingship, III, BLANKINGSHIP &
ASSOCIATES, PC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Nicole M. Rob-
inson. ON BRIEF: John W. Montgomery, Jr., MONTGOM-
ERY & SIMPSON, LLLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Equifax
Information Services, LLC. Thomas B. Christiano, BLANK-
INGSHIP & ASSOCIATES, PC, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Nicole M. Robinson.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Chief Judge:
After discovering that a thief had stolen her identity and
ruined her credit, Nicole M. Robinson sought to have Equifax
ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES 3
Information Services, LLC ("Equifax"), a credit reporting ser-
vice, correct the resulting errors in her credit report. Several
years later, however, Robinson continued to experience credit
problems resulting from Equifax’s mishandling of her credit
file. In response, Robinson brought this action against Equifax
for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15
U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq. (West 1998 & Supp. 2008). A jury
found that Equifax had violated the FCRA in numerous
respects and awarded Robinson $200,000 in actual damages.
The district court entered judgment in that amount and
granted Robinson’s request for attorney’s fees in the amount
of $268,652.25. On appeal, Equifax challenges the award of
damages and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part and vacate and
remand in part.
I.
In April 2000, Robinson discovered that a woman named
Nicole Antoinette Robinson had stolen her identity and
opened fraudulent accounts in her name and under her social
security number. Shortly after discovering that she had been
the victim of identity theft, Robinson began the process of
restoring her credit history. Specifically, she filed a police
report, called the Federal Trade Commission hotline and
opened a case, and spent the next five months trying to correct
the erroneous entries on her credit report. As a result of her
efforts, by 2001 Robinson’s credit report was free of all fraud-
ulent accounts caused by the identity thief. During this same
time, but unrelated to her identity theft, Robinson lost her job
and was forced to file for bankruptcy protection in May 2001.
Robinson was able to obtain a discharge of her debts by Sep-
tember 2001, but this was not the end of Robinson’s financial
and credit woes. Unfortunately, it was just the beginning.
For several more years, Robinson continued to experience
credit problems resulting from Equifax’s mishandling of her
credit file. Equifax mistakenly placed Robinson’s address and
social security number on three credit files established by the
4 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
identity thief, each of which contained derogatory credit
accounts (the "identity thief’s files"). Consequently, Equifax
sent various creditors requesting Robinson’s credit report her
actual credit file along with one of the identity thief’s files.
As a result of these errors, Robinson’s credit problems per-
sisted and she experienced difficulties obtaining any type of
consumer credit from 2003 until 2006. For example, in Octo-
ber 2003, Robinson applied for a credit card for the first time
since filing for bankruptcy protection. Her credit card applica-
tion, however, was denied in part based on derogatory infor-
mation contained in one of the identity thief’s files that
Equifax sent the credit card company.
In January 2004, after discovering the company’s errors,
Robinson contacted Equifax. The company properly com-
bined two of Robinson’s files into a single file, suppressed
fraudulent information, and "cross blocked" fraudulent infor-
mation so that it could not return to the file. When Equifax
attempted to correct these mistakes, however, the company
exacerbated matters further by placing Robinson’s identifica-
tion information on another one of the identity thief’s files.
As a result, Robinson’s credit problems continued and she
was not able to obtain a home loan over the course of the next
couple of years. In January 2005, Robinson tried to secure a
home loan from a mortgage company, but she was turned
down because Equifax sent the mortgage company one of the
identity thief’s files. The loan officer told Robinson that he
could not give her a loan until the numerous problems in her
Equifax credit report were corrected. Chagrined that Equifax
had not yet corrected all of the errors in her credit report,
Robinson contacted Equifax’s Director of Consumer Affairs
on February 9, 2005, who removed Robinson’s identification
from one of the identity thief’s files.
Several months later, in May of 2005, yet another error
occurred when Equifax, responding to a request to place a
ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES 5
fraud alert on Robinson’s account, inadvertently placed Rob-
inson’s social security number and address on another of the
identity thief’s files. Unaware of this most recent error, Rob-
inson applied for another home loan in January of 2006. Yet
again, Equifax sent the mortgage company her correct file
along with one of the identity thief’s files. Although the loan
officer prepared a preapproval letter for Robinson, he could
only offer her a loan on far less advantageous terms than she
might have qualified for absent Equifax’s still inaccurate
credit report. After contacting Equifax to fix this most recent
error, Robinson applied for another mortgage in July 2006.
