Sidney v. Com.

Present: All the Justices

ALLEN EDWARD SIDNEY, JR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 092313 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
November 4, 2010
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Acting on an anonymous tip that there were arrest

warrants outstanding for an individual who was at a particular

location, police officers conducted an investigative traffic

stop of the defendant’s vehicle. In this appeal, we consider

whether the tip provided reasonable suspicion to justify the

stop.

Allen Edward Sidney, Jr. was indicted in the Circuit

Court of the City of Petersburg for possession of cocaine in

violation of Code § 18.2-250. Sidney was also charged with

possession of marijuana in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1.

Thereafter, Sidney filed a motion to suppress, claiming the

stop of his vehicle, which resulted in his arrest and recovery

of the illegal drugs, violated his rights as secured under the

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article

1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia. ∗ Following an

∗
The rights Sidney asserts under the Fourth Amendment are
co-extensive with those rights afforded under Article 1,
Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia. El-Amin v.
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 15, 19 n.3, 607 S.E.2d 115, 116 n.3
(2005); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 348, 337 S.E.2d
273, 274 (1985). For purposes of this opinion we include
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the motion.

Sidney entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges,

preserving for appeal the issues raised in his motion to

suppress. Code § 19.2-254.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, a judge of that

Court denied Sidney’s petition for appeal in an unpublished

order. Sidney v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2125-08-2 (August

19, 2009). For the reasons stated in that order, a panel of

the Court subsequently denied Sidney’s petition for appeal.

Sidney v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2125-08-2 (October 19,

2009). We awarded Sidney this appeal.

BACKGROUND

Under familiar principles of appellate review, we will

state “the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court, and

will accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable

inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.” Murphy v.

Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 836, 837

(2002)(applying this principle in a case involving a motion to

suppress evidence). The evidence presented at the suppression

hearing showed that on December 14, 2007, Petersburg police

officer Dustin Sloan received a radio dispatch that an

Sidney’s state constitutional rights in our discussion of his
federal constitutional rights.

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anonymous “tip” had been called in to police headquarters.

The tip reported that Sidney was at 1300 Patterson Street,

driving a tan Jeep Cherokee with wood grain side paneling, and

that there were outstanding warrants in the city for his

arrest. The tip described Sidney as a black male,

approximately 5’7” or 5’9” tall.

Upon arriving at 1300 Patterson Street, Officer Sloan

observed a vehicle matching the tip’s description parked in

the driveway. Officer Sloan, who had never seen Sidney

before, observed a man in the driver’s seat of the vehicle.

Officer Sloan “ran” the vehicle’s license plate and discovered

it was registered to Sidney’s mother.

Meanwhile, Officer J.W. Schmidt was dispatched to 1300

Patterson Street “to locate a wanted subject” named “Allen

Edward Sidney” for whom there were outstanding arrest

warrants. The dispatcher described Sidney as a black male,

with brown eyes and black hair, 5’3” tall, weighing 165

pounds, and with a birth date of “5-26-1974.” The dispatcher

also informed Officer Schmidt about a tan Jeep Cherokee with

“30-day tags” in the driveway of 1300 Patterson Street.

While Officer Sloan waited for backup officers to arrive,

the vehicle exited from the driveway and proceeded northbound

on Patterson Street. As the vehicle drove past him, Officer

Sloan saw the driver’s head and arms. Officer Sloan notified

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backup officers and followed the vehicle. After backup

officers joined him, Officer Sloan stopped the vehicle on the

suspicion that the driver was wanted on outstanding arrest

warrants.

Officer Schmidt then approached the driver’s side of the

vehicle and asked the driver for his license and the vehicle

registration. After identifying Sidney as the driver, Officer

Schmidt radioed dispatch and confirmed that Sidney was the

wanted subject. Officer Schmidt then informed Sidney of the

outstanding warrants and placed him under arrest. A search

incident to Sidney’s arrest uncovered cocaine and marijuana.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Sloan testified that

he had determined what the warrants were for prior to stopping

the vehicle driven by Sidney, but could not recall if they

were for felonies or misdemeanors. Upon questioning by the

circuit court, Officer Sloan admitted that he had not

personally checked the police database to confirm that there

were outstanding warrants for Sidney’s arrest. Officer Sloan

explained that the dispatcher on duty verifies the existence

of outstanding warrants. He further explained that dispatch

does not tell the officers in the field what the warrants are

for, only that they exist. Officer Schmidt corroborated this

testimony when he testified without objection that dispatch

had advised him that outstanding warrants existed for Sidney’s

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arrest. In denying the motion to suppress, the court ruled

that the dispatcher’s knowledge of the existence of the

outstanding warrants could be imputed to the officers.

DISCUSSION

Sidney contends that the Court of Appeals erred in

upholding the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress

because the anonymous tip did not supply the reasonable

suspicion necessary under the Fourth Amendment to justify the

traffic stop. He maintains that the record does not reflect

that the police confirmed the existence of the outstanding

warrants before stopping him, and even if they did, his

seizure flowed entirely from an unreliable anonymous tip.

The Commonwealth responds that Sidney fails to view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

According to the Commonwealth, the police confirmed the

existence of the outstanding warrants for Sidney’s arrest

before stopping the vehicle he was driving. The Commonwealth

asserts that this confirmation corroborated the information

offered by the anonymous tip and provided the reasonable

suspicion necessary to stop the vehicle.

Sidney’s claim that he was seized in violation of the

Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact

that we review de novo. Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689,

694, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2008); McCain v. Commonwealth, 275

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Va. 546, 551, 659 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2008). We give deference

to the factual findings of the trial court but independently

determine whether the manner in which the challenged evidence

was obtained satisfies the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment. Harris, 276 Va. at 694, 668 S.E.2d at 145; Jackson

v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004).

The defendant has the burden to show that, when viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was reversible

error. Harris, 276 Va. at 695, 668 S.E.2d at 145; Jackson,

267 Va. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 598.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. While limited in its purpose and length, an

investigative stop (commonly referred to as a “Terry stop”),

such as the traffic stop in this case, constitutes a seizure

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Harris, 276 Va. at 694, 668

S.E.2d at 144; Jackson, 267 Va. at 672, 594 S.E.2d at 598. An

investigative stop must be justified by reasonable suspicion,

based upon specific and articulable facts, of criminal

activity. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989);

Harris, 276 Va. at 694, 668 S.E.2d at 144; Jackson, 267 Va. at

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672, 594 S.E.2d at 598. Additionally, pursuant to “the fruit

of the poisonous tree” doctrine, evidence seized during an

illegal stop is not admissible at trial. Harris, 276 Va. at

694, 668 S.E.2d at 145; Jackson, 267 Va. at 672, 594 S.E.2d at

598.

Although a less demanding standard than probable cause,

reasonable suspicion is more than an unparticularized

suspicion or “hunch.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-

24 (2000). Whether reasonable suspicion exists depends on the

“totality of the circumstances,” which includes “the content

of the information possessed by police and its degree of

reliability.” Jackson, 267 Va. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 598-99

(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

“[T]here are situations in which an anonymous tip,

suitably corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of

reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the

investigatory stop.’ ” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270

(2000) (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327). We explained in

Harris:

The analysis regarding the use of an anonymous
tip to provide reasonable suspicion for an
investigative stop was clarified by this Court in
Jackson, in which we relied upon the United States
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
[J.L.] and [White]. See Jackson, 267 Va. at 674-75,
594 S.E.2d at 599-600. An anonymous tip has a
relatively low degree of reliability, requiring more
information to sufficiently corroborate the

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 information contained in the tip. See J.L., 529 U.S.
at 270; Jackson, 267 Va. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 599.
. . .

The indicia of reliability of an anonymous tip
may be bolstered when the tipster provides
predictive information, which the police can use to
test the tipster’s basis of knowledge and
credibility. Jackson, 267 Va. at 676, 594 S.E.2d at
600. However, for such predictive information to
bolster the tipster’s basis of knowledge or
credibility, the information must relate to the
alleged criminal activity.

276 Va. at 695-96, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46.

The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts

in Harris, Jackson, J.L., and White. Those cases involved

whether the anonymous tip alone provided reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268 (anonymous

tip that a man at a bus stop was carrying a gun); White, 496

U.S. at 327 (anonymous tip that a woman possessed cocaine);

Harris, 276 Va. at 693, 668 S.E.2d at 144 (anonymous tip that

a driver was intoxicated); Jackson, 267 Va. at 670, 594 S.E.2d

at 597 (anonymous tip that a passenger of a car was

brandishing a firearm). Here, the tipster’s knowledge of

criminal activity is not at issue because, when viewing the

police officers’ testimony in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, a reasonable inference must be drawn that the

dispatcher verified the existence of the outstanding warrants

for Sidney’s arrest prior to the traffic stop and communicated

that information to one of the officers. The dispatcher’s

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knowledge of the outstanding warrants is also imputed to the

arresting officers in this case. See United States v.

Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-33 (1985).

It is not known whether these outstanding warrants were

for felonies or misdemeanors. Nonetheless, “an officer has

probable cause, and indeed the legal duty, to arrest upon

knowledge of the existence of an unexecuted felony warrant for

the suspect.” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 151, 153, 191

S.E.2d 239, 240 (1972). Moreover, Code § 19.2-81(F) allows an

officer to arrest “for an alleged misdemeanor not committed in

his presence when the officer receives a radio message from

his department . . . that a warrant or capias for such offense

is on file.” Because the police had probable cause to believe

that Sidney had committed a crime and to arrest him when

found, the only issue that remains is whether the police had

reasonable suspicion that Sidney was driving the tan Jeep

Cherokee. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985)(“if

there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion

that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person

may be stopped in order to identify him, to question him

briefly, or to detain him briefly while attempting to obtain

additional information”).

In J.L., the United States Supreme Court stated that an

anonymous tipster’s “accurate description of a subject’s

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readily observable location and appearance is of course

reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police

correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to

accuse.” 529 U.S. at 272. The anonymous tipster in this case

reported that Sidney – a black male, approximately 5’7” or

5’9” tall – was wanted and driving a tan Jeep Cherokee with

wood grain side paneling at 1300 Patterson Street. Officer

Sloan arrived at that location and observed a black male in

the driver’s seat of a tan Jeep Cherokee with wood grain side

paneling. Officer Sloan also independently determined that

the vehicle was registered to Sidney’s mother. Considering

the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Officer

Sloan had reasonable suspicion to believe that Sidney was

driving the vehicle. Thus, the investigative stop for the

limited purpose of establishing the driver’s identity did not

violate Sidney’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a

suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity

. . . may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to

the officer at the time.”).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals did

not err. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals

will be affirmed.

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 Affirmed.

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