VIRGINIA:
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 16th day of
January, 2004.
Christy Rawlings, Appellant,
Against Record No. 030085
Circuit Court No. CL00-4694
Pablo Lopez, Appellee.
Crystal Crayton, Appellant,
Against Record No. 030086
Circuit Court No. CL00-4693
Pablo Lopez, Appellee.
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit
Court of Greensville County.
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of
counsel, the Court is of opinion there is error in the judgment of
the Circuit Court of Greensville County.
The appellants were passengers in an automobile that was
involved in an accident. The appellants and the driver of the
automobile filed separate motions for judgment against Lopez, the
appellee, alleging negligence. Neither of the appellants were
parties to the driver's suit and did not appear of record in that
proceeding. The driver's suit was the first to be tried and
resulted in a jury verdict for Lopez.
Lopez then filed pleas in bar alleging that appellants' suits
were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. The circuit court sustained the pleas in bar and
dismissed the appellants' motions for judgment by final order
entered October 10, 2002.
Appellants have assigned error to the circuit court's judgment
that their claims are barred by either collateral estoppel or res
judicata. We agree with the appellants and will reverse the circuit
court's judgment.
"Under the concept of collateral estoppel, 'the parties to the
first action and their privies are precluded from litigating [in a
subsequent suit] any issue of fact actually litigated and essential
to a valid and final personal judgment in the first action.' "
Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 640, 272
S.E.2d 217, 218 (1980) (quoting Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671,
202 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1974)). In Bailey, this Court reaffirmed
Virginia's adherence to the principle of mutuality which holds that
"a litigant is generally prevented from invoking the preclusive
force of a judgment unless he would have been bound had the prior
litigation of the issue reached the opposite result." Id. (citing
Bates, 214 Va. at 671 n.7, 202 S.E.2d at 921 n.7). There was no
mutuality in the case at bar because, had the jury in the first
action found against Lopez, he would not have been bound by that
verdict in the subsequent suits brought by the appellants. See
Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178, 182, 196 S.E. 688, 689 (1938).
Moreover, as noted below, the record does not reflect any relation
of privity between the appellants and the driver of the car who was
the plaintiff in the first suit.
Lopez's claim of res judicata also fails because in order "[t]o
establish the defense of res judicata, the proponent of the doctrine
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must establish identity of the remedies sought, identity of the
cause of action, identity of the parties, and identity of the
quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made."
State Water Control Board v. Smithfield Foods, 261 Va. 209, 214, 542
S.E.2d 766, 769 (2001) (citing Balbir Brar Assocs. v. Consol.
Trading & Servs. Corp., 252 Va. 341, 346, 477 S.E.2d 743, 746
(1996)) (emphasis added). The appellants in the case at bar were
not parties to the first suit brought by the driver. Therefore, the
preclusive effect of res judicata cannot be sustained unless, as
Lopez argues, there was privity between the driver and the
appellants.
The record reflects no relationship existing between appellants
and the driver that would have permitted the driver to assert the
appellants' legal rights during the first suit. Thus, no privity
existed between the parties and res judicata did not bar the
appellants' suits. See Smithfield Foods, 261 Va. at 214, 542 S.E.2d
at 769 (2001) ("The touchstone of privity for purposes of res
judicata is that a party's interest is so identical with another
that representation by one party is representation of the other's
legal right.").
For these reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Greensville County is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
This order shall be certified to the Circuit Court of
Greensville County and shall be published in the Virginia Reports.
A Copy,
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Teste:
Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk
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