PRESENT: All the Justices.
DONALD L. SHIPMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS TRUSTEE, ET AL.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 030500 JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE
MARCH 5, 2004
FREDERICK R. KRUCK, JR., ESQ.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
John E. Kloch, Judge
The determinative issue in this appeal is when the
appellants’ cause of action for legal malpractice accrued for
purposes of the statute of limitations.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On January 16, 1998, Donald L. Shipman and his wife, Kym L.
Shipman (collectively, “the Shipmans”) hired Frederick H. Kruck,
Jr. (“Kruck”) to defend them in an action brought by one of the
Shipmans’ creditors. The Shipmans informed Kruck that shielding
their residence from the collection efforts of creditors was
their primary objective. The Shipmans also informed Kruck that
the residence was held in trust under a 1984 Declaration of
Trust (“the Trust”). The Shipmans gave Kruck an unsigned and
undated copy of the Declaration of Trust, reflecting Mr. Shipman
was the Trust’s trustee holding the trust property for the
benefit of Mrs. Shipman and their children. The Shipmans had
conveyed their residence by deed to Mr. Shipman as Trustee under
the Trust.1
On March 9, 1998, Kruck filed a joint Chapter 7 petition on
behalf of the Shipmans in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia. The Shipmans agreed to the
bankruptcy filing based on Kruck’s advice.
Kruck represented the Shipmans in the initial stages of the
bankruptcy proceedings, but certain of the Shipmans’ creditors
and the Bankruptcy Trustee asserted the Trust was revocable and
therefore the Trust’s assets were nonexempt property of the
Shipmans’ bankruptcy estate subject to sale and administration
by the Bankruptcy Trustee. On January 19, 1999, Kruck withdrew
as the Shipmans’ counsel and advised them that he would be more
valuable as a witness in the bankruptcy proceedings concerning
the Trust. The Shipmans promptly hired new counsel to represent
them in the bankruptcy proceedings.2
During the subsequent bankruptcy proceedings Kruck
testified that he erroneously assessed the trust documents as
establishing an irrevocable trust when he advised the Shipmans
1
By an examination of land title records, Kruck verified
the real estate conveyances to the trust, but found no copy of
the trust document on record.
2
The parties disagree as to whether new counsel was hired
explicitly to cure Kruck’s negligence. Our resolution of this
case does not depend on why, or even if, the Shipmans hired new
counsel.
2
to file bankruptcy. On March 8, 2000, the bankruptcy court
entered an order declaring the Trust to be a revocable trust and
authorizing the Bankruptcy Trustee to sell the Shipmans’
residence as an asset of the bankruptcy estate for the payment
of the Shipmans’ creditors. To prevent their residence from
being sold to a third party, the Shipmans purchased the
residence for $427,000 from the Bankruptcy Trustee on June 29,
2001.
On January 8, 2002, the Shipmans filed a motion for
judgment against Kruck in the Circuit Court of the City of
Alexandria alleging counts for negligence, breach of contract,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. They asserted
that Kruck was negligent in failing to advise them that the
Trust was revocable and could be revoked by the Bankruptcy
Trustee if they filed for bankruptcy. Kruck filed a demurrer
and plea in bar alleging the Shipmans lacked standing to bring
their suit because any claims they might have belonged to the
bankruptcy estate and must be asserted by the Bankruptcy
Trustee. Before argument on Kruck’s demurrer and plea in bar
the Shipmans requested a nonsuit which the trial court granted
on March 12, 2002.
The Shipmans then requested and received an order from the
bankruptcy court abandoning any interest in an action for
malpractice against Kruck as part of the bankruptcy estate.
3
Armed with the abandonment order, the Shipmans filed a new
motion for judgment against Kruck on September 11, 2002, in
which they renewed the counts for negligence and breach of
contract. Kruck filed another demurrer and plea in bar alleging
that the Shipmans’ action was barred by the three-year statute
of limitations applicable to breach of an oral contract. He
asserted that the limitations period expired on January 19,
2002, three years after Kruck’s representation of the Shipmans
terminated.
