Walker v. Kelly

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DARICK DEMORRIS WALKER, 
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
 No. 08-11
LORETTA K. KELLY, Warden,
Sussex I State Prison,
Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge.
(1:01-cv-01196-CMH-TCB)

Argued: September 22, 2009

Decided: December 16, 2009

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and
SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the
majority opinion, in which Judge Shedd joined. Judge
Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Danielle Spinelli, WILMERHALE, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Katherine Baldwin Burnett, OFFICE OF
2 WALKER v. KELLY
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Craig Goldblatt, Heather
M. Zachary, D. Hien Tran, Annie L. Owens, WILMER-
HALE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Robert F. McDon-
nell, Attorney General of Virginia, Jerry P. Slonaker, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appel-
lee.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Darick Demorris Walker was convicted of capital murder
in the deaths of Stanley Beale and Clarence Threat and sen-
tenced to death.1 In this, his fourth appearance before this
court during federal habeas proceedings, Walker challenges
the district court’s order rejecting, after a full evidentiary
hearing, his claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and denying his application for relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Walker contends that this court previously determined
the Commonwealth violated Brady by failing to disclose cer-
tain information to Walker’s defense team. See Walker v.
Kelly ("Walker II"), No. 04-22, 195 Fed. Appx. 169 (4th Cir.
May 22, 2006). By conducting an evidentiary hearing and
issuing a decision on the Brady claim, the district court failed,
argues Walker, to adhere to this court’s previous ruling. For
the reasons that follow, we disagree.
1
The evidence in this case is thoroughly recounted in the Virginia
Supreme Court’s decision affirming Walker’s conviction and sentence on
direct appeal, see Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 568-69 (Va.
1999), as well as various decisions from this court during federal habeas
proceedings, see, e.g., Walker v. True ("Walker I"), No. 02-22, 67 Fed.
Appx. 758, 759-61 (4th Cir. May 6, 2003) (per curiam). We will recite the
facts here only to the extent necessary to address the Brady issue presented
to us.
 WALKER v. KELLY 3
I.

A.

Walker contends that the prosecution failed to disclose evi-
dence that would have impeached the trial testimony of
Bianca Taylor, Beale’s daughter and a crucial witness for the
Commonwealth.2 Bianca testified that she saw Walker break
into her family’s apartment and shoot her father, and she iden-
tified Walker at trial as the shooter.

According to Walker, the Commonwealth suppressed four
pieces of evidence that the defense would have used to
impeach Bianca’s eyewitness testimony at trial. First, Walker
alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose a Supplementary
Offense Report from Officer David Ernst (the "Ernst Report")
summarizing his interview of Bianca on the night of the
shooting. The Ernst report does not indicate that Bianca
claimed to have seen her father’s murder. Rather, it notes that,
immediately prior to the shooting, Bianca was on the phone
with Karen Rudolph, who told Bianca that "Todd" – the name
by which Bianca knew Walker – was coming to Bianca’s
apartment. According to the Ernst Report, the shooting com-
menced a few moments later.

The second piece of evidence at issue is a handwritten note
from Detective Curtis Mullins, dated the night of the shoot-
ing, indicating that "13 [year-]old [Bianca] heard [a] voice
and stated that it sounded like Todd and she was positive that
it was Todd’s." J.A. 1112. Detective Mullins’s notes, how-
ever, were based not on information he gleaned first-hand but
2
Walker claimed that the prosecution also violated Brady by failing to
disclose evidence that would have impeached the testimony of Common-
wealth witnesses Tameria Patterson and Christopher Miller. The state
court rejected this portion of Walker’s Brady claim on the merits. We are
concerned in this appeal only with Walker’s Brady claim as it relates to
Bianca.
4 WALKER v. KELLY
on information given to him by Officer Ernst and Detective
James Hickman.

Third, Walker claims the Commonwealth failed to disclose
a Supplementary Report prepared by Detective Mullins (the
"Mullins Report") nearly one month after Beale’s murder,
indicating that Bianca "stated that she recognized the voice of
the subject as a [black male] by the name of Todd or Ty." J.A.
1112.

Fourth, and finally, Walker asserts that the prosecution
failed to disclose the notes of Detective Hickman from the
night of the shooting. Hickman’s notes reflect that he inter-
viewed Bianca and she identified "Todd" as the killer and
physically described him; however, Hickman’s notes do not
expressly indicate whether or not Bianca saw the shooting
first hand.

B.

Walker first raised this Brady claim during state habeas
review, having not pursued it on direct appeal. The Supreme
Court of Virginia concluded that Walker’s claim was barred
under Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974), which
precludes a habeas petitioner from asserting a claim that
"could have been [but was not] raised and adjudicated at . . .
trial and upon his [direct] appeal," id. at 682.3 Therefore,
according to the Virginia Supreme Court, the factual and legal
3
The Virginia Supreme court explained as follows:
[Walker’s] claim I in part alleges that exculpatory evidence
impeaching the testimony of witness Bianca Taylor was withheld
by the Commonwealth in violation of petitioner’s due process
rights as enunciated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The Court holds that this portion of claim I is procedurally
defaulted by operation of the rule in Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va.
27, 205 S.E.2d 80 (1974).
J.A. 402.
 WALKER v. KELLY 5
basis for Walker’s Brady claim was available to the defense
at the time of Walker’s direct appeal.

Walker then sought relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, raising a number of claims, including his Brady claim
that the Commonwealth withheld evidence that would have
impeached Bianca’s credibility. Walker alleged that
"[a]lthough the prosecution’s star witness [Bianca] testified
that she watched Walker shoot her father, it is now clear,
based on evidence the prosecution withheld, that this witness
did not see the shooting or the shooter." J.A. 417.

The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
to the extent Walker’s Brady claim related to the testimony of
Bianca, it had been procedurally defaulted and was thus not
amenable to review by a federal habeas court. Federal habeas
courts are precluded from reviewing any claim that "a state
court has declined to consider [on] its merits on the basis of
an independent and adequate state procedural rule." Bacon v.
Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2000); see Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). Application of the
Slayton procedural bar qualifies as such an adequate and inde-
pendent state law ground. See Vinson v. True, 436 F.3d 412,
417 (4th Cir. 2005). Review by a federal court is permissible
only if Walker is able to establish cause to excuse the default
and prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional viola-
tion. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999); Vin-
son, 436 F.3d at 417.4

Walker did not dispute that his Brady claim was procedur-
ally defaulted, but he argued that he could demonstrate cause
and prejudice. Specifically, Walker argued that the impeach-
4
A federal habeas petitioner may also obtain review of a procedurally
defaulted claim if he shows that the court’s failure to review such a claim
will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See McCarver v. Lee,
221 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2000). Walker has not advanced such a theory.
See Walker I, No. 02-22, 67 Fed. Appx. at 767 n.5.
6 WALKER v. KELLY
ment evidence remained undisclosed for months after his
direct appeal until state habeas counsel obtained it via a Free-
dom of Information Act ("FOIA") request. Walker claimed,
therefore, that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose estab-
lished cause in that the defense was unable to raise a claim
based on information it did not have.

The district court rejected Walker’s cause argument, con-
cluding that Walker failed to rebut by clear and convincing
evidence the state court’s finding that "appellate counsel was
sufficiently on notice of the factual predicate of the [Brady]
claim that it could have been raised on direct review." J.A.
597-98; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The district court noted
that Walker’s state habeas petition acknowledged that prior to
trial defense counsel received a Presentence Report which ref-
erenced two undisclosed police reports suggesting Bianca did
not actually see the shooting. Walker’s state habeas petition,
which included a claim that defense counsel rendered ineffec-
tive assistance by failing to raise the Brady issue, also alleged
that the defense received a Report of Autopsy prior to trial
that indicated the witnesses did not see the shooting. Indeed,
Walker’s state habeas petition offered counsel’s notes to dem-
onstrate counsel was aware of reports stating that Bianca did
not see the murder of her father. The district court found that

[t]his evidence in the record establishes that Walker
had knowledge of the factual predicate of his Brady
claim with regard to Bianca’s testimony prior to the
filing of his direct appeal. As a result, Walker has
failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the factual predicate of his claim was not known
to his appellate counsel prior to the filing of his
direct appeal . . . [and] [t]hus, Walker fails to show
cause for his procedural default as a result of govern-
mental interference.

J.A. 599. Having concluded that Walker failed to establish
cause, the district court did not address the prejudice compo-
 WALKER v. KELLY 7
nent.5 The district court granted the Commonwealth’s motion
to dismiss on the basis of the pleadings, state court filings and
other documents presented to it—no evidentiary hearing was
conducted.

On appeal, this court affirmed and held that Walker "was
aware or should have been aware that documents had been
suppressed when he appealed his conviction." Walker I, No.
02-22, 67 Fed. Appx. at 767. We reasoned that because
Walker admitted in his state habeas petition to receiving the
Presentence Report prior to trial, he was unable to rebut the
state court’s determination that he could have raised the
Brady claim on direct appeal:

Indeed, as Walker admitted . . . , shortly before trial
the defense received a Presentence Report referenc-
ing two undisclosed police reports containing the
same information as the [alleged undisclosed evi-
dence]. This Presentence Report, by referencing
these undisclosed documents, evidenced the Com-
monwealth’s suppression of the alleged Brady mate-
rial. The factual basis for the assertion of Walker’s
Brady claim, therefore, was available not only before
direct appeal, but before sentencing.

Id. at 767-68 (footnote omitted). We concluded that consider-
ation of actual prejudice was unnecessary in light of Walker’s
failure to establish cause. The Supreme Court subsequently
granted Walker’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this
court’s decision in Walker I, and remanded for this court to
reconsider an ineffective assistance claim that is unrelated to
5
Walker also theorized that even if the Commonwealth’s nondisclosure
did not establish cause, counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing to raise
the Brady claim on direct appeal constituted cause. The district court
addressed whether counsel’s performance in this regard resulted in preju-
dice to Walker; however, Walker’s ineffective assistance claim is not at
issue in this appeal.
8 WALKER v. KELLY
the current appeal. See Walker v. True, 540 U.S. 1013 (2003).
Following this court’s subsequent decision, see Walker v.
True, 401 F.3d 574 (4th Cir. 2005), the Supreme Court again
granted certiorari and remanded the case to this court for
reconsideration of Walker’s Brady claim in light of Banks v.
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). See Walker v. True, 546 U.S.
1086 (2006).

On remand, a split panel of this court determined that the
facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Walker as
the nonmoving party, were sufficient to support a finding of
cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default and to
necessitate a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the
Brady claim. See Walker II, No. 04-22, 195 Fed. Appx. at
175, 177.6 Noting that the prosecutor confirmed in open court,
prior to trial, that the Commonwealth had provided Walker
with the required discovery, the court concluded that the fact
that "documents in Walker’s possession might suggest that
Bianca provided contradicting statements at trial does not
diminish the reasonableness of Walker’s reliance on the Com-
monwealth’s representation that it had complied fully with
Brady." Id. at 174. Moreover, we rejected the Common-
wealth’s position that "it was unreasonable for Walker to rely
on the prosecution’s affirmative response since Walker could
have reasonably discovered all the information later obtained
by his habeas counsel’s FOIA requests." Id. at 175. Thus, we
held that Walker alleged sufficient facts to establish cause.

With respect to the prejudice requirement, the majority
concluded that "the lack of forensic or other eyewitness evi-
dence made Bianca’s testimony crucial to the prosecution,"
id. at 176, and that, in turn, the undisclosed impeaching evi-
dence "‘could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
6
Although this opinion was not technically the second decision in the
Walker series of appeals, we designate it for ease of reference as Walker
II to signify that it was the Fourth Circuit’s second decision addressing
Walker’s Brady claim.
 WALKER v. KELLY 9
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the ver-
dict,’" id. at 177 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435
(1995)). Based on the facts before the panel on the Common-
wealth’s motion to dismiss, the majority concluded that
"[w]ithout Bianca’s testimony, the only evidence linking
Walker to the Beale murder is the uncorroborated testimony
of Tameria Patterson that she saw Walker enter the Randolph
apartment and say ‘I shot him.’" Id. The majority concluded
that Walker demonstrated that "prejudice resulted from his
inability to develop the factual basis of his Bianca Brady
claim at trial." Id.

Thus, having reconsidered Walker’s Brady claim in light of
Banks, the Walker II panel concluded that the district court
erroneously granted the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss
the procedurally defaulted Brady claim. Given the procedural
posture of the appeal, the court essentially held that, accepting
the allegations of Walker’s federal habeas petition as true,
Walker established cause and prejudice to excuse the default.
Therefore, we vacated the order of the district court and we
directed that an evidentiary hearing on the merits be held. See
id.

On remand from this court, the district court referred the
case to the magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing on the
merits of Walker’s Brady claim. Walker offered testimony
from three witnesses. Rebecca Norris, co-counsel for the
defense during Walker’s 1998 trial, testified that she did not
receive any of the alleged Brady material prior to trial, and
that she would have kept any such documents in her file. And,
she indicated that had lead defense counsel, the late Robert
Johnson, received any such documents, he would have shared
them with her. During the state habeas proceedings, Norris
turned over her files to the Commonwealth Attorney Gener-
al’s Office and permitted Walker’s habeas counsel an oppor-
tunity to duplicate the contents of the file. At the time that
Walker’s trial counsel turned over Walker’s files to habeas
counsel, the Brady material was not contained in the files.
10 WALKER v. KELLY
Finally, Norris testified that none of the information available
to her, including the Presentence Report, led her to believe the
prosecution was withholding exculpatory information.

Walker also put up Tameria Patterson, the witness who tes-
tified at trial that Walker entered an apartment she was visit-
ing and stated, "I shot him." J.A. 830. At the evidentiary
hearing, Tameria testified that Bianca told her that she recog-
nized the shooter’s voice while she was in the bathroom, but
that Bianca never indicated whether she actually saw the
shooter. The final witness for Walker, Carolyn Patterson,
essentially confirmed Tameria’s testimony, recalling that
Bianca recognized the shooter’s voice but did not claim to
have seen the shooter.

The Commonwealth called five witnesses. Retired homi-
cide detective James Hickman testified that he interviewed
Bianca on the night of the murder and took handwritten notes.
According to Hickman, he responded to the homicide call and
conducted informal interviews of Bianca and other witnesses.
Hickman described Bianca as "very upset[,] . . . crying, [and]
hysterical." J.A. 847. During the interviews, Hickman took
notes which he turned over to lead detective Curtis Mullins;
Hickman did not prepare a formal report of the interview and
had no further involvement in the case after the night of the
shooting. Although Hickman’s notes did not expressly state
that Bianca saw the shooting, Hickman testified that, to the
best of his recollection, on "that particular night Bianca
advised me that she did see the shooter." J.A. 875. Further-
more, Hickman testified that Bianca provided a physical
description of the shooter. Based on his notes and his inde-
pendent recollection, Hickman testified that his notes
reflected Bianca’s description of the man she saw that night
as opposed to a description of Walker from memory. Hick-
man indicated that "[i]f Bianca Taylor had told [me] that, I
didn’t see him, [I would have] reflected that in [my] notes."
J.A. 849.
 WALKER v. KELLY 11
Finally, Hickman clarified two contradictory affidavits he
executed regarding his interview of Bianca. In 2000, after
talking with an investigator employed by Walker, Hickman
signed an affidavit indicating that Bianca did not state that she
actually witnessed the shooting of her father. Hickman testi-
fied that he did not have access to his notes at the time he
signed the affidavit. In 2001, Hickman signed a second affida-
vit after reviewing his notes, which were provided by the
Attorney General’s office. The second Hickman affidavit
indicated that Bianca had, in fact, described the shooter. At
the evidentiary hearing, Hickman testified that the second
affidavit was correct.

David Ernst, a Richmond police officer who responded to
the scene, prepared a Supplemental Offense Report in which
he noted that Bianca stated that, prior to the shooting, she was
talking on the telephone to Ms. Randolph, who told her that
"Todd and Karen are coming to talk to you." J.A. 882. Ernst
did not recall whether Bianca stated that she saw the shooter;
however, he testified that if Bianca had so stated, or if she had
provided a description of the shooter, he would have included
it in his report. Ernst did not speak with Bianca after the night
of the shooting.

Bianca Taylor also testified at the evidentiary hearing.
Bianca was 13 years old at the time of the murder and 15
years old when she testified at Walker’s trial. At the hearing,
she reiterated much of her trial testimony, acknowledging
that, prior to the shooting, she was on the telephone with
Karen Randolph who told Bianca that "we’re coming over."
J.A. 891. Bianca testified unequivocally that she saw Walker
shoot her father, that she had seen him numerous times before
that night, and that she told the detectives that she had seen
Walker shoot her father. Subsequently, Bianca identified
Walker out of a photo lineup presented to her by Officer Mul-
lins, although she knew him as "Todd or Ty" at that time. J.A.
894.
12 WALKER v. KELLY
Next, Joy Robinson, the lead prosecutor, recalled that she
followed an open file policy in this case, "mak[ing] available
to the defense whatever was in [the] file." J.A. 898. Robinson
testified that the four Brady documents in question looked
familiar, but she could not remember specifically whether or
not they were in the file or whether she turned this informa-
tion over to the defense. However, Robinson stated that "[i]f
I had it, I did [turn it over]." J.A. 911. Robinson acknowl-
edged that when she reviewed the file after the trial was fin-
ished, she noticed that various documents – the motions, in
particular - were missing. According to her testimony, there
was never any evidence that led Robinson to believe that
Bianca identified Walker as the shooter not because she saw
him but only because she recognized his voice.

Finally, Curtis Mullins, the lead detective in the Beale mur-
der, testified that he did not talk to Bianca until he presented
the photographic lineup to her a few months after the shoot-
ing. On the night of the shooting, Mullins talked to Bianca’s
mother, Detective Hickman and possibly some other officers.
Mullins’s handwritten notes reflect that Hickman reported
that the "[d]oor was kicked in and victim shot," and that "13-
year old heard voice and stated that it sounded like Todd, and
she was positive that it was Todd’s." J.A. 928. Mullins agreed
that his notes "don’t reflect that [Hickman] told [him] that
[Bianca] . . . said she actually saw the person," id., but he
observed that the notes were not exhaustive. Furthermore,
Mullins testified that, as far as he could recall, he never
received any information suggesting that Bianca did not actu-
ally see the shooter.

The magistrate judge found that Walker failed to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged Brady
material was not disclosed to the defense by the Common-
wealth, and thus that Walker failed to prove the second ele-
ment of a Brady claim. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282
(petitioner must prove that the evidence was "suppressed by
the State, either willfully or inadvertently"). Without address-
 WALKER v. KELLY 13
ing the other two elements, the magistrate judge recom-
mended that the district court deny Walker relief on the Brady
claim.

The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s factual
determination that Walker did not establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the Commonwealth suppressed the
alleged Brady material:

Petitioner argues that [defense counsel] Norris’s tes-
timony that she did not recall receiving the four doc-
uments at issue ought to satisfy [his] burden that the
documents were not disclosed by the State. How-
ever, this ignores the affirmative evidence offered by
Respondent that the Commonwealth Attorney’s
Office had an open file policy, that Robinson testi-
fied she gave defense counsel all evidence she pos-
sessed related to the case, and that the Pre-Sentence
Report contained information very similar to what
was in [Detective] Mullins’s Report.

J.A. 1119. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommended conclusion that Walker failed to establish the
failure-to-disclose element of his Brady claim.

At the behest of both parties, however, the district court
also addressed the other two Brady elements. The court found
that Walker failed to establish that the evidence allegedly
withheld by the Commonwealth was favorable to him. See
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. Rejecting Walker’s view that
the evidence in question established Bianca heard but did not
see the shooter, the district court concluded that "[t]he evi-
dence at issue does not affirmatively show that Bianca told
police she only heard the shooter’s voice and did not see
him," as "Hickman’s notes provide a physical description of
the shooter given by Bianca." J.A. 1120. Furthermore, the
court found that, "[b]ased on the evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing, had Petitioner’s defense counsel
14 WALKER v. KELLY
attempted to use the evidence at issue to impeach Bianca’s
testimony at trial[,] the effect would have been negligible."
J.A. 1120-21.

Finally, the district court determined that the alleged Brady
material was not material to the outcome of Walker’s trial, see
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, that is, the evidence in question
"could [not] reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such
a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict,"
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. According to the district court,

[h]ad Petitioner’s defense counsel used the evidence
at issue to challenge Bianca’s testimony that she wit-
nessed the murder, the Commonwealth would have
introduced the uncontroverted evidence presented at
the evidentiary hearing that Bianca knew Petitioner
and had seen him on multiple occasions prior to the
shooting. Such evidence, had it been presented,
would have only bolstered Bianca’s identification of
Petitioner as the man who shot her father. Further-
more, Bianca’s mother testified at trial that Bianca
argued with Petitioner after he entered the apartment
but before shooting Beale. Petitioner never chal-
lenged this testimony. Had defense counsel chal-
lenged that Bianca actually saw the Petitioner,
Bianca’s mother’s testimony would have rebutted
the claim.

J.A. 1121. Additionally, the court found that the materiality of
the impeachment evidence was undercut by Tameria’s testi-
mony that Walker stated "I shot him" and by evidence "show-
ing that a bullet had been found on the floor of Petitioner’s
apartment that had been loaded into the gun that was used to
shoot Beale." J.A. 1122.

II.

Walker contends that this court resolved the merits of his
Brady claim in Walker II. In holding a full evidentiary hearing
 WALKER v. KELLY 15
and issuing its decision on the merits, Walker argues, the dis-
trict court impermissibly relitigated the Brady issue and vio-
lated the law of the case doctrine or, more specifically, the
mandate rule. The law of the case doctrine promotes judicial
economy and finality by providing "‘that when a court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to
govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same
case.’" United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th Cir.
1999) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988)). The mandate rule is "merely a spe-
cific application" of this doctrine that "forecloses relitigation
of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate
court." United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In short,

once the decision of an appellate court establishes
the law of the case, it must be followed in all subse-
quent proceedings in the same case in the trial court
. . . unless: (1) a subsequent trial produces substan-
tially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has
since made a contrary decision of law applicable to
the issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erro-
neous and would work manifest injustice.

United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 528 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As explained below, we
conclude that Walker II did not hold –- and could not have
held—that Walker was entitled to relief on his Brady claim.

There are three fundamental components to a Brady claim:
(1) "The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching";
(2) the "evidence must have been suppressed by the State";
and (3) the evidence must be material to the defense, that is,
"prejudice must . . . ensue[ ]." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.
The Supreme Court has explained that the cause and prejudice
showing necessary to overcome a defaulted Brady claim
"‘parallel[s] two of the three components of the alleged Brady
16 WALKER v. KELLY
violation itself.’" Banks, 540 U.S. at 691 (quoting Strickler,
527 U.S. at 282). Thus, the required showing of cause corre-
sponds to the Brady requirement that the petitioner show that
the state suppressed the evidence. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 691
("[A] petitioner shows ‘cause’ when the reason for his failure
to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State’s
suppression of the relevant evidence . . . ."). The showing of
prejudice required to excuse a procedural default corresponds
to the Brady prejudice requirement. See id. ("[C]oincident
with the third Brady component (prejudice), prejudice within
the compass of the ‘cause and prejudice’ requirement exists
when the suppressed evidence is ‘material’ for Brady pur-
poses.").

Walker’s argument is premised on the interplay between
"cause and prejudice" and the second and third elements of a
Brady claim. His primary focus is on language in Banks stat-
ing that "if [petitioner] succeeds in demonstrating ‘cause and
prejudice,’ he will at the same time succeed in establishing
the elements of his . . . Brady . . . claim." Id. (emphasis
added). Based on Banks, Walker contends that when the
Walker II panel concluded that he successfully demonstrated
cause and prejudice, it necessarily concluded that he simulta-
neously established the corresponding Brady elements—that
the Commonwealth suppressed evidence and that the evi-
dence was material to the defense. As for the remaining Brady
element, Walker argues that Walker II also found that he
established that the evidence in question was favorable.

Walker misreads the scope of Walker II. First, the majority
opinion did not hold that Walker successfully established that
the Commonwealth either suppressed the evidence at issue or
that the evidence was material. Indeed, the majority made
very clear that Walker’s showing was sufficient to overcome
the procedural default hurdle and to allow him to pursue his
Brady claim:

[W]e hold that Walker has established sufficient
cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural
 WALKER v. KELLY 17
default of his Bianca Brady claim and that an eviden-
tiary hearing on the merits of his Bianca Brady
claim is appropriate. Accordingly, the judgment of
the district court is vacated and this case is remanded
for an evidentiary hearing on Walker’s Bianca Brady
claim.

Walker II, 195 Fed. Appx. at 177 (emphasis added). It could
not be more plain from this language that the panel was mak-
ing no decision whatsoever with regard to the merits of Walk-
er’s Brady claim except to direct the district court to conduct
an evidentiary hearing so that the merits could then be
decided. The question before this court in Walker I was
whether the district court properly granted the Common-
wealth’s motion to dismiss the defaulted Brady claim on the
basis that Walker failed to establish cause and prejudice. The
Supreme Court’s remand for reconsideration in light of Banks
did not change the posture of the case—Walker II still
involved an appeal from an order granting the Common-
wealth’s motion to dismiss for procedural default. Thus, the
Walker II panel was tasked with reconsidering whether Walk-
er’s allegations were sufficient to establish cause and preju-
dice to excuse the default and permit consideration of
Walker’s Brady claim on the merits. Not only did Walker II
not make any factual or legal determinations regarding the
elements of a Brady claim – as Walker suggests – but it
expressly did not reach the merits and limited its analysis to
the procedural default issue. See id. at 175 ("[W]e find that
Walker has established cause such that he may be entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on his Bianca Brady claim.") (empha-
sis added); id. at 177 ("[W]e find that Walker has established
that actual, significant prejudice resulted from his inability to
develop the factual basis of his Bianca Brady claim at trial.").

Furthermore, we reject Walker’s argument that even if
Walker II did not expressly determine that he established at
least two of the three elements of his Brady claim, then the
Supreme Court effectively did so in Banks when explaining
18 WALKER v. KELLY
that, by establishing cause and prejudice to excuse a proce-
dural default, the petitioner simultaneously established the
requisite Brady elements. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 703. Banks
was decided in light of a record developed through a full-
blown evidentiary hearing on the Brady issue. See id. at 684-
86. By contrast, there had been no such evidentiary hearing at
the time Walker II was decided; the matter was before the
Walker II panel on a motion to dismiss. For purposes of the
Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss, the record in Walker II
consisted of the factual allegations set forth in the pleadings
which this court was required to accept as true, along with
documents attached from the state habeas record. There was
no evidence from the Commonwealth, however, regarding
what information was or was not given to defense counsel on
the issues raised.

