Sharpe v. Bell

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MONTOYAE DONTAE SHARPE, 
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.  No. 09-6206
MICHAEL T. W. BELL,
Respondent-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.
(5:04-hc-00886-BO)

Argued: December 4, 2009

Decided: January 29, 2010

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and
Henry E. HUDSON, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkin-
son wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Hud-
son joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Clarence Joe DelForge, III, NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. William Gregory Duke, Greenville, North Caro-
2 SHARPE v. BELL
lina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, Attorney Gen-
eral, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Montoyae Dontae Sharpe was convicted of first degree
murder in North Carolina Superior Court and sentenced to life
in prison. After exhausting state post-conviction remedies,
Sharpe petitioned for habeas corpus in federal court, claiming
that his conviction was unconstitutional because it resulted
from ineffective assistance of counsel. Although he had pro-
cedurally defaulted on this claim, the district court held that
Sharpe had come forward with new evidence of "actual inno-
cence" sufficient to excuse his default. The district court then
ruled in Sharpe’s favor on the merits of his constitutional
claim. Yet in reaching its conclusions, the district court
ignored the several state post-conviction proceedings which
had determined that the evidence Sharpe presented was not
credible and that his constitutional claim was without merit.

Such a de novo do-over was impermissible under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"). Sharpe would have us substitute our own judg-
ment for the state court’s credibility determinations, disregard
the fact that the state courts soundly assessed each of his con-
tentions, and unfairly hindsight the performance of his own
trial counsel. Such an approach undermines the principles of
comity and federalism that the Supreme Court and Congress
have set forth in the context of federal habeas review. We
therefore reverse and remand with directions to dismiss the
petition.

I.

Dontae Sharpe was charged with killing a man named
George Radcliffe, who was shot to death on the night of Feb-
 SHARPE v. BELL 3
ruary 11, 1994, in downtown Greenville, North Carolina.
Radcliffe’s body was found inside his pickup truck on a
grassy lot, just off a downtown street. Inside the truck, police
officers found Radcliffe’s wallet, which contained fifty-three
dollars, and a coat later identified as belonging to one Wilbur
Mercer.

At trial, the state offered the testimony of two purported
eyewitnesses to the killing. Beatrice Stokes, twenty-seven
years old, and Charlene Johnson, fifteen years old, both testi-
fied that Sharpe sold drugs with a man named Mark Joyner
and was a leading drug dealer in the neighborhood where
Radcliffe’s body was found. Both testified that on the night
of the murder, they saw Sharpe, Joyner, and Radcliffe stand-
ing in the street next to Radcliffe’s pickup truck, that an argu-
ment broke out, and that Sharpe shot Radcliffe. Both stated
that Wilbur Mercer was also at the scene, and Stokes noted
the presence of several others.

Stokes testified that she immediately fled and called the
police when the shot went off. Johnson testified that she
watched Sharpe and Joyner load Radcliffe’s body into the
truck and drive it into the lot where it was found. Johnson
admitted that she had received a reward for coming forward.
Stokes testified that she had not received a reward but admit-
ted that she was probably using drugs at the time.

A third eyewitness, Alonzo Vines, lived in a house adjacent
to the lot where Radcliffe’s truck was found. He testified that
he was in his house on the night of the murder when he heard
a loud noise, looked out his window, and saw that a pickup
truck had been driven into the lot. He stated that he saw the
truck’s door was open and that two or three people were
standing next to it. He could not identify them, however,
because his view was blocked by dust on his windows. Seven
other witnesses testified for the state. The state’s medical
examiner testified as to the trajectory of the bullet and opined
that Radcliffe could have remained conscious after the shoot-
4 SHARPE v. BELL
ing for no more than 10 seconds. Police officers investigating
the murder testified that local residents appeared to be afraid
to get involved.

In his defense, Sharpe offered the testimony of his aunt and
her neighbor, who offered partial alibis, and of two witnesses
who testified that Stokes was untrustworthy. Sharpe also
attempted to introduce further testimony from one of these
witnesses, a woman named Tracy Highsmith. On voir dire,
Highsmith stated that her boyfriend, Damien Smith, had come
home on the night of the murder and confessed to shooting a
man, presumed to be Radcliffe, whom he had attempted to
rob. According to Highsmith, Smith repeated comments to
this effect several times over the next three weeks. Smith
committed suicide twenty-seven days after the murder, and
while Highsmith asserted that he had become increasingly
agitated after Radcliffe was killed, she also admitted that he
had repeatedly threatened suicide before Radcliffe’s death.
Although Sharpe’s attorney argued that Highsmith’s testi-
mony should be admitted under the dying declaration and
state of mind exceptions to the bar on hearsay evidence, the
court held that the testimony was inadmissible. A jury found
Sharpe guilty on July 24, 1995, and the North Carolina
Supreme Court sustained his conviction on appeal. State v.
Sharpe, 473 S.E.2d 3 (N.C. 1996).

On the day Sharpe was first arrested for the murder, Char-
lene Johnson had been beaten and stabbed by a group of
women for being a "snitch." Sharpe’s mother and aunt had
followed behind the women as they set out for Johnson’s
home and rescued Johnson from the attack. In the course of
taking her to the emergency room, they told her, in Johnson’s
words, that the "word on the street" was that Johnson was "the
one that said something about Dontae murdering Mr. Rad-
cliffe." For safety reasons, Johnson went to live outside of
Greenville, but her mother could not come with her, and she
returned after a few weeks. Johnson came to form a relation-
ship with Sharpe’s family, and eventually with Sharpe him-
 SHARPE v. BELL 5
self, visiting him in prison at least twice. Not long after his
conviction, Johnson recanted her testimony.

In February 1997, Sharpe filed a motion for appropriate
relief ("MAR") in North Carolina Superior Court, alleging
that the recantation entitled him to a new trial and raising, for
the first time, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
MAR court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that
Johnson’s recantation was not credible. It also held that the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim had been defaulted.

Sharpe then filed for habeas corpus in federal court, and the
district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on his claims.
Just prior to the hearing, a man named Dearl Powell came for-
ward, claiming to have witnessed the shooting and indentify-
ing Smith as Radcliffe’s killer. In Powell’s account, Radcliffe
was in the driver seat of the truck and Wilbur Mercer was in
the passenger seat when Smith shot Radcliffe through the
driver side window. According to Powell, after being shot,
Radcliffe drove the truck off. Powell began to testify at the
habeas hearing, but the district court cut him off before he
could be cross-examined and ordered that his evidence be
presented first in North Carolina court.

Sharpe filed another MAR in November 2001, seeking a
new trial under North Carolina law on the basis of newly dis-
covered evidence of actual innocence and renewing his inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim. A second evidentiary
hearing was held before the same judge who had considered
Sharpe’s earlier MAR. After listening to Powell and consider-
ing the entire evidentiary record, the court concluded that his
testimony was not credible and denied Sharpe’s actual inno-
cence claim. In addition, the court held that Sharpe’s ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim was not only defaulted, as it
had done previously, but also that it would fail on the merits.

Sharpe then returned to federal court. Without holding an
evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that Sharpe
6 SHARPE v. BELL
had sufficiently made out a claim of "actual innocence" under
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to justify setting aside
his procedural default under North Carolina law. Sharpe v.
Bell, 571 F.Supp.2d 675, 681 (E.D.N.C. 2009). It also rejected
the state’s statute-of-limitations defense. Id. at 680. The dis-
trict court then concluded that the failure of Sharpe’s counsel
to argue for the admission of Highsmith’s testimony under the
hearsay exceptions identified in Sharpe’s habeas petition vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment. Sharpe v. Bell, 595 F.Supp.2d
636, 644-45 (E.D.N.C. 2009). This appeal followed.

II.

A.

We begin with the district court’s conclusion that Sharpe’s
procedural default in raising his claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel should be excused.1 In general, "a federal
habeas court may not review constitutional claims when a
state court has declined to consider their merits on the basis
of an adequate and independent state procedural rule." Burket
v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 183 (4th Cir. 2000); see also
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977). The MAR
court held that Sharpe had procedurally defaulted under
N.C.G.S. § 15A–1419(a)(3), a statute we have repeatedly held
to be both adequate and independent. Lawrence v. Branker,
517 F.3d 700, 714 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). A fed-
eral habeas court "does not have license to question a state
court’s finding of procedural default" or to question "whether
the state court properly applied its own law." Barnes v.
Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 974 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). Nor is a procedural default waived when a state
court reaches the merits of a federal claim as an alternative
1
In light of the district court’s conclusion that the timeliness of Sharpe’s
federal habeas petition has been established as law of the case, we decline
the state’s invitation to consider anew whether Sharpe’s second petition
was time-barred under AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
 SHARPE v. BELL 7
basis for dismissal. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10
(1989); Ashe v. Styles, 39 F.3d 80, 86 (4th Cir. 1994).

Although the doctrine of procedural default limits federal
habeas review of state convictions, it does not provide an
absolute bar. In order to "balance the societal interests in
finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources
with the individual interest in justice that arises in the extraor-
dinary case," the Supreme Court has recognized an exception
for situations in which a petitioner’s incarceration represents
a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Schlup, 513 U.S. at
324. This exception excuses a procedural default where "a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the convic-
tion of one who is actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 496 (1986). If a petitioner presents "new reliable
evidence" supporting a claim of actual innocence, the habeas
court must determine whether "it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327-28.
This assessment is based on a review of "all the evidence, old
and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to
whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules of
admissibility that would govern at trial." House v. Bell, 547
U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (cit-
ing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28).

B.

Whether and to what extent AEDPA applies to Schlup
claims is the threshold question. One of the most significant
changes wrought by AEDPA was to provide that, with certain
limited exceptions, a petition for federal habeas must be
denied if it is founded on a "claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). With
respect to a Schlup claim of actual innocence, however, we do
not believe that this provision applies. State courts have no
occasion to adjudicate a Schlup claim as such and "the MAR
court’s primary holding—that the [ineffective assistance of
8 SHARPE v. BELL
counsel] claim was procedurally barred—was not an ‘adjudi-
cation on the merits’ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)." Stephens v.
Branker, 570 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2009); but see Cooper
v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 638 (9th Cir. 2009) (Rymer, J., con-
curring in denial of rehearing en banc).

But while a state court does not adjudicate a Schlup claim,
it may well decide matters relevant to one, quite possibly in
the course of deciding highly similar issues of state or federal
law. In addition to Section 2254(d), AEDPA also provides
that in a habeas proceeding challenging a state conviction, "a
determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The habeas
petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Id. While Sec-
tion 2254(d) thus has no application in the context of a Schlup
claim because it pertains only to a "claim that was adjudi-
cated" in state court, Section 2254(e)(1) does come into play
because it refers to the "determination of a factual issue"—
that is, to a state court’s findings of fact, rather than its con-
clusions of federal law. See Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2001); see also Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204,
212, 221 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying presumption of cor-
rectness under Section 2254(e)(1) in resolving Schlup claim).
This conclusion is generally consistent with the pre-AEDPA
standard of review for factual matters, which recognized the
need to defer to state court fact-finding as a matter of comity
and federalism. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432
(1983); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, (1981).

AEDPA does not make deference to state court fact-finding
dependent on the adequacy of the procedures followed by the
state court. Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2007);
Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d, 941, 951 & n. 17 (5th Cir.
2001); Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir.
2000). Nonetheless, the character of the process upon which
the state court based its conclusion may have some bearing on
whether a petitioner’s showing amounts to "clear and con-
 SHARPE v. BELL 9
vincing" evidence that the state court erred. Mendiola, 224
F.3d at 592. Where the state court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and explained its reasoning with some care, it should
be particularly difficult to establish clear and convincing evi-
dence of error on the state court’s part. This is especially so
when the court resolved issues like witness credibility, which
are "factual determinations" for purposes of Section
2254(e)(1). Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 858 (4th Cir.
2003). "[F]or a federal habeas court to overturn a state court’s
credibility judgments, the state court’s error must be stark and
clear." Cagle v. Branker, 520 F.3d 320, 324-25 (4th Cir.
2008) (citing Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 434); see also Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).

