Brown v. Com.

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J.

TAVARES LAMONT BROWN

v.   Record No. 050639       OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
                                        November 4, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

              FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

      In this appeal we determine whether, based on the

totality of the circumstances, a police officer had probable

cause to arrest an individual seen holding a hand-rolled

cigarette.

                         FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

      Officer Edward C. Lambert, III's supervisor instructed

him to patrol a particular block of Lakeview Avenue in

Richmond, Virginia, because of several recent shootings and a

homicide in the area.     One morning while patrolling the area,

Officer Lambert observed a red automobile parked in an alley

in a manner that would not allow a wide emergency vehicle to

pass through the alley.     Officer Lambert got out of his patrol

car and, as he approached the vehicle, four men standing

nearby quickly walked away in different directions.    When he

reached the red car, Officer Lambert saw the defendant,

Tavares Lamont Brown, asleep in the passenger seat holding a

partially-burned, hand-rolled cigarette in one hand and a

lighter in the other.     Officer Lambert woke Brown up, took the
items out of his hands, and asked him to step out of the

vehicle.   The record does not reflect Officer Lambert observed

any drug related items in the vehicle or around Brown.

Further, Officer Lambert testified that he later smelled the

cigarette and "did not believe it to be marijuana" because "it

smelled like tobacco."

     A subsequent search of Brown's pockets produced a folded

$5.00 bill.   Laboratory tests showed that the hand-rolled

cigarette and the folded money contained traces of cocaine and

heroin, respectively.

     Brown was charged with possession of cocaine and

possession of heroin, violations of Code § 18.2-250.    He filed

a motion to suppress the evidence arguing that it "was

obtained during a warrantless and unlawful search."    At the

suppression hearing, Officer Lambert testified that Brown was

seized "when [Officer Lambert] approached the vehicle and saw

the hand[-]rolled item in his hand."   Officer Lambert further

testified that, based on his 19 years of law enforcement

experience during which he saw over 100 hand-rolled cigarettes

each containing a controlled substance, he "knew" Brown's

hand-rolled cigarette contained a controlled substance.    On

cross-examination, Officer Lambert agreed that some people

roll their own tobacco cigarettes.




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     At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial

court denied Brown's motion to suppress, finding Officer

Lambert had probable cause to search Brown:

     In looking at the totality of the circumstances and
     looking at the car blocking an alley, four males
     standing near the car and then dispersing when the
     police officer shows up, the fact that this
     gentleman is sound asleep in the car at 7:30 a.m.
     in the morning, the fact that this officer
     testified that the smoking item in his experience
     of more than hundreds of times he's encountered the
     situation it has never contained just tobacco, his
     strong belief about the fact that it contained an
     illegal substance, I believe he had probable cause
     to arrest this individual and any search subsequent
     to that arrest was legal and valid.

     In a bench trial, the trial court found Brown guilty on

both charges and sentenced him to a total of 20 years

imprisonment with 16 years and 6 months suspended.   The Court

of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Brown v. Commonwealth, No. 0160-04-2 (February 22, 2005).

Brown then appealed to this Court.

                               DISCUSSION

     Brown argues here, as he did in the trial court and Court

of Appeals, that Officer Lambert did not have probable cause

to arrest him and, therefore, the evidence of cocaine and

heroin should have been suppressed as the fruit of an
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unconstitutional search.


     1
       We note that Officer Lambert searched Brown before
officially arresting him. This does not affect our probable

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     The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

safeguards the privacy and security of individuals against

arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.   Camara v.

Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).    Searches and

seizures may be conducted in compliance with the Fourth

Amendment if they are reasonable.   Elkins v. United States,

364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).   Searches and seizures conducted

pursuant to a particularized warrant based on probable cause

as adjudged by a magistrate are reasonable.   See Massachusetts

v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-91 (1984); McDonald v. United

States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).    Because law enforcement

will not always be in a position to secure a warrant prior to

detaining or searching persons suspected of criminal activity,

searches and seizures based on probable cause that the

individual is engaged in criminal activity are also reasonable

for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.   Whren v. United States,

517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.

411, 423-24 (1976).

     Whether an officer has probable cause to arrest an

individual in the absence of a warrant is determined under an

objective test based on a reasonable and trained police



cause analysis because a search conducted before an arrest is
not invalid if probable cause to arrest the person existed at
the time of the search. See Italiano v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
334, 336, 200 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1973).

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officer's view of the totality of the circumstances.      See

Parker v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 96, 106, 496 S.E.2d 47, 53

(1998).   On appellate review, we give deference to the

historical facts determined by the trial court, but we review

de novo whether the legal standard of probable cause was

correctly applied to the historical facts.   Jackson v.

Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004);

see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).         To

determine whether probable cause exists, we "will focus upon

'what the totality of the circumstances meant to police

officers trained in analyzing the observed conduct for

purposes of crime control.' "   Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va.

816, 820-21, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981) (quoting Hollis v.

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976)).

     In this case, the probable cause requirement arose when

Officer Lambert approached the car and saw the hand-rolled

cigarette, the point at which the parties agree Brown was

seized. Thus, the circumstances relevant to the probable cause

determination are the position of the red car in an alley in

an area Officer Lambert had been instructed to patrol, the

dispersal of four men when Officer Lambert approached the red

car, finding of Brown asleep in the car at 7:30 a.m. with a

partially-burned, hand-rolled cigarette in his hand, and the

strong belief of Officer Lambert that the hand-rolled


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cigarette contained a controlled substance based on his prior

experience with hand-rolled cigarettes.

