Present: All the Justices
JOSE GRANADOS
v. Record No. 980190 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
January 8, 1999
WINDSON DEVELOPMENT
CORP., ET AL.
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming a decision of the Workers'
Compensation Commission denying a claimant, an illegal alien,
benefits because he misrepresented his immigration status and
eligibility for employment in the United States.
Jose Ismael Granados was employed as a carpenter's helper
by Windson Development Corporation (Windson) in January 1995.
He speaks Spanish and does not speak or read English. At the
time Granados was hired, Cleo Heavener, Windson's
representative, asked Granados to provide his "social security
card" and one other form of identification, in accordance with
the requirements of the United States Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Granados gave Heavener a "social security card" bearing his
name and a card purportedly issued by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, containing his photograph and
identifying him as a resident alien. At that time, Granados
also signed an employment eligibility and verification form
required by federal law, attesting that he was an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States. The
documents Granados provided were forged. He was ineligible for
lawful employment in the United States both on the date he began
work and on the date he sustained a work-related injury.
In February 1995, Granados was injured in the course of his
employment when he fell off a "stack of lumber" and fractured
his right ankle. He was totally disabled until June 1995, when
his treating physician released him for light duty work. Based
on his illegal work status, Granados was unable to market his
remaining work capacity.
Granados filed a claim for benefits with the Workers'
Compensation Commission (the Commission). At a hearing before a
deputy commissioner, and in his responses to interrogatories,
Granados admitted that he had never applied for a social
security card or any kind of work permit, that he was not a
permanent resident alien, and that he was ineligible for
employment in the United States. Granados did not dispute that
the documents he provided to Windson were forged.
Heavner testified that Windson did not hire applicants who
lacked proper documentation of their immigration status. He
also stated that Windson would not have hired Granados if he had
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failed to produce documents indicating that he was eligible for
employment.
Granados asked the deputy commissioner to compel Windson to
respond to his discovery request seeking all of Windson's
employment records from 1990 to 1995. The deputy commissioner
determined that the documents were not relevant to the
proceeding and denied the request. The deputy commissioner
issued an opinion denying Granados benefits on the ground that
he "materially misrepresented his employment eligibility by (1)
providing a false social security card, (2) providing a [false]
alien immigration card[,] and (3) signing the Employment
Eligibility Verification Form."
The full Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's
decision, holding that Granados' claim for benefits was properly
denied because he obtained his employment by misrepresentation.
The Commission stated that Windson "properly relied on the
documents presented. Had [Heavener] been aware of claimant's
true alien status, he would not have hired him. . . . The
claimant cannot now complain that the employer was taken in by
the forged documents which he presented to obtain this
employment." The Commission also affirmed the deputy
commissioner's ruling denying Granados' motion to compel the
production of Windson's employment records.
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A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's
decision in an opinion that was withdrawn when the Court granted
Granados' request for a rehearing en banc. On rehearing en
banc, the Court entered an order, without opinion, affirming the
Commission's decision "by an equally divided court." Granados
v. Windson Dev. Corp., 26 Va. App. 251, 494 S.E.2d 162 (1997).
On appeal, Granados first asserts that the Commission erred
in denying him benefits on the basis of his false
representations, because there was no causal connection between
those representations and the injury he sustained. He argues
that his injury was "independent of the condition which was
misrepresented."
In response, Windson contends that Granados was properly
denied benefits based on his false representations. Windson
argues that there was a causal connection between Granados'
false representations and his injury, because the evidence
showed that he would not have been hired without the "proof" he
submitted to document his immigration and employment status.
The test we apply on review is well settled. A false
representation made by an employee in applying for employment
will bar a later claim for workers' compensation benefits if the
employer proves that 1) the employee intentionally made a
material false representation; 2) the employer relied on that
misrepresentation; 3) the employer's reliance resulted in the
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consequent injury; and 4) there is a causal relationship between
the injury at issue and the misrepresentation. Prince William
County Serv. Auth. v. Harper, 256 Va. 277, 280, 504 S.E.2d 616,
617 (1998); Falls Church Constr. Co. v. Laidler, 254 Va. 474,
477-78, 493 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1997).
The case before us presents the same type of causation
issue we addressed in Harper. There, an employee sustained
injuries to her wrist and coccyx while performing her job. She
had been hired after falsely stating in her employment
application that she had not been convicted of a crime as an
adult. In fact, she had been convicted of the felonies of
insurance fraud and criminal conspiracy. Her employer's
personnel director testified at a hearing before a deputy
commissioner that the employee would not have been hired if she
had disclosed her felony convictions, because of the nature of
the convictions and their recent date. 256 Va. at 279, 504
S.E.2d at 617.
We affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment upholding the
award of compensation. We stated that the employer failed to
prove its claim of false representation, because testimony that
the employee would not have been hired if she had disclosed her
felony convictions "is not sufficient to demonstrate the
existence of a causal relationship between [the employee's]
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work-related injury and her misrepresentation." Id. at 280, 504
S.E.2d at 617.
The required causal connection between an injury and a
false representation was demonstrated in McDaniel v. Colonial
Mechanical Corp., 3 Va. App. 408, 350 S.E.2d 225 (1986), in
which the complainant had sustained a work-related back injury.
At the time he was hired, the employee denied in his employment
application that he had any physical limitations that would
prevent him from performing certain types of work, and stated
that he had never received workers' compensation benefits for
his injuries. However, the employee had injured his back about
six months earlier in a previous job and had received
compensation benefits for that injury for about five weeks. Id.
at 410, 350 S.E.2d at 226.
The Court of Appeals held that there was a causal
relationship between the employee's false representations and
his injury. The Court based its holding on the medical
evidence, which established that the second injury was in the
same area of the employee's back as the earlier injury and was
accompanied by similar complaints of pain radiating into the
right leg. Id. at 413, 350 S.E.2d at 228.
In the present case, Windson failed to demonstrate the
required causal relationship between Granados' false
representation and his resulting injury. Granados' injury was
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unrelated to the substance of his false representations
concerning his immigration status and eligibility for
employment. Therefore, based on Harper, we conclude that the
Commission erred in ruling that Granados' false representations
precluded an award of benefits.
Windson asserts, however, that even if the Commission's
reason for denying benefits to Granados was erroneous, the
record still demonstrates that the Commission reached the
correct result. Windson argues that Granados was properly
denied benefits because he was not Windson's "employee," within
the meaning of the workers' compensation statutes. Windson
contends that an illegal alien cannot enter into an employment
contract in the United States and, thus, that Granados' alleged
contract of employment with Windson was void and unenforceable.
In response, Granados argues that the illegality of a
contract does not bar the receipt of workers' compensation
benefits. He relies primarily on Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co.,
146 Va. 91, 108, 135 S.E. 890, 895 (1926), in which this Court
applied the provisions of the workers' compensation statutes to
a minor who was unlawfully employed at the time he sustained a
work-related injury. We disagree with Granados' argument.
The determination whether Granados was Windson's "employee"
depends on whether he met the definition of "employee" set forth
in the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code §§ 65.2-100 to -
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1310 (the Act). Virginia Beach Police Dept. v. Compton-Waldrop,
252 Va. 302, 305, 477 S.E.2d 514, 516 (1996). As a claimant
seeking benefits under the Act, Granados had the burden of
proving that he met this definition. See Behrensen v. Whitaker,
10 Va. App. 364, 366, 392 S.E.2d 508, 509 (1990).
Code § 65.2-101 defines, in material part, an "[e]mployee"
as "[e]very person, including a minor, in the service of another
under any contract of hire." Granados was not in the service of
Windson under any contract of hire because, under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, an illegal alien
cannot be employed lawfully in the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a; see also Code § 40.1-11.1. Therefore, Granados was not
eligible to receive compensation benefits as an "employee" under
the Act because his purported contract of hire was void and
unenforceable.
We disagree with Granados' argument that our decision in
Humphrees requires a different result. There, we held that a
minor was subject to the provisions of the workers' compensation
statutes despite the fact that he was not lawfully employed in
conformance with the child labor laws. We stressed that, since
the principal object of the child labor laws is the protection
of the child, the workers compensation statutes should be
interpreted with due regard to the child's care and welfare.
146 Va. at 94-95, 135 S.E. at 891.
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Those concerns are not present in this appeal. Also,
unlike the case before us, the employer in Humphrees accepted
the child for work without an employment certificate required by
statute. Here, the record shows that Windson was diligent in
obtaining from Granados the documentation required under state
and federal law to verify his immigration status and eligibility
for employment. Therefore, Windson's conduct does not provide a
basis for reaching a different result in this case.
We find no merit in Granados' argument that the denial of
workers' compensation benefits violates his constitutional right
of equal protection. The denial of benefits results from
Granados' failure to meet his burden of proving that he was an
"employee" under the Act, not from his status as an illegal
alien. Likewise, we find no merit in Granados' contention that
the deputy commissioner improperly denied him discovery of
Windson's corporate records relating to all employment
applications made between 1990 and 1995, because those records
were irrelevant to Granados' claim for benefits.
Since the Commission reached the correct conclusion in
denying benefits to Granados, although it gave the wrong reason,
we sustain that conclusion and assign the right ground set forth
above. See Harrison & Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assoc., 253
Va. 364, 369, 484 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997); First Sec. Fed. Sav.
Bank, Inc. v. McQuilken, 253 Va. 110, 115, 480 S.E.2d 485, 488
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(1997). Therefore, we will affirm the Court of Appeals'
judgment.
Affirmed.
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