Present: All the Justices
SUGARLAND RUN HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION
Record No. 992331 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
September 15, 2000
WALTER D. HALFMANN, ETC., ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Jean Harrison Clements, Judge
In this wrongful death case, the dispositive issue is
one of proximate cause. We review a judgment entered
against a homeowners’ association in favor of the personal
representatives of the estate of a child who was struck and
killed by a motorist as the child was riding his bicycle
from a pathway located in the common areas owned by the
homeowners’ association onto a public street. Because we
conclude that there was insufficient evidence as a matter
of law to establish that any alleged defects in the pathway
and its intersection with the street proximately caused the
accident, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court
and enter final judgment for the homeowners’ association.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Walter R. Halfmann (Halfmann) was killed in January
1995 as he rode his bicycle from a multi-purpose, private
pathway 1 onto Sugarland Run Drive, a public street in
Loudoun County, and was struck by a motor vehicle driven by
Trina Kabiri. The bike path was located in a residential
subdivision and was part of the common areas owned by
Sugarland Run Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association).
Halfmann’s parents, Walter D. Halfmann and Barbara B.
Halfmann, as personal representatives of their eight-year-
old son’s estate, filed this action against Kabiri, the
Association, and several other defendants. 2 The personal
representatives alleged that the Association had notice or
knowledge of “the unreasonably dangerous condition”
existing at the intersection between the pathway and the
street where the accident occurred, and that the
Association failed to take “reasonable and necessary” steps
to ensure that people utilizing the common areas could do
so safely.
After the personal representatives presented evidence
at trial, the Association moved to strike that evidence
because, inter alia, the alleged defects in the pathway
were not a proximate cause of the accident. The circuit
1
Bicyclists, pedestrians, in-line skaters and
skateboarders used the paved path.
2
At the time of trial, only Kabiri and the Association
remained as party defendants.
2
court denied the motion initially and again when the
Association renewed its motion to strike at the conclusion
of all the evidence.
A jury then returned a verdict against the Association
in favor of the personal representatives and awarded
damages to Halfmann’s estate and his statutory
beneficiaries pursuant to Code §§ 8.01-52 and –53. The
jury, however, found in favor of Kabiri. 3 After denying the
Association’s motion to set aside the jury verdict, the
circuit court entered judgment for the personal
representatives. 4 This appeal followed.
The bike path at issue in this case was designed and
constructed no later than the summer of 1974, but not by
the Association. The path intersects Sugarland Run Drive
and continues on the opposite side of the street. No signs
or markings were placed along the pathway or on Sugarland
Run Drive to warn a bicyclist or a motorist about the
intersection. Nor were any barriers or devices installed
at the end of the path to prevent or impede a bicyclist’s
3
The personal representatives did not appeal the
judgment in favor of Kabiri, and she is not a party to this
appeal.
4
The circuit court’s judgment was in accordance with
the jury verdict except that the court remitted a portion
of the jury’s award for funeral expenses and for the care,
3
travelling from the path onto Sugarland Run Drive. The
only change to the pathway since its construction was the
installation of curb cuts, or wheelchair ramps, on both
sides of Sugarland Run Drive. The Virginia Department of
Transportation constructed the curb cuts in approximately
1994.
On the afternoon of the accident, as Halfmann was
riding his bicycle down the descending pathway and
approaching the intersection with Sugarland Run Drive, the
intersection and street were clearly visible to him.
However, several objects were on his left side between the
path and that portion of the street where Kabiri was
operating her vehicle. Two large, electrical
switch/transformer boxes were located within a few feet of
the edge of the pathway and approximately 10 to 15 feet
from the edge of Sugarland Run Drive. 5 Two vehicles were
parked on the side of the street nearest Halfmann about 30
to 40 feet down Sugarland Run Drive. A house was likewise
located about 70 feet down the street from the point of
impact between Halfmann’s bicycle and Kabiri’s car. Bushes
had been planted along one side of the driveway of that
__________________
treatment, and hospitalization of Halfmann. The personal
representatives did not object to the remittitur.
4
house. All these objects, as well as the pathway upon
which Halfmann was riding his bicycle, were to Kabiri’s
right as she drove her vehicle along Sugarland Run Drive.
While no testimony established Halfmann’s speed as he
rode his bicycle on the path toward Sugarland Run Drive,
Rachel Susan Toepfer, who was driving along Sugarland Run
Drive in the direction opposite to that in which Kabiri was
travelling at the time of the accident, testified that
Halfmann’s speed did not change as he approached the
intersection, nor did he stop or look to his left in the
direction of Kabiri’s vehicle. According to Toepfer,
Halfmann entered the street and almost travelled past
Kabiri’s vehicle before the left front of her vehicle (the
driver’s side) struck the rear wheel of his bicycle.
Another witness to the accident likewise testified that
Halfmann did not stop at the intersection and did not
appear to look to his left, the direction from which
Kabiri’s vehicle was approaching.
When the accident occurred, Kabiri was on her way to
pick up her child from school. Kabiri testified that
Halfmann passed in front of her car and that she could not
do anything to avoid hitting his bicycle. She further
__________________
5
The switch/transformer boxes were in place before the
pathway was constructed.
5
stated that, if she had seen him, she would have stopped
but she was not aware of anything in the street until the
impact occurred. 6 However, she knew that children who
attended the nearby school often walked or rode bicycles to
that school.
Jennifer L. Toole, an expert in the field of bicycle
and pedestrian planning, testified that there were two
major “flaws” in the design of the pathway and the
intersection where the accident at issue occurred. First,
she stated that there should have been a sign inscribed
with the warning “Bike Crossing” or “Pedestrian Crossing”
on Sugarland Run Drive at its intersection with the
pathway. She also recommended that a crosswalk be painted
on the street.
The second defect, according to Toole, was the
inadequacy of “sight lines” between an approaching motorist
and a bicyclist on the pathway. 7 Toole identified the
6
The investigating police officer testified that he
found no skid marks on Sugarland Run Drive that would
indicate Kabiri applied her brakes before the impact.
Likewise, the officer did not find any indication on the
bike path that Halfmann braked or slowed before entering
the street.
7
Toole testified that “appropriate sight lines”
provide an “adequate visual distance” for a motorist to see
a pedestrian and stop in time to avoid hitting the
pedestrian, based on the speed limit or the prevailing
6
switch/transformer boxes as the factor that significantly
blocked the sight lines for Halfmann and Kabiri on the day
of the accident. However, Toole admitted that, in order to
analyze whether sight lines are adequate, the respective
likely speeds of a motorist and bicyclist must be
determined. Toole further testified that only by removing
the switch/transformer boxes could proper sight lines have
been established. If the pathway itself were moved further
from the boxes, Toole could say only that the sight lines
would have been “better” since she had not analyzed that
possibility.
Toole also stated that the pathway’s downward slope to
the intersection caused both motorists and bicyclists to
have only a “narrow window” of visibility in which to see
each other as they approached the intersection. Toole
indicated that the pathway should have had only a grade of
five to eight degrees, but instead, it sloped between 10
and 15 degrees. Nevertheless, she testified that if
Halfmann had stopped at the intersection, he would have had
a clear line of sight down Sugarland Run Drive in the
direction from which Kabiri was travelling for “quite a
distance.” Finally, Toole stated that the location of the
__________________
speed of motorists on the road. The term also applies when
a bicyclist is approaching an intersection with a road.
7
curb cut was not appropriate because it did not exit into a
crosswalk. 8
ANALYSIS
Several principles guide our analysis of this case.
On appeal, we review the facts in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party at trial, in this case the personal
representatives of Halfmann’s estate. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. St. John, 259 Va. 71, 76, 524 S.E.2d 649, 651
(2000). “[A] party who comes before us with a jury verdict
approved by the trial court ‘occupies the most favored
position known to the law.’ " Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v.
Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992)
(quoting Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 892, 901, 263 S.E.2d
69, 76 (1980)). A trial court’s judgment is presumed to be
correct, and on appeal, we will not set it aside unless the
judgment is plainly wrong or not supported by the evidence.
Ravenwood, 244 Va. at 57, 419 S.E.2d at 630. However, when
these principles are applied, if it appears that the
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it, we must set it aside. Evaluation Research Corp. v.
8
The curb cut was not directly in front of Halfmann as
he rode down the path. Instead, the curb cut was located
to the side of the path, thus requiring Halfmann to make a
turn to his left followed by another similar turn to his
right in order to access the curb cut and Sugarland Run
Drive from the path.
8
Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 147-48, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1994)
(citing Thompson v. Bacon, 245 Va. 107, 111, 425 S.E.2d
512, 514 (1993); Whichard v. Nee, 194 Va. 83, 89, 72 S.E.2d
365, 369 (1952)).
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the
alleged defects in the design of the pathway and its
intersection with Sugarland Run Drive were a proximate
cause of the accident. In order to hold the Association
liable for that alleged “unreasonably dangerous condition,”
the evidence must establish that such condition was a
proximate cause of the accident. See Cannon v. Clarke, 209
Va. 708, 711, 167 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1969) (to hold owner
liable for injuries sustained because of alleged unsafe
condition of premises, it must be shown that such condition
was a proximate cause of injuries). The personal
representatives had the burden of proving not only that the
Association was negligent but also that its negligence was
a proximate cause of the accident. Commercial
Distributors, Inc. v. Blankenship, 240 Va. 382, 395, 397
S.E.2d 840, 847 (1990) (citing State-Planters Bank & Trust
Co. v. Gans, 172 Va. 76, 81, 200 S.E. 591, 593 (1939));
Boyd v. Brown, 192 Va. 702, 711, 66 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1951).
A proximate cause of an event is that “act or omission
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
9
efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and
without which that event would not have occurred.” Beale
v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970);
accord Jenkins v. Payne, 251 Va. 122, 128, 465 S.E.2d 795,
799 (1996); Banks v. City of Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 135,
348 S.E.2d 280, 282 (1986). Generally, the issue of
proximate causation is a question of fact to be resolved by
a jury. Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing
Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 524, 531, 331 S.E.2d 440, 445
(1985)). However, when reasonable people cannot differ,
the issue becomes a question of law for the court to
decide. Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing
Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 285, 377 S.E.2d 589,
593 (1989)); Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 875, 140
S.E.2d 645, 648-49 (1965).
With regard to the issue of proximate cause, the
Association argues that, while the personal
representatives’ expert, Toole, identified several alleged
“flaws” in the design of the pathway and its intersection
with Sugarland Run Drive, she never explained the causal
connection between those particular defects and the
accident at issue. To the contrary, the Association points
out several facts that show that those defects were not a
proximate cause of the accident. First, Toepfer, who
10
witnessed the accident, stated that Halfmann never altered
the speed of his bicycle as he approached the intersection,
and neither stopped at the intersection nor looked to his
left for oncoming traffic. Second, the intersection and
the street were visible to anyone travelling on the pathway
toward Sugarland Run Drive. Finally, Toole admitted that
if Halfmann had stopped at the intersection, he could have
seen Kabiri’s oncoming vehicle.
The personal representatives respond that there was
“far more than a sufficient basis to show a causal
connection” between the defects in the pathway and the
accident. They point to the inadequate sight lines between
motorists on Sugarland Run Drive and bicyclists on the
pathway, the excessive slope of the path, the lack of
warning signs or a crosswalk, the absence of any barrier on
the pathway to stop or slow a bicyclist, and the improperly
located curb cut. The personal representatives also
contend that the question of proximate cause is actually an
issue of contributory negligence, and argue that the jury
found that Halfmann was not contributorily negligent when
it returned a verdict against the Association. 9 We agree
with the Association.
9
Since Halfmann was eight years old at the time of the
accident, the circuit court instructed the jury that
11
Assuming, without deciding, that there was an
unreasonably dangerous condition at the intersection
between the pathway and Sugarland Run Drive, and that the
Association knew or should have known of that condition,
the burden of proving proximate causation remained with the
personal representatives. In this case, the evidence did
not establish that the “flaws” identified by Toole were an
“omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, . . .
produce[d] the [accident], and without which [the accident]
would not have occurred.” Beale, 210 Va. at 522, 171
__________________
Halfmann was presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence but that the presumption could be rebutted. The
court further instructed the jury to find its verdict for
either defendant if it concluded, as to that defendant, the
personal representatives failed to prove either negligence
or proximate cause, or if it found that Halfmann was
contributorily negligent and that such contributory
negligence was a proximate cause of Halfmann’s death.
Although the personal representatives contend that the
jury verdict in favor of the Association established that
Halfmann was not contributorily negligent, under the
instructions given, the jury could have found either that
Halfmann was not capable of being contributorily negligent
or that he was not contributorily negligent in this
instance. The verdict form was a general form that simply
stated that the jury found in favor of the personal
representatives and against the Association. Thus, we
reject the contention that the jury necessarily decided
that Halfmann was not contributorily negligent.
Furthermore, an analysis of the question whether a
tortfeasor’s primary negligence proximately caused an
accident and, if so, the consequent question whether a
victim was contributorily negligent often involves review
of the same or overlapping evidence. That the evidence is
the same or overlapping does not obviate the necessity of
an independent examination of each question.
12
S.E.2d at 853. We reach this conclusion because of the
particular facts of the accident at issue. See Banks, 232
Va. at 135, 348 S.E.2d at 283 (in applying rules of
proximate cause, each case must be decided upon its own set
of facts).
First, there is no evidence that Halfmann attempted to
stop at the intersection and could not do so because of the
grade of the path, the absence of a barrier or device to
slow his speed, or the location of the curb cut. In fact,
according to Toepfer, Halfmann did not alter his speed,
never stopped, and did not even look to his left for
oncoming vehicles as he approached the intersection. Next,
the evidence was uncontradicted that Sugarland Run Drive
and the intersection were clearly visible to Halfmann as he
proceeded along the pathway toward the street. Finally,
Toole admitted that a determination regarding adequate
sight lines depends on the respective speeds of a motorist
and bicyclist, but the evidence did not demonstrate either
Halfmann’s speed or that of Kabiri. 10
However, the evidence did establish that if Halfmann
had stopped at the intersection of Sugarland Run Drive and
10
The speed limit on Sugarland Run Drive was 30 miles
per hour, and the record contained no evidence that Kabiri
was speeding.
13
the pathway, he could have seen Kabiri’s car approaching
that intersection. This case is not one where Halfmann had
to ride his bicycle into the edge of Sugarland Run Drive
and look around the switch/transformer boxes in order to
determine whether any vehicle was approaching from his
left. Those boxes were 10 to 15 feet back from the edge of
the street.
Although all accidents, however “tragic and
deplorable,” Clark v. Hodges, 185 Va. 431, 438, 39 S.E.2d
252, 256 (1946), must have some factual cause, “often
described as the ‘but for’ . . . rule[,] [g]enerally a
person is not liable to another unless but for [that
person’s] negligent act the harm would not have occurred.”
Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 622, 151 S.E.2d 422, 428
(1966). In this case, the personal representatives failed
to carry their burden to establish that “but for” the
Association’s alleged negligence, the accident would not
have occurred. Id. at 622, 151 S.E.2d at 428.
For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the
alleged defects in the design of the pathway and its
intersection with Sugarland Run Drive were a proximate
14
cause of the accident. 11 Accordingly, we will reverse the
judgment of the circuit court, set aside the jury verdict
in favor of the personal representatives, and enter final
judgment here in favor of the Association.
Reversed and final judgment.
11
In light of our decision, we need not address the
Association’s other assignments of error.
15