In proceedings under § 2254, the familiar standards in Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the
government’s motion to dismiss. See Walker v. True, 399
F.3d 315, 319 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts, Rule 11 (incorporating the FRCP "to the extent that
they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or
these rules"). Thus, a motion to dismiss a § 2254 petition
under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the petition,
requiring the federal habeas court to "assume all facts pleaded
by the § 2254 petitioner to be true." Wolfe v. Johnson, 565
F.3d 140, 169 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Because the Commonwealth filed its
answer to Walker’s petition and its motion to dismiss simulta-
neously, it technically should have filed the motion under
Rule 12(c) as one for judgment on the pleadings. See Burbach
Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-
06 (4th Cir. 2002); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d
231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). We will construe the Common-
wealth’s motion as a motion under Rule 12(c) which is
assessed under the same standard that applies to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. See Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243.
 WALKER v. KELLY 19
In assessing whether the § 2254 petition states a claim for
relief, the district court must consider "the face of the petition
and any attached exhibits." Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 169 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court was pre-
sented with a substantial amount of material from the record
of the state habeas proceeding, including affidavits and evi-
dence presented at trial. A court may consider such materials
without having to convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for
summary judgment under Rule 56(b). Moreover, a federal
court may consider matters of public record such as docu-
ments from prior state court proceedings in conjunction with
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29
F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994).

We read nothing in Banks that renders the procedural con-
text meaningless. Walker II clearly and expressly held that,
assuming the truth of Walker’s assertions, he came forward
with sufficient evidence to survive the Commonwealth’s dis-
positive motion and advance his claim for a merits determina-
tion. Thus, the district court did precisely what it was
expressly instructed to do –- conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the Brady issue and render a decision on the merits.

III.

Walker next contends that even if the district court properly
conducted an evidentiary hearing, the evidence developed at
the hearing did not differ materially from the facts before the
court in Walker II. Thus, Walker argues, the district court was
obligated to adhere to this court’s determination in Walker II
that, for purposes of the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss,
Walker alleged sufficient facts to establish that the prosecu-
tion failed to disclose the Brady material and that Walker suf-
fered actual prejudice from the nondisclosure of this evidence.
According to Walker, no additional evidence was adduced
that would cast doubt onto these conclusions.

We disagree. Walker’s argument appears to rest on a cou-
ple of false premises. The first presumes that Walker II made
20 WALKER v. KELLY
a merits determination that the Commonwealth committed a
Brady violation, and the second presumes that Walker II’s
conclusions govern unless "called into question" by new evi-
dence presented at the hearing. The first is false for the rea-
sons explained in detail above. The second is false in that it
suggests the issue before the district court was whether the
Commonwealth produced sufficient additional evidence to
rebut the presumptive Brady violation. Moreover, Walker’s
argument subverts the burden of proof, which belonged to
him on remand. See Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 46
(1995).

The issue before the district court on remand was simply
whether Walker’s proof satisfied the three elements of a
Brady claim. We review the district court’s legal conclusions
de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. See Quesin-
berry v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1998); cf. Monroe
v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2003) (reviewing
for clear error the district court’s conclusions regarding
whether the habeas evidence established the elements of a
Brady claim). As discussed herein, we conclude that the dis-
trict court did not clearly err in finding that Walker failed to
prove that the evidence was "suppressed by the State" and that
the district court properly determined that no prejudice "en-
sued" from the alleged nondisclosure. Strickler, 527 U.S. at
282.

Favorability of the Items Allegedly Suppressed.

In order to establish a Brady violation, the evidence sup-
pressed by the state "must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching." Id. at
282. As noted previously, the district court concluded that
Walker failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the items allegedly withheld were favorable to Walker’s
defense. The court explained that

[t]he evidence at issue does not affirmatively show
that Bianca told police she only heard the shooter’s
 WALKER v. KELLY 21
voice and did not see him. Indeed, Hickman’s notes
provide a physical description of the shooter given
by Bianca. Moreover, the evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing shows that Bianca was hysterical
and emotionally distraught when interviewed by
detectives on the night of her father’s murder. She
has no independent recollection regarding what she
told the detectives . . . Based on the evidence pre-
sented at the evidentiary hearing, had [Walker’s]
defense counsel attempted to use the evidence at
issue to impeach Bianca’s testimony at trial the
effect would have been negligible.

J.A. 1120-21.

Walker contends that the district court applied the wrong
legal standard in determining whether the evidence at issue
was favorable. Specifically, Walker argues that the district
court improperly conflated the issue of whether the alleged
undisclosed evidence was favorable with the separate issue of
whether it was material in light of the record as a whole. See
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 451 (recognizing that the "favorable ten-
dency" of a given piece of evidence should be assessed with-
out regard to the "weight of the evidence" as a whole);
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282 (concluding that the impeaching
character of the evidence in question was apparent from the
contrast between the witness’s trial testimony and the undis-
closed evidence).

It is somewhat unclear whether the district court based its
conclusion on the effect of the alleged Brady documents on
the trial as a whole in light all the evidence, as opposed to the
impeachment character of the alleged Brady documents, if
any. During the evidentiary hearing, Bianca affirmed the
accuracy of her trial testimony that she heard the front door
being forced open, saw Walker enter and then saw him shoot
her father. She emphatically rejected the suggestion that she
might have told officers that she recognized the shooter by
22 WALKER v. KELLY
voice, not sight, because she "did see him." J.A. 890. Her tes-
timony, however, may go to the weight of the so-called
impeachment evidence rather than its tendency to contradict
the Commonwealth’s star witness. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 451.

Because the district court’s decision can easily be affirmed
on its disposition of the suppression and materiality Brady
elements, however, we need not determine whether the dis-
trict court properly concluded that Walker failed to establish
that the evidence was favorable.

Suppression of the alleged Brady material.

In arguing that the evidence does not permit us to affirm
the district court’s finding that he failed to prove the Com-
monwealth suppressed the Brady material, Walker points to
evidence showing that the documents were not in defense
counsel’s files at the time the files were surrendered to habeas
counsel. Indeed, the parties stipulated at the evidentiary hear-
ing "that on the date that Mr. Walker’s habeas counsel
received the files from Mr. Walker’s trial counsel, . . . [the
documents] were not in those files." J.A. 825. The record also
contained an affidavit from Rebecca Norris, Walker’s trial
counsel, indicating that prosecutor Joy Robinson provided the
defense team with Beale’s autopsy report, an offense report,
crime scene photos, and other items; however, Norris indi-
cated that "Robinson never provided any additional informa-
tion that would have alerted us that it was possible that Bianca
may not have actually seen Walker enter her home." J.A. 581.
At the hearing, Norris testified that she did not "believe" she
received any of the alleged Brady material prior to trial and
that she would have kept them in the file as a matter of course
if she had received them. And, Norris reaffirmed her position
that "Joy Robinson never told [her] that there was any evi-
dence that [Bianca] didn’t see the shooter but only heard his
voice." J.A. 823. Finally, Walker also highlights prosecutor
Robinson’s testimony that she could not recall whether she
 WALKER v. KELLY 23
had the Brady materials in her files prior to trial or whether
she specifically disclosed these items to the defense.