This all makes sense in the general scheme of things.
AEDPA in general and Section 2254(e) in particular were
designed "to further the principles of comity, finality, and fed-
eralism." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). Sec-
tion 2254(e)(1) plainly seeks to conserve judicial resources
and reflects Congress’s view that there is no reason for a do-
over in federal court when it comes to facts already resolved
by state tribunals. That section also reflects Congress’s
respect for principles of federalism, recognizing that a deci-
sion to set aside state court factual findings intrudes on the
state’s interest in administering its criminal law. See Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The deference Section
2254(e)(1) requires has particular salience when a state
court’s determinations closely track the legal issues before the
federal habeas court. Where a state court looks at the same
body of relevant evidence and applies essentially the same
legal standard to that evidence that the federal court does
under Schlup, Section 2254(e)(1) requires that the state
court’s findings of fact not be casually cast aside. See Miller,
474 U.S. at 113 (citation omitted). Indeed, the cavalier treat-
ment of such findings in federal Schlup proceedings would
contravene the course of federal-state relations set by the
Congress and the Supreme Court with great consistency over
a very considerable period of time.
10 SHARPE v. BELL
C.

In considering Sharpe’s petition, the district court found
that the combination of Sharpe’s two alibi witnesses, John-
son’s recantation, an absence of physical evidence linking
Sharpe to the crime, and the testimony of Highsmith and
Powell amounted to "a strong showing" under Schlup, and
that Sharpe’s procedural default on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim should therefore be excused. Sharpe, 571
F.Supp.2d at 681. Yet the MAR court considered all this evi-
dence and more, and specifically found that Powell’s testi-
mony, Highsmith’s hearsay testimony, and Johnson’s
recantation were not credible and that Johnson’s original testi-
mony at trial was. Unless Sharpe could present clear and con-
vincing evidence that those findings were unwarranted, see 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the district court was obliged to respect
them in ruling on Sharpe’s Schlup claim. The district court,
however, did not so much as acknowledge the MAR court’s
efforts, other than to note in passing that the motion based on
Powell’s testimony had been rejected. Sharpe, 571 F.Supp.2d
at 678. Nowhere in its discussion of Sharpe’s actual inno-
cence claim did it so much as mention the MAR court’s hav-
ing probed and assessed the evidence that was the basis for
the claim. See id. at 680-81.

The court’s failure to do so was error. At the outset, we
note that the MAR court provided a much more substantial
fact-finding process than the district court and was far better
positioned to decide the sorts of factual matters that the dis-
trict court opted to decide for itself. The MAR court heard
from nineteen witnesses altogether. The transcripts of the
MAR evidentiary hearings total more than three hundred
pages. Lest there be any doubt, the MAR court repeatedly
alluded to its impressions of the demeanor and comportment
of various witnesses and made it clear that its judgments were
informed by those observations. The district court, by con-
trast, held only a truncated evidentiary hearing and made no
findings of fact or assessments of credibility. Where, for
 SHARPE v. BELL 11
example, the MAR court concluded that Johnson’s recantation
was untrustworthy after hearing from a dozen different wit-
nesses on the matter, the district court credited Johnson’s
recantation without hearing even from Johnson, let alone any-
one else who could speak to the veracity of her statements.

We also note that the MAR court was tasked with an
inquiry similar to that required of the district court. It consid-
ered Sharpe’s claim for a new trial under North Carolina law
based on new evidence of actual innocence. The claim was
rejected after considering Powell’s testimony in light of a
holistic examination of the entire record, including both John-
son’s recantation and Highsmith’s story of Smith’s confes-
sion. The court’s decision was based on a preponderance of
the evidence standard. See State v. Beaver, 229 S.E.2d 179,
183 (N.C. 1976). The only appreciable respect in which the
state court’s legal analysis differed from Schlup was that the
court itself evaluated the evidence, rather than attempting to
predict the reaction of hypothetical jurors to that evidence.
See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 (actual innocence is based upon
"a probabilistic determination" that "no juror, acting reason-
ably, would have voted to find [petitioner] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt."). Given the similarity of the state proceed-
ings to petitioner’s habeas claims under Schlup, the state
court’s factual determinations should have exerted a heavy
pull on the habeas court’s adjudication.

D.

Turning to the reasoning of the MAR court’s opinion, we
note that the explanations it provided were commendably
thorough. The district court’s explanation of its Schlup ruling
consisted of five sentences. See Sharpe, 571 F.Supp.2d at 681.
By contrast, the MAR court’s analysis on the single issue of
Powell’s credibility took up eleven pages. And in terms of
substance, we find the MAR court’s conclusions to be plainly
reasonable and certainly uncontradicted by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
12 SHARPE v. BELL
In determining that Dearl Powell’s testimony "entirely
lacks credibility," the MAR court exhaustively catalogued the
problems with it. We touch only a few of those problems
here. Powell’s account did not square with the medical exam-
iner’s testimony as to the bullet’s trajectory. It was also incon-
sistent with the fact that Wilbur Mercer and Damien Smith
were like father and son and Mercer had been at Smith’s bed-
side when life support was turned off, yet in Powell’s account,
Mercer was sitting next to Radcliffe in the truck when Smith
fired the fatal shot. No explanation was provided for why
Smith would "endanger someone so close to him."

