Present: All the Justices
JELD-WEN, INC.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 972103 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ,
JR.
June 5, 1998
ANTHONY KENT GAMBLE, BY HIS MOTHER
AND NEXT FRIEND, LaDONNA GAMBLE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge
This is an appeal of a judgment entered on a jury verdict
for the plaintiff in a products liability action. Upon well
settled principles we will review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing in the trial court and recount
only those facts relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
On April 25, 1993, Anthony Kent Gamble (Gamble), then
thirteen months old, fell though an open second floor window in
the living room of the townhome rented by his parents after the
window’s screen fell out of the window frame. As a result of
his fall, Gamble suffered severe, permanent injuries.
Thereafter, Gamble, by his mother and next friend, LaDonna
Gamble, filed a motion for judgment against Jeld-Wen, Inc.
(Jeld-Wen), the manufacturer of the window and screen; the
building contractor that purchased these products from Jeld-Wen
and used them in the construction of the townhome; and the
parents’ landlord. The contractor and the landlord were
subsequently nonsuited following settlement of the claims
against them, leaving Jeld-Wen as the sole defendant. The
motion for judgment asserted alternative theories of Jeld-Wen’s
liability, alleging both negligence in the manufacture of the
window frame and screen and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability.
At trial, the evidence established that this tragic
incident arose under the following relevant facts. The window
was approximately six feet in height and its sill was eight
inches above the surface of the living room floor. The window
screen was an ordinary wire mesh screen 1 and covered the entire
opening of the window. It was designed to be held in place by
two fixed pins at the top and two spring-loaded pins at the
lower left and right of the window frame. The left spring-
loaded pin and the groove in the window frame into which the pin
was intended to be inserted contained manufacturing defects that
prevented the screen from being held securely in place unless
light pressure was applied to the screen from the outside rather
than from the inside of the window where the pin was located.
While not clear from the evidence, we will assume that this pin
and, thus, the screen appeared to be, but was not, secured on
1
The parties do not dispute that the screen was neither
designed nor constructed of special materials so as to permit it
to function as a body restraint beyond the incidental contact
that might result from the intended use and function of an
ordinary window screen.
2
the day in question, resulting in a “false latch” as alleged by
Gamble.
Gamble was approximately twenty-eight inches in height and
weighed seventeen pounds, thirteen ounces. According to his
father’s testimony, Gamble was standing on the cushions of a
loveseat that backed up to the window. Gamble’s father had
opened the blinds and raised the lower sash of the window to
allow fresh air into the home and to permit Gamble to “wave
good-bye” to his mother who was outside the home. When the sash
began to slip down, Gamble’s father left the loveseat in order
to adjust it. At that point, Gamble reached out and “barely
touched” the screen. The screen fell away from the window and
Gamble fell through the open window, falling approximately ten
feet to the concrete driveway below.
The jury awarded Gamble $15,000,000 in damages. The trial
court confirmed the jury’s verdict, reducing it by the amounts
already received through settlement of the claims against the
other defendants. We awarded Jeld-Wen this appeal.
We have not previously addressed the dispositive issue in
this appeal which involves the determination, as a matter of
law, of the duty of a manufacturer of an ordinary window screen
that is neither designed nor manufactured to act as a body
restraint to safeguard against the misuse of the screen for that
purpose. Without a legal duty there can be no cause of action
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for an injury. See C&P Telephone Co. v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61,
365 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1988). We have, however, established
principles that guide our analysis of this novel issue.
“[A] manufacturer is not required to supply an accident-
proof product.” Besser Company v. Hansen, 243 Va. 267, 276, 415
S.E.2d 138, 144 (1992). Rather, “[t]he standard of safety of
goods imposed on . . . the manufacturer of a product is
essentially the same whether the theory of liability is labeled
warranty or negligence. The product must be fit for the
ordinary purposes for which it is to be used.” Logan v.
Montgomery Ward, 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975).
In order to recover under either of these theories against the
manufacturer of a product, “a plaintiff must show (1) that the
[product was] unreasonably dangerous either for the use to which
[it] would ordinarily be put or for some other reasonably
foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the unreasonably dangerous
condition existed when the goods left the manufacturer’s hands.”
Morgen Industries, Inc. v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60, 65, 471 S.E.2d
489, 492 (1996). While a manufacturer may not be held liable
for every misuse of its product, it may be held liable for a
foreseeable misuse of an unreasonably dangerous product.
Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 219 Va. 949, 964,
252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1979); Sloan v. General Motors Corp., 249
Va. 520, 526, 457 S.E.2d 51, 54 (1995).