Once again, Equifax sent another one of the identity thief’s
files to the mortgage lender. The loan officer showed Robin-
son all of the derogatory accounts Equifax was reporting, and
ultimately concluded that "there was no way that I could pos-
sibly help her get the loan that she was trying to get" until the
derogatory accounts in her Equifax credit report were
resolved. (J.A. 697.)
To make matters worse, Robinson had to spend hundreds
of hours out of work trying to correct Equifax’s mistakes. The
stress of these problems weighed on Robinson and the physi-
cal and emotional toll she experienced was apparent to others,
particularly her family and co-workers. During this period,
Robinson frequently experienced headaches, sleeplessness,
skin acne, upset stomach, and hair loss.
On November 22, 2006 — following several years of strug-
gling with Equifax to correct her credit report — Robinson
filed this action against the company in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging viola-
tions of the FCRA and seeking actual and punitive damages.
Neither party filed a dispositive motion, and the case pro-
ceeded to trial. At the close of Robinson’s case in chief, Equi-
fax moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that
Robinson had failed to present sufficient evidence to support
an award of actual or punitive damages, which the district
court took under advisement. Equifax renewed its motion at
6 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
the close of all evidence, which the district court again took
under advisement. Ultimately, the district court granted Equi-
fax’s motion with respect to punitive damages, denied the
motion with respect to actual damages, and sent the case to
the jury for deliberations. Following deliberations, the jury
awarded Robinson $200,000 in actual damages. Thereafter,
both parties filed post-trial motions — Robinson moved for
an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and Equifax moved for
a new trial. The district court denied Equifax’s motion for a
new trial and issued a memorandum opinion granting Robin-
son approximately 90% of her fee request, in the amount of
$268,652.25. This appeal followed, and we possess jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006).
II.
"Congress enacted [the] FCRA in 1970 to ensure fair and
accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking
system, and protect consumer privacy." Saunders v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir.
2008) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S.Ct. 2201,
2205-06 (2007)). The FCRA seeks to accomplish those goals
by requiring consumer credit reporting agencies to maintain
"‘reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce
for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other informa-
tion in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer,
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and
proper utilization of such information. . . .’" 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1681(b).
The FCRA creates a private right of action allowing injured
consumers to recover "any actual damages" caused by negli-
gent violations and both actual and punitive damages for will-
ful noncompliance. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681n, 1681o. Actual
damages may include economic damages, as well as damages
for humiliation and mental distress. Sloane v. Equifax Info.
Servs., 510 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007). The Act further
"provides that a successful plaintiff suing under the FCRA
ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES 7
may recover reasonable attorney’s fees." Id. (citing 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1681n(a)(3), 1681o(a)(2)).
Equifax contends that, despite its numerous statutory viola-
tions, the jury erred in awarding Robinson damages and the
district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees.1 We consider
Equifax’s contentions in turn.
A. Actual Damages
1.
Equifax first argues that there was not a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found that
Equifax’s conduct resulted in Robinson’s damages. Equifax
claims that the evidence Robinson offered was based on pure
speculation and conjecture, such that the district court erred
in denying the company’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law. "We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d
125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), a
"district court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law during a jury trial after a party has been fully heard on an
issue only if ‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect
to that issue.’" Brown v. CSX Transp., Inc., 18 F.3d 245, 248
(4th Cir. 1994) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)).
1
In addition to these arguments, Equifax challenges two of the district
court’s evidentiary rulings. The company contends that the district court
(1) erroneously admitted evidence of collection notices and calls received
by Robinson from creditors seeking payment on fraudulent accounts, and
(2) improperly excluded evidence of what Equifax does generally in han-
dling inaccuracies in a consumer’s credit file, in accordance with the mag-
istrate judge’s order sanctioning Equifax for various discovery violations.
We review a district court’s decision "to admit or exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion." Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261
(4th Cir. 1999). After a careful review of the record, we conclude that
Equifax’s arguments are without merit, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion.