Powell’s claim that Radcliffe drove the car into Vines’s lot
was inconsistent with the medical examiner’s opinion that
Radcliffe would have lost all consciousness within seconds of
being shot. Powell’s claim that Smith had robbed Radcliffe
was inconsistent with the fact that money was found in Rad-
cliffe’s wallet. Powell’s account, in which Joyner "plays no
part," was inconsistent with the fact that Joyner pled guilty as
an accessory. Powell denied that the shooting had taken place
in Sharpe drug-selling territory, contradicting the testimony of
multiple witnesses.

The MAR court also noted reasons to doubt Powell’s
motive in testifying and his general trustworthiness. Powell
claimed that he was moved to come forward because he did
not want to see an innocent man go to jail, yet somehow Pow-
ell did not come forward for six years and thereby "allowed
not just one, but two men, the Defendant and Mark Joyner, to
serve prison sentences for a crime they did not commit." The
court noted that Powell adopted a "belligerent[ ]" attitude on
the stand inconsistent with his claim that it was his conscience
that prompted him to come forward. The court expressed
skepticism at Powell’s suggestion that it was simply a "‘coin-
cidence’" he came forward just in time for Sharpe’s federal
habeas hearing, and it noted that Powell sat with Sharpe’s
family and supporters throughout the MAR proceedings. It
 SHARPE v. BELL 13
also took account of Powell’s own criminal record and the
fact that he too was a drug dealer.

In contrast, the MAR court found that Johnson’s and
Stokes’s original trial testimony was believable. That testi-
mony was consistent with the rest of the evidentiary record in
every way that Powell’s testimony was not. Furthermore,
Johnson and Stokes "independently and separately" came for-
ward soon after Radcliffe’s shooting and gave accounts that
were consistent with one another. Both Stokes and Johnson
were subjected to rigorous cross-examination, but neither
wavered in her testimony. The truthfulness of Johnson’s origi-
nal testimony was also corroborated by numerous witnesses
who testified that Johnson consistently gave the same account
before trial, even though she had been "severely" beaten for
having identified Sharpe to the police. Both Stokes and John-
son "had to have known that it was very dangerous to spread
a lie, if it was one, about Dontae Sharpe."

The MAR court also found reasons to question the credibil-
ity of Johnson’s recantation and Highsmith’s hearsay testi-
mony. Johnson was "young and lonely" and only recanted
after having befriended Sharpe and his family. Highsmith’s
story was particularly dubious in light of the fact that,
although the police had originally suspected her of murdering
Smith, she somehow never told them what would have been
an exculpatory story of Smith’s confession and his subsequent
emotional turmoil and suicide. And despite the reward that
was being offered for information about the killing, High-
smith did not tell anyone her story until the eve of trial. The
court also took account of Highsmith’s criminal record. Fur-
thermore, even if Highsmith was telling the truth, the court
noted reasons to doubt the veracity of Smith’s supposed con-
fession. Smith was a drug user and was emotionally disturbed,
as evidenced by his suicide. Any confession would also need
to be discounted as hearsay, uttered entirely in private, rather
than offered under oath in court.
14 SHARPE v. BELL
Finally, the MAR court noted that investigators could not
find witnesses and that "[p]eople behaved as though they were
afraid to speak." That finding was consistent with the killer
being a live drug dealer, capable of striking fear into the heart
of the community, rather than a dead man, who could strike
fear into no one. And the MAR court recognized that High-
smith’s story may well have formed a "nucleus" around which
to build a story implicating Smith, who by then was "conve-
niently dead."

Based on all of these considerations, the state court con-
cluded that Sharpe had not established by a preponderance of
the evidence that Johnson’s and Stokes’s trial testimony had
been called into any real doubt. That conclusion and the sub-
sidiary determinations on which it rested should have been
taken into account in the district court’s analysis of the
requirements set out in Schlup. Even without the deference
that AEDPA mandates, there is little basis for concluding that
Sharpe had successfully made out his Schlup claim. But when
the requirements of Section 2254(e)(1) are factored in, the
appropriate course for the district court was apparent.

III.

A.

Sharpe’s flawed Schlup claim is not the only problem with
his habeas petition. Even if the procedural default could
somehow be excused, Sharpe’s ineffective assistance argu-
ment has its own deficiencies. Sharpe’s ineffectiveness claim
centers on the proposed testimony of Tracy Highsmith, who,
as noted, was prepared to tell the jury that her boyfriend
Damien Smith had confessed to the murder prior to his sui-
cide three weeks later. Sharpe argues that his attorney’s fail-
ure to argue for the admission of Highsmith’s testimony at
trial either as a statement against penal interest under North
Carolina evidentiary law or under the due process principle
 SHARPE v. BELL 15
established in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973),
denied him the right to effective assistance of counsel.

To make out such a claim, Sharpe must show (1) "that
counsel’s performance was deficient," and (2) "that the defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). With respect to the
first prong of the Strickland test, Sharpe "must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of rea-
sonableness." Id. at 688. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s perfor-
mance "must be highly deferential," and a reviewing court
must avoid the biases of hindsight. Id. at 689. Under the sec-
ond prong of the test, Sharpe must establish that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent." Id. at 694.

It should be obvious that the failure of Sharpe’s gateway
actual innocence claim under Schlup makes it less likely that
Sharpe’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim would suc-
ceed on the merits. First, unlike the Schlup claim, Sharpe’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected in the
state court proceedings, and the state courts’ disposition of
that claim is entitled to the full measure of AEDPA deference.
Second, the range of materials favorable to Sharpe’s case that
are relevant to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
more restricted than those relevant to his actual innocence
claim. Newly discovered post-trial evidence -– Powell’s testi-
mony and Charlene Johnson’s recantation—would have no
bearing on Sharpe’s particular Sixth Amendment claim.

As discussed, Section 2254(d) ordinarily bars federal
habeas relief for "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings," and the MAR court rejected
Sharpe’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on substan-
tive, as well as procedural, grounds. Despite Sharpe’s conten-
tion to the contrary, a state court’s alternative holding on the
merits of a constitutional claim qualifies for deference under
16 SHARPE v. BELL
Section 2254(d).2 Stephens, 570 F.3d at 208; accord Brooks
v. Bagley, 513 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Harris,
489 U.S. at 264 n.10. In order to win relief, Sharpe would
therefore need to show that the MAR court’s adjudication on
the merits either "was contrary to, or involved an unreason-
able application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), or was "based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Furthermore,
under Section 2254(e)(1), factual findings must be taken as
correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005).

B.

In this case, the MAR court found that Sharpe failed both
prongs of Strickland because Highsmith’s testimony would
not have been admissible under the hearsay exceptions Sharpe
claims his attorney should have invoked. The court reasoned
that since the testimony would not have been admissible,
Sharpe’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to argue for its
introduction.

Certainly, the MAR court did not reach a result "contrary
to" Strickland, since it relied on the case and correctly articu-
lated its holding. Nor did it unreasonably apply Strickland in
concluding that, since Highsmith’s testimony was inadmissi-
ble, it was neither objectively unreasonable nor prejudicial to
Sharpe’s case to refrain from seeking its admission. "Counsel
2
Sharpe also asserts that the MAR court rejected his ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim "without any substantive analysis," but that allega-
tion is plainly untrue. The MAR court’s discussion of Sharpe’s claim was
extensive, and Sharpe himself takes issue with various points in the court’s
reasoning. At any rate, § 2254(d) applies to a state court’s rejection of a
constitutional claim even where the court "did not articulate the rationale
underlying its rejection" of the claim. Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158
(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
 SHARPE v. BELL 17
is not required to engage in the filing of futile motions."
Moody v. Polk, 408 F.3d 141, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted). Therefore, the only question is whether the MAR
court’s conclusion that the testimony would not have been
admissible was unreasonable.

