Present: All the Justices
PYRAMID DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
v. Record No. 002784 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
November 2, 2001
D&J ASSOCIATES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Theodore J. Markow, Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred
in admitting parol evidence to aid in interpreting the terms
of an easement, and in granting an injunction against Pyramid
Development, L.L.C. (“Pyramid”) to prevent it from interfering
with D&J Associates’ (“D&J”) use of an easement over certain
property (“the property”) owned by Pyramid.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
On March 30, 1984, D&J acquired title to a building
located at 1719 and 1721 Summit Avenue in the City of
Richmond. The building’s public entrances are located on
Summit Avenue, with the commercial entrances and loading bays
for shipping and receiving located at the rear of the
building. Another row of connected buildings runs parallel to
Summit Avenue fronting on Altamont Avenue to the south. The
property in question lies between both rows of buildings.
The deed conveying the property to D&J includes the
building and an easement to use railroad spur tracks located
behind each row of buildings. The easement provides in
pertinent part:
[T]he right, privilege and easement to use in
common the said spur tracks and sidings, and so
much of the property of Davis Brothers,
Incorporated, in the block bounded by Patton
Avenue, the Boulevard, Altamont Avenue, Norfolk
Street, and Summit Avenue, and abutting said spur
tracks and sidings as may be necessary to afford
the property hereby conveyed and the improvements
thereon free and convenient access to and use of
the said spur tracks and sidings. . . .
The deed refers to “the location of said spur tracks and
sidings” on a particular plat which identifies an “easement to
use in common spur tracks.” The railroad spur tracks
referenced in the deed branched from a main railroad line
nearby, entered the property, and ran along the rear of each
row of buildings. The rail service was discontinued sometime
in the 1970’s. The parties agree that if D&J’s easement has
not been extinguished, then it encumbers the property owned by
Pyramid.
Beginning before the rail service was discontinued and
continuing to the present, the property was used by motor
vehicles for deliveries and for parking by the occupants of the
building. After Pyramid purchased the property in 1998, it
wished to improve the property by paving it and adding parking
spaces and asked the owners of the other buildings, including
D&J, to enter into an agreement to defray the costs involved in
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exchange for the use of parking spaces. Pyramid planned to
rent the spaces to those owners who chose not to enter into the
agreement.
D&J did not enter into the agreement or pay for parking
spaces. Instead, D&J filed a bill of complaint requesting
injunctive relief to prevent Pyramid from restricting access to
the property. D&J asserted in the bill of complaint that the
easement in its deed allowed for ingress and egress to its
building and for the parking of vehicles. In response, Pyramid
maintained that when the rail service was discontinued, the
essential purpose of the easement was abandoned.
The trial court found the language of the easement
ambiguous and permitted the introduction of parol evidence to
determine whether the scope of the easement allowed for the use
of trucks and other vehicles. At trial, D&J’s evidence
demonstrated that it regularly used the property for loading
and unloading trucks and other vehicles. The trial court found
that the easement granted to D&J included the “use of the way
to access [its] building in a reasonable manner in the ordinary
course of [its] business.” Relying on our decision in Wagoner
v. Jack’s Creek Coal Corp., 199 Va. 741, 744-45, 101 S.E.2d
627, 629 (1958), the trial court found that “the more modern
use of motor vehicles to access plaintiff’s building instead of
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the spur tracks [did] not violate the terms of the easement at
issue.”
The trial court enjoined Pyramid from impeding D&J’s
access to the property. Following issuance of the trial
court’s order, both parties requested clarification. After a
hearing, the trial court entered a subsequent order to clarify
the rights of the parties. The revised order provided D&J with
“the non-exclusive right of ingress and egress over and across”
the property for access to its building and for loading and
unloading vehicles, delivery and shipment of goods, placement
of a dumpster, and the non-exclusive right to park motor
vehicles at the rear of its building. Pyramid appeals the
adverse judgment of the trial court.
II. Standard of Review
The trial court’s finding of facts are binding upon this
Court unless they are plainly wrong or unsupported by the
evidence. Quantum Dev. Co. v. Luckett, 242 Va. 159, 161, 409
S.E.2d 121, 122 (1991). However, “[t]he question whether a
writing is ambiguous is not one of fact but of law.” Langman
v. Alumni Assoc. of the Univ. of Virginia, 247 Va. 491, 498,
442 S.E.2d 669, 674 (1994). On appellate review, we are not
bound by the trial court’s conclusions regarding an
instrument’s ambiguity because we are provided with the same
opportunity as the trial court to consider the written
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provisions of the deed in question. Id. If the trial court
errs in admitting parol evidence, its findings of facts based
upon improperly admitted evidence are plainly wrong. Id.
III. Analysis
On appeal, Pyramid argues that the trial court erred in
allowing the introduction of parol evidence to aid in
determining the scope of the easement. Additionally, Pyramid
argues that the easement was extinguished because the subject
of the easement, rail service, ceased to exist.
When an easement is granted by deed, unless it is
ambiguous, “the rights of the parties must be ascertained from
the words of the deed, and the extent of the easement cannot
be determined from any other source.” Gordon v. Hoy, 211 Va.
539, 541, 178 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1971). We have held that when
the language of a deed is “clear, unambiguous, and explicit,”
a court interpreting it “should look no further than the four
corners of the instrument under review.” Langman, 247 Va. at
498-99, 442 S.E.2d at 674. Only when the language is
ambiguous may a court look to parol evidence, or specifically,
to the language employed “in light of the circumstances
surrounding the parties and the land at the time the deed was
executed.” Hoy, 211 Va. at 541, 178 S.E.2d at 496.
The trial court, citing reliance on our decision in
Strickland v. Barnes, 209 Va. 438, 164 S.E.2d 768 (1968),
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concluded that the language used in D&J’s grant was ambiguous
and therefore determined it was appropriate to utilize parol
evidence. In Strickland, the grant at issue was made subject
to easements and restrictions indicated on a plat. Id. at
441, 164 S.E.2d at 770. The plat showed several easements,
including a 25-foot strip “reserved for future R.R. Siding.”
Id. The crucial question in the case was, “[w]hat easement or
right of way . . . was intended by the words ‘Reserved for
future R.R. Siding?’ " Id. at 442, 164 S.E.2d at 770. No
railroad siding had been constructed, so the Court was called
upon to decide whether any right had been granted in the 25-
foot strip pending the construction of the siding. Id. In
Strickland, we agreed with the trial court that both the deed
and the plat were ambiguous; therefore, parol evidence was
proper to aid in the trial court’s determination. Id. at 442,
164 S.E.2d at 770-72.
The present case is different from Strickland. The deed
at issue in Strickland referenced an easement to a railroad
siding that was not yet constructed, and the intended use of
the easement prior to construction of the siding rendered the
language in the deed ambiguous. In the present case, however,
the deed unambiguously granted an easement “to use in common
the said spur tracks and sidings, and so much of the property
. . . abutting said spur tracks and sidings as may be
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necessary to afford the property hereby conveyed . . . free
and convenient access to and use of the said spur tracks and
sidings.” The language employed in D&J’s deed is not
ambiguous; the purpose of the easement was expressly limited
to allowing access to the spur tracks and sidings, and nothing
more. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erroneously
admitted parol evidence to determine the scope of the
unambiguous easement.
The trial court also relied on our decision in Wagoner;
however, the present case differs from Wagoner as well. The
easement at issue in Wagoner granted a right of way across a
road described as “a wagon haul road.” Wagoner, 199 Va. at
744, 101 S.E.2d at 629. We recognized that “where a right of
way is granted or reserved it may be used for any purpose to
which the land accommodated thereby may reasonably be devoted
unless the grant or reservation specifically limits the use
. . . .” Id. at 744, 101 S.E.2d at 629. We further held that
use of the easement by trucks, the modern substitute for
wagons, did not violate the easement. Id. at 745, 101 S.E.2d
at 629. The easement involved in the present case is
different from the easement in Wagoner. In Wagoner, the
easement was not limited as to use and the road continued in
existence. Id. at 744-45, 101 S.E. 2d at 629. However in the
case before us, D&J’s easement is specifically limited to
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allowing access to the spur tracks and sidings. The spur
tracks and sidings are no longer in use; therefore, the
limited purpose of the easement is no longer in existence.
Finally, based on the unambiguous language in the deed,
the easement to use the spur tracks and sidings was
extinguished when rail service was discontinued. “If the
particular purpose for which [an] easement is granted is
fulfilled or otherwise ceases to exist, the easement . . .
falls to the ground.” 1 FREDERICK D.G. RIBBLE, MINOR ON REAL
PROPERTY § 107.1, at 145-46 (2d ed. 1928). Accord American Oil
Co. v. Leaman, 199 Va. 637, 652, 101 S.E.2d 540, 552 (1958).
When the rail service was discontinued, the purpose of the
easement, which was to allow access to the spur tracks and
sidings, ceased to exist.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
erred in finding the language of the deed ambiguous and in
permitting the introduction of parol evidence. The trial
court further erred in finding that an easement continued to
exist over the property, despite the discontinuance of rail
service. Because the injunction was based upon an erroneous
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premise, the trial court further erred in granting injunctive
relief. *
Accordingly, we will reverse and vacate the judgment of
the trial court, and will enter final judgment for Pyramid
dismissing the Bill of Complaint.
Reversed and final judgment.
*
Pyramid also asserted that the trial court erred in
finding that the easement included the use of delivery
vehicles and parking privileges, and the placement of a
dumpster on the property. Because we find that the easement
was extinguished, we need not address this assignment of
error.
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