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Applying these principles, we think it is clear that Jeld-
Wen’s duty to Gamble was to manufacture a window screen and
frame “fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is to be used”
and safe for a reasonably foreseeable misuse that could cause
injury. Gamble concedes that the ordinary purposes of Jeld-
Wen’s window screen are to keep insects out while letting in
light and fresh air and would not include this screen serving as
a childproof restraint. 2 Gamble asserts, however, that because
the evidence supports a finding that Jeld-Wen knew or should
have known of the existence of the defect that permitted the
screen to have a “false latch” appearance and that a child could
make casual contact with this screen and cause the screen to
fall out of the frame, Jeld-Wen should have foreseen that the
child could lose his balance and fall through the open window.
The initial difficulty with Gamble’s theory is that it
fails to draw the necessary distinction between the
foreseeability of the screen being dislodged by the child’s
2
We recognize that we have previously stated that “[w]hile
screens are installed to keep bugs out, they do afford some
protection to little children; and . . . [may cause] a false
sense of security.” Crosswhite v. Shelby Operating Corp., 182
Va. 713, 718-19, 30 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1944), appeal following
remand, 185 Va. 585, 37 S.E.2d 7 (1946)(affirmed by an equally
divided Court). The issue in Crosswhite, however, was not
manufacturer’s products liability, but negligent maintenance of
the window by an inn-keeper. The legal duties involved in
Crosswhite are not the same as those at issue here.
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touch and the foreseeability of the child’s losing his balance
and falling through the open window. Inherent in this theory is
the necessary assumption that the screen was being used to
provide balance and restraining support for the child’s body
weight, and, thus, to prevent a fall through the open window.
As previously noted, this screen was not intended for this
purpose, and therefore this was a misuse of the screen.
Accordingly, it is not the occurrence of the “gentle touch,” but
the misuse of the screen to provide balance and restraining
support that is the focus of our inquiry, and we must determine
whether this misuse was reasonably foreseeable such that Jeld-
Wen had a duty to safeguard against it.
In addition, Gamble’s theory rests on the contention that
because the danger of falling through open windows with screens
is widely known, the “false latch” defect in Jeld-Wen’s screen
distinguishes this case from cases involving such falls where
non-defective window screens may in fact provide a modest level
of restraint. In short, Gamble is asserting that because the
defect in Jeld-Wen’s screen would allow it to fall away from the
window more readily than a screen without a defect, it was
reasonable that Jeld-Wen would have foreseen the danger of the
misuse of the defective screen. We disagree.
Common knowledge of a danger from the foreseeable misuse of
a product does not alone give rise to a duty to safeguard
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against the danger of that misuse. To the contrary, the purpose
of making the finding of a legal duty as a prerequisite to a
finding of negligence, or breach of implied warranty, in
products liability “is to avoid the extension of liability for
every conceivably foreseeable accident, without regard to common
sense or good policy.” Pineda v. Ennabe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 206,
209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). In this respect, manufacturers of
ordinary window screens are not charged with a duty to safeguard
against the misuse of their products as body restraints as this
misuse is not considered reasonably foreseeable despite, or
perhaps even because of, the obvious nature of the danger the
misuse presents. See, e.g., Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449,
458 (Ill. 1990); Drager v. Aluminum Industries Corporation, 495
N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). The same rationale is
extended in many cases to landlords and property owners. See,
e.g., Henstein v. Buschbach, 618 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993); Vazquez v. City of New York, 596 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners,
941 P.2d 707, 709-710 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
It then does not logically follow that the alleged defect
in Jeld-Wen’s screen would impose a different or greater duty to
manufacture the screen so that it would act as a childproof
restraint if misused for that purpose. Although the existence
of a defect is a factor in determining whether a product is
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unreasonably dangerous for the use to which it would ordinarily
be put, Morgen Industries, 252 Va. at 65-66, 471 S.E.2d at 492,
it is not the dispositive factor in determining the duty, if
any, to be imposed on the manufacturer to reasonably foresee a
particular misuse of its product. See Turner v. Manning,
Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 251, 217 S.E.2d 863, 868
(1975). Therefore, here it is irrelevant that, absent this
defect, Jeld-Wen’s screen might have provided some level of
restraint, since, as we have already determined, the misuse of
the screen for balance and restraining support, however modest,
was not reasonably foreseeable.
For these reasons, we hold, as a matter of law, that no
duty extended to Jeld-Wen to manufacture the screen in question
so that it would act as a childproof restraint. Accordingly, we
will reverse the judgment of the circuit court and enter final
judgment for Jeld-Wen.
Reversed and final judgment.
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