Kellermann v. McDonough

Present: All the Justices

MICHAEL H. KELLERMANN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF JAIMEE ELIZABETH KELLERMANN, DECEASED
OPINION BY
CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 081718 November 5, 2009 ∗
PAUL MCDONOUGH, ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Daniel T. Balfour, Judge

I.

The primary question that we consider in this appeal is

whether adults who agree to supervise and care for a child owe

a duty to exercise reasonable care in the supervision and care

of that child.

II.

Michael H. Kellermann, administrator of the estate of his

daughter, Jaimee Elizabeth Kellermann, filed a wrongful death

action against Paul McDonough and Paula McDonough (the

McDonoughs). Kellermann alleged in the complaint that Paul

McDonough and Paula McDonough breached numerous duties owed to

Jaimee and as a result of such breaches Jaimee died. The

McDonoughs filed a demurrer to the complaint asserting, among

other things, that they owed no duties in tort to Jaimee, a

14-year-old child under their supervision and care. Even

∗
The prior opinion in this appeal issued July 17, 2009,
was withdrawn and a rehearing was granted by Order of the
Court dated September 16, 2009.

1
though the circuit court initially overruled the demurrer, the

court subsequently sustained the demurrer and entered an order

dismissing the complaint. Kellermann appeals.

III.

A.

The purpose of a demurrer is to determine whether a

complaint states a cause of action upon which relief may be

granted. Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709,

712-13, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006); Welding, Inc. v. Bland

County Service Auth., 261 Va. 218, 226, 541 S.E.2d 909, 913

(2001). "A demurrer admits the truth of all properly pleaded

material facts. 'All reasonable factual inferences fairly and

justly drawn from the facts alleged must be considered in aid

of the pleading. However, a demurrer does not admit the

correctness of the pleader's conclusions of law.' " Dodge v.

Randolph-Macon Woman's College, 276 Va. 1, 5, 661 S.E.2d 801,

803 (2008) (citations omitted); accord Tronfeld, 272 Va. at

713, 636 S.E.2d at 449; Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass’n,

265 Va. 127, 131-32, 575 S.E.2d 858, 861 (2003). With these

principles in mind, we will consider the litigants' arguments.

2
 B.

Kellermann pled the following facts in his complaint that

are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. Michael

Kellermann and Elizabeth Kellermann (the Kellermanns) were the

natural parents of Jaimee Kellermann. At the time of the

events described in the complaint, they lived in Wake Forest,

North Carolina.

In December 2004, the McDonoughs, husband and wife who

resided in Henrico County, informed the Kellermanns that the

McDonoughs' daughter, Becka McDonough, was "having a 'tough

time of it.' " The McDonoughs told the Kellermanns that

Becka’s "outlook and mood" might improve if she spent time

with her former classmate, Jaimee, who had moved from Henrico

County with her family to North Carolina in 2002. The

McDonoughs asked the Kellermanns if "Jaimee Kellermann could

stay a night or two at the McDonoughs' home."

The Kellermanns agreed that Jaimee could spend one night

with the McDonoughs and Becka. On Saturday, December 4, 2004,

Michael Kellermann left his home with Jaimee and traveled 150

miles, approximately half the distance between their home in

North Carolina and Richmond, Virginia, where they met Paula

McDonough and Becka. "Michael Kellermann asked . . . Paula

McDonough what activities were planned during Jaimee

3
Kellermann's stay at the McDonoughs' home. . . . Paula

McDonough said that they planned to go to the new shopping

mall. . . . Paula McDonough said that she would be taking the

girls to the mall. Michael Kellermann then said that Jaimee

Kellermann was not to be driven by any inexperienced drivers.

He then emphasized that his daughter was not to be in a car

with any young, male drivers, stating 'no boys with cars.'

The rule was intended for Jaimee Kellermann's safety and was a

rule enforced by the Kellermanns at their home." Paula

McDonough agreed and said "'don't worry, I promise we'll take

good care of her,' or words to that effect." Paula McDonough

returned to her home in Henrico County with Jaimee and Becka.

Later that day, Paula McDonough took Jaimee and Becka to

a shopping mall and movie theater complex in Henrico County.

Paula McDonough "dropped the girls off, and drove away,

leaving them unsupervised."

Mary Madelyn Lane (Maddie) joined Becka and Jaimee at the

shopping mall. All the girls were 14 years old and were

former classmates as well as best friends. The girls planned

to go to a movie theater.

Before the girls went to the movie theater, Nathan

DeFrank (Nate), a 17-year-old boy who was Becka's friend,

arrived at the shopping center in his car. Nate had a

reputation for reckless behavior. Allegedly, Becka had "gone

4
street racing with [Nate]; Becka McDonough may have driven the

car at times." Nate had been stopped by police officers

previously because Nate had driven his car more than 20 miles

per hour over the speed limit.

After meeting Nate, the girls attended a movie with Nate

and another young male, Bruce MacConnell, who was 15 years

old. After the movie concluded, Becka spoke, by telephone,

with her mother, Paula McDonough. Becka either asked Paula

McDonough if the girls could obtain a ride home with Nate, or

Becka "informed . . . Paula McDonough that the girls were

going to be driven [home] by [Nate]." Even though the

Kellermanns had instructed Paula McDonough that their

daughter, Jaimee, "was not to be driven by any non-adult

drivers," Paula McDonough "purposefully instructed or

otherwise permitted the girls to go home with [Nate] in his

car."

Jaimee and Maddie did not want to ride in the car with

Nate. After learning that Paula McDonough had directed the

girls to obtain a ride home with Nate, Jaimee and Maddie

"separated from Becka McDonough, [Nate], and Bruce." Jaimee

and Maddie tried to contact, by telephone, Maddie's father,

mother and brother. Jaimee and Maddie were unable to contact

them. Jaimee and Maddie also tried to contact one other

person, by telephone, but they were not successful.

5
 Jaimee and Maddie reluctantly got into Nate's car about

10:00 p.m. Nate began to "drive wildly." "On a two-lane,

winding road, [Nate] drove [his car] at speeds that at times

approached or exceeded 80 miles per hour." Jaimee and Maddie,

"clutching each others['] hands in the back seat, begged

[Nate] to slow down or to let them out. At one point, while

driving at or over 25 miles per hour, [Nate] opened his door

and told Jaimee Kellermann and Maddie Lane they could get out

of the moving car if they wished."

"Fearing for her life, Jaimee Kellermann sent a 'text

message' to her father and a friend. She said to her friend

in real-time messages that: she wanted to go home, that she

wanted to get away from the 'guys,' and that she feared she

would 'die.' She also said that 'they're planning on street

racing.' "

As Nate drove his car, he approached oncoming "headlights

in the distance. [Nate] slammed on the brakes and pulled the

hand brake. [His] car skidded and the front end spun to the

right side of the road, causing the rear left passenger side

of the car, where Jaimee Kellermann was seated, [to leave the

road and] slam into a tree. The car recoiled off the tree and

came to rest in the roadway. The car left a skid mark 173

feet long, and a 'yaw mark' that measured 92 feet." When Nate

6
lost control of his car, he was traveling at least 77 miles

per hour.

Jaimee was transported by helicopter to the Virginia

Commonwealth University Medical Center, where she died the

next morning. Paula McDonough was informed of the car

accident and she went to the hospital. She repeatedly told

Maddie's parents "that she feared that she was 'going to be

sued' for directing the girls to go in [Nate]'s car, which

violated the Kellermann's clear instructions."

IV.

A.

Kellermann argues that he pled a cause of action in tort

against the McDonoughs and that they owed a duty of care to

Jaimee. Kellermann alleged that Jaimee was a 14-year-old

minor; she was visiting the McDonoughs' home at their

invitation; she was dependent upon the McDonoughs to make wise

decisions about her care and safety; and the McDonoughs

breached this duty of care. Responding, the McDonoughs argue

that they owed no duty of care to Jaimee, and hence the

circuit court properly sustained their demurrer. We disagree

with the McDonoughs' argument.

We have stated that a "plaintiff who seeks to establish

actionable negligence must plead the existence of a legal

duty, violation of that duty, and proximate causation which

7
results in injury." Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,

259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2000); accord Marshall

v. Winston, 239 Va. 315, 318, 389 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1990); Fox

v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 73-74, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1988);

Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61, 365

S.E.2d 751, 754 (1988); Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 192 Va.

776, 780, 66 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1951).

The issue whether a legal duty in tort exists is a pure

question of law. Yuzefovsky v. St. John's Wood Apartments,

261 Va. 97, 106, 540 S.E.2d 134, 139 (2001); Burns v. Johnson,

250 Va. 41, 45, 458 S.E.2d 448, 451 (1995). If the

allegations in a complaint are legally sufficient to establish

the existence of a duty, then a jury, upon consideration of

the evidence, must determine whether the duty has been

performed. Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 106, 540 S.E.2d at 139;

Acme Markets, Inc. v. Remschel, 181 Va. 171, 178, 24 S.E.2d

430, 434 (1943).

The gist of Kellermann's claim against the McDonoughs is

that they had a common law duty to supervise and care for

Jaimee, a 14-year-old child who was dependent upon the

McDonoughs' care and supervision. We agree with Kellermann

that he pled a common law cognizable cause of action in

negligence against the McDonoughs. We hold that when a parent

relinquishes the supervision and care of a child to an adult

8
who agrees to supervise and care for that child, the

supervising adult must discharge that duty with reasonable

care. However, such adult who agrees to supervise and care

for a child upon the relinquishment of that care and

supervision by the child's parent is not an insurer of the

child's safety. Rather, the supervising adult must discharge

his or her duties as a reasonably prudent person would under

similar circumstances.

In this case, Kellermann pled sufficient facts that

support the existence of this common law duty. As we have

already stated, both Paula and Paul McDonough invited Jaimee

to visit their family, and the McDonoughs knew Jaimee was a

14-year-old child. Kellermann alleged that Jaimee was in the

care of the McDonoughs for approximately two days, that she

was dependent upon their supervision and care, that they

breached their duty to supervise and care for her, and that

she died as a result of the McDonoughs' breaches of duty.

We note that our holding is consistent with the majority

rule embraced by most states that have considered the issue

whether an adult who agrees to supervise and care for a minor

has a duty in tort to exercise reasonable care in the

supervision of that minor. See e.g., Laite v. Baxter, 191

S.E.2d 531, 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (" 'measure of precaution

which must be taken by one having a child in his care, who

9
stands in no relation to the child except that he has

undertaken to care for it, is that care which a prudent person

would exercise under like circumstances' ") (citation

omitted); Putney v. Keith, 98 Ill. App. 285, 291 (Ill. App.

Ct. 1901) ("that which is ordinary care as respects adults,

may not be as regards children; nevertheless, as regards

children as well as adults, the care of persons having no

special relation to them, required by law, is that which

prudent people exercise under like circumstances"); Hernandez

v. Toney, 289 So. 2d 318, 320 (La. Ct. App. 1973) ("'[t]he

general rule, however, is that a person who undertakes the

control and supervision of a child has the duty to use

reasonable care commensurate with the reasonably foreseeable

risks of harm'"); Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313, 313 (N.Y.

1965) ("[e]ven without compensation, when defendants undertook

to control a young child and provide care for her, they became

responsible for her injury through their negligence" and "were

required to use reasonable care to protect the infant

plaintiff from injury").

If this Court were to agree with the McDonoughs, that

they do not owe a duty in tort to supervise and care for a

child whose parents have relinquished such supervision and

control to them, such holding would yield absurd results. For

example, an adult who agreed to supervise and care for a group

10
of four-year-old children could permit the youngsters to play

in a street at a dangerous and busy intersection, and yet that

supervising adult would not be subject to tort liability for

her negligent supervision and care. Additionally, under the

McDonoughs' view of this case, an adult who agreed to baby-sit

and care for a group of four-year-old boys in her home

overnight could allow the boys to play with loaded pistols

without being subject to any tort liability in the event one

of the boys fired a pistol and killed another child.

B.

Kellermann argues that he pled sufficient facts in his

complaint that would support a conclusion that Paul McDonough

and Paula McDonough assumed a duty to Jaimee and that they

were required to discharge that duty with reasonable care.

Continuing, Kellermann asserts that the circuit court erred by

sustaining the demurrer to his claim of assumption of a duty.

Responding, the McDonoughs contend that Kellermann failed to

plead a viable cause of action for assumption of a duty in

tort by them. Additionally, Paul McDonough assigns as cross-

error the circuit court's failure to sustain the demurrer

filed on his behalf because the only allegations of alleged

liability on his part regarding this claim involved the

conduct of his wife.

11
 This Court has recognized on many occasions that "[i]t is

ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though

gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting

carefully, if he acts at all." Nolde Bros. v. Wray, 221 Va.

25, 28, 266 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1980) (quoting Glanzer v.

Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922)). We recently restated

this principle in Fruiterman v. Granata, 276 Va. 629, 645, 668

S.E.2d 127, 136 (2008) and Didato v. Strehler, 262 Va. 617,

628, 554 S.E.2d 42, 48 (2001). Accord Ring v. Poelman, 240

Va. 323, 326, 397 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1990); Cofield v. Nuckles,

239 Va. 186, 192, 387 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1990).

In Didato, we observed that the common law principle of

assumption of a duty is embodied in the Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 323:

" 'One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection
of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if
"(a) his failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of such harm, or
"(b) the harm is suffered because of the
other's reliance upon the undertaking.' "

Didato, 262 Va. at 629, 554 S.E.2d at 48.

Applying our well established jurisprudence, we hold that

Kellermann pled a cause of action cognizable in tort against

Paula McDonough on the theory that she assumed a duty to

12
Jaimee. As we have already stated, Kellermann pled that he

and his wife allowed their daughter, Jaimee, to spend a night

at the McDonoughs' home in Henrico County. Michael Kellermann

specifically told Paula McDonough that Jaimee was "not to be

driven by any inexperienced drivers" and he emphasized that

Jaimee "was not to be in a car with any young, male drivers,

stating 'no boys with cars.' " Kellermann alleged that Paula

McDonough agreed and said " 'don't worry, I promise we'll take

good care of her,' or words to that effect." Kellermann also

alleged that Paula McDonough breached the duty that she

assumed and, as a proximate cause of that breach, his daughter

was killed in the car accident. Hence, Kellermann pled that

Paula McDonough undertook a duty to render services to Jaimee,

that Paula McDonough breached this duty, and the breach was a

proximate cause of Jaimee’s injuries and death.

Kellermann, however, failed to plead a cause of action in

tort based upon assumption of a duty against Paul McDonough.

The complaint contains no allegations that would permit the

finder of fact to find that Paul McDonough assumed any duty of

care to Jaimee. Indeed, according to the allegations in the

complaint, Paul McDonough was not present when Paula McDonough

assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent Jaimee

from riding in cars driven by inexperienced drivers or young

male drivers.

13
 Contrary to the assertion in Justice Kinser’s concurrence

and dissent, Kellermann repeatedly contended in the circuit

court and in this Court that the McDonoughs owed a common law

duty of care to his daughter, Jaimee. For example, Kellermann

pled in his complaint that the McDonoughs “had a duty . . . to

provide ordinary and reasonable care to Jaimee Kellermann.

These duties included, but were not limited to, the obligation

of the [McDonoughs] to exercise ordinary and reasonable care

in transporting Jaimee Kellermann while she stayed at the

McDonoughs’ home.” Additionally, Kellermann alleged that the

McDonoughs were negligent in “failing to exercise ordinary and

reasonable care or otherwise failing to reasonably provide for

the safety of Jaimee Kellermann.”

Kellermann also asserted in the circuit court that the

McDonoughs “owed clear duties to Jaimee Kellermann, including

the duty to provide her with safe transportation and adequate

supervision.” Additionally, during a hearing in the circuit

court, Kellermann argued that the McDonoughs owed numerous

duties to Jaimee, including a duty to care for her.

Kellermann stated that the McDonoughs, “when they took

[Jaimee] in, had a duty to ensure that if she got ill, she[]

[would] be taken to a doctor, to feed her, to give her

shelter, and to provide her safe transportation.”

14
 In this Court, Kellermann asserts in an assignment of

error that the circuit court erred by sustaining the demurrer

to his negligence claim because he pled sufficient facts that

constituted a sufficient cause of action against the

McDonoughs. Kellermann also argues in his brief, filed in

this Court, that an adult who accepts responsibility for the

supervision of a child has a duty to exercise reasonable care.

Code § 8.01-384(A) states:

“No party, after having made an objection or motion
known to the court, shall be required to make such
objection or motion again in order to preserve his
right to appeal, challenge, or move for
reconsideration of, a ruling, order, or action of
the court. No party shall be deemed to have agreed
to, or acquiesced in, any written order of a trial
court so as to forfeit his right to contest such
order on appeal except by express written agreement
in his endorsement of the order. Arguments made at
trial via written pleading, memorandum, recital of
objections in a final order, oral argument reduced
to transcript, or agreed written statements of facts
shall, unless expressly withdrawn or waived, be
deemed preserved therein for assertion on appeal.”

We recently discussed this statute this year in Helms v.

Manspile, 277 Va. 1, 6, 671 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2009). We stated

in Helms that “[o]nce a litigant informs the circuit court of

his or her legal argument, ‘[i]n order for a waiver to occur

within the meaning of Code § 8.01-384(A), the record must

affirmatively show that the party who has asserted an

objection has abandoned the objection or has demonstrated by

his conduct the intent to abandon that objection.’ ” Id.

15
(quoting Shelton v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 121, 127-28, 645

S.E.2d 914, 917 (2007)); accord King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va.

576, 581, 570 S.E.2d 863, 865-66 (2002); Chawla v.

BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623, 499 S.E.2d 829, 833

(1998). Based on the record, Kellermann raised the issue

whether the McDonoughs owed a common law duty of care to

Jaimee and Kellermann never waived this legal argument.

C.

Kellermann argues that the circuit court erred in

sustaining the demurrer because the McDonoughs owed Jaimee a

duty to exercise reasonable care in controlling the conduct of

third parties to prevent her from harm. We disagree with

Kellermann's contention.

We have consistently held that "generally a person does

not have a duty to protect another from the conduct of third

persons." Didato, 262 Va. at 629, 554 S.E.2d at 49; accord

Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 322, 626 S.E.2d 428,

432 (2006); Delk, 259 Va. at 134-35, 523 S.E.2d at 832; A.H.

v. Rockingham Publishing Co., 255 Va. 216, 220, 495 S.E.2d

482, 485 (1998); Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 309, 311, 421

S.E.2d 419, 420 (1992). However, this general rule does not

apply when a special relationship exists between a defendant

and a plaintiff that gives rise to a right to protection to

the plaintiff or between the defendant and third persons that

16
imposes a duty upon the defendant to control the conduct of

the third person causing reasonably foreseeable danger to the

plaintiff. Taboada, 271 Va. at 323-24, 626 S.E.2d at 432-33;

Didato, 262 Va. at 630, 554 S.E.2d at 49; Delk, 259 Va. at

134-35, 523 S.E.2d at 832; A.H., 255 Va. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at

485; Burdette, 244 Va. at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 420.

Examples of special relationships that we have recognized

between a defendant and a plaintiff include common carrier-

passenger, business proprietor-invitee, innkeeper-guest, and

employer-employee with regard to the employer's potential duty

of protecting or warning an employee. Even though this list

of relationships that give rise to a special relationship is

not exhaustive, A.H., 255 Va. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at 485, we

perceive of no reason to expand our jurisprudence regarding

special relationships to include an adult who agrees to

supervise and provide care to a minor. Therefore, we hold

that the circuit court did not err when it sustained the

demurrer on this basis.

In view of our holding that the Kellermanns have failed

to establish a special relationship as we have defined this

particular legal concept in our jurisprudence, proof of

foreseeability in order to create a duty is not necessary.

The duties that do exist in this case are a general duty of

ordinary care and an assumed duty. And, as discussed in part

17
IV. D, infra, of this opinion, the Kellermanns must establish

proximate causation in order to impose liability upon the

McDonoughs.

D.

The McDonoughs argue that based upon the complaint, as a

matter of law, Nate's "actions were the sole proximate cause

of Jaimee Kellermann's death" and therefore, they could not be

liable in tort to her. We disagree with the McDonoughs.

Generally, issues of negligence and proximate causation

are questions of fact for the jury's determination. Moses v.

Southwestern Va. Transit Mgmt. Co., 273 Va. 672, 679, 643

S.E.2d 156, 160 (2007); Jenkins v. Payne, 251 Va. 122, 128,

465 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1996); Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 524,

531, 331 S.E.2d 440, 445 (1985); Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va.

190, 200, 196 S.E. 613, 616 (1938). "'The proximate cause of

an event is that act or omission which, in natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening

cause, produces the event, and without which that event would

not have occurred.'" Beverly Enterprises-Virginia v. Nichols,

247 Va. 264, 269, 441 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1994) (quoting Coleman v.

Blankenship Oil Corp., 221 Va. 124, 131, 267 S.E.2d 143, 147

(1980)); accord Williams v. Le, 276 Va. 161, 167, 662 S.E.2d

73, 77 (2008); Beale v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d

851, 853 (1970). There may be more than one proximate cause

18
of an event. Williams, 276 Va. at 167, 662 S.E.2d at 77;

Atkinson v. Scheer, 256 Va. 448, 454, 508 S.E.2d 68, 71

(1998); Panousos v. Allen, 245 Va. 60, 65, 425 S.E.2d 496, 499

(1993); Coleman, 221 Va. at 131, 267 S.E.2d at 147. "A

subsequent proximate cause may or may not relieve a defendant

of liability for his negligence." Williams, 276 Va. at 167,

662 S.E.2d at 77.

We have stated:

" 'In order to relieve a defendant of liability for
his negligent act, the negligence intervening
between the defendant's negligent act and the injury
must so entirely supersede the operation of the
defendant's negligence that it alone, without any
contributing negligence by the defendant in the
slightest degree, causes the injury.' "

Atkinson, 256 Va. at 454, 508 S.E.2d at 71-72 (quoting

Jenkins, 251 Va. at 129, 465 S.E.2d at 799) (emphasis

omitted); accord Williams v. Joynes, 278 Va. 57, 63, 677

S.E.2d 261, 264 (2009); Panousos, 245 Va. at 65, 425 S.E.2d at

499; City of Richmond v. Gay, 103 Va. 320, 324, 49 S.E. 482,

483 (1905). We have emphasized that "a superseding cause of

an injury 'constitutes a new effective cause and operates

independently of any other act, making it and it only the

proximate cause of injury.' " Jenkins, 251 Va. at 129, 465

S.E.2d at 799 (quoting Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 511,

151 S.E.2d 339, 345 (1966)); accord Joynes, 278 Va. at 63, 677

S.E.2d at 264; Atkinson, 256 Va. at 454, 508 S.E.2d at 72;

19
Dickenson v. Tabb, 208 Va. 184, 191, 156 S.E.2d 795, 801

(1967). We also note that:

"[N]ot every intervening cause is a superseding cause.
In order to relieve a defendant of liability for his
negligence, negligence intervening between the
defendant's negligence and the injury 'must so entirely
supersede the operation of the defendant's negligence
that it alone, without the defendant's [negligence
contributing] thereto in the slightest degree, produces
the injury.' Richmond v. Gay, 103 Va. 320, 324, 49 S.E.
482, 483 (1905). Furthermore, an intervening cause is
not a superseding cause if it was 'put into operation by
the defendant's wrongful act or omission.' Jefferson
Hospital, Inc. v. Van Lear, 186 Va. 74, 81, 41 S.E.2d
441, 444 (1947)."

Coleman, 221 Va. at 131, 267 S.E.2d at 147; accord Joynes, 278

Va. at 63, 677 S.E.2d at 264.

Based upon the above legal principles, if Kellermann

presents evidence at a trial to prove the factual allegations

in the complaint, and the jury finds that the McDonoughs

breached their duty of care and supervision of Jaimee, a jury

could also find that their breaches of duty constituted a

proximate cause of Jaimee's death and that Nate's acts were

not the sole proximate cause of her death. Additionally, if a

jury finds that Paula McDonough assumed a duty to Jaimee to

exercise reasonable care to provide safe transportation for

Jaimee and to prevent her from riding in cars with young males

and Paula McDonough breached that duty, the jury could also

find that Paula McDonough's breach of that duty was a

proximate cause of Jaimee's death.

20
 V.

In conclusion, we hold as follows. Kellermann pled a

cause of action for negligence against the McDonoughs because

he alleged that they breached a common law duty in tort by

failing to supervise and care for Jaimee when her parents

relinquished supervision and care to the McDonoughs and the

McDonoughs agreed to supervise and care for Jaimee.

Kellermann also pled a viable cause of action against Paula

McDonough on the basis that she assumed a duty to Jaimee.

Kellermann failed to plead a cause of action based upon

assumption of a duty against Paul McDonough and the circuit

court erred by failing to sustain the demurrer on this basis.

Paul McDonough and Paula McDonough did not have a special

relationship with Jaimee and, therefore, they had no duty to

protect her from the criminal acts of third parties based on

this theory of negligence. Finally, Nate's acts did not

constitute, as a matter of law, a superseding act between the

McDonoughs' alleged negligent acts and Jaimee's death.

We will remand this proceeding to the circuit court for a

trial on Kellermann's claims of assumption of a duty against

Paula McDonough and breach of a common law tort duty of

supervision and care against both McDonoughs.

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and remanded.

21
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE KINSER joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent. At its core, this case involves

the tragic death of a fourteen year old child, Jaimee

Elizabeth Kellermann, who died as a result of an automobile

accident caused by the criminal acts of the juvenile operator

of the vehicle in which she was a passenger during the time in

which Jaimee was a social guest in the home of Paul and Paula

McDonough, the parents of her friend Becka McDonough. Today,

for the first time in this Commonwealth, a majority of this

Court under these factual circumstances fashions a generalized

common law duty upon a host parent to “supervise and care” for

a child guest “when a parent relinquishes the supervision and

care of [that] child to an adult who agrees to supervise and

care for that child.” In my view, the majority’s

characterization of this common law duty is too broad, both

because in this case it is made applicable to the criminal

acts of a third party not occurring on the premises of the

host parent and also because it implicitly makes the host

parent the virtual insurer of the guest child’s safety despite

the majority’s disclaimer to the contrary.

Justice Kinser in her dissenting opinion in this case

takes a persuasive view that the common law duty to supervise

and care for Jaimee now fashioned by the majority in this case

22
is not a theory of liability before this Court in this appeal.

Indeed, Justice Kinser correctly observes that the circuit

court when ruling on the McDonoughs’ demurrer specifically

identified the issues to be resolved as those involving a

“special relationship” from which a duty to protect Jaimee

might arise and proximate cause. The theory of liability

premised upon a special relationship upon which a duty to

protect a person from the criminal acts of a third party can

arise is distinctly different from a theory of liability

premised upon the assumption of a specific duty to care and

protect another. In this case, there is no dispute that

Michael H. Kellermann, in his capacity as the administrator of

Jaimee’s estate, asserted both of these theories of liability

against the McDonoughs. However, because the majority also

addresses the theory of a common law duty and I cannot concur

with the majority’s analysis of that issue, I write separately

here on that issue.

In Virginia, we adhere to the rule that “[g]enerally, a

person does not have a duty to protect another from the

conduct of third persons.” Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare

Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2000). While we

have recognized a narrow exception to this general rule when a

“special relationship” exists between the defendant and the

plaintiff, see, e.g., Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 261 Va.

23
121, 129, 540 S.E.2d 123, 127 (2001), in the present case

neither the plaintiff nor the majority is able to cite to any

prior decision of this Court which, in the absence of a

finding of a special relationship, creates an exception to

this general rule in the context of a guest child and host

adult with regard to the criminal acts of a third person

causing harm to the child. Additionally, it is notable that

the cases relied upon by the majority provide little, if any,

support for a holding that essentially creates a broad

exception to this general rule.

Laite v. Baxter, 191 S.E.2d 531 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972),

involved a twelve year old boy who died from injuries he

received when he slipped and fell on wet rocks below a dam

while he was on an outing as the guest of the parents of his

friend. While recognizing a general rule that “a person who

undertakes the control and supervision of a child, even

without compensation, has the duty to use reasonable care to

protect the child from injury,” the court stressed that such a

person “is required only to use reasonable care commensurate

with the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm” to the child.

Id. at 534. In finding no liability on the part of the

supervising adult, the court reasoned that the danger of the

wet rocks was open and obvious, that the child appreciated

that danger and, thus, that the incident was “nothing more

24
than an accident, for which no one can be held [liable].” Id.

at 536. Laite, unlike the present case, did not involve the

criminal acts of a third party.

Putney v. Keith, 98 Ill. App. 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1901),

involved a two year old child who fell into a tub of hot water

on the floor of the kitchen and died as a result of her

injuries while a guest in the home of an adult who used the

hot water for housecleaning purposes. In finding no liability

on the part of the adult, the court reasoned that placing

“tubs of hot water upon a floor of the kitchen, to which small

children have access, for the purpose of cleaning the room, is

an ordinary occurrence, and an act such as prudent people

perform in the discharge of household duties.” Id. at 290.

Again, unlike the present case, Putney did not involve the

criminal acts of a third party.

Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1965), involved a

four year old child who was injured when a faulty swing set on

the defendants’ premises fell on her during the time the

defendants had assumed the duty to care for the child while

her mother was at work. Id. at 313. The court held that the

defendants owed a duty to maintain their premises in a

reasonably safe condition, and they had breached that duty.

Id. Again, Zalak was a premises liability case and did not

involve the criminal acts of a third party.

25
 Finally, the majority cites Hernandez v. Toney, 289 So.2d

318 (La. Ct. App. 1973), which involved a young child who was

injured when he left the fenced playground of the apartment

complex in which he lived with his mother and was accidentally

struck and injured by a car driven by a third person in a

nearby parking lot. One of the defendants was the apartment

manager who had ordered the child to leave the playground

after observing the child throwing dirt in the face of the

manager’s child. The court reasoned that the manager

“undertook control and supervision of [the child, and] assumed

the duty to use reasonable care to protect the child from

injury,” and he “breached this duty by ordering [the child]

from the fenced playground without escorting him the short

distance to his home or notifying his mother that he was no

longer in the playground.” Id. at 321. The court further

reasoned that the manager “could easily have foreseen the

result of his action.” Id. In Hernandez, the driver of the

vehicle was not found to be negligent. Id. at 323. At best,

Hernandez supports a finding of a duty of care when the

supervising adult assumes a specific duty of care.

In the present case, the majority concludes that “we

perceive of no reason to expand our jurisprudence regarding

special relationships to include an adult who agrees to

supervise and provide care to a minor.” I agree and need not

26
unnecessarily lengthen this opinion by repeating the

majority’s citations to our prior cases that support this

conclusion. However, it is to be noted that our prior cases

make clear that it is the finding of a special relationship

between a defendant and a plaintiff that gives rise to a duty

upon the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the harmful

acts of a third person, and that duty is an exception to the

general rule that no such duty exists at common law. In this

regard, we have cautioned that application of exceptions to

this general rule “is always fact specific and, thus, not

amenable to a bright-line rule for resolution.” Yuzefovsky v.

St. John’s Wood Apartments, 261 Va. 97, 106, 540 S.E.2d 134,

139 (2001). We have also cautioned that each particular

factual circumstance must be carefully analyzed “to avoid

permitting the narrow exception to swallow the general rule.”

Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 261 Va. 133, 139, 540

S.E.2d 129, 132-33 (2001).

In this case it has been determined that no “special

relationship” existed between Jaimee and the McDonoughs in her

capacity as a guest in their home. Jaimee was fatally injured

as a result of the criminal acts of a third person. Those

acts did not occur on the premises or in the presence of the

McDonoughs. Nor were those acts committed by a person under

the control of the McDonoughs. Until today, under such

27
factual circumstances, our prior cases have not recognized an

exception to the general rule that a person does not have a

duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third

person. In my view, to fashion a generalized, common law duty

to “supervise and care” for a child guest, such as Jaimee,

upon adult hosts, such as the McDonoughs, so as to impose

potential liability upon the adult hosts for the criminal acts

of a third party which harm the child under the circumstances

of the present case effectively permits an exception to

swallow the general rule. Accordingly, I would hold that

Kellermann did not plead a viable cause of action against the

McDonoughs on the basis that they breached a duty in tort by

failing to supervise and care for Jaimee.

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience that

parents frequently invite friends of their children to visit

in their homes as their guests for periods of time.

Certainly, such visits can be both enjoyable and beneficial to

the children. While the parents undoubtedly assume a degree

of responsibility for the care and safety of the guest

children during these visits, the parents, as recognized by

the majority in this case, are not the insurers of these

childrens’ safety during the visits. The duty to “supervise

and care” fashioned by the majority in this case, however, is

potentially broad enough to bring that proposition into

28
serious question. I simply take this opportunity to assure

host parents in this Commonwealth that the host parent in this

case, Paula McDonough, assumed a specific duty not to permit

her guest child to be transported by a juvenile driver and her

potential liability for breaching that duty, if proven at

trial, does not make her an insurer of the guest child’s

safety, and I am confident that the majority does not intend

to suggest otherwise.

I respectfully concur with that portion of the majority’s

opinion holding that Kellermann failed to plead a viable cause

of action against Paul and Paula McDonough on the basis that

they had a special relationship with Jaimee and, therefore,

they had a duty to protect her from the criminal acts of a

third party. I also concur with those portions of the opinion

holding that Kellermann pled a viable cause of action against

Paula, and not Paul, on the basis of assumption of a specific

duty to Jaimee and that the acts of the third party did not

constitute, as a matter of law, a superseding act between

Paula’s alleged negligence and Jaimee’s death.

JUSTICE KINSER, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The threshold question in any negligence case is whether

the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Burns v.

Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 44, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1995). The

29
majority addresses three sources of duty that it concludes are

at issue in this appeal: (1) a common law duty to supervise

and care for a minor child during a social visit; (2) an

assumption of duty; and (3) a special relationship. Michael

H. Kellermann, Administrator of the Estate of Jaimee Elizabeth

Kellermann, has asserted, however, only two bases for

liability, assumption of duty and special relationship, before

both the circuit court and this Court. Without explanation,

the majority is departing from the well-established principle

that "an appellate court may not reverse a judgment of the

trial court based upon an alleged error in a decision that was

not made or upon an issue that was not presented." McDonald

v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 249, 255, 645 S.E.2d 918, 921 (2007).

Thus, I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion

that Kellermann pled a common law duty on the part of Paul and

Paula McDonough to supervise and care for Jaimee during her

visit with the McDonoughs. I concur in the majority's holding

with regard to the theories of liability based on assumption

of duty and special relationship. I will address each source

of duty seriatim.

30
 I. COMMON LAW DUTY

To demonstrate why a common law duty to supervise and

care for Jaimee is not a theory of liability before us in this

appeal, I will first discuss the proceedings in the circuit

court and Kellermann's arguments before that court, and then

turn to his arguments in this Court.

In his wrongful death action, Kellermann alleged in the

complaint that, by the McDonoughs' inviting Jaimee to their

home for an overnight visit, "a special relationship of care

and trust" existed between the McDonoughs and the Kellermanns.

Kellermann claimed this special relationship gave rise to a

"duty to warn the Kellermanns and/or protect Jaimee Kellermann

from the danger of harm caused by the reasonably foreseeable

wrongful acts of others."

Continuing, Kellermann asserted that since Paula

"agree[d] to comply with the Kellermanns' directive" that

Jaimee was not to be in a vehicle with a young male driver,

the McDonoughs "were required to provide or otherwise ensure

transportation by an experienced, responsible, and safe

driver." Kellermann claimed "the McDonoughs failed to provide

safe transportation" for Jaimee when "the Defendants, through

Defendant Paula McDonough, knowingly, consciously, and

purposefully instructed or otherwise permitted [Jaimee] to go

home with [Nate] DeFrank in his car." Additionally,

31
Kellermann alleged that the McDonoughs agreed "to take Jaimee

Kellermann into Defendants' care" and "promis[ed] Kellermann

to provide Jaimee Kellermann with responsible, adult

supervision."

Finally, Kellermann alleged that the McDonoughs were

"negligent and/or grossly negligent . . . by failing to use

ordinary and reasonable care in transporting [Jaimee] or

otherwise providing for her safe transportation." The

McDonoughs' breach of these duties, according to Kellermann,

was a proximate cause of Jaimee's death. 1

In response to the complaint, the McDonoughs filed a

demurrer, claiming, among other things, that Kellermann failed

to state a cause of action because no duty extended from the

McDonoughs to either Jaimee or her parents. In response,

Kellermann asserted a special relationship arose between

Jaimee and the McDonoughs; "[c]onsequently, the McDonoughs

willingly assumed a myriad of duties to Jaimee and her parents

– among them to feed her, to take her to a doctor if she

became ill, to drive her in a safe manner and to look out for

her welfare like a parent would." The circuit court denied

the demurrer despite its "serious reservations as to whether a

1
Kellermann also alleged breach of an express contract,
breach of an implied contract, and breach of implied
warranties. The circuit court sustained the demurrer as to
these counts, and they are not before us in this appeal.

32
third party, as in this case, can be liable without more in a

non-paid in loco parentis arrangement." The court concluded

that the negligence claim could go forward if Kellermann could

prove a special relationship existed between the McDonoughs

and the Kellermanns.

After filing their answer to the complaint, the

McDonoughs filed a motion to revive their demurrer and a

motion for summary judgment. In support of both motions, the

McDonoughs asserted that, as a matter of law, they owed no

duty to protect Jaimee from the criminal acts of third parties

on the night of the accident because no special relationship

arose between the McDonoughs and Jaimee. They also claimed

that their alleged negligent conduct was not a proximate cause

of the accident and Jaimee's death. Finally, the McDonoughs

asserted the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to

show that Paul had any involvement in the arrangements for

Jaimee's visit or participated in the decision to allow the

girls to ride in the vehicle driven by DeFrank.

Kellermann opposed the motions. He claimed that a

special relationship did exist between the McDonoughs and

Jaimee. Kellermann also asserted that the McDonoughs

voluntarily "assumed a duty to care for and protect Jaimee

Kellermann, including a duty to provide safe transportation

for her."

33
 In a letter opinion, the circuit court enumerated the

issues before it:

1. Whether or not a "special relationship" exists
between the [Kellermanns] and the Defendants.

2. If a special relationship existed, whether or not
a duty was placed upon the Defendants while
acting in loco parentis of the minor during the
weekend visitation.

3. Generally, whether or not there is any basis for
proximate cause of the accident by Defendants.

The circuit court concluded that "the law in Virginia does not

recognize [a special] relationship creating a duty on the

[McDonoughs] that would lead to [the] proximate cause of this

accident." Thus, the court sustained the demurrer without

addressing the remaining two issues.

In my view, it is clear from the pleadings, the parties'

arguments, and the circuit court's findings that Kellermann

never asserted or relied on a common law duty to supervise and

care for a minor. The primary focus in the circuit court was

on the issue concerning whether a special relationship existed

between the McDonoughs and Jaimee. Kellermann also

specifically argued the McDonoughs assumed a duty to care for

and protect Jaimee. The common law duty addressed by the

majority was not mentioned by anyone.

On appeal to this Court, Kellermann argues "the

McDonoughs assumed willingly a myriad of duties to Jaimee –

34
among them, to feed her, to give her shelter in their house,

to take her to a doctor . . . if she became ill, to drive her

in a safe manner, to look out for her welfare, and to protect

her from harm." Kellermann states the McDonoughs "voluntarily

took upon themselves" responsibility for Jaimee and "assumed,

temporarily, at the least the minimum duty to exercise

ordinary care for [Jaimee's] safety." Kellermann also asserts

additional duties on the part of the McDonoughs because a

special relationship existed between them and Jaimee.

In support of his argument regarding assumption of duty,

Kellermann cites this Court's decision in Didato v. Strehler,

262 Va. 617, 554 S.E.2d 42 (2001) and Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 323. With regard to the issue of special

relationship, Kellermann relies on many of this Court's

decisions discussing special relationships that give rise to

an affirmative duty to protect an individual from the

reasonably foreseeable wrongful acts of a third party. See,

e.g., Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 626 S.E.2d 428

(2006); Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 261 Va. 121, 540

S.E.2d 123 (2001).

While I believe there can be no confusion about

Kellermann's theories of liability, if there is any, he

resolves it in his reply brief. There, Kellermann expressly

refers to "the two bases for negligence liability in this

35
case." Again relying on Didato and Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 323, the first theory of liability, argues Kellermann,

is based on the McDonoughs' own negligent conduct, which

Kellermann describes as the McDonoughs' undertaking "to

supervise and care for Jaimee during her weekend stay at their

home (an obligation that they assumed voluntarily and had

acted upon), including agreeing to provide safe transportation

(free of boys with cars[])." Continuing, Kellermann argues:

"[The McDonoughs] failed to exercise reasonable care in that

undertaking; this failure increased the risk of harm to Jaimee

. . . and led to her tragic death. This basis of liability

comes from [the McDonoughs'] affirmative decision to put

[Jaimee] into harm's way." Then, Kellermann states: "The

second basis for liability is founded on the well-recognized

'special relationship' exception to the rule that, generally,

one does not have a duty to protect another from the wrongful

conduct of a third person."

Nowhere before this Court has Kellermann relied on a

theory of liability based on the common law duty used by

the majority as the basis of its decision. Even assuming

Kellermann initially pled such a duty in his complaint,

he has since waived it by failing to assert that legal

position in the proceedings in the circuit court and now

in this Court. In any event, he affirmatively abandoned

36
any such theory in his reply brief when he specifically

articulated only two bases for liability. The Court

therefore cannot and should not reach the issue. Rule

5:17(c)(4); see McDonald, 274 Va. at 255, 645 S.E.2d at

921 ("the arguments of the parties on appeal . . . must

be limited to issues preserved in the trial court . . .

and to issues presented before the appellate courts[;] an

appellate court may not reverse a judgment of the trial

court based upon an alleged error in a decision that was

not made or upon an issue that was not presented");

Shelton v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 121, 127-28, 645 S.E.2d

914, 917 (2007) (waiver occurs if the record

affirmatively shows a party has abandoned an objection or

has demonstrated by conduct an intention to abandon the

objection); Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 436, 304

S.E.2d 271, 278 (1983) (an issue not raised or ruled on

by a trial court will not be noticed on appeal); Thrasher

v. Thrasher, 210 Va. 624, 628-29, 172 S.E.2d 771, 774

(1970) (a question not raised in the trial court and upon

which the record contains no evidence will not be

considered on appeal); Allaun v. First & Merchs. Nat'l

Bank of Richmond, 190 Va. 104, 113, 56 S.E.2d 83, 88

(1949) (a claim not decided by the trial court will not

be addressed on appeal).

37
 Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's

finding that Kellermann pled the existence of a common law

duty to supervise and care for Jaimee. 2 I firmly believe that

this Court's Rules must be applied consistently. Otherwise,

our decisions become arbitrary.

II. ASSUMPTION OF DUTY

Relying on this Court's decision in Didato and the

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, Kellermann argues the

McDonoughs undertook the responsibility to care for,

supervise, and provide safe transportation for Jaimee during

her overnight visit, thereby assuming a duty to exercise

reasonable care in performing the undertaking. He further

claims the McDonoughs failed to exercise reasonable care in

2
In light of my conclusion on this issue, it is not
necessary to address the majority's holding that "an adult who
agrees to supervise and care for a minor has a duty in tort to
exercise reasonable care in the supervision of that minor." I
do, however, wholeheartedly agree with Justice Koontz'
dissenting opinion regarding this common law duty. As Justice
Koontz correctly explains, the cases upon which the majority
relies, Laite v. Baxter, 191 S.E.2d 531, 534 (Ga. Ct. App.
1972); Putney v. Keith, 98 Ill. App. 285, 291 (Ill. App. Ct.
1901); Hernandez v. Toney, 289 So. 2d 318, 320 (La. Ct. App.
1973); Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313, 313 (N.Y. 1965), did
not involve a duty to supervise and care for a minor in the
context of protecting that minor from the wrongful or
negligent acts of a third party, which is the only duty
allegedly breached by the McDonoughs in this case. Given the
nature of the alleged breach, the majority is giving
Kellermann the benefit of a common law duty to protect against
the wrongful acts of a third party without the attendant
restrictions concerning foreseeability that govern liability

38
carrying out that undertaking when they allowed Jaimee to ride

in a vehicle driven by DeFrank and that such failure increased

the risk of harm to Jaimee, leading to her death.

In Didato, the Court decided, among other things, whether

the plaintiffs stated cognizable causes of action against the

defendant healthcare providers on the theory that they had

assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the

communication of certain medical information to the plaintiffs

even if no duty existed prior to the undertaking to render

services. 262 Va. at 627-28, 554 S.E.2d at 47. The Court

concluded "the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts which, if

proven at trial, would permit the finder of fact to conclude

that the defendants assumed the duty to convey to the

plaintiffs the correct results of [a medical test]." Id. at

629, 554 S.E.2d at 48. The Court reiterated the legal

principle that "'[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes

to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject

to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.'" 3 Id. at

628, 554 S.E.2d at 48 (quoting Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Wray, 221

Va. 25, 28, 266 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1980) (quoting Glanzer v.

based on a special relationship. A.H. v. Rockingham Publ'g
Co., 255 Va. 216, 220-21, 495 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1998).
3
This principle is often referred to as the "negligent
undertaking doctrine" or the "Good Samaritan" rule. See
Mukthar v. Latin Am. Sec. Serv., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 566
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006).

39
Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922))); accord Fruiterman v.

Granata, 276 Va. 629, 645, 668 S.E.2d 127, 136 (2008); Ring v.

Poelman, 240 Va. 323, 326, 397 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1990); Cofield

v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 192, 387 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1990).

Additionally, the Court referenced with approval
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection
of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of such harm, or

(b) the harm is suffered because of the
other's reliance upon the undertaking.

Didato, 262 Va. at 629, 554 S.E.2d at 48.

In Fruiterman, the Court further explained that, for an

assumption of duty to occur in the physician-patient context,

"a physician [must] personally engage[] in some affirmative

act amounting to a render[ing of] services to another." 276

Va. at 646, 668 S.E.2d at 137 (internal quotations and

citation omitted) (second and third alterations in original).

Whether in a physician-patient context or some other

circumstance, the threshold requirement for liability under

the voluntary undertaking theory is that the defendant must

specifically undertake to perform the task with which he or

she is charged as having performed without reasonable care.

40
Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implant Recipients v. Dow Chem.

Co., 113 F.3d 1484, 1493 (8th Cir. 1997); Patentas v. United

States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3rd Cir. 1982); Artiglio v. Corning

Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Cal. 1998); Rogers v. Clark Equip.

Co., 744 N.E.2d 364, 368-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Lather v.

Berg, 519 N.E.2d 755, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); South v.

McCarter, 119 P.3d 1, 16-17 (Kan. 2005). 4 Without the

defendant's actual undertaking to render a service, there is

no correlative duty to perform the undertaking with reasonable

care. See South, 119 P.3d at 17. The extent of the

undertaking defines the scope of a defendant's duty. TMJ

Implant Recipients, 113 F.3d at 1493; Margaret W. v. Kelley

R., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); McGee v.

Chalfant, 806 P.2d 980, 983 (Kan. 1991).

The Court has not previously defined the phrase

"voluntary undertaking," nor has the Restatement (Second) of

Torts. One court, however, concluded "voluntarily undertaking

a duty requires some sort of affirmative acknowledgment or

recognition of the duty by the party who undertakes the duty;

4
Some of these cases discuss Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 324A instead of § 323. While the sections state
somewhat different rules, both pertain to a person who
voluntarily undertakes to render services to another and
provide that a person may be liable for failing to take
reasonable care in performing the undertaking. See Browne v.
Turner Constr. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 433, 443 & n.4 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005).

41
in other words, there must be a showing of the party's intent

to undertake the duty." Rogers, 744 N.E.2d at 368-69.

Another court stated, "the term 'undertaking' is potentially

somewhat ambiguous, since it may refer either to a promise

that one will do a thing, or to an actual endeavor or setting-

out to do the thing." Browne v. Turner Constr. Co., 26 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 433, 443 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see also

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 323, caveat (expressing no

opinion whether "the making of a contract, or a gratuitous

promise, without in any way entering upon performance, is a

sufficient undertaking to result in liability"). I therefore

conclude, as indicated in Fruiterman, 276 Va. at 646, 668

S.E.2d at 137, that, in order to have a voluntary undertaking,

a party must engage in an affirmative act that amounts to a

rendering of services to another and demonstrates the party's

intent to undertake a duty.

Although Kellermann argues that the McDonoughs undertook

the responsibility to care for, supervise, and provide safe

transportation for Jaimee during her overnight visit, his

factual allegations concerning the alleged undertaking are not

so broad in scope. Kellermann specifically alleged that, when

he asked Paula about what activities were planned during

Jaimee's visit, he told Paula that Jaimee was not "to be

driven by any inexperienced drivers" and "emphasized that his

42
daughter was not to be in a car with any young, male drivers,

stating 'no boys with cars.' " According to Kellermann, Paula

"agreed," and said, " '[D]on't worry, I promise we'll take

good care of her.' "

Accepting these allegations as true, see Taboada, 271 Va.

at 317, 626 S.E.2d at 429, I conclude that Paula, by agreeing

to comply with Kellermann's directive that Jaimee not be

allowed to ride in a vehicle driven by an inexperienced and/or

young male driver, and then taking Jaimee with her and her

daughter, Becca McDonough, 5 to Henrico County for the overnight

visit, engaged in an affirmative act that amounted to the

rendering of a service to Jaimee and demonstrated Paula's

intent to assume a duty to protect Jaimee from inexperienced

and/or young male drivers. See Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784

S.W.2d 298, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding the defendant

assumed a duty to protect the plaintiff from attacks by third

persons as the defendant's employee assured the plaintiff

someone would be present and would help her unload her donated

merchandise because the plaintiff was reluctant to go to the

rear of the shop alone due to the character of the

neighborhood).

5
Although Kellermann initially spelled her name "Becka"
in his pleadings below, he has conformed his spelling of Becca
to the McDonoughs' spelling of their daughter's name in the
briefs before this Court.

43
 By this conclusion, I am not suggesting that any time a

parent invites his or her child's friend for a social visit

and assures the friend's parents that the friend will be

supervised and cared for, that parent has voluntarily

undertaken to protect the child from the wrongful acts of

third persons and thereby assumed a duty of care. My

conclusion in the case before us is based on the particular

allegations in the complaint, which if proven at trial, would

sustain a factfinder's determination that Paula voluntarily

and affirmatively undertook to protect Jaimee from a very

specific risk of harm, i.e., the risk of harm associated with

riding in a vehicle driven by an inexperienced and/or young

male driver. The scope of her undertaking was narrow and

defined the extent of her duty to exercise due care in

performing the undertaking. See South, 119 P.3d at 16 ("The

extent of the undertaking defines the scope of the duty.").

Thus, I concur with the majority in this regard and conclude

that Kellermann stated a cause of action against Paula based

on the theory of assumption of duty.

I also concur with the majority's decision as to Paul.
As the McDonoughs assert in their assignment of cross-
error, the complaint contains no factual allegations that
Paul engaged in any undertaking to protect Jaimee from
inexperienced and/or young male drivers. He was not
present when Paula met Kellermann halfway between their
respective homes and was not a party to the conversation
when Paula agreed to Kellermann's directive regarding
Jaimee. Paul's knowledge of and assent to Jaimee's

44
 overnight visit were not affirmative acts amounting to
the rendering of a service to Jaimee and did not
demonstrate any intent by Paul to undertake a duty to
protect. Thus, I conclude that Kellermann did not state
a cause of action with regard to Paul.

Before addressing the issue of special relationship, I

find it appropriate at this juncture to turn to the

McDonoughs' remaining assignment of cross-error. Relying on

Robinson v. Matt Mary Moran, Inc., 259 Va. 412, 525 S.E.2d 559

(2000), and Turner v. Lotts, 244 Va. 554, 422 S.E.2d 765

(1992), the McDonoughs contend Paula's decision granting

permission for Jaimee to ride in the vehicle driven by DeFrank

was not a proximate cause of Jaimee's death. In response,

Kellermann asserts the issue of proximate cause is generally a

question of fact for the jury to decide. I agree with

Kellermann.

In Robinson, this Court held that the act of selling

alcoholic beverages, even to an intoxicated person under the

age of 21, is "too remote to be a proximate cause of an injury

to a third party resulting from the negligent conduct of the

purchaser of the beverages." 259 Va. at 417, 525 S.E.2d at

562; accord Williamson v. The Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350,

353, 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1986). Thus, the plaintiff's

pleading in that case was insufficient as a matter of law

because the defendant's act of serving alcohol to an

individual who subsequently drove an automobile negligently,

45
resulting in an accident, was not a proximate cause of the

passenger's death. Robinson, 259 Va. at 417, 525 S.E.2d at

562.

Likewise in Turner, which involved a claim against two

parents for the alleged negligent entrustment of an automobile

to their son, the Court stated that "the plaintiff must prove

that the negligent entrustment of the motor vehicle to the

tortfeasor was a proximate cause of the accident." 244 Va. at

557, 422 S.E.2d at 767 (citations omitted). This Court

concluded that there was no allegation that the son's "conduct

in prior accidents was negligent or that his accident with

[the plaintiff] was a proximate cause of similar negligence."

Id. at 558, 422 S.E.2d at 768.

Neither of these cases is analogous to the factual

scenario presented in the case before us. According to the

allegations in Kellermann's complaint, Paula undertook the

responsibility to protect Jaimee from the specific danger

associated with riding in a vehicle operated by an

inexperienced and/or a young male driver. Paula allegedly

failed to perform that particular undertaking with due care.

Thus, I cannot say in this context that Paula's decision

allowing Jaimee to ride in the vehicle driven by DeFrank is

too remote, as a matter of law, to constitute a proximate

cause of Jaimee's death.

46
 A proximate cause of an event is that "act or omission

which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an

efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and without

which that event would not have occurred." Beale v. Jones,

210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970); accord Jenkins

v. Payne, 251 Va. 122, 128, 465 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1996); Banks

v. City of Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 135, 348 S.E.2d 280, 282

(1986). Generally, the issue of proximate causation is a

question of fact to be resolved by a jury. Jenkins, 251 Va.

at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va.

524, 531, 331 S.E.2d 440, 445 (1985)). In this case, it is a

question for the jury to decide. Thus, I concur with the

majority in holding the circuit court did not err by failing

to sustain the demurrer on this basis.

III. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Kellermann argues that, based on the particular facts of

this case, a special relationship existed between the

McDonoughs and Jaimee because the McDonoughs invited Jaimee to

their home for an overnight visit and undertook the

responsibility of caring for and supervising her. Thus,

according to Kellermann, this special relationship gave rise

to an affirmative duty to protect Jaimee from the reasonably

foreseeable wrongful acts of third persons. The McDonoughs

counter that, while this Court has recognized certain

47
categories of special relationships, such as business

invitor/invitee, innkeeper/guest, common carrier/passenger,

and employer/employee, the "social host/sleepover" situation

alleged here is not a recognized special relationship.

"Generally, a person does not have a duty to protect

another from the conduct of third persons." Delk v.

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d

826, 830 (2000). There is, however, an exception to this

general rule "when a special relationship exists (1) between

the defendant and the plaintiff which gives rise to a right to

protection to the plaintiff, or (2) between the defendant and

the third person which imposes a duty upon the defendant to

control the third person's conduct." Id. at 132, 523 S.E.2d

at 830-31; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. We

have recognized that a special relationship may exist between

a particular plaintiff and defendant "either as a matter of

law or because of the particular factual circumstances in a

given case, which may give rise to a duty of care on the part

of the defendant to warn and/or protect the plaintiff against

the danger of harm from the reasonably foreseeable criminal

acts committed by a third person." Thompson, 261 Va. at 129,

540 S.E.2d at 127. In that regard, the "special relationships

that may create a duty of care include those of common carrier

and passenger, business proprietor and invitee, innkeeper and

48
guest, and employer and employee." Yuzefovsky v. St. John's

Wood Apts., 261 Va. 97, 108, 540 S.E.2d 134, 140 (2001); see

also A.H. v. Rockingham Publ'g Co., 255 Va. 216, 220, 495

S.E.2d 482, 485 (1998). This list, however, is not exclusive

and the determination whether a special relationship exists is

fact-specific. See Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 108, 540 S.E.2d at

140.