The trial court determined that because the action was
based upon an oral contract, the applicable statute of
limitations period was three years. The trial court further
held that the Shipmans’ cause of action accrued when Kruck’s
representation of the Shipmans terminated on January 19, 1999,
and that filing the nonsuit did not toll the running of the
statute of limitations. Therefore, the trial court sustained
Kruck’s plea in bar.3
The Shipmans filed a motion for reconsideration alleging a
written contract existed (and thus the correct limitations
period was five years) and that their legal malpractice claim
did not accrue until there was payment on a judgment creating
damages. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the Shipmans
3
The trial court did not rule on Kruck’s demurrer and the
Shipmans did not assign error to the trial court’s ruling on the
effect of the nonsuit.
4
failed to prove the existence of a written contract and that, in
any event, it was not pled. With regard to the accrual issue,
the trial court held that the Shipmans’ cause of action accrued
“when counsel was retained and paid,” referring to the counsel
substituted for Kruck.
On appeal, the Shipmans assert two assignments of error.
First, they contend the trial court erred in granting Kruck’s
plea in bar and denying their motion for reconsideration because
their action was filed within the applicable three year
limitations period.4 Second, they assert the trial court erred
in holding that their cause of action accrued when Kruck’s
representation of them ended and new counsel was retained and
paid because there was no evidence in the record as to when new
counsel was paid.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A cause of action for legal malpractice requires the
existence of an attorney-client relationship which gave rise to
a duty, breach of that duty by the defendant attorney, and that
the damages claimed by the plaintiff client must have been
proximately caused by the defendant attorney’s breach.” Rutter
v. Jones, Blechman, Wolz and Kelly, 264 Va. 310, 313, 568 S.E.2d
4
No assignment of error was made to the trial court’s
ruling that the five year statute of limitations applicable to
written contracts did not apply. The parties now agree the
applicable statute of limitations is three years, the period
applicable to oral contracts.
5
693, 695 (2002). The statute of limitations for legal
malpractice actions is the same as those for breach of contract
because although legal malpractice actions sound in tort, it is
the contract that gives rise to the duty. MacLellan v.
Throckmorton, 235 Va. 341, 343, 367 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1988);
Oleyar v. Kerr, 217 Va. 88, 90, 225 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1976)); see
also Code § 8.01-246 (setting forth the limitations periods for
breach of contract actions).
III. ANALYSIS
The parties agree the alleged negligent act, the breach of
Kruck’s duty to the Shipmans, occurred when the bankruptcy
petition was filed on March 9, 1998. The parties differ,
however, in affixing the date when the statute of limitations on
the Shipmans’ legal malpractice action accrued.
Code § 8.01-230 states, in pertinent part, that “[i]n every
action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the right of
action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation
period shall begin to run . . . when the breach of contract
occurs in actions ex contractu and not when the resulting damage
is discovered.” We have previously stated that “[a] right of
action is a remedial right to presently enforce a cause of
action.” Stone v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 232 Va. 365, 368, 350
S.E.2d 629, 631 (1986). Although a cause of action and a right
6
of action may accrue simultaneously, a right of action cannot
arise until a cause of action exists. Id.
The Shipmans contend that until the bankruptcy court
finally adjudicated the Trust to be revocable and therefore a
nonexempt part of the Shipmans’ bankruptcy estate, they had no
cause of action (and thus no right of action) against Kruck.
This is so, the Shipmans contend, because until that point in
time they had no injury or damages − an essential element of a
legal malpractice cause of action. Alternatively, citing Allied
Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977),
the Shipmans argue there could be no damages until there was
payment on an underlying judgment under the so-called “payment
rule.” The Shipmans contend the “payment” did not occur, and
the limitations period did not begin to run, until June 29,
2001, when they purchased their residence from the Bankruptcy
Trustee to prevent its sale.
Kruck asserts the statute of limitations began to run when
the bankruptcy petition was filed, subject to the “continuous
representation rule” set forth in Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512,
352 S.E.2d 327 (1987).
A. DETERMINATION OF INJURY
The parties agree that Kruck breached his duty to the
Shipmans on March 9, 1998, when the bankruptcy petition was
filed. The issue in controversy is whether on that date, or at
7
a later time, the Shipmans sustained injury or damage sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.
We have stated on more than one occasion that “[d]amage is
an essential element of a cause of action. Without some injury
or damage, however slight, a cause of action cannot accrue.”
Keller, 232 Va. at 520, 352 S.E.2d at 332; see Stone, 232 Va. at
365, 368-69, 350 S.E.2d at 631-32; accord First Va. Bank-
Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 82, 301 S.E.2d 8, 13-14 (1983);
Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 957, 275 S.E.2d 900,
904 (1981); Caudill v. Wise Rambler, 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d
257, 259 (1969). “In the absence of any injury or damage, there
is no cause of action.” Rutter, 254 Va. at 313, 568 S.E.2d at
695. Moreover, we have said that it is immaterial whether all
the damages resulting from the negligent act were sustained at
the time that act occurred. The running of the limitations
period will not be tolled by the fact that the actual or
substantial damages did not occur until a later date. Stone,
232 Va. at 369, 350 S.E.2d at 632; Housing Authority v. Laburnum
Corp., 195 Va. 827, 839, 80 S.E.2d 574, 581 (1954)).
In Virginia,
[w]e have followed the general rule that the
applicable period of limitation begins to run
from the moment the cause of action arises rather
than from the time of discovery of injury or
damage, and we have said that difficulty in
ascertaining the existence of a cause of action
is irrelevant.
8
Virginia Military Institute v. King, 217 Va. 751, 759, 232
S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977) (hereinafter “VMI”) (citing Laburnum, 195
Va. at 838, 80 S.E.2d at 580-81). In VMI we commented that this
rule may produce inequities by triggering a statute of
limitations “when the injury or damage is unknown or difficult
or even incapable of discovery . . . .” Id. at 760, 232 S.E.2d
at 900. Nevertheless, we concluded that it was the role of the
General Assembly, not the judiciary, to change a rule of law
that has been relied upon by bench and bar for so long. Id. We
continue to adhere to that principle. Under Code § 8.01-230 the
injury is deemed to accrue “when the breach of contract occurs
. . . not when the resulting damage is discovered.”
Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition the Shipmans
incurred a legal injury. Although the injury could not be
delineated as a sum certain or reflected as a final judgment on
the merits, there was injury sufficient to commence a cause of
action for legal malpractice. First and foremost, the Shipmans
lost control of their assets to the Bankruptcy Trustee,
including the power to revoke the Trust and receive the
reversion. The filing of the bankruptcy, in and of itself,
vested those rights in the Bankruptcy Trustee as a matter of
law. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, 544, 704 (2000). This injury in
particular countermanded their express wishes to protect the
9
Trust property from their creditors. Even the Shipmans’ right
to bring a legal malpractice claim vested in the Bankruptcy
Trustee, which necessitated their initial nonsuit. See National
Am. Ins. Co. v. Ruppert Landscaping Co., 187 F.3d 439, 441 (4th
Cir. 1999) (“If a cause of action is part of the estate of the
bankrupt then the trustee alone has standing to bring that
claim.”); Ellwanger v. Budsberg, 140 Bankr. 891, 903 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1992) (state court actions for legal malpractice are
property of the bankruptcy estate); Scarlett v. Barnes, 121
Bankr. 578, 579 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (state court actions for legal
malpractice are property of the bankruptcy estate). Further,
the Shipmans admitted in their motion for judgment that in
addition to the costs of repurchasing their residence, they
incurred “additional costs in legal fees, litigation costs, and
other costs associated with the bankruptcy filing and
litigation.” (Emphasis added). The Shipmans’ own pleadings
thus admit that the filing fee for the bankruptcy itself is a
recoverable damage.5 As we note below, these damages need only
be incurred, not paid.
The unity of duty, breach, and damage required to establish
a cause of action occurred on March 9, 1998, when the bankruptcy
petition was filed. It was at that time the Shipmans’ cause of
5
The Shipmans also allege their credit rating was damaged
by the bankruptcy filing.
10
action against Kruck attached, albeit vested in the Bankruptcy
Trustee. Having determined that the Shipmans’ cause of action
existed as of the time the bankruptcy was filed, the question
then becomes, under Code § 8.01-230, whether the Shipmans’ right
of action came into existence simultaneously with their cause of
action or whether it accrued at another time.
B. THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION RULE
Code § 8.01-230 dictates the right of action shall accrue
at the time of the breach. Thus, in this case, the Shipmans’
right of action came into existence and their cause of action
accrued contemporaneously with the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. In other words, the Shipmans could have brought an
action against Kruck at any time after the bankruptcy petition
was filed. However, that does not necessarily establish the
date the statute of limitations began to run for purposes of a
legal malpractice action. In Keller we held that
when malpractice is claimed to have occurred
during the representation of a client by an
attorney with respect to a particular undertaking
or transaction, the breach of contract or duty
occurs and the statute of limitations begins to
run when the attorney’s services rendered in
connection with that particular undertaking or
transaction have terminated.
Keller, 232 Va. at 518, 352 S.E.2d 330. This axiom is commonly
termed the “continuous representation rule,” which takes into
consideration the special trust and confidence inherent in the
11
attorney-client relationship. Id. at 518, 352 S.E.2d at 331.
“The relationship between a lawyer and his client is a fiduciary
relationship, one which commands the highest fidelity to a most
solemn trust, for the lawyer is the expert and the client is
utterly dependent upon his knowledge, his skill, and his honor.”
Duesterdick, 217 Va. at 767, 232 S.E.2d at 776-77 (Poff, J.,
dissenting); see also MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 255 Va. 314,
318, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1998) (noting “the highly confidential
and fiduciary relationship between an attorney and client”).6
In Keller we made clear that the continuous representation
rule applies “only when a continuous or recurring course of
professional services relating to a particular undertaking is
shown to have taken place over a period of time.” Keller, 232
Va. at 518, 352 S.E.2d at 331. The proper inquiry is not
whether a general attorney-client relationship has ended, but
instead, when the attorney’s work on the particular undertaking
at issue has ceased. Id. If malpractice is alleged with
respect to “a single, isolated act, Code § 8.01-230 . . .
6
Code § 8.01-230 was amended in 1996. However, the changes
do not materially affect the issue under consideration here and
the statute as amended does not explicitly abrogate the
continuous representation rule this Court expressed in Keller.
See Weathers v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 803, 805, 553 S.E.2d 729,
730 (2001) ("When the General Assembly acts in an area in which
one of its appellate courts already has spoken, it is presumed
to know the law as the court has stated it and to acquiesce
therein, and if the legislature intends to countermand such
appellate decision it must do so explicitly.")
12
dictates that the statute of limitations begins to run when that
act is performed, regardless of the time of its discovery.” Id.
at 518-19, 352 S.E.2d at 331.
Applying the criteria of the continuous representation rule
to the case at bar the record reflects that the attorney-client
relationship between Kruck and the Shipmans was for the
particular undertaking concerning the creditor’s action and the
resulting bankruptcy. Kruck’s advice to the Shipmans to file
for bankruptcy was an important and integral part of his
representation in that matter. For statute of limitations
purposes, the continuous representation rule effectively tolled
the accrual of the statute of limitations for the Shipmans’
cause of action from the filing of bankruptcy until January 19,
1999, the date Kruck’s representation terminated regarding the
particular undertaking for which he was engaged.
For purposes of the continuous representation rule, it is
irrelevant whether substitute counsel is acquired or when that
occurs. The date the alleged negligent attorney’s
representation of the client terminates is the relevant date
which commences the running of the statute of limitations.
Unless another rule of law tolls the accrual date further, the
Shipmans thus had until January 19, 2002, to timely file their
legal malpractice claim against Kruck.
13
C. THE “PAYMENT RULE”
In Duesterdick this Court held that a motion for judgment
asserting legal malpractice that fails to allege actual damages
fails to state a cause of action, and is demurrable.
[W]hen a client has suffered a judgment for money
damages as the proximate result of his lawyer's
negligence such judgment constitutes actual
damages recoverable in a suit for legal
malpractice only to the extent such judgment has
been paid. Here, the motion for judgment failed
to allege such actual damages. It failed,
therefore, to state a cause of action, and the
trial court correctly sustained the demurrer.
217 Va. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776. The Shipmans aver that our
decisions in Duesterdick and Rutter stand for the “payment
rule,” which they construe to mean “that a cause of action for
legal malpractice does not accrue until there is actual injury
or damages, and there is, at a minimum, a judgment in any
underlying litigation on an issue central to the malpractice
claim.” They argue that the outcome in Rutter was based on this
view of the Duesterdick “payment rule.”
According to the Shipmans, application of the “payment
rule” means the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until they had suffered a judgment (the bankruptcy court’s March
8, 2000 order declaring the Trust revocable) and they had made
payment on that judgment by purchasing the residence from the
Bankruptcy Trustee on June 29, 2001. The Shipmans thus contend
they had three years from that date, until June 29, 2004, to
14
bring their malpractice action. Since Kruck’s alleged breach of
duty occurred on March 8, 1998 with the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, the Shipmans’ “payment rule” would allow them to file
their malpractice claim more than six years after the breach.
Kruck responds that Duesterdick is “not a statute of
limitations or accrual case but instead simply stands for the
proposition that attorneys are only liable for actual damages
which their errors proximately cause their clients to incur.”
Moreover, Kruck asserts the “payment rule” only applies “when a
client has suffered a judgment for money damages as the
proximate result of his lawyer’s negligence.” Duesterdick, 217
Va. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776.
Neither Duesterdick nor Rutter involved a statute of
limitations issue. In Duesterdick, the trial court sustained a
demurrer to a motion for judgment which failed to sufficiently
plead damages. The motion for judgment did not allege the
plaintiff had made any payment upon a default judgment which was
the basis of the alleged legal malpractice. In affirming the
trial court, we never considered the statute of limitations in
any way.
Rutter involved a legal malpractice claim brought by the
executor of an estate against a law firm that had drafted the
decedent’s will and trust documents. The estate alleged that
the testamentary documents failed to distribute charitable
15
donations according to the decedent’s wishes, resulting in a
significant estate tax liability. The estate contended a cause
of action against the law firm arose during the decedent’s
lifetime because she was entitled to recover the fees paid to
the law firm for drafting defective testamentary documents. We
held, however, that the additional amount of estate tax, not the
fee decedent paid to the attorneys, was the injury or damage
proximately caused by the legal malpractice. Rutter, 264 Va. at
314, 568 S.E.2d at 695. Therefore, no cause of action came into
existence during the decedent’s lifetime as to the estate tax
liability and thus the claim did not survive her death. Id.
The distinctly different interpretations of the “payment
rule” expressed by the litigants illustrates the difficulty in
construing our holding in Duesterdick with our decisions in
Stone, Laburnum, VMI, and Keller and other cases for purposes of
the accrual of the statute of limitations. If, as we have
consistently held, even slight damage sustains a cause of
action, it is difficult to discern how the existence of a cause
of action can be postponed until some payment in partial or
whole satisfaction of the client’s damage has occurred. The
infirmities of such a rule are obvious.
First and foremost, adherence to a payment rule would vest
the aggrieved client with the power to forestall the running of
the statute of limitations by the deferral of payment,
16
regardless of whether he has already suffered damages sufficient
to give rise to his cause of action. It is the legislature that
decides when causes of action shall accrue, not plaintiffs.
Second, such a rule does not protect a client who, due to
bankruptcy or insolvency, cannot afford to pay whatever damage
he has suffered. “If the client has no cause of action until he
has paid the judgment against him, then the larger the judgment,
the greater the client’s burden and the lawyer’s impunity; the
greater the injury wrongfully inflicted, the less the liability
of the wrongdoer.” Duesterdick, 217 Va. at 767, 232 S.E.2d at
777 (Poff, J., dissenting).
Finally, the “payment rule”, in a statute of limitations
context, would work an injustice on attorneys who may be forced
to defend allegations of malpractice brought many years after
the alleged breach occurred, dependent entirely upon the ability
or whim of the complaining client to pay the resulting damages.
In this regard the “payment rule” defeats the primary objectives
of statutes of limitations, such as compelling “the exercise of
a right of action within a reasonable time,” Street v. Consumers
Min. Corp., 185 Va. 561, 575, 39 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1946),
preventing surprise, and avoiding problems “incident to the
gathering and presentation of evidence when claims have become
stale.” Truman v. Spivey, 225 Va. 274, 279, 302 S.E.2d 517, 519
17
(1983). Application of the “payment rule” to the facts of the
case at bar, as the Shipmans urge, illustrates these defects.
Even if we determined that when the Shipmans hired the
second attorney they incurred legal fees, and thus damages
sufficient to establish a cause of action, there is no
indication in the record as to when those fees were paid. If
they had given a retainer to that attorney on their first visit,
presumably the “payment rule” would then be satisfied and their
cause of action would begin to accrue. Suppose, instead, the
Shipmans did not pay their attorney for six months, one year, or
longer. Such a scenario exemplifies why the payment rule would
frustrate the will of the legislature and circumvent the
objectives of the statutes themselves if made applicable in a
statute of limitations context.
In the context of a judgment entered against a client by
virtue of his attorney’s purported negligence, we said in
Duesterdick, “until the client has made a payment on that debt
he has suffered no actual loss or damage.” 217 Va. at 766, 232
S.E.2d at 776. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude
that this is an incorrect statement of law. As Justice Poff
stated in his dissent in Duesterdick, a client who suffers the
entry of a judgment against him indeed suffers a legal injury or
damage.
18
There is little remote, speculative, or
contingent about a money judgment. Indeed, it is
a legal creature of singular dignity. Such a
judgment calls into existence what did not exist
before, viz., a liquidated debt. Except for
jurisdictional defect, that judgment and the debt
it creates cannot be collaterally attacked and is
actionable in every state. The recorded judgment
constitutes a continuing lien (securing the debt
and the interest as it accrues) on the debtor’s
assets (presently owned and later acquired), a
lien that is enforceable by public sale. Subject
to the statute of limitations, the debt survives
the debtor’s death and may be revived against his
personal representative. Code § 8-396 (Cum.
Supp. 1976). Some judgments, such as that
suffered by the client here, survive bankruptcy.
11 U.S.C. § 35.
Id., 217 Va. at 768, 232 S.E.2d at 777.
Accordingly, our prior decision in Duesterdick is overruled
and cannot be viewed as supporting the Shipmans’ argument, which
we reject.
IV. CONCLUSION
“When the trial court has reached the correct result for
the wrong reason, we will assign the correct reason and affirm
that result.” Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 191, 523 S.E.2d
246, 253 (2000); accord Hartzell Fan, Inc. v. Waco, Inc., 256
Va. 294, 303, 505 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1998); Ridgwell v. Brasco Bay
Corp., 254 Va. 458, 462, 493 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1997); Harrison &
Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 253 Va.
364, 369, 484 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997). Although the trial court
was initially correct in its ruling from the bench, it later
19
held, incorrectly, that the Shipmans’ cause of action accrued
“when counsel was retained and paid.”
For the reasons stated above, the Shipmans’ cause of action
for legal malpractice accrued at the time of the attorney’s
breach, subject to the continuous representation rule.7
Therefore, the Shipmans failed to timely prosecute their claim
against Kruck and the trial court correctly granted Kruck’s plea
in bar. We will therefore affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Affirmed.
7
No argument was made in the present litigation concerning
any tolling effect of the bankruptcy on the Shipmans’
malpractice claim under federal law or Code § 8.01-229, or
concerning the statute of limitations effect on the nonsuit of
the original motion for judgment. Hence, we express no opinion
on such arguments in the present disposition.
20