Having rejected Walker’s view that Walker II established
binding factual determinations, we review the district court’s
findings under the deferential clear error standard of review:

If the district court’s account of the evidence is plau-
sible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the
court of appeals may not reverse it even though con-
vinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
would have weighed the evidence differently. Where
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74
(1985)). A district court’s finding of fact is "‘clearly errone-
ous’ when, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

Although there is evidence in the record that supports
Walker’s position, the district court’s conclusion is certainly
plausible in light of the evidence as a whole and the allocation
of the burden of proof to Walker. Robinson testified that she
observed an open file policy in the Walker case and that she
"ma[d]e available to the defense whatever was in [her] file."
J.A. 898. According to Robinson, the alleged Brady materials
were items that her office commonly received from the police
department; Robinson typically included in her case file
"whatever the police department had." J.A. 900. For that rea-
son, and because Robinson testified that she was "very famil-
iar" with the alleged Brady documents, Robinson believed
that it was "probable" that she had the items at issue in her
files and that, in turn, she disclosed these items to defense
counsel, as was her custom. Moreover, Robinson reaffirmed
24 WALKER v. KELLY
at the hearing her affidavit testimony suggesting that the attor-
neys discussed the documents at issue:

In this case I distinctly recall having a conversation
in my office with one of Walker’s attorneys about
reports that Bianca apparently told police that she
recognized Walker’s voice. I also remember telling
the defense that despite these reports, Bianca had
picked Walker out of a photo . . . lineup.

J.A. 906.

Norris’s testimony, as well, supports the conclusion that the
district court did not commit clear error in determining that
the Commonwealth turned over these materials to the defense.
For example, Norris testified that the defense files were
incomplete, having once contained "investigatory reports" and
"offense reports." J.A. 802. Norris also admitted that she was
unable to say with certainty that her co-counsel gave her all
of the information in his possession, although Norris did not
believe that co-counsel would have withheld anything from
her. Furthermore, Norris acknowledged that, prior to trial, she
had the Medical Examiner’s report which contained a state-
ment that "[w]itnesses inside the home heard the shots but did
not witness the shooting." J.A. 810. Norris also had the pre-
sentence report which incorporated a statement from the Mul-
lins Report that Bianca "recognized the voice of the suspect
as a black male by the name of Todd or Ty." J.A. 820. And,
the record includes Norris’s handwritten, pre-trial notes,
reflecting that she was aware of the information included in
the alleged Brady material.7

In light of the totality of the evidence, the district court
properly determined that Walker failed to prove by a prepon-
7
In pertinent part, her notes posed the question whether the defense
could "get in[to]" evidence the "Autopsy [which] says no witnesses on
Beale" or the "Offense Rep[or]t [which] says no witnesses." J.A. 1017.
 WALKER v. KELLY 25
derance of evidence that the Commonwealth suppressed the
items at issue.

Materiality of the suppressed evidence.

Brady "does not ‘automatically require a new trial when-
ever a combing of the prosecutors’ files after the trial has dis-
closed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely
to have changed the verdict.’" Moseley v. Branker, 550 F.3d
312, 318 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 677 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evi-
dence is considered material when it "could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.
"The question is not whether the defendant would more likely
than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,
but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood
as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. at
434.

A glaring preliminary problem for Walker is that none of
the Brady documents were independently admissible to
impeach Bianca because she did not prepare the documents or
adopt or subscribe to the statements contained therein. See
United States v. Barile, 286 F.3d 749, 757 (4th Cir. 2002)
(noting that "[o]nly prior inconsistent statements made by the
witness are admissible as impeachment evidence") (emphasis
added); United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 710 (11th Cir.
1993) ("[W]e conclude that a witness may not be impeached
with a third party’s characterization or interpretation of a prior
oral statement unless the witness has subscribed to or other-
wise adopted the statement as his own."). Walker’s defense
team would have been forced to call officers Hickman, Mul-
lins, and Ernst as witnesses to testify about their respective
reports and interview notes. Of course, having the benefit of
a full-blown evidentiary hearing after remand, we now know
how these witnesses would have testified. For example,
Detective Hickman testified that Bianca did tell him that she
26 WALKER v. KELLY
saw Walker murder her father even though his notes did not
so reflect.

Moreover, even if the alleged Brady evidence could be
used to impeach Bianca’s testimony that she saw Walker
shoot her father, there was substantial evidence, as noted by
the district court, that the Commonwealth would have offered
in rebuttal. For example, the evidence is uncontroverted that
Bianca had seen Walker before on many occasions. More-
over, Bianca’s mother testified that Bianca argued with
Walker after he entered the apartment but before he shot
Beale. Tameria Patterson testified that on the night of the
shooting, Walker entered her apartment and stated "I shot
him." Additionally, the Commonwealth presented evidence
that a round of ammunition that had been loaded into the mur-
der weapon was recovered from the floor of Walker’s apart-
ment.

In light of the evidence presented at the hearing and the
record in its entirety, we conclude that the district court prop-
erly determined that, even if Walker were able to show that
the evidence at issue was withheld and that it was favorable
to him, the alleged Brady material does not undermine confi-
dence in the guilty verdict.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court
is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Today, the majority affirms the district court’s dismissal of
Walker’s Brady claim in this capital case only by departing
from this Court’s prior decision in Walker II, 195 Fed. App’x
169 (4th Cir. 2006). Having heard Walker II, I disagree with
 WALKER v. KELLY 27
the majority’s interpretation of the case. This Court’s determi-
nations in Walker II that Walker established cause and preju-
dice to overcome procedural default were dispositive of
Walker’s Brady claim. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I.

It is not Walker, but the majority, that "misreads the scope
of Walker II." (Maj. Op. at 16.) This Court’s decision in
Walker II that Walker had established cause and prejudice to
overcome procedural default meant that he simultaneously
satisfied two of the three components of his Brady claim, and
the Court’s other determinations were necessarily dispositive
of the third component. Therefore, the district court’s decision
to disregard this Court’s prior determinations of law and fact
violated the law of the case doctrine, or more specifically, the
mandate rule.

A.

In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999), the
Supreme Court stated that the elements required to demon-
strate procedural default—cause and prejudice—"parallel two
of the three components of the alleged Brady violation itself,"
namely suppression and prejudice. Accord Banks v. Dretke,
540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). The Banks decision not only reaf-
firmed the observation laid out in Strickler, but also elabo-
rated on the overlap between these two tests:

Corresponding to the second Brady component (evi-
dence suppressed by the State), a petitioner shows
"cause" when the reason for his failure to develop
facts in state-court proceedings was the State’s sup-
pression of the relevant evidence; coincident with
the third Brady component (prejudice), prejudice
within the compass of the "cause and prejudice"
requirement exists when the suppressed evidence is
"material" for Brady purposes.
28 WALKER v. KELLY
Id.

After finding that Walker established cause and prejudice
to excuse the procedural default of his Brady claim, Judge
Floyd, writing for the majority in Walker II, concluded "that
an evidentiary hearing on the merits of [Walker’s] Bianca
Brady claim is appropriate," and thus remanded the case to
the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 195 Fed. App’x
at 177. As I pointed out in my concurrence, "Walker’s show-
ing of cause and prejudice is not merely sufficient to over-
come the procedural default, but also to satisfy the second and
third elements of a Brady claim" and ultimately to establish
a Brady violation. Id. at 179 (Gregory, J., concurring).

As observed in Banks, a defendant who shows cause
and prejudice to excuse a procedural default simulta-
neously satisfies the second and third elements of a
Brady claim—evidence suppressed by the state and
prejudice, respectively. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 691.
Without question, the first Brady element—the sup-
pressed evidence is favorable to the accused—is sat-
isfied here. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,
281-82 (1999) (setting forth the elements of a Brady
claim). Indeed, the undisclosed reports contain pow-
erful impeachment material, which calls into ques-
tion the veracity of Bianca’s testimony. Thus, I
believe that the conclusion that a Brady violation
occurred flows from the finding of cause and preju-
dice.

Id. (Gregory, J., concurring).

Even the dissent indicated that Judge Floyd’s conclusion as
to Walker’s showing of cause and prejudice "means that
Walker has satisfied two of the three elements of a successful
Brady claim," suppression and prejudice. Id. at 184 n.4 (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting).
 WALKER v. KELLY 29
The majority therefore remands for the district court
to determine only whether Walker has shown the
third element of a Brady claim; that is, that "the evi-
dence at issue is favorable to [Walker], either
because it is exculpatory or because it is impeach-
ing." Although the majority strangely refrains from
addressing this legal question, its statement that
"[t]he withheld reports provide persuasive evidence
that Bianca did not see the shooter the night of [her
father’s] murder," answers this question in the affir-
mative. In essence, then, as suggested by Judge
Gregory’s concurrence, the majority opinion results
in an inevitable grant of Walker’s § 2254 petition.

Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).

Thus, both the concurrence and dissent in Walker II cor-
rectly noted that, under Strickler and Banks, Judge Floyd’s
majority opinion necessarily meant that Walker had satisfied
the suppression and prejudice components of the Brady claim
itself. See 195 Fed. App’x at 179 (Gregory, J., concurring),
184 n.4 (Williams, J., dissenting). The majority wholly disre-
gards these two opinions, instead altering this Court’s analysis
of the facts when the facts have not changed. While the
majority affords no weight to the clear views of a majority of
the panel members in Walker II on the significance of that
case’s holding, surely it does not question the intent of Judge
Floyd’s majority opinion. Judge Floyd simply found an evi-
dentiary hearing to be appropriate, providing the Government
with an opportunity to produce evidence different on Walk-
er’s Brady claim than what had been shown before this Court.
Indeed, the majority states that "[t]here was no evidence from
the Commonwealth . . . regarding what information was or
was not given to defense counsel on the issues raised." (Maj.
Op. at 18.) Given that no evidence was ultimately presented
that was significantly different from that before this Court in
Walker II, the district court was not free to depart from this
Court’s prior determinations.
30 WALKER v. KELLY
At oral argument before this Court, the Warden repeatedly
asserted that Walker chose to not put evidence on at the evi-
dentiary hearing. This argument is incorrect at best, as Walker
did introduce evidence. The argument also demonstrates the
affront to fairness that has occurred here. Walker proved his
Brady claim before this Court in Walker II. In a light most
generous to the Warden, the evidentiary hearing was granted
either to allow the Government to bring new evidence to light
in order to avoid summary judgment in favor of Walker or to
decide only the issue of favorability. However, the effect of
the majority’s approach in this case is that Walker was forced
to relitigate his claim until the Warden prevailed.

Furthermore, irrespective of the import of the holdings in
Strickler and Banks, the express determinations in Walker II
conclusively establish the suppression and prejudice compo-
nents of Walker’s Brady claim. With regard to the suppres-
sion component, this Court found that "the prosecution failed
to disclose Brady material" when "the Commonwealth knew
of, but failed to disclose, police reports that contain evidence
which challenges the credibility of Bianca Taylor’s alleged
eyewitness testimony." Walker II, 195 Fed. App’x at 172.
With regard to the prejudice component, this Court concluded
that "[g]iven the dearth of physical evidence and the centrality
of Bianca’s testimony, the withheld evidence ‘could reason-
ably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’" Id. at 177 (quot-
ing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). This conclu-
sion in fact mirrors the governing standard for demonstrating
prejudice for purposes of a Brady violation. See Kyles, 514
U.S. at 435.

While the majority opinion in Walker II did not expressly
state that the third component of the Brady
claim—favorability—had been demonstrated by Walker, the
Court’s findings leave no doubt that the favorability compo-
nent had been established.* The opinion found that the with-

*Both the concurrence and dissent in Walker II recognized that the
determinations by the majority opinion necessarily meant that the favora-
 WALKER v. KELLY 31
held police reports "contain evidence which challenges the
credibility of Bianca Taylor’s alleged eyewitness testimony,"
195 Fed. App’x at 172, and "provide compelling evidence
suggesting that Bianca never saw the intruder the night of the
murder and that she based her identification of Walker solely
on the intruder’s voice," id. at 173. The opinion concluded:
"As such, the withheld documents would have provided sub-
stantial evidence impeaching Bianca’s trial testimony that she
saw the person who shot her father." Id. at 174. According to
Strickler, this type of impeachment evidence is, by definition,
"favorable to the accused" for purposes of proving a Brady
violation. See 527 U.S. at 281-82.

For its part, the majority modifies the previous determina-
tions made by this Court by claiming that in Walker II, we
were merely accepting Walker’s pleadings as true for pur-
poses of determining whether his procedural default was
excused, rather than evaluating the facts as would be done for
purposes of evaluating the Brady claim itself. The majority
even goes so far as to declare that Walker II expressly
assumed the truth of Walker’s assertions. This is plainly not
the case. The opinion in Walker II never made such assump-
tion, explicitly or implicitly. Instead, the Court "[v]iew[ed]
the facts of the case at bar through the lens of Banks." 195
Fed. App’x at 172.

In arriving at its interpretation of Walker II, the majority
conflates the standard a court uses in ruling on a motion to
dismiss with the standard it uses to determine whether a peti-
tioner has put on evidence to overcome procedural default.
The Banks decision is particularly instructive in this regard,
for as in Banks, the lower court here dismissed Walker’s
Brady claim on account of procedural default. See 540 U.S.
at 689, 691. Yet the Banks decision acknowledged that the

bility component had been satisfied. See 195 Fed. App’x at 179 (Gregory,
J., concurring), id. at 184 n.4 (Williams, J., dissenting).
32 WALKER v. KELLY
standard for showing cause and prejudice to excuse proce-
dural default is the same as that for establishing the underly-
ing Brady claim. See id. at 691 ("[I]f Banks succeeds in
demonstrating ‘cause and prejudice,’ he will at the same time
succeed in establishing the elements of his . . . Brady . . .
claim.") Here, while the district court had not held an eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue of procedural default, we reached
our decision based on evidence beyond the pleadings, includ-
ing the affidavits of counsel and police officers involved in
the investigation of the Beale murder. Thus, when this Court
"[v]iew[ed] the facts of the case at bar through the lens of
Banks," 195 Fed. App’x at 172, it did not, and indeed could
not, view the facts in the light most favorable to Walker.

B.

Because the majority misinterpreted the effect of this
Court’s findings and conclusions in Walker II on the merits of
Walker’s Brady claim, it failed to determine whether the dis-
trict court violated the mandate rule by denying Walker’s
motion for summary judgment and holding an evidentiary
hearing on the Brady claim. "Few legal precepts are as firmly
established as the doctrine that the mandate of a higher court
is ‘controlling as to matters within its compass.’" United
States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Sprague
v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939)). According
to Bell, "[b]ecause this mandate rule is merely a specific
application of the law of the case doctrine, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, it compels compliance on remand
with the dictates of a superior court and forecloses relitigation
of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate
court." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., 845 F.2d 66, 69 (4th
Cir. 1988) ("[T]he [law of the case] doctrine applies both to
questions actually decided as well as to those decided by ‘nec-
essary implication’ . . . ."). Thus, on remand "a district court
must, except in rare circumstances, implement both the letter
and spirit of the . . . mandate, taking into account [our] opin-
 WALKER v. KELLY 33
ion and the circumstances it embraces." Bell, 5 F.3d at 66-67
(alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted). The majority fails to enforce this law.

Even though the majority in Walker II "remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on Walker’s Bianca Brady claim," 195
Fed. App’x at 177, the district court was bound by the find-
ings and conclusions in that opinion, which by necessary
implication required the granting of summary judgment in
favor of Walker. Cf. Volvo Trademark Holding Aktiebolaget
v. Clark Mach. Co., 510 F.3d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 2007) (con-
cluding that this Court’s determination that defendant could
state a claim against plaintiff under a statute necessarily
implied that the statute applied to plaintiff, and thus the dis-
trict court did not err in refusing to allow plaintiff to argue on
remand that the statute was inapplicable). "A mandate from
[an appellate] court ordering a new trial does not preclude the
district court from entering summary judgment if all of the
appropriate requirements are met." Perlmutter v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 54 F.3d 659, 662 (10th Cir. 1995) (alteration in the origi-
nal) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Publish-
ers Res., Inc. v. Walker-Davis Pubs., Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 559-
60 (7th Cir. 1985).

Nor are there "exceptional circumstances" in this case that
would compel the district court to disregard our findings and
conclusions. The Fourth Circuit has identified three categories
of exceptional circumstances: "(1) a subsequent trial produces
substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has
since made a contrary decision of law applicable to the issue,
or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
work manifest injustice." Sejman, 845 F.2d at 69 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); accord United States
v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th Cir. 1999). The second
and third of these circumstances are plainly inapplicable here,
and thus the only circumstance that could potentially apply is
the first: that the subsequent evidentiary hearing produced
substantially different evidence on Walker’s Brady claim. But
34 WALKER v. KELLY
as other courts have recognized, the "substantially different
evidence" exception "does not apply where a prior appeal has
not left the issue open for decision." Lyons v. Fisher, 888 F.2d
1071, 1075 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted); see also United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931
F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir. 1991). That is because "[i]f, by the
simple expedient of flaunting the law of the case, a trial court
which should have deferred to an appellate court’s resolution
of an issue could proceed to address the issue anew, then the
doctrine would disappear into thin air." Rivera-Martinez, 931
F.2d at 151.

Because our opinion in Walker II was dispositive of Walk-
er’s Brady claim, the district court erred in refusing to grant
summary judgment in favor of Walker and ultimately denying
his habeas petition. Furthermore, even assuming that the evi-
dence adduced at the evidentiary hearing was "substantially
different" than the record in Walker II, the "substantially dif-
ferent evidence" exception cannot apply because the district
court was foreclosed from relitigating the findings and con-
clusions of this Court. To reach a different result, the majority
modifies previous determinations by this Court, and I must
dissent on this basis.

II.

Walker alternatively contends that even if the district court
was not strictly bound by the legal determinations of this
Court, the district court nevertheless erred in finding that
Walker had not established his Brady claim. Specifically,
Walker contends that "[t]he factual record developed at the
evidentiary hearing in district court did not differ in any mate-
rial way from the factual record before this Court when it con-
cluded that the prosecution suppressed material, favorable
evidence." (Petr.’s Br. 38.) Given this, Walker argues that the
district court was not free to come to the opposite legal con-
clusions as those reached by this Court. The majority dis-
misses this argument in one brief paragraph, maintaining that
 WALKER v. KELLY 35
there was no previous merits determination by this Court and
that Walker’s argument "subverts the burden of proof."

First, as discussed above, there was a previous merits deter-
mination by this Court in Walker II on Walker’s Brady claim.
Second, Walker’s argument does not shift the burden of
proof. Rather, Walker simply sets out an application of the
law of the case doctrine, which the majority does not address.
Instead, the majority charts a new course and concludes that
the findings and decision of the district court were fully sup-
ported by the record.

In essence, Walker’s argument is a specific application of
the law of the case doctrine. Other circuits, relying on the law
of the case doctrine, have held that a district court is not free
to depart from a circuit court’s legal conclusions where the
evidence developed at the district court level was "substan-
tially similar" to the evidence considered by the circuit court
in a previous appeal. See, e.g., Africa v. City of Philadelphia
(In re City of Philadelphia Litig.), 158 F.3d 711, 720-22 (3d
Cir. 1998); Williams v. City of Dothan, 818 F.2d 755, 757-58
(11th Cir. 1987). Based on the Fourth Circuit’s application of
the law of the case doctrine as I set out above, this Court
should adopt this particular holding as well. Because the evi-
dence before this Court and the district court was "substan-
tially similar" and undoubtedly established all elements of
Walker’s Brady claim, the district court erred in denying
Walker’s habeas petition. In finding otherwise, the majority
advances several arguments which I need not address because
each relies on evidence that was considered and rejected by
this Court in Walker II.

III.

In this case, the district court violated the mandate rule and
erred in its conclusions as to all elements of Walker’s Brady
claim. I would, accordingly, reverse the decision of the dis-
trict court and remand with instructions to issue the writ of
36 WALKER v. KELLY
habeas corpus and grant Walker a new trial. I am troubled by
the majority’s choice to reject the conclusions previously
made by this Court in Walker II. When, as here, actual inno-
cence is at issue in a capital case involving such scant physi-
cal corroboration, justice requires that we adhere to the well-
established law of the case doctrine and specifically, the man-
date rule. Thus, I dissent.