Almy v. Grisham

PRESENT: All the Justices

KATHARINE ALMY

v. Record No. 052378 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
January 12, 2007
JOHN GRISHAM, JR., ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY
William R. Shelton, Judge Designate

In this appeal involving an action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress and a related civil conspiracy

claim, we consider whether the circuit court erred in sustaining

the defendants’ demurrers. As part of our consideration, we

decide the issue of first impression whether a civil claim for

conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress will be

recognized as a cause of action in this Commonwealth.

I. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In February 2004, Katharine Almy filed a motion for

judgment against John Grisham, Jr., Alan Swanson, Donna Swanson,

David Liebman, and Cina L. Wong (collectively, defendants),

alleging claims including intentional infliction of emotional

distress and conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional

distress. Almy had asserted similar claims in a previous

action, which was dismissed without prejudice on her motion for

nonsuit.

The defendants each filed demurrers asserting that Almy had

failed to state a cause of action. At a hearing on the

1
demurrers, defendant Grisham asked that the circuit court take

judicial notice of the deposition testimony of Dr. Stephen

Alexander, a licensed professional counselor and potential

witness in the case, who had given the deposition testimony in

the previous action. Almy did not object to Grisham’s request.

After considering the parties’ arguments, the circuit court

issued a letter opinion stating:

[T]he intentional infliction of emotional distress and
conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress
claims will not survive demurrer, based on the depositions
which are part of the record in this case. The
depositions[] allow[] the court to evaluate and decide the
merits of claims set forth in the motion for judgment.1

In a final order incorporating its letter opinion, the circuit

court sustained the defendants’ demurrers and dismissed the

action with prejudice.

Almy’s motion for judgment recounted a series of events

that allegedly occurred between 1996 and 1999. Beginning in

1996 and continuing through 1998, Donna Swanson (Donna) received

several anonymous, hand-written letters that made various

accusations, including allegations of marital infidelity on the

part of Alan Swanson (Alan), Donna’s husband. In 1998, Grisham

also received an anonymous, hand-written letter. According to

Almy’s allegations, Grisham and the Swansons decided together

1
Although the circuit court did not identify which
depositions it was considering, Dr. Alexander’s deposition was
the only deposition before the court.

2
that they should determine the source of the anonymous letters,

suspecting that Almy was the author. Grisham allegedly stated

during a tape-recorded conversation that he “really, really

wanted to make Ms. Almy suffer for writing those letters.”

As part of their effort to determine if Almy was the author

of the letters, Grisham and the Swansons contacted Liebman, a

handwriting analyst. Liebman asked to see the anonymous

letters, along with known samples of Almy’s handwriting.

Grisham produced for Liebman’s analysis a “thank-you” note

written by Almy and a form Almy had completed when she

registered her daughter to play baseball in a league in which

Grisham was a coach. Liebman later requested additional samples

of Almy’s handwriting.

To provide Liebman with the requested additional samples,

Grisham and Alan allegedly agreed to obtain documents bearing

Almy’s handwriting from her children’s files at St. Anne’s-

Belfield School (St. Anne’s). Grisham served on the board of

directors at St. Anne’s, and Alan was a teacher there. Alan,

without permission from anyone at St. Anne’s, allegedly obtained

from the school files an enrollment and medical release form

that Almy had completed, which was marked “Strictly

Confidential” and contained confidential and personal

information. Alan provided a copy of the document to Grisham,

who allegedly sent it to Liebman.

3
 Wong, a handwriting examiner who worked with Liebman, also

analyzed the submitted samples. Liebman and Wong concluded in a

written report (Liebman report) that it was possible Almy had

written the letters, and that she appeared to have addressed the

envelopes containing the letters. Almy alleged that Grisham,

Liebman, and Wong collaborated regarding the desired contents

and phrasing of the Liebman report.

Grisham and the Swansons next met with Grisham’s attorney,

John Zunka. Grisham allegedly told Zunka that the Liebman

report concluded that Almy had written the anonymous letters.

Based on this information, Zunka advised Grisham to contact the

local Commonwealth’s Attorney, James Camblos, to initiate

criminal proceedings against Almy.

Grisham and the Swansons met with Camblos and allegedly

told him that their handwriting experts concluded that Almy had

written some of the anonymous letters and had addressed the

envelopes containing those letters. Camblos contacted Detective

Thomas Grimes of the Albemarle County Police Department, who

arranged a meeting with the Swansons. The Swansons provided

Grimes with copies of the anonymous letters and told him that

they thought Almy was the author.

In August 1998, Grimes confronted Almy at her residence and

asked her if she had written the anonymous letters. After Almy

denied writing the letters, Grimes informed Almy that she was

4
not under arrest but that he “want[ed] the letters to stop.”

Almy alleged that Grimes was “rude and demeaning” during the

visit, causing her to cry and become upset.

Almy asserted that as a result of Grimes’ visit in August

1998, she suffered severe emotional distress, including

nervousness, sleeplessness, stress with accompanying physical

symptoms, and an inability to concentrate. Almy further alleged

that after Grimes’ visit she withdrew from her customary

activities, could not perform her duties as wife and mother, was

unable to manage her mother’s real estate properties, and could

not perform her administrative duties at a nonprofit

organization.

In November 1998, Almy sought treatment for her emotional

distress from Dr. Alexander, who concluded that Almy suffered

from a “major depressive disorder.” Almy refused medication for

her depression but, over the next seven months, she received

therapy from Dr. Alexander on several occasions.

Almy alleged that her depressed condition improved until

about August 1999, when she learned that Grisham and the

Swansons earlier had obtained materials from certain files at

St. Anne’s containing confidential information about Almy’s

children. According to Almy’s allegations, upon learning that

Grisham and the Swansons had made copies of documents from those

files, Almy felt “extremely violated, outraged, deeply disturbed

5
and worried,” and she “feared for how her children would be

treated during the upcoming school year.” As a result, Almy

allegedly suffered a serious “setback” in her depression. She

asserted that her husband and several friends observed a “return

of her depressive state and debilitating functioning.” Almy

also alleged that she again sought counseling from Dr.

Alexander, who concluded that Almy’s discovery concerning her

children’s files had caused the “setback” in her depression.

II. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

Almy argues that the circuit court erred in considering Dr.

Alexander’s deposition testimony when ruling on the defendants’

demurrers, because a demurrer addresses only the legal

sufficiency of the allegations of a motion for judgment. Almy

also contends that the circuit court erred in sustaining the

demurrers because Almy properly pleaded all required elements of

intentional infliction of emotional distress and an accompanying

conspiracy claim.

In response, Grisham initially argues that Almy did not

preserve for appeal the issue whether the circuit court erred in

relying on Dr. Alexander’s deposition testimony when ruling on

the demurrers.2 Next, addressing the merits of Almy’s pleadings,

Grisham contends that the pleadings fail to state a cause of

2
The Swansons and Wong assert essentially the same
arguments as Grisham. Liebman has not filed a brief in this
appeal.

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action. Grisham asserts that Almy’s allegations of emotional

distress are identical to the plaintiff’s allegations in Russo

v. White, 241 Va. 23, 400 S.E.2d 160 (1991), in which this Court

held that the pleadings were insufficient to support a claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Grisham also argues that Almy’s pleadings are deficient

because they do not allege facts sufficient to establish that

the defendants’ actions were intentional or reckless and were

outrageous. He further contends that because Almy’s pleadings

do not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, her conspiracy claim based on that underlying tort

likewise fails.

III. ANALYSIS

We first observe that when ruling on a demurrer, in

contrast to ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court is

not permitted to decide the merits of a claim but only may

decide whether a plaintiff’s factual allegations are sufficient

to state a cause of action. Barber v. VistaRMS, Inc., 272 Va.

319, 327, 634 S.E.2d 706, 711 (2006); see Fun v. Virginia Mil.

Inst., 245 Va. 249, 252, 427 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1993); Elliott v.

Shore Stop, Inc., 238 Va. 237, 239-40, 384 S.E.2d 752, 753

(1989). Thus, a demurrer presents an issue of law, not an issue

of fact. See Code § 8.01-273; Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188,

7
196, 624 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2006); Glazebrook v. Board of

Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 554, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003).

In the present case, the circuit court erred in considering

the factual merit of Almy’s allegations in ruling on the

defendants’ demurrers.3 Our analysis does not end here, however,

because Almy asks us to review the circuit court’s express

holding that her claims “will not survive demurrer.” Almy’s

failure to object to the circuit court’s consideration of the

deposition testimony does not affect our review because, given

the court’s erroneous mode of procedure, we do not address the

substance of the court’s analysis but consider only whether the

court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason.

Thus, we confine our review to the legal sufficiency of Almy’s

pleadings.4 See Harris, 271 Va. at 195, 624 S.E.2d at 28; Dreher

3
We find no merit in the defendants’ argument that, based
on our decision in Fleming v. Anderson, 187 Va. 788, 48 S.E.2d
269 (1948), the circuit court properly considered Dr.
Alexander’s deposition when ruling on the demurrer. Fleming is
inapposite because, there, the circuit court took judicial
notice of prior judicial proceedings when ruling on a demurrer
solely because the plaintiff’s cause of action arose from the
outcome of those prior proceedings. Id. at 794-95, 48 S.E.2d at
272-73.
4
We observe, in contrast, that on at least two prior
occasions when a circuit court erroneously decided the merits of
a case in ruling on a demurrer, we nevertheless reviewed the
circuit court’s decision as if it were a ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. See Shelor Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473,
544 S.E.2d 345 (2001); Carmel v. City of Hampton, 241 Va. 457,
403 S.E.2d 335 (1991). In those cases, however, the parties, as
well as the circuit court, treated the pleadings in this manner.
Here, the parties did not ask the circuit court to rule on the

8
v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 272 Va. 390, 395, 634 S.E.2d

324, 326-27 (2006); Thompson v. Skate Am., Inc., 261 Va. 121,

128, 540 S.E.2d 123, 126-27 (2001).

We consider the factual allegations of the motion for

judgment in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

McDermott v. Reynolds, 260 Va. 98, 100, 530 S.E.2d 902, 903

(2000); W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377,

384, 478 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996). We will consider as true the

facts alleged therein, the facts impliedly alleged, and the

reasonable inferences of fact that can be drawn from the facts

alleged. See McDermott, 260 Va. at 100, 530 S.E.2d at 903; Delk

v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 259 Va. 125, 129, 523 S.E.2d

826, 829 (2000); Breeding v. Hensley, 258 Va. 207, 211-12, 519

S.E.2d 369, 371 (1999).

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

We first recognized this intentional tort as a cause of

action in Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145

(1974). There, we held that the tort has four elements that

must be proved: 1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or

reckless; 2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable; 3) there

was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the

resulting emotional distress; and 4) the resulting emotional

merits of the claims, and the defendants merely asserted that
Dr. Alexander’s deposition supported their position that Almy
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

9
distress was severe. Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148; accord,

Harris, 271 Va. at 203, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Delk, 259 Va. at 136,

523 S.E.2d at 833; Jordan v. Shands, 255 Va. 492, 498-99, 500

S.E.2d 215, 218-19 (1998).

Because of problems inherent in proving a tort alleging

injury to the mind or emotions in the absence of accompanying

physical injury, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional

distress is “not favored” in the law. Harris, 271 Va. at 203-

04, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Russo, 241 Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162;

Ruth v. Fletcher, 237 Va. 366, 373, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415-16

(1989). Thus, in contrast to a claim of negligence, a plaintiff

alleging a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress must allege in her motion for judgment all facts

necessary to establish the cause of action in order to withstand

challenge on demurrer. Harris, 271 Va. at 204, 624 S.E.2d at

33; Russo, 241 Va. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163. Accordingly, we

must consider whether Almy alleged sufficient facts to establish

each element of the tort.

1) Intentional or Reckless Conduct

We conclude that Almy’s pleadings sufficiently allege that

Grisham, Alan, and Donna intended to cause Almy severe emotional

distress. This element of the tort is set forth in Almy’s

allegations that Grisham, Alan, and Donna acted intentionally to

falsely accuse Almy, with the specific purpose of causing her

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humiliation, ridicule, and severe emotional distress. Almy

further alleged that these three defendants intentionally

manufactured evidence to cause her distress, and that Grisham

expressed his intent to have her “really, really, suffer” for

writing the letters.

Almy fails to allege in her motion for judgment, however,

that Liebman and Wong engaged in conduct with the intent to

cause Almy emotional distress. Likewise, Almy’s pleadings do

not contain allegations that the actions of Liebman and Wong

were reckless, such that they knew or should have known their

act of writing a false report likely would cause Almy severe

emotional distress. Therefore, we hold that Almy has failed to

state a cause of action against Liebman and Wong for intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

2) Outrageous or Intolerable Conduct

We conclude that Almy sufficiently alleged the element of

outrageous conduct perpetrated by Grisham, Alan, and Donna.

This conduct is described in Almy’s allegations that the three

defendants devised a scheme to falsely accuse Almy of writing

the letters and that, in furtherance of this scheme, Alan and

Grisham provided Liebman with the confidential documents

improperly obtained from St. Anne’s. Almy further alleged that

Alan and Donna knew or should have known that Grisham

inappropriately influenced the wording of Liebman’s report,

11
causing Liebman to issue a false report implicating Almy. In

addition, Almy alleged that Grisham, Alan, and Donna caused

Officer Grimes to confront Almy by providing false information

that a handwriting examiner had determined that Almy was the

author of the letters.

In reviewing these allegations, we acknowledge that the

term “outrageous” does not objectively describe particular acts

but instead represents an evaluation of behavior. Russo, 241

Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162. Nevertheless, in the absence of

an objective definition of the term, we must make this threshold

assessment in determining the sufficiency of Almy’s allegations.

See id.

We hold that reasonable persons could view the conduct

alleged, if proved, as being “so outrageous in character, and so

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly

intolerable in a civilized community.” See Russo, 241 Va. at

27, 400 S.E.2d at 162 (quoting Ruth, 237 Va. at 368, 377 S.E.2d

at 413). When reasonable persons could view alleged conduct in

this manner and the other elements of the tort are properly

pleaded, the controversy must be resolved at a trial on the

merits of the claim, rather than by a circuit court on demurrer.

See Burroughs v. Keffer, 272 Va. 162, 168, 630 S.E.2d 297, 301

(2006); Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 252 Va. 186, 191, 475

12
S.E.2d 798, 801 (1996); Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at

148.

3) Causal Connection Between Conduct and Distress

We hold that Almy alleged sufficient facts to support a

conclusion that the conduct of Grisham, Alan, and Donna

proximately caused her severe emotional distress. Almy’s

pleadings contain two primary allegations of proximate

causation. First, Almy alleged that these three defendants

provided false information to local law enforcement officials

and that, as a result, Detective Grimes confronted Almy, causing

her to suffer severe emotional distress and depression. Second,

Almy alleged that she suffered severe emotional distress caused

by her discovery that Grisham and Alan had removed from school

files confidential information related to her family. Thus,

these allegations of proximate causation were sufficient to

survive the defendants’ demurrers.

4) Severity of Resulting Emotional Distress

Finally, we hold that Almy adequately alleged that she

suffered severe emotional distress. Almy asserted that the

conduct of Grisham, Alan, and Donna caused her to suffer from

several debilitating conditions, including depression,

nervousness, and an inability to sleep, which ultimately caused

a complete disintegration of virtually every aspect of her life.

She allegedly was unable to manage her mother’s financial

13
affairs, to carry out her family duties, or to perform her

various charitable endeavors. Also relevant are Almy’s

allegations that due to her “major depressive disorder” caused

by the defendants’ false accusations, she was required to

undergo extensive therapy from Dr. Alexander.5

We hold that these allegations are materially different

from the allegations of severe emotional distress in Russo,

which we held were inadequate to survive a demurrer. Unlike the

plaintiff in Russo, Almy alleged that she was required to seek

professional counseling because of her depression occasioned by

the defendants’ misconduct.

We likewise conclude that Almy’s allegations of severe

emotional distress exceed those alleged by the plaintiff in

Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 624 S.E.2d 24 (2006). While

both Almy and the plaintiff in Harris alleged that they required

counseling and suffered from severe psychological trauma,

depression, humiliation, and injury to reputation, Almy

additionally alleged that the defendants’ actions rendered her

functionally incapable of carrying out any of her work or family

responsibilities. See id. at 204-05, 624 S.E.2d at 34.

5
In addition, the motion for judgment alleges that Almy
obtained a forensic psychiatric assessment conducted by David
Pickar, M.D. Although the assessment was obtained for purposes
of litigation and Almy did not seek treatment from Dr. Pickar,
Dr. Pickar nevertheless allegedly concluded that Almy suffered
from a major depressive disorder as a result of the defendants’
actions.

14
 According to Almy, her emotional distress reached such a

level of severity that “[e]very aspect of [her] life [was]

fundamentally and severely altered,” such that she “had trouble

even walking out of the front door.” As a result, Almy’s motion

for judgment sufficiently alleges emotional distress “so severe

that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” See

id. at 205, 624 S.E.2d at 34 (citing Russo, 241 Va. at 28, 400

S.E.2d at 163). Thus, we hold that Almy’s factual allegations

describing her severe emotional distress are adequate to survive

a demurrer on this fourth and final element of the tort.

B. Conspiracy Allegations

We next consider Almy’s conspiracy allegations. We decide

the question whether the tort of conspiracy to intentionally

inflict emotional distress should be recognized as a cause of

action in this Commonwealth.

We begin our analysis with the observation that, in

Virginia, a common law claim of civil conspiracy generally

requires proof that the underlying tort was committed. See

Commercial Bus. Sys. v. Halifax Corp., 253 Va. 292, 300, 484

S.E.2d 892, 896 (1997). This general rule reflects the view of

a majority of states that have considered the question. See,

e.g., Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 894 A.2d 240,

254-55 (Conn. 2006); Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 310 n.

27 (D.C. 2000); Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander &

15
Assocs., 650 A.2d 260, 265 (Md. 1994); Jones v. BP Oil Co., 632

So.2d 435, 439 (Ala. 1993); Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excav.

Corp. v. The Carteret Indus. Ass’n, 181 A.2d 774, 779 (N.J.

1962); Cook v. Robinson, 116 S.E.2d 742, 744-45 (Ga. 1960).

“The gist of the civil action of conspiracy is the damage

caused by the acts committed in pursuance of the formed

conspiracy and not the mere combination of two or more persons

to accomplish an unlawful purpose or use an unlawful means.”

CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 28, 431

S.E.2d 277, 281-82 (1993) (quoting Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335,

338, 19 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1942)); accord, Commercial Business Sys.

v. BellSouth Servs., 249 Va. 39, 48, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995).

As stated above, a claim for intentional infliction of severe

emotional distress requires proof of severe emotional distress

proximately caused by a defendant’s outrageous conduct that is

intentional or reckless. See Harris, 271 Va. at 203, 624 S.E.2d

at 33; Delk, 259 Va. at 136, 523 S.E.2d at 833; Jordan, 255 Va.

at 499, 500 S.E.2d at 219; Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at

148. Thus, under the common law in Virginia, a conspiracy claim

based on this underlying tort would include these same elements

of proof. See Halifax, 253 Va. at 300, 484 S.E.2d at 896.

As we already have observed, the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress is “not favored” in the law.

See Harris, 271 Va. at 204, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Russo, 241 Va. at

16
26, 400 S.E.2d at 162; Ruth, 237 Va. at 373, 377 S.E.2d at 416.

A primary reason for the tort’s disfavored status is that

because the prohibited conduct cannot be defined objectively,

clear guidance is lacking, both to those wishing to avoid

committing the tort, and to those who must evaluate whether

certain alleged conduct satisfies all elements of the tort. See

Russo, 241 Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162.

If we were to recognize a conspiracy claim based on an

agreement to commit this tort, the difficulties resulting from

this absence of clear guidance would be compounded. Courts and

juries would be faced with the amorphous task of determining

whether parties have entered into an agreement to engage in

conduct that cannot be defined objectively. See id.

Determinations of this nature would invite great uncertainty and

speculation on the part of the fact finder.

We also observe that, in Virginia, a plaintiff can allege

joint liability of parties who acted in concert to commit the

tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without the

need to assert a claim of conspiracy. The case before us

plainly illustrates this point. Accordingly, upon consideration

of these several factors, we hold that a plaintiff may not

assert a cause of action in Virginia for civil conspiracy to

intentionally inflict severe emotional distress.

IV. CONCLUSION

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 When a circuit court has reached the correct result for the

wrong reason, we will assign the correct reason and affirm the

relevant portion of the court’s judgment. Whitley v.

Commonwealth, 260 Va. 482, 492, 538 S.E.2d 296, 301 (2000);

Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 191, 523 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2000);

Hartzell Fan, Inc. v. Waco, Inc., 256 Va. 294, 303, 505 S.E.2d

196, 202 (1998). Therefore, based on our holdings in this

appeal, we will affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Almy’s

conspiracy claim with regard to all defendants. We also will

affirm the circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice the claims

of intentional infliction of emotional distress with regard to

David Liebman and Cina L. Wong. We will reverse the circuit

court’s dismissal of the claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress with regard to John Grisham, Jr., Alan

Swanson, and Donna Swanson, and remand the case to the circuit

court for a trial on the merits of the remaining claims.

Affirmed in part and final judgment,
reversed in part and remanded.

JUSTICE KINSER, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the majority’s refusal to recognize an

independent cause of action for civil conspiracy to

intentionally inflict emotional distress, as well as its

decision to affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Katherine

Almy’s claims against David Liebman and Cina L. Wong. With

18
respect to the portion of the majority opinion holding that

Almy’s motion for judgment contained sufficient allegations of

each element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional

distress to survive demurrer, I respectfully dissent.

To recover for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, a plaintiff must show:

One, the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or
reckless. . . . Two, the conduct was outrageous and
intolerable in that it offends against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality. . . .
Three, there was a causal connection between the
wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional distress. Four,
the emotional distress was severe.

Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148

(1974). Even assuming Almy pled sufficient facts to satisfy the

first three prongs of the four-part Womack test, I find that her

allegations concerning the severity of her emotional distress

are deficient.1

The majority holds otherwise, notwithstanding the opposite

conclusion this Court recently reached when confronted with

similar allegations in Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 624

S.E.2d 24 (2006). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a

licensed clinical psychologist verbally abused her, causing the

plaintiff to suffer “severe psychological trauma and mental

1
I express no opinion whether Almy’s allegations as to the
other three prongs were sufficient because her failure to
sufficiently plead the severity of her emotional distress is, by
itself, fatal to her cause of action.

19
anguish affecting her mental and physical well-being,” the

symptoms of which were “nightmares, difficulty sleeping, extreme

loss of self-esteem and depression.” Id. at 204−05, 624 S.E.2d

at 34. Notably, the plaintiff in Harris, unlike the plaintiff

in Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 25, 28, 400 S.E.2d 160, 161–63

(1991), alleged that she needed “additional psychological

treatment and counseling” as a result of the psychologist’s

actions. Harris, 271 Va. at 205, 624 S.E.2d at 34.

Nonetheless, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment sustaining

the psychologist’s demurrer, holding that the plaintiff failed

to allege facts showing emotional distress “‘so severe that no

reasonable person could be expected to endure it.’” Id.

(quoting Russo, 241 Va. at 27, 400 S.E.2d at 163). We reached

the same result in Russo even though the plaintiff there alleged

that she “withdrew from activities and was unable to concentrate

at work.” 241 Va. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163.

In my view, Almy has failed to plead facts relative to the

severity of her emotional distress that materially differ from

the allegations we held insufficient in Harris and Russo. For

this reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion

inasmuch as it holds that Almy adequately pled this element in

20
tort. Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court in

its entirety.2

2
The parties in this case have not argued whether Almy’s
alleged emotional distress was exaggerated and unreasonable
under the circumstances. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46 cmt. j (1965) (“The distress must be reasonable and
justified under the circumstances, and there is no liability
where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable
emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar
susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has
knowledge.”); Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir. 1981); Drejza v.
Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1314 n.16 (D.C. 1994); Cafferty v.
Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); Dickerson v. Int’l United Auto Workers Union, 648
N.E.2d 40, 48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Tanner v. Rite Aid of W.
Va., Inc., 461 S.E.2d 149, 157 n.11 (W. Va. 1995). Thus, I
express no opinion on that issue.

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