       The red car's position and the dispersal of the four men

could indicate criminal activity under some circumstances;

however, here, the basis for such indication could no longer

be supported when Officer Lambert found Brown asleep in the

car.   Brown was not engaged in any activity implicating the

position of the car or the other men.   The Court of Appeals

also referred to the area as a "high crime" area, but this

characterization and the directive to patrol the area were

based on a recent history of violent crimes and, again,

provided no support to the proposition that the sleeping Brown

was engaged in such activities.

       Officer Lambert's experience with controlled substances

and his observation of a hand-rolled cigarette in Brown's hand

undoubtedly support Officer Lambert's suspicion that Brown may

have been engaged in criminal activity.   We have considered a

number of instances in which an officer's expertise and

training made his observation of an item suspected to contain

contraband a significant factor in the probable cause

analysis.   In none of these cases, however, has that fact

alone supported a finding of probable cause when the

suspicious item is also capable of legitimate use.




                                  6
     In Matthews v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1, 2, 235 S.E.2d

306, 306 (1977), an officer stopped Matthews for speeding and

observed a "pack of cigarette wrapping papers" and a "folded

brown paper bag."   We held the officer did not have probable

cause to look inside the bag because the connection he made

between the bag and the cigarette wrapping papers "was not

combined with any other circumstance which might have

justified a rational belief that the bag contained contraband

drugs."   Id. at 3, 235 S.E.2d at 307.    Similarly, in Harris v.

Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 154, 400 S.E.2d 191, 196 (1991), we

rejected the Commonwealth's argument that an officer had

probable cause to open a film canister found during a valid

investigatory stop and pat down because the officer recognized

it as a container often used to hold drugs.     We observed that

although in the officer's experience people kept drugs in film

canisters, law-abiding citizens used film canisters for

legitimate purposes, and we concluded that no probable cause

existed because the only other evidence to support a finding

of probable cause in that case was a report from an informant

who was not shown to be reliable.   Id.

     We have found that the requisite probable cause for a

warrantless search of a vehicle existed based on the police

officer's belief that a hand-rolled cigarette held by a

passenger contained marijuana combined with the passenger's


                                7
actions in attempting to hide or get rid of the hand-rolled

cigarette.   Hollis, 216 Va. at 877, 223 S.E.2d at 889.     In

Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354, 355, 228 S.E.2d 685, 686

(1976), the officer testified that he observed a yellow bag

that "looked like a 'nickel bag of marijuana.' "    We concluded

that the totality of the circumstances supported a finding of

probable cause to arrest a passenger in a vehicle because

officers observed the driver and passenger repeatedly pass the

yellow bag between them and the passenger locked the car door

as the officers approached the car.    Id. at 357-58, 228 S.E.2d

at 687.

     These cases show that for the last 25 years, this Court

has consistently declined to find that probable cause can be

established solely on the observation of material which can be

used for legitimate purposes, even though the experience of an

officer indicates that such material is often used for

illegitimate purposes.   To support a finding of probable

cause, such observations must be combined with some other

circumstance indicating criminal activity.    This requirement

is consistent with that of many other jurisdictions that have

considered the issue.    See, e.g.,   United States v. Anderson,

401 F.Supp. 996, 1000 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (officer did not have

probable cause to arrest upon observing a " 'home-made

looking' cigarette in the ashtray" of a car because he "had no


                                 8
way of knowing at that instant whether it contained tobacco,

corn-silks, 'rabbit-tobacco', [sic] marijuana or a myriad of

other combustible substances");       Thomas v. Superior Court, 99

Cal. Rptr. 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1972) (presence of hand-rolled

cigarette insufficient to form probable cause without

"evidence of other circumstances such as attempted concealment

of the item, the defendant's distinctive manner of smoking it,

the odor of burned marijuana, the defendant's evasiveness or

abnormal physical condition, an admission by the defendant, or

the arresting officer's expertise on the subject"); Caplan v.

State, 531 So.2d 88, 91-92 (Fla. 1988) (the mere observation

of a hand-rolled cigarette without more cannot constitute

probable cause); People v. Wright, 400 N.E.2d 731, 733-34

(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (mere observation of a hand-rolled

cigarette does not without additional circumstances furnish

reasonable cause to arrest the suspect or seize the item);

State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 353 (N.H. 1983) ("To transform

mere suspicion about the contents of the hand-rolled cigarette

into a reasonable belief based on probable cause, the officer

must articulate additional corroborating facts."); see also 2

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(b), at 317-18 (4th

ed. 2004).

     Because Officer Lambert's strong suspicion that the hand-

rolled cigarette in Brown's possession contained contraband


                                  9
was not sufficient by itself to establish probable cause to

arrest Brown, and because as explained above, the other

relevant circumstances could not support a reasonable

conclusion that the sleeping Brown was engaged in criminal

activity, the conclusion that the totality of the

circumstances established probable cause to arrest Brown was

error.2

                           CONCLUSION

     Considering the totality of the circumstances, Officer

Lambert did not have probable cause to arrest and search Brown

and, thus, the trial court erred in denying Brown's motion to

suppress the evidence.   Accordingly, we will reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate Brown's convictions,

and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with direction to

remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings,

if the Commonwealth be so advised.

                                          Reversed and remanded.




     2
       The Commonwealth also argues that even if Officer
Lambert lacked probable cause, the evidence could have been
admitted under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. The
Commonwealth did not raise this argument below, and we will
not consider an alternative argument raised for the first time
on appeal. See Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 352, 131 S.E.2d
280, 283 (1963).

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