The North Carolina Rules of Evidence allow a person’s
statement that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay to be
admitted in a criminal trial if, inter alia, the statement "so far
tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability . . . that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the state-
ment unless he believed it to be true" and if "corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the state-
ment." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(3). The MAR court con-
cluded that a confession by Smith made at home and only to
his live-in girlfriend was not one that would tend to subject
Smith to criminal liability. It also held that the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement indicated that the
statement was not trustworthy.

The district court cast aside this conclusion, arguing that
there was no North Carolina authority for the proposition that
a statement made only to a live-in girlfriend could not consti-
tute a statement against penal interest. See Sharpe, 595
F.Supp.2d at 643. It is beyond the mandate of federal habeas
courts, however, to correct the interpretation by state courts of
a state’s own laws. Cagle, 520 F.3d at 324 (citing Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)). To do so only on the
basis of an absence of authority to support the state court’s
conclusion, rather than the presence of contrary authority, is
particularly misguided.

Thus, Sharpe’s entire Sixth Amendment claim, and the cor-
rectness of the result reached by the district court, hinges on
establishing that it was unreasonable for the MAR court to
conclude that the due process interpretation given in Cham-
bers, 410 U.S. 284, would not have supported the introduction
of Highsmith’s testimony. Chambers required that a defen-
18 SHARPE v. BELL
dant be allowed to introduce evidence that a third party had
confessed to the crime of which the defendant stood accused.
Id. at 302. In Chambers, however, the third party confessed
in writing, orally confessed to three different people, and was
available to testify at trial. Id. at 297. The MAR court noted
that the deceased Smith’s alleged oral confession only to his
girlfriend differed in every respect from the situation in
Chambers, and that, according to the Supreme Court, Cham-
bers "specifically confined its holding to the ‘facts and cir-
cumstances’ presented in that case." U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.
303, 316 (1998) (plurality) (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at
303).

In addition, the result in Chambers was predicated on the
existence of "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness,"
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, and the MAR court provided
numerous reasons to consider the Highsmith hearsay untrust-
worthy. These included Highsmith’s criminal record, the fact
that she never came forward with her testimony until the eve
of trial, the fact that Smith was obviously emotionally dis-
turbed, the fact that Smith allegedly claimed to have robbed
the victim when Radcliffe’s wallet was found in the truck
with fifty three dollars in it, and the fact that no evidence in
the record at the time of trial corroborated Highsmith’s testi-
mony.

As it had done with the MAR court’s North Carolina Rules
of Evidence ruling, the district court rejected the MAR court’s
conclusion on Chambers. It never once considered the differ-
ences noted by the MAR court between the Highsmith hear-
say and the facts of Chambers. Instead, it offered a smattering
of reasons to credit Highsmith’s testimony, including John-
son’s post-trial recantation. Sharpe, 595 F.Supp.2d at 644.
And it took issue with the MAR court’s reasoning that the
money in Radcliffe’s wallet undermined Highsmith’s story,
since Radcliffe might have been robbed without losing all of
his cash. Id. at 644-45. The court ignored all the other indica-
tions of untrustworthiness cited by the MAR court.
 SHARPE v. BELL 19
Furthermore, in assessing Sharpe’s Strickland claim, the
district court also erred in taking into account Johnson’s
recantation. Johnson’s recantation occurred after Sharpe’s
conviction, and it cannot be used to suggest that it was more
likely that the Highsmith hearsay would have been admitted,
since neither Sharpe’s counsel nor the trial judge could possi-
bly have been aware of it. Nor can Johnson’s recantation be
used to suggest that Sharpe might not have been convicted if
Highsmith’s testimony had been introduced, since the jury
would not have known of it either. "[A] court deciding an
actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of
counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular
case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). The North Carolina courts
were certainly reasonable in determining that the difficulties
in Sharpe’s case lay not in any deficiency of counsel but in
the understandable reluctance of the state system to buy a
belated and contrived attempt to pin Radcliffe’s murder on
someone who was all-too-conveniently deceased.

IV.

There is little left to say as to Sharpe’s petition except that
it overlooks the state courts’ efforts at every turn and in every
way. Quite aside from the damage inflicted on AEDPA and
dual sovereignty, a ruling in Sharpe’s favor would fail to rec-
ognize the dedicated manner in which the state court system
went about its work. The encouragement of capable and con-
scientious judging on the part of states is what comity is all
about. The state courts did their job well here and this case is
accordingly remanded with directions that the federal habeas
petition be dismissed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED