Smith v. Ozmint

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

KEVIN SMITH, a/k/a Bar-None 
Royal Blackness,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JON OZMINT; GARY D. MAYNARD;
ROBERT WARD; GARY A. BOYD;
GENE NOLES; JAMES SLIGH; DEBRA
WISE; ALVIN GRABER; LESTER
HINSON, JR.; MS. HILL, OFC; DORIS
CURENTON; MARY STEWART; DEAN
DAY; MARCIA FULLER; T. W.
THOMAS; LAURIE BESSINGER;
BERNARD MCKIE; ASSOCIATE
WARDEN STEVENSON; SAMUEL  No. 07-6558
LATTA; JAMES CHRISTENSEN; WILLIE
MASON; HAROLD SCOTT; SERGEANT
SHIVERS; E. JENNINGS; E. REARDON;
J. KIRCHER; S. BROWN; M. HAYES;
ROLLAND MOODY; S. HORSELY;
JOEL MOORE; KENNETH JONES;
NURSE R. MURPHY; JOHN DOE; JANE
DOE; RICHARD P. STROKER; MARY
DAVENPORT ANDERSON; LEON LOTT,
JR.; DANIEL E. JOHNSON; DAVID
WILSON; CARLTON MEDLEY; DAVID
MILDRED; JAMES ROBINSON,
Defendants-Appellees.

2 SMITH v. OZMINT


AKEEM MUHAMMAD, 
Amicus Supporting Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.
Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.
(0:04-cv-01819-PMD)

Argued: May 14, 2009

Decided: July 31, 2009

Before MICHAEL, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published
opinion. Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge
King and Judge Gregory joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Cecily Elizabeth Baskir, GEORGETOWN UNI-
VERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Andrew Lindemann, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Steven
H. Goldblatt, Director, Kelly A. Anderson, Student Counsel,
Zheyao Li, Student Counsel, Daniel E. Shuey, Student Coun-
sel, Kimberly Witherspoon, Student Counsel, GEORGE-
TOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant. Akeem Muhammad, Raiford, Florida, Amicus
Supporting Appellant.
 SMITH v. OZMINT 3
OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:

Kevin Smith,* a South Carolina prisoner, appeals the dis-
trict court’s award of summary judgment to twenty-six South
Carolina Department of Corrections officials and employees
(collectively, the SCDC) on (1) his claim asserted under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and (2) his claims alleging constitutional viola-
tions relating to excessive force and conditions of confine-
ment. Smith contends that the SCDC violated his RLUIPA
rights when, in contravention of his religious beliefs, it forci-
bly shaved his head under the Maximum Security Unit (MSU)
grooming policy. Because the SCDC failed to meet its burden
to show that the MSU policy of forcible grooming is the least
restrictive means to further a compelling governmental inter-
est, we vacate the summary judgment granted to the SCDC on
Smith’s RLUIPA claim. The SCDC failed in its proffer
because it relied on an affidavit, which was filed in another
case and which did not address administrative burdens and
security requirements in the MSU, where the grooming policy
at issue was enforced. The RLUIPA claim requires a remand
for further consideration. We affirm the district court’s award
of summary judgment to the SCDC on Smith’s constitutional
claims.

I.

Smith is an inmate in the MSU at Kirkland Correctional
Institution in South Carolina. SCDC maintains two special-
ized housing units, the MSU and the Special Management
Unit (SMU), for prisoners requiring greater monitoring and
supervision than the general prison population. The MSU pro-
vides the higher level of security and is designed for inmates

*We refer to Smith as his name appears in the case caption even though
he now prefers and uses the name Bar-None Royal Blackness.
4 SMITH v. OZMINT
who "have demonstrated an unwillingness to conform to the
rules and regulations of [the SMU], who have been charged
with violent criminal behavior committed while in the general
[prison] population, and/or for whom emergency placement
has been ordered." J.A. 651. Common reasons for placement
in the MSU include "violent participation in a riot or other
institutional disorder," "violent escapes or escape attempts
with force," and "seizing and holding a hostage." J.A. 651-52.
MSU inmates are essentially confined to their cells except for
an hour of exercise per day, five days a week. When MSU
inmates are permitted to leave their cells, they are "restrained
with leg irons, security cuffs, and/or belly chains." J.A. 663.

The MSU has a grooming policy (MSU grooming policy or
MSU policy) that requires inmates "to wear close-cropped
haircuts for security reasons." J.A. 658. It also provides that
"[i]nmates may . . . be given forced haircuts or shaves if they
refuse to comply with the haircut and shave schedule." J.A.
664. The MSU grooming policy, including its provision
authorizing the use of force, has been in effect since at least
January 1, 2002. Smith, who is a practicing Rastafarian,
refused to comply with the grooming policy because of his
religious beliefs. As a result, MSU employees forcibly shaved
Smith’s head with clippers on at least two occasions: on
November 9, 2002, and on August 13, 2003.

The SCDC also has a grooming policy (SCDC grooming
policy or SCDC policy) applicable throughout the Department
of Corrections that requires male inmates to keep their hair
"neatly cut (not to exceed one [1"] inch in length) and [it]
must remain above the shirt collar and above the ear (not
touching the ear)." J.A. 388. A May 1, 2004, amendment to
the SCDC grooming policy authorizes prison employees to
forcibly administer haircuts to inmates who refuse to comply.
Prior to that change, inmates in the general population who
refused to comply with the SCDC grooming policy were not
forcibly shorn, but were reclassified and transferred to the
SMU, where security arrangements are more restrictive. The
 SMITH v. OZMINT 5
current SCDC policy is essentially identical to the MSU pol-
icy: both require short haircuts and authorize prison employ-
ees to forcibly groom inmates. Smith, however, was forcibly
shorn under the MSU policy, which permitted the use of force
at the time of the 2002 and 2003 incidents challenged by him.
The SCDC policy was only amended to permit the use of
force effective May 1, 2004.

The first challenged incident occurred on November 9,
2002, when about five correctional officers wearing protective
gear entered Smith’s MSU isolation cell and subdued him by
forcing him to the floor and then attaching leg and arm
restraints. In the first thirty seconds after the officers entered
Smith’s cell, the officers used physical force against him,
including pushing, pulling, and (possibly) hitting. The officers
were in Smith’s cell for approximately two minutes and fifty
seconds before leaving the cell with Smith in full restraints.
Thereafter, the officers forcibly moved Smith to a different
room and shaved his head.

Correctional officers again enforced the MSU grooming
policy against Smith on August 13, 2003. Smith was in a rec-
reation yard wearing handcuffs when the officers entered the
yard and sprayed mace in his face. At the outset Smith
reminded the officers that he was wearing handcuffs, but the
SCDC says that an "inmate[ ] must be treated as if [he is] not
restrained until the restraints can be verified by correctional
officers." J.A. 367. Thus, according to the SCDC, its officers
used mace to subdue Smith as a part of the effort to make sure
that he was adequately restrained. The chemicals burned
Smith’s eyes and skin and caused him difficulty in breathing.
The officers removed Smith to a separate room and helped
him wash and clean his face. His head was then shaved. Smith
complained of injuries and received medical care at the cor-
rectional facility after both the November 9, 2002, and August
13, 2003, incidents. Correctional officers filmed both inci-
dents, and the video recordings are in the record.
6 SMITH v. OZMINT
After exhausting administrative remedies, Smith filed a pro
se complaint alleging that the SCDC violated his rights under
RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. Smith further
alleges that excessive force was used against him during the
November 9, 2002, and August 13, 2003, incidents in viola-
tion of his constitutional rights and that conditions of confine-
ment within the MSU violate the Constitution in several
respects. The district court granted summary judgment to the
SCDC on all of Smith’s claims, and he appeals.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354
F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appro-
priate if "the pleadings . . . and any affidavits show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
Smith, the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable infer-
ences in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

III.

RLUIPA, in relevant part, provides that:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on
the religious exercise of a person residing in or con-
fined to an institution . . . even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, unless the gov-
ernment demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
 SMITH v. OZMINT 7
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). "Government" includes any official
of "a State . . . or other governmental entity created under the
authority of a State" and "any other person acting under color
of State law." Id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). The defendants here, who
are officials or employees of the SCDC and whom we refer
to collectively as the "SCDC," fit within that definition.

"If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence" of an
RLUIPA violation, "the government shall bear the burden of
persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plain-
tiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the [pol-
icy] or government practice that is challenged by the claim
substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion." Id.
§ 2000cc-2(b). In particular, the government must prove that
the burden in question is the least restrictive means of further-
ing a compelling governmental interest. Id. § 2000cc-1(a). As
to those elements on which it bears the burden of proof, a
government is only entitled to summary judgment if the prof-
fered evidence is such that a rational factfinder could only
find for the government. Gooden v. Howard County, Md., 954
F.2d 960, 971 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[W]here . . . the movant
would have the burden of persuasion at trial, the summary
judgment burden is a correspondingly heavy one.").

A.

Invoking RLUIPA, Smith challenges the MSU grooming
policy that requires him to have close-cropped hair and autho-
rizes prison employees to forcibly shave his head. The SCDC
does not challenge Smith’s allegation that his refusal to cut
his hair stems from a genuinely held religious belief. Rather,
the SCDC first argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
because Smith cannot show that the grooming policy imposes
a substantial burden on his religious exercise.

SCDC attempts to rely on our decision in Hines v. South
Carolina Department of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353 (4th Cir.
1998), a pre-RLUIPA case involving a prior SCDC grooming
8 SMITH v. OZMINT
policy for the general prison population under which "[n]o
prisoners [were] forcibly shaved or shorn." Id. at 356. In
Hines we rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to the
SCDC grooming policy, holding that "although the Grooming
Policy may have an incidental effect of preventing the
Inmates from wearing their hair and beards as their religion
prescribes . . . the Grooming Policy is a neutral and generally
applicable regulation and, therefore, does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause." Id. at 358. SCDC argues that Hines requires
us to conclude that the MSU grooming policy only "inciden-
tally effects" religious exercise and therefore cannot impose
a substantial burden on Smith’s religious exercise under
RLUIPA. We disagree.

Our holding in Hines is based on the established neutrality
principle "that if [burdening] the exercise of religion . . . is not
the object of [a provision] but merely the incidental effect of
a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment [Free Exercise Clause] has not been offended."
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 878 (1990); see also Hines, 148 F.3d at 358 (concluding
that grooming policy had only an incidental effect on reli-
gious exercise because "[t]here is no suggestion that the
Grooming Policy was enacted to burden anyone’s free exer-
cise rights, or was at all motivated because of the religious
beliefs or practices of any inmate"). We have previously held
that Smith’s neutrality principle does not foreclose liability
under RLUIPA, which Congress enacted to protect prisoners
and other institutionalized persons who face substantial bur-
dens in practicing their religious faiths, including substantial
burdens that are imposed in an incidental manner. See Madi-
son v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2003).

The MSU grooming policy imposes a substantial burden on
religious exercise if it "‘put[s] substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,’ or
. . . forces a person to ‘choose between following the precepts
of her religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the
 SMITH v. OZMINT 9
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion
. . . on the other hand.’" Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187
(4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981), and Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)). We may "not judge
the significance of the particular belief or practice in ques-
tion." Id. at 187 n.2. Indeed, "religious exercise" is defined to
include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled
by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7).

The policy requiring Smith to cut his hair—and implement-
ing that policy with physical force—compelled him to modify
his behavior in violation of his genuinely held religious
beliefs. Accordingly, we conclude that the MSU grooming
policy substantially burdened Smith’s religious exercise. See
also Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 2007)
(concluding that similar allegations were sufficient to state a
claim that grooming policy substantially burdened religious
exercise); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 996 (9th
Cir. 2005) (concluding that grooming policy substantially bur-
dened religious practice).

B.

SCDC also argues that the summary judgment record estab-
lishes that the MSU grooming policy furthers a compelling
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that interest. As to these elements, the SCDC bears the
burden of persuasion, and summary judgment is only appro-
priate if a rational factfinder would necessarily find that the
grooming policy withstands scrutiny under RLUIPA. See
Gooden, 954 F.2d at 971. Of course, due deference must be
given "to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and pro-
cedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, con-
sistent with consideration of costs and limited resources."
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (citation omit-
10 SMITH v. OZMINT
ted). Security concerns deserve "particular sensitivity." Id. at
722.

To meet its burden to show a compelling interest, the
SCDC’s "first job" is "to take the unremarkable step of pro-
viding an explanation for the policy’s restrictions that takes
into account any institutional need to maintain good order,
security, and discipline or to control costs." Lovelace, 472
F.3d at 190. The only justification offered for the MSU
grooming policy that is specific to the MSU is the policy
itself: "Inmates in all levels of MSU will be required to wear
close-cropped haircuts for security reasons." J.A. 658
(emphasis added). This conclusory, one-sentence explanation
does not, by itself, explain why the security interest is com-
pelling. See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 190.

We are puzzled that the primary support offered by the
SCDC for the MSU grooming policy is an affidavit that deals
solely with why a different category of inmates, SMU
inmates, were subjected to an amended SCDC grooming pol-
icy that allows forced haircuts. The affidavit, signed by Rob-
ert E. Ward, SCDC’s Director of the Division of Operations,
has nothing to do with the MSU, where Smith is housed.
Indeed, the affidavit was prepared and submitted in another
case.

According to Ward, the "[f]irst and perhaps most impor-
tant[ ]" reason for the SCDC policy requiring general popula-
tion and SMU inmates to have close-cropped hair was the
shortage of space in SMUs. J.A. 380. Before the forced
grooming standard applied, inmates in the general population
could grow long hair in violation of the grooming policy for
any reason—for example, to satisfy a personal preference
unrelated to religious belief, to avoid a work assignment, or
to secure placement in a private cell — and then be assigned
to the SMU. These inmates were taking up space in SMUs
that was needed for inmates presenting security and disciplin-
ary problems. This reasoning, however, does not bear on the
 SMITH v. OZMINT 11
MSU grooming policy: MSU inmates who grew long hair in
violation of policy were not transferred to the SMU, a lower
security unit.

According to Ward, the second reason for not accommodat-
ing SMU inmates who want long hair is that housing inmates
in the SMU requires additional manpower and is thus more
costly. For example, when SMU inmates are taken from their
cells for recreation or showering, they are strip searched,
placed in restraints, and escorted by officers. However, there
is no record of inmates ever straining manpower needs by
seeking transfer to the MSU, where Smith is housed, simply
to have long hair. The SCDC offers no evidence that the MSU
grooming policy reduces manpower needs or costs.

In addition to the overriding concerns about space and
manpower needs in the SMU, which have no relevance to the
MSU grooming policy, Ward mentions concerns about
hygiene and security. With respect to hygiene, Ward says that
long hair makes it "more unsanitary for officers to conduct
needed searches." J.A. 382. Smith responds that latex gloves
and masks could be used in any body search, thereby protect-
ing the officers.

With respect to security concerns, Ward says that long hair
provides a place to hide contraband, renders an inmate more
susceptible to assault (hair pulling), and can be shorn after an
escape to alter appearance. These security concerns, however,
were discussed in the context of SCDC’s experience with
SMU inmates, not MSU inmates. For example, Ward did not
discuss whether (or to what extent) there was a risk of contra-
band in the MSU, whether MSU inmates are exposed to
assault by other inmates, or whether (or to what extent) there
is a risk of escape from the MSU.

The major failing of the Ward affidavit is that it was not
written to address this case. Specifically, it was not written to
establish that the MSU grooming policy — which allows the
12 SMITH v. OZMINT
use of force to achieve compliance — is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest. Yet the district court relied
heavily on the Ward affidavit in granting summary judgment
to the SCDC. In short, the Ward affidavit does not permit the
conclusion on summary judgment that the MSU forced
grooming policy advances a compelling interest.

Even if we assume that the space utilization, hygiene, and
security concerns mentioned in the Ward affidavit are suffi-
cient to establish a compelling governmental interest in main-
taining the MSU forced grooming policy, the SCDC must
demonstrate that the policy is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. In other words, the SCDC must pro-
vide a substantive, relevant explanation as to why drastic hair-
cuts, administered through physical force, are the least
restrictive means of enforcing the compelling interest
advanced. Again, due deference must be given to any substan-
tive, relevant explanation.

In an effort to meet the least restrictive means requirement,
the SCDC, once more relying on the Ward affidavit, makes
the conclusory argument that uniform application of the
forced grooming policy is necessary. Ward says only that: "I
am not aware as to how the objectives discussed . . . could be
accomplished without making all inmates uniformly subject
to the grooming standards." J.A. 383. But see Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
436 (2006) (noting that under the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 the government may not merely "echo[ ] the
classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make
an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so
no exceptions"). The statement falls short in several respects.

First, Ward says nothing about the need to administer
forced head shaving in the MSU, where Smith is housed. As
we have already noted, head shaving in the MSU does noth-
ing to free up needed space in the SMUs, the main objective
discussed in the Ward affidavit. Similarly, the hygiene and
 SMITH v. OZMINT 13
security concerns listed by Ward were discussed in the con-
text of dealing with SMU prisoners, not MSU prisoners who
are in more restricted custody. Second, Ward makes no
attempt whatsoever to explain that hygiene and security con-
cerns in the MSU cannot be accommodated without forcibly
shaving the heads of prisoners who wear long hair due to reli-
gious belief. See Hines, 148 F.3d at 356 (upholding prior
SCDC grooming policy under the First Amendment, but not-
ing that "[n]o prisoners are forcibly shaved or shorn"); McRae
v. Johnson, 261 F. App’x 554, 559 (4th Cir. 2008) ("We note
that one of the key features of the [Virginia Department of
Corrections’] Grooming Policy that supports the district
court’s least restrictive means conclusion is that the VDOC’s
Grooming Policy does not mandate the forcible cutting of an
inmate’s long hair and/or beard."). Finally, Ward does not
explain why the SCDC is able to deal with hygiene and secur-
ity concerns with respect to female inmates who must keep
their hair "at least one (1) inch long." J.A. 388 (emphasis
added).

In sum, the SCDC has not demonstrated in the summary
judgment record before us that its policy of forcibly shaving
the heads of MSU inmates who wear long hair as a matter of
religious belief furthers a compelling governmental interest in
space utilization, hygiene, and security by the least restrictive
means. In making this determination, we emphasize that the
SCDC’s key item of evidence, the Ward affidavit, was simply
not on point. In light of the SCDC’s failure to meet its burden,
we vacate the summary judgment granted to the SCDC on
Smith’s RLUIPA claim. The case will be remanded for fur-
ther proceedings on this claim.

IV.

Smith also alleges that unconstitutionally excessive force
was used against him during the November 9, 2002, and
August 13, 2003, incidents when he was extracted from his
cell for forced haircuts. An excessive force claim requires a
14 SMITH v. OZMINT
plaintiff to prove (1) that force was applied "maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" and (2) that
he suffered more than de minimis pain or injury. Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quota-
tion omitted).

Smith and the SCDC offer very different versions of the
facts. Through affidavits submitted by Smith’s fellow
inmates, Smith claims, for example, that on November 9,
2002, correctional officers "ramm[ed] [his head] into the wall,
pok[ed] at his eyes with their hands, punch[ed] and kick[ed]
him in his body, slapp[ed] him several times hard across his
face, and then [held] him down, face first, in scalding hot
water while in mechanical restraints." J.A. 543. In contrast,
the SCDC contends that as officers prepared to enter Smith’s
cell to put him in restraints, Smith sought to thwart them by
spreading soap and water on the floor, throwing human waste,
and possessing a metal shank.

We, of course, may not make credibility determinations.
Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir. 1991). But
"[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no rea-
sonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment." See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007). We have reviewed the video recordings of both inci-
dents and conclude that no reasonable jury could find that cor-
rectional officers—on either November 9, 2002, or August
13, 2003—applied force "maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm." Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. We
thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the SCDC on Smith’s excessive force claims.

V.

Lastly, Smith claims that he was subjected to several
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including (1) the
 SMITH v. OZMINT 15
continuous and indefinite exposure to extremely harsh condi-
tions, (2) the exposure to unhealthful ventilation and unsani-
tary drinking water, and (3) after the November 9, 2002,
incident, the temporary confinement in a cell that contained
human blood and feces.

To demonstrate that conditions of confinement constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, Smith must (1) establish that
prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" and (2)
prove extreme deprivations of basic human needs or "serious
or significant" pain or injury. Williams, 77 F.3d at 761 (inter-
nal quotations omitted). The summary judgment record estab-
lishes that no reasonable jury could find that both of these
elements were met with respect to Smith’s allegation relating
to his indefinite confinement in the MSU and his allegations
about the ventilation and drinking water. Moreover, we agree
with the district court that Smith’s allegations about the con-
dition of the cell in which he was placed following the
November 9, 2002, incident are contradicted by the video
record. Accordingly, we also affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment on these claims.

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in part
and vacated in part, and the case is remanded to the district
court for further proceedings on Smith’s RLUIPA claim.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED