Present: All the Justices
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
v. Record No. 980378 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
November 6, 1998
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the defendant’s conviction of grand larceny
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove his
criminal intent.
Michael W. Taylor was indicted for grand larceny in
violation of Code § 18.2-95. He was accused of stealing eleven
dies used in the manufacture of trunk locks from Long
Manufacturing Company ("Long"), a business located in the City
of Petersburg. Taylor was convicted in a bench trial in the
Circuit Court of the City of Petersburg and was sentenced to
three years’ imprisonment, with execution of all three years
suspended.
Taylor appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the trial court’s judgment in an unpublished
opinion. Taylor v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2474-96-2 (December
16, 1997). The Commonwealth appeals the judgment of the Court
of Appeals under Code § 19.2-317(C).
We will state the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. Horton v.
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 608, 499 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1998);
Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 425-26, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871
(1998). In March 1995, Long held an auction of its property in
compliance with the terms of a bank foreclosure action. Since
the electric power had been turned off in all the buildings, the
items for auction were illuminated by lighting powered by an
electric generator or by the auctioneer’s flashlight. The
purchasers at the auction were allowed thirty days to remove
their items from Long’s premises.
Taylor, a self-employed scrap metal dealer, attended the
auction and purchased approximately $900 worth of items,
including several presses and dies. The dies he purchased were
located in the "main building" on metal racks containing three
or four shelves. Taylor returned on the first or second day
after the auction and removed most of his property, but waited
until the thirtieth day to retrieve his remaining items.
Before the auction, Long had sold to Sudhaus of America, a
New Jersey business, eleven dies used to manufacture trunk locks
("the Sudhaus dies"). The purchase price was $9,000 plus an
additional $29,000 for the patent rights to the dies. These
dies were stored on wooden pallets on the floor of Long’s
shipping and receiving building. Deborah Loftis, Long’s
president, placed yellow tags bearing the name and address of
Sudhaus on at least half of the eleven dies prior to the
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auction. The tags measured about two by four inches, and the
dies were two to three feet long.
The Sudhaus dies were the only items remaining in the
shipping and receiving building on the thirtieth day following
the auction. The building doors were open that day on both
sides, providing sufficient natural light to illuminate the
interior space. Loftis saw the yellow tags on the dies that
morning.
Loftis was present when Taylor arrived that day, but soon
left the premises for several hours. When Loftis returned later
in the day, she noticed that the Sudhaus dies were missing.
Loftis located some of the Sudhaus dies at Peck Recycling, a
business in the City of Richmond. The dies were untagged, but
Loftis was able to identify them by pulling apart and examining
each die.
The day after the Sudhaus dies were taken, Loftis spoke to
Taylor by telephone and made notes of their conversation. When
Loftis asked about the missing dies, Taylor responded: "Well,
what am I going to do about my press that wasn’t there [sic] I
came to pick up?" Loftis then asked Taylor, "Did you take [the
Sudhaus dies]?" Taylor responded, "Well, yeah, but what am I
going to do about my stuff that wasn’t there?"
After his arrest a few days later, Taylor admitted to
Detective Raymond Richardson of the City of Petersburg Police
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Department that he took the Sudhaus dies and sold them for scrap
metal to Peck Recycling. Taylor stated, however, that he
mistakenly thought that the dies belonged to him. Taylor also
told Detective Richardson that the Sudhaus dies were located in
the same building where most of his other purchases were
located.
Taylor testified at trial that, on the day of the auction,
the dies he purchased were illuminated only by a flashlight and
were later removed from their marked metal racks and placed on
the floor with no identifying lot marks. He stated that he saw
no tags on any of the Sudhaus dies when he returned to remove
the last of his purchases and mistakenly thought that those dies
were the same dies he had purchased because he saw no other dies
on the premises. Taylor admitted that he previously had been
convicted of two misdemeanors involving moral turpitude.
Taylor argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction. He contends that the evidence supported his
claim of mistake, and that the Court of Appeals properly held
that the trier of fact would have had to speculate from the
evidence in order to conclude that Taylor took the tagged
Sudhaus dies. We disagree with Taylor’s argument.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
on appeal, the reviewing court must accord the judgment of the
trial court sitting without a jury the same weight as a jury
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verdict. Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107, 113, 406 S.E.2d
39, 42, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991); Evans v.
Commonwealth, 215 Va. 609, 613, 212 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1975). It
is the appellate court’s duty to examine the evidence that tends
to support the conviction and to uphold the conviction unless it
is plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. Code § 8.01-
680; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263,
265 (1998); Walton, 255 Va. at 427, 497 S.E.2d at 871; Tyler v.
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 162, 165-66, 487 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1997).
In making this determination, the appellate court must examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Jenkins, 255 Va. at 521, 499 S.E.2d at 265; Walton, 255 Va. at
425-26, 497 S.E.2d at 871.
If there is evidence to support the conviction, the
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment,
even if its view of the evidence might differ from the
conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.
Jenkins, 255 Va. at 520, 499 S.E.2d at 265; Tyler, 254 Va. at
165-66, 487 S.E.2d at 223; Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236,
239, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992). The fact finder, who has the
opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, has the sole
responsibility to determine their credibility, the weight to be
given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from
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proven facts. Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 497 S.E.2d at 871;
Saunders, 242 Va. at 113, 406 S.E.2d at 42.
Larceny, a common law crime, is the wrongful or fraudulent
taking of another’s property without his permission and with the
intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof. Bryant v.
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 179, 183, 445 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1994);
Winston v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 746, 756, 497 S.E.2d 141,
147 (1998). Under Code § 18.2-95, grand larceny includes the
taking, not from the person of another, of goods having a value
of $200 or more.
Here, Taylor admitted to Loftis and Detective Richardson
that he took the Sudhaus dies from Long's premises. There is no
dispute that the dies were worth more than $200. Thus, we must
determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Taylor wrongfully took the dies with the necessary
criminal intent.
There can be no larceny if the accused, in good faith,
believes that the property taken belongs to him, since the
essential element of criminal intent is lacking in that
circumstance. Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 533, 138
S.E.2d 28, 31-32 (1964); Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800,
811-12, 133 S.E. 764, 767-68 (1926). Intent is the purpose
formed in a person’s mind at the time an act is committed. See
Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 140, 495 S.E.2d 489, 492
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(1998); Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d
313, 314 (1979). Intent may, and often must, be inferred from
the facts and circumstances of the case, including the actions
and statements of the accused. Id.; Hargrave v. Commonwealth,
214 Va. 436, 437, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1974).
We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s conclusion that Taylor wrongfully removed the
Sudhaus dies from Long’s premises with the intent to permanently
deprive the owner of that property. When Loftis asked Taylor to
explain his actions, he did not say that he took the Sudhaus
dies by mistake. Instead, he flatly stated that he took the
dies and twice asked Loftis about his items that he alleged were
missing.
Taylor told Detective Richardson that he found the Sudhaus
dies in the same building as his other purchases, which
contradicted Loftis’ testimony that none of Taylor’s items were
located in the shipping and receiving building where the Sudhaus
dies were stored. Loftis’ testimony further contradicted
Taylor’s version of the events when she stated that Taylor’s
dies were stored on metal racks, while the Sudhaus dies were
located on pallets on the floor and were marked with yellow
tags. The trier of fact was entitled to accept the entire
testimony of Richardson and Loftis, find Taylor’s contradictory
testimony unworthy of belief, and conclude that the Sudhaus dies
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were located in a different building than Taylor’s items and
were clearly marked when Taylor took them. Thus, there is
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that
Taylor was untruthful in his testimony, and that he knew when he
took the Sudhaus dies that they were not the dies he had
purchased.
For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeals’
judgment and reinstate Taylor’s conviction in accordance with
the trial court’s judgment order.
Reversed and final judgment.
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