Because the imposition of a duty of care to warn and/or

protect a plaintiff from the reasonably foreseeable danger of

harm from the criminal acts of a third party is an exception

to the general tort rule, the Court must carefully analyze

each particular fact pattern so as "to avoid permitting the

narrow exception to swallow the general rule." Dudas v.

Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 261 Va. 133, 139, 540 S.E.2d 129,

132-33 (2001). Additionally, " 'in determining whether a duty

exists, the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden

of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing that

burden on the defendant must be taken into account.

Imposition of a duty does not depend upon foreseeability

alone.' " Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207

S.E.2d 841, 845 (1974) (quoting Trice v. Chicago Housing

Auth., 302 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)); accord

Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 531, 362 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1987).

49
 Aside from the traditional type of special relationships

that the Court has recognized, see Taboada, 271 Va. at 326,

626 S.E.2d at 434 (innkeeper/guest); Thompson, 261 Va. at 129,

540 S.E.2d at 127 (business invitor/invitee); A.H., 255 Va. at

220, 495 S.E.2d at 485 (employer/employee); Hines v. Garrett,

131 Va. 125, 137, 108 S.E. 690, 693-94 (1921) (common

carrier/passenger), the Court has, in only two instances,

found that a special relationship existed between a defendant

and a plaintiff that gave rise to a duty to protect based on

the particular factual scenario presented. 6 In the first case,

Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 309, 311, 421 S.E.2d 419, 420

(1992), a deputy sheriff failed to render assistance to and/or

protect a citizen who was being assaulted by a third person

even when the citizen asked for help. The deputy sheriff knew

the assailant and the victim and witnessed part of a first

attack and all of a second attack. Id.

The issue before this Court was twofold: (1) whether a

special relationship existed between the deputy sheriff and

the victim that "gave rise to a special duty" on the part of

the deputy sheriff to protect the victim; and (2) whether the

6
The Court, however, also held that a special
relationship may arise between a defendant and a third party
by the defendant's taking charge of the third party, which
therefore creates a duty to control the third party's conduct.
See, e.g., Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration of Richmond,
Inc., 241 Va. 270, 279-80, 401 S.E.2d 878, 883 (1991).

50
deputy sheriff "reasonably could have foreseen that he would

be expected to take affirmative action to protect" the citizen

from harm. Id. at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 421. Because the deputy

sheriff was on duty at the time, the Court concluded it could

be reasonably inferred that he was armed and possessed the

capabilities to subdue the assailant. Based on the particular

facts alleged, the Court held that "a special relation existed

between [the deputy sheriff and the citizen] which imposed a

duty upon [the deputy sheriff] to render assistance to [the

citizen]." Id. The Court further held that the case "falls

within one of the exceptions to the general rule [and] that,

under the facts alleged, [the deputy sheriff] owed a legal

duty to protect [the citizen] from [the assailant's] attack."

Id. at 313, 421 S.E.2d at 421.

In the second case, the plaintiff, who was a patient at a

psychiatric facility, alleged that another patient entered her

room and sexually assaulted her. Delk, 259 Va. at 130, 523

S.E.2d at 829-30. The plaintiff further alleged that the

defendants knew she was a danger to herself and others, was in

constant need of 24-hour supervision, had a history of

psychiatric problems associated with prior sexual assaults,

and was deemed a high risk to herself and others. Id. at 130,

523 S.E.2d at 829. Based on those allegations, the Court held

the plaintiff pled sufficient facts to establish a special

51
relationship between herself and the psychiatric facility that

would give rise to a duty on the part of the defendants to

protect the plaintiff from third persons. 7 See id. at 134, 523

S.E.2d at 831.

In contrast, the Court held in Holles v. Sunrise Terrace,

Inc., 257 Va. 131, 137, 509 S.E.2d 494, 498 (1999), that a

special relationship did not exist between a resident on an

"independent living" floor of an adult care residence center

and the defendant company that provided food and management

services, including security, for the center. The plaintiff

was robbed and raped by an intruder who gained entry into the

building by waiting until a side door was opened from within

and then walking through the open doorway past the person who

had opened the door. Id. at 134, 509 S.E.2d at 496. The

Court concluded the defendant did not have a special

relationship with the plaintiff "because there was no right of

protection inherent in their relationship separate and apart

from any duties imposed" by the defendant's contract with the

7
The Court also concluded that the plaintiff pled
sufficient facts to create a jury issue as to whether the
assault was reasonably foreseeable and to show that the
defendants had taken charge of the assailant because he was in
the acute care wing of the psychiatric facility but failed to
control him. Delk, 259 Va. at 135, 523 S.E.2d at 832.

52
local county to manage the center. 8 Id. at 137, 509 S.E.2d at

498.

In Burdette and Delk, as opposed to Holles, a duty of

protection from the criminal acts of third persons was

inherent in the particular relationship between the plaintiff

and the defendant. In Burdette, an on-duty deputy sheriff

witnessed an attack upon a citizen by a third person. 244 Va.

at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 421. Likewise in Delk, the plaintiff

was a patient at a psychiatric facility, was a danger to

herself and others, had a history of psychiatric problems

related to sexual assaults upon her, and needed constant 24-

hour supervision. See 259 Va. at 130, 523 S.E.2d at 829. In

both instances, the defendants were necessarily equipped to

protect against the criminal acts of third persons. Thus, the

magnitude of the burden of providing the protection and the

consequences of placing that burden on the defendant was not

8
The Court has also held in several cases that there was
not a special relationship between a landlord and a tenant as
to give rise to a duty on the part of the landlord to protect
a tenant from the criminal acts of third persons. See
Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 108, 540 S.E.2d at 140; Klingbeil Mgmt.
Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 447, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201
(1987); Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 157, 207 S.E.2d at 844. In
denying the existence of a special relationship, we noted that
a landlord is not an insurer of a tenant's safety, Yuzefovsky,
261 Va. at 108, 540 S.E.2d at 140; Dudas, 261 Va. at 141, 540
S.E.2d at 133-34; Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 159-60, 207 S.E.2d
at 845, and does not have a "duty to act as a policeman,"
Klingbeil, 233 Va. at 447, 357 S.E.2d at 201.

53
unfair or unreasonable given the particular facts presented in

each case.

Based on our prior cases and the factual scenario

presented here, I concur with the majority's holding that a

special relationship did not exist between the McDonoughs and

Jaimee. Jaimee was a social guest in the McDonoughs' home. A

duty to protect Jaimee from the wrongful acts of third persons

is not inherent in that relationship as it was in Burdette and

Delk. The magnitude of the burden to provide such protection

and the consequences of placing that burden on the McDonoughs

are too great.

Parents routinely invite their children's friends into

their homes for social visits. When doing so, they do not

become insurers of the friends' safety, especially against the

wrongful acts of third persons. To hold otherwise would

indeed stretch the exception of the special relationship

beyond the limits of the rule itself. I therefore conclude

the circuit court did not err in finding that a special

relationship did not exist between the McDonoughs and Jaimee. 9

9
Kellermann relies on the decisions in Doe v. Bruton
Parish Church, Law No. 7977 (City of Williamsburg and James
City County, July 10, 1997) and Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll.,
236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002), in support of his
assertion that a special relationship existed between the
McDonoughs and Jaimee. Those cases are not analogous to the
present case and do not persuade me to a contrary conclusion.

54
 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from that

portion of the majority's opinion holding that Kellermann pled

a common law duty on the part of the McDonoughs to supervise

and care for Jaimee during her visit. I respectfully concur

with the other portions of the majority's opinion. Thus, I

would reverse the circuit court's judgment sustaining the

demurrer with regard to the cause of action against Paula

McDonough on the theory of assumption of duty and remand for

further proceedings. I would otherwise affirm the circuit

court's judgment.

55