8 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
In this case, Robinson bears the burden of proving actual
damages sustained as a result of Equifax’s activities. To meet
this burden, Robinson proffered evidence of various damages
she sustained as a result of Equifax’s conduct, including, (1)
loss of opportunity in the home mortgage market, (2) emo-
tional distress, and (3) loss of income from missing approxi-
mately 300 hours of work addressing Equifax’s mistakes.
Equifax counters that Robinson did not meet her burden
because she "failed to establish that she was denied any credit
because of an inaccuracy in an Equifax credit report" and
"presented no evidence that she sustained emotional distress
proximately caused by Equifax." (Appellant’s Br. at 21.) We
conclude that there is more than sufficient evidence in the
record connecting Equifax’s errors with Robinson’s damages
to support the jury’s actual damages award.
We turn first to the evidence relating to Robinson’s loss of
opportunity in the home mortgage market. The evidence pre-
sented at trial clearly demonstrates that on numerous occa-
sions Robinson attempted to secure a home mortgage, only to
be either denied outright or offered a loan on less advanta-
geous terms than she might have received absent Equifax’s
errors. Indeed, two loan officers testified that the inaccurate
Equifax credit reports were a substantial factor in their inabil-
ity to approve Robinson for a loan, and that they could not
qualify her for a loan unless and until the erroneous accounts
either were paid off or removed from her credit report.
Likewise, we conclude that Robinson proffered sufficient
evidence that she suffered emotional distress as a result of
Equifax’s errors. "Our previous cases establish the type of
evidence required to support an award for emotional dam-
ages." Sloane, 510 F.3d at 503. As we recently explained:
We have warned that not only is emotional distress
fraught with vagueness and speculation, it is easily
susceptible to fictitious and trivial claims. For this
reason, although specifically recognizing that a
ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES 9
plaintiff’s testimony can provide sufficient evidence
to support an emotional distress award, we have
required a plaintiff to reasonably and sufficiently
explain the circumstances of the injury and not resort
to mere conclusory statements. Thus, we have distin-
guished between plaintiff testimony that amounts
only to conclusory statements and plaintiff testimony
that sufficiently articulates true demonstrable emo-
tional distress.
Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and alteration marks
omitted).
In this case, Robinson presented evidence that her mental
distress manifested itself as headaches, sleeplessness, skin
acne, upset stomach, and hair loss. Moreover, the testimony
of Robinson’s friends and family members painted a detailed
picture of her ongoing struggles with Equifax and the emo-
tional toll these events took upon her. Illustratively, one of
Robinson’s co-workers testified that in response to her contin-
ued problems with Equifax, Robinson "would be crying" and
"screaming" and often she was "upset . . . [and] stressed."
(J.A. 799.) Another co-worker recounted that Robinson only
complained about Equifax and that she was often "visibly
upset" as a result of the company’s conduct. (J.A. 732.) As
her mother recalled, Robinson was "[d]istraught" and there
"were changes in her physical appearance. There were
changes in her demeanor, her interactions with her daughter
and her family, [and] friends." (J.A. 1022-23.)
Based on these incidents and our review of the entire
record, it is clear that Robinson sufficiently articulated and
demonstrated the emotional distress she experienced as she
attempted to correct Equifax’s errors. Accordingly, we con-
clude that there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to have found that Equifax’s conduct resulted
in Robinson’s damages.2 We therefore affirm the district
2
Based on our review of the record, we also conclude that Robinson
proffered sufficient evidence of loss of income from time missed from
work addressing Equifax’s errors.
10 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
court’s denial of Equifax’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law with respect to actual damages.3
2.
Equifax next contends that the district court committed
reversible error in denying its motion for a new trial or remit-
titur of the $200,000 actual damages award, arguing that the
damages award was excessive in light of the evidence pre-
sented at trial. See Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d
294, 305 (4th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a damages award
"must be set aside if . . . the verdict is against the clear weight
of the evidence" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We
review a district court’s denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new
trial for abuse of discretion. Id. at 301. A district court abuses
its discretion by upholding an award of damages only when
"‘the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence or
based on evidence which is false.’" Sloane, 510 F.3d at 502
(quoting Cline, 144 F.3d at 305).
Equifax attacks the denial of its motion for a new trial on
numerous grounds, asserting, among other things, that (1) the
district court erred by submitting to the jury a general verdict
form that did not separate damages for emotional distress
from those for economic injury, and (2) the district court erred
by failing to overturn "the excessive emotional distress
award." (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 35.)4 Equifax’s strained
arguments are unconvincing.
3
On cross-appeal, Robinson challenges the district court’s decision
granting Equifax’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to
punitive damages, asserting that the district court erred in refusing to sub-
mit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. To be sure, the FCRA allows
a plaintiff to recover punitive damages for willful violations. See 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1681n, 1681o (West 1998 & Supp. 2008); Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Burr, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 2206 (2007) (recognizing that "[i]f [a viola-
tion of the FCRA is] willful, however, the consumer may have actual dam-
ages, or statutory damages ranging from $100 to $1,000, and even punitive
damages."). In this case, however, evidence that Equifax acted willfully is
wholly lacking. Accordingly, Robinson’s argument is without merit.
4
In support of its argument for a new trial, Equifax persists with its con-
tention that Robinson "failed to present sufficient evidence of injury or
ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES 11
Turning to Equifax’s complaint regarding the verdict form
the district court submitted to the jury, the parties agreed to
the use of a general verdict form that did not separate dam-
ages for emotional distress from those for economic injury.
Indeed, the company admits that it did not raise this issue
below: "That Equifax did not object to the jury verdict form
does not change the fact it was improper." (Reply Br. at 37.)
"Absent exceptional circumstances, of course, we do not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." Volvo
Const. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581,
603 (4th Cir. 2004). Rather, "we consider such issues on
appeal only when the failure to do so would result in a miscar-
riage of justice." Id. (citing Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246,
250 (4th Cir. 1993)). Equifax has not even argued that excep-
tional circumstances justifying departure from the general rule
are present, and based on our review of the record, we find no
exceptional circumstances warranting such departure. We
therefore decline to consider this argument on appeal.
Perhaps looking for a way around this rule, Equifax now
attempts to parse the award of actual damages into economic
and emotional distress damages, asserting that Robinson’s
"emotional distress award" should be reduced to no more than
$100,000. (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 36.) The jury, however,
did not provide one award for emotional distress and a sepa-
rate one for economic damages. Rather, the jury awarded
Robinson a total of $200,000 for all of the damages she
proved at trial. Consequently, and as the company acknowl-
edges, "there is no way to determine how much of the jury’s
$200,000 award is attributable to emotional damages."
(Appellant’s Br. at 42.) It would be pure speculation and
damages from alleged mortgage denials." (Appellant’s Br. at 27). As dis-
cussed above, however, Robinson offered more than sufficient evidence of
economic loss and emotional distress to sustain an award of actual dam-
ages. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
12 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
guesswork for us to attempt to attribute any particular portion
of the jury’s award to emotional distress damages, and we
will not engage in such an unprincipled approach.5
In summary, we are convinced that the jury’s award is not
excessive in light of the evidence presented at trial. Similar to
the plaintiff in Sloane:
[Robinson] did not suffer from isolated or accidental
reporting errors. Rather, as a victim of identity theft,
she suffered the systematic manipulation of her per-
sonal information, which, despite her best efforts,
Equifax failed to correct over a protracted period of
time. Of course, Equifax bore no responsibility for
the initial theft, but the FCRA makes the company
responsible for taking reasonable steps to correct
[Robinson]’s credit report once she brought the theft
to the company’s attention; this Equifax utterly
failed to do.
Sloane, 510 F.3d at 505-06. Against this backdrop, we con-
clude that the district court was well within its discretion in
sustaining the award of $200,000 in actual damages against
Equifax.
5
As we recently informed Equifax, in response to a similar request, we
do not employ such unsound methodologies:
Equifax simply proposes replacing the jury’s number with one of
its own invention-offering $25,000 in place of $245,000. Yet
when asked at oral argument to explain the basis for the proposed
remittitur, Equifax’s counsel could offer no legal or factual basis
for this amount, conceding that the number had been taken "out
of the air." Not only is such an unprincipled approach intrinsi-
cally unsound, but it also directly contravenes the Seventh
Amendment, which precludes an appellate court from replacing
an award of compensatory damages with one of the court’s own
choosing.
Sloane v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 510 F.3d 495, 502-03
(4th Cir. 2007).
ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES 13
B. Attorney’s Fees
Finally, Equifax challenges the district court’s judgment
awarding Robinson $268,652.25 in attorney’s fees and costs.
The FCRA provides that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to
"the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s
fees as determined by the court." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681o(a)(2).
Because Robinson obtained relief on her FCRA claims, Equi-
fax does not dispute that she was a "prevailing party." Rather,
the company argues that Robinson failed to carry her burden
of proof that the hourly rate sought for each of her attorneys
was reasonable.
We review an award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discre-
tion. McDonnell v. Miller Oil Co., 134 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir.
1998). "Our review of the district court’s award is sharply cir-
cumscribed; we have recognized that because a district court
has close and intimate knowledge of the efforts expended and
the value of the services rendered, the fee award must not be
overturned unless it is clearly wrong." Plyler v. Evatt, 902
F.2d 273, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks,
citations, and alteration marks omitted).
In calculating an award of attorney’s fees, a court must first
determine a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of rea-
sonable hours expended times a reasonable rate. Grissom v.
The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2008). In decid-
ing what constitutes a "reasonable" number of hours and rate,
we have instructed that a district court’s discretion should be
guided by the following twelve factors:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill
required to properly perform the legal services ren-
dered; (4) the attorney’s opportunity costs in press-
ing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for
like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the out-
set of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed
14 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in
controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experi-
ence, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the
undesirability of the case within the legal community
in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of
the professional relationship between attorney and
client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar
cases.
Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226, n.28 (4th Cir.
1978) (adopting twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Ga.
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abro-
gated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87 (1989)).
After determining the lodestar figure, the "‘court then
should subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims
unrelated to successful ones.’" Grissom, 549 F.3d at 321
(quoting Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir.
2002). Finally, "[o]nce the court has subtracted the fees
incurred for unsuccessful, unrelated claims, it then awards
some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the
degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff." Id. (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted).
Of the various arguments raised by Equifax, we specifically
address the company’s contention that Robinson failed to
carry her burden of proof that the hourly rate sought for each
of her attorneys was reasonable.6 As we have recognized:
[D]etermination of the hourly rate will generally be
the critical inquiry in setting the reasonable fee, and
the burden rests with the fee applicant to establish
the reasonableness of a requested rate. In addition to
the attorney’s own affidavits, the fee applicant must
6
We conclude that the remainder of the Equifax’s arguments are without
merit.
ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES 15
produce satisfactory specific evidence of the prevail-
ing market rates in the relevant community for the
type of work for which he seeks an award. Although
the determination of a market rate in the legal pro-
fession is inherently problematic, as wide variations
in skill and reputation render the usual laws of sup-
ply and demand largely inapplicable, the Court has
nonetheless emphasized that market rate should
guide the fee inquiry.
Plyler, 902 F.2d at 277 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Thus, "[t]he market rate should
be determined by evidence of what attorneys earn from pay-
ing clients for similar services in similar circumstances,
which, of course, may include evidence of what the plaintiff’s
attorney actually charged his client." Depaoli v. Vacation
Sales Assocs., L.L.C., 489 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In support of her burden to establish the prevailing market
rate of attorneys’ fees in the relevant community where the
district court sits (the Eastern District of Virginia), Robinson
(1) filed billing records for the two attorneys representing her
and an affidavit of her lead counsel, and (2) requested the
hourly rates recommended by the "Laffey Matrix," an official
statement of market-supported reasonable attorney fee rates
which was adopted, and is periodically updated, by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Laf-
fey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 24-25 (D.C. Cir.
1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Save Our Cum-
berland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (en banc).
Robinson’s lead counsel (a partner with Blankingship &
Associates, P.C., in Alexandria, Virginia), A. Hugo Blanking-
ship, was the only attorney who attested to his own normal
billing rate and the billing rate of his associate, Thomas B.
Christiano. Mr. Blankingship represented that his normal bill-
16 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
ing rate for hourly clients during the relevant time period was
$350.00 per hour, and that Mr. Christiano’s normal billing
rate during the relevant time period was $250.00 per hour.
Robinson’s counsel, however, requested substantially higher
hourly rates in accordance with the Laffey Matrix — $425.00
per hour for Mr. Blankingship and $305.00 per hour for Mr.
Christiano. According to her attorneys, the hourly rates identi-
fied by the Laffey Matrix are reasonable "[g]iven the fact that
consumer law is a special field not practiced by many attor-
neys and the risk[s] associated in litigating an FCRA case on
a contingent basis . . . ." (J.A. 1603.) Significantly, Robinson
did not file any affidavits of attorneys outside the firm of
Blankingship & Associates, P.C., regarding the prevailing
market rates of attorneys in the Eastern District of Virginia for
similar work.
In making its lodestar calculations, the district court applied
the hourly rates requested by Robinson’s attorneys (i.e.,
$425.00 per hour for Mr. Blankingship and $305.00 per hour
for Mr. Christiano). (J.A. 1802.) The district court explicitly
acknowledged that the Laffey Matrix "is not binding upon the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia," but concluded that "even without considering the Laf-
fey Matrix, the hourly rates for Plaintiff’s counsel are very
reasonable given the firm’s experience and expertise." (J.A.
1807-08.)
Although we recognize that the district court authored a
very thorough memorandum opinion, we nonetheless con-
clude that it abused its discretion by awarding the hourly rates
requested by Robinson in the absence of "satisfactory specific
evidence of the prevailing market rates. . . ." Plyler, 902 F.2d
at 277 ("In addition to the attorney’s own affidavits, the fee
applicant must produce satisfactory specific evidence of the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type
of work for which he seeks an award.") (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Examples of the type of specific evidence
that we have held is sufficient to verify the prevailing market
ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES 17
rates are affidavits of other local lawyers who are familiar
both with the skills of the fee applicants and more generally
with the type of work in the relevant community. See id. at
278 ("[A]ffidavits testifying to [the fee applicants’] own rates,
experience, and skills as well as affidavits of South Carolina
lawyers who were familiar both with the skills of some of the
applicants and more generally with civil rights litigation in
South Carolina. . . . was sufficient evidence of the prevailing
market rates to support the hourly rates fixed by the district
court . . ."). In this case, "beyond the affidavit of [Mr. Blank-
ingship], [Robinson] offered no specific evidence that the
hourly rates sought for h[er] attorneys coincided with the then
prevailing market rates of attorneys in the Eastern District of
Virginia of similar skill and for similar work, which our case
law required h[er] to do." Grissom, 549 F.3d at 323.
The Laffey Matrix is also insufficient to carry Robinson’s
burden of proof. The district court properly recognized that
the Laffey Matrix is not binding upon the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and as we
recently explained, "Plaintiff has provided no evidence that
the Laffey Matrix, which pertains to hourly rates of litigation
attorneys in Washington, D.C., is a reliable indicator of the
hourly rates of litigation attorneys in [Alexandria], Virginia,
a suburb of Washington, D.C." Grissom, 549 F.3d at 323.
Moreover, we find untenable Robinson’s belief that the Laf-
fey Matrix rates are reasonable because "consumer law is a
special field" and there is an appreciable "risk associated in
litigating an FCRA case on a contingent basis." (J.A. 1603.)
Such a rationale can hardly justify a thirty-five percent
increase over the $315.00 per hour Mr. Blankingship claimed
just a year earlier in Sloane. Moreover, the district court made
a specific finding that "the matters raised in this case did not
require extraordinary skills beyond those required of other
counsel litigating similar FCRA issues." (J.A. 1805.) Signifi-
cantly, Robinson does not challenge this finding on appeal.
Put simply, Robinson has not met her burden of establish-
ing the prevailing market rates. There is an absence of evi-
18 ROBINSON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES
dence in the record to support rates of $425.00 and $305.00
per hour for charges by Robinson’s attorneys. Moreover, we
will not rely on the hourly rates attested to by Mr. Blanking-
ship because his affidavit, standing alone, is not sufficient evi-
dence of the prevailing market rates. See Plyler, 902 F.2d at
277. Because the appellate record does not contain satisfac-
tory specific evidence, we instruct the district court on remand
to recalculate the fee award after taking additional evidence
of the market rates for the type of work done in this case in
the Eastern District of Virginia.
III.
In summary, we affirm (1) the district court’s order grant-
ing in part and denying in part Equifax’s motion for judgment
as a matter of law; (2) the district court’s order denying Equi-
fax’s motion for a new trial; (3) the district court’s evidentiary
rulings; and we vacate the fee award and remand to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART