Present: All the Justices
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 971020 February 27, 1998
MICHAEL R. BRIGGS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether the limitation of
liability in the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Code §§ 8.01-
195.1, et seq., applies to a judgment entered against the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Michael R.
Briggs filed a motion for judgment against the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) alleging that he
was injured when a bus, operated by WMATA’s employee,
collided with Briggs’ motorcycle. The case was tried before
a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of Briggs in the
amount of $90,000.
WMATA filed a post-trial motion requesting that the
court reduce the verdict to $75,000 on the basis that WMATA
is an agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia and that an
interstate agreement, the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Regulation Compact, permitted WMATA to invoke the
$75,000 limitation of tort liability contained in Code
§ 8.01-195.3. * The trial court denied WMATA’s motion and
entered a judgment in favor of Briggs in the amount of
*
Code § 8.01-195.3 was amended to permit a claimant to
recover a maximum of $100,000 if the claimant’s cause of
action accrued on or after July 1, 1993. Briggs’ cause of
$90,000. WMATA appeals.
Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia
entered into the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Regulation Compact with the consent of the United States
Congress. The purpose of this Compact, codified in Code
§§ 56-529 and –530, was to improve transit service in the
metropolitan area of Washington, D.C.
Section 80 of the Compact states:
“Liability for Contracts and Torts
80. The Authority shall be liable for its
contracts and for its torts and those of its
Directors, officers, employees and agent[s]
committed in the conduct of any proprietary
function, in accordance with the law of the
applicable signatory (including rules on conflict
of laws), but shall not be liable for any torts
occurring in the performance of a governmental
function. The exclusive remedy for such breach of
contracts and torts for which the Authority shall
be liable, as herein provided, shall be by suit
against the Authority. Nothing contained in this
Title shall be construed as a waiver by the
District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia and the
counties and cities within the Zone of any
immunity from suit.” (Emphasis added).
Code § 8.01-195.3, which is a part of the Virginia Tort
Claims Act, stated in relevant part:
“Subject to the provisions of this article, the
Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for money
only accruing on or after July 1, 1982, . . . on
account of damage to or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee while
acting within the scope of his employment under
circumstances where the Commonwealth . . . if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant
for such damage, loss, injury or death. However,
. . . the Commonwealth . . . shall [not] be liable
for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
action arose before the effective date of this amendment.
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damages. The amount recoverable by any claimant
shall not exceed (i) $25,000 for causes of action
accruing prior to July 1, 1988, $75,000 for causes
of action accruing on or after July 1, 1988, or
. . . (ii) the maximum limits of any liability
policy maintained to insure against such
negligence or other tort, if such policy is in
force at the time of the act or omission
complained of, whichever is greater, exclusive of
interest and costs.”
WMATA argues that it is an instrumentality of each of
the signatory jurisdictions, including Virginia, and, thus,
it is entitled to the benefit of the $75,000 limitation
contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act. Continuing,
WMATA says that “[a]s a matter of federal law, WMATA is
entitled to the same privileges and immunities as the
Commonwealth of Virginia including the liability cap
provided in . . . Code § 8.01-195.3.” Specifically, WMATA
contends that § 80 of the Compact permits it to invoke the
limitation of liability in Code § 8.01-195.3 because WMATA
is liable for its torts and those committed by its agents in
the conduct of a proprietary function “in accordance with
the law of the applicable signatory.” Relying upon that
phrase, WMATA argues that it is entitled to the protection
of the limitation of liability contained in the Virginia
Tort Claims Act.
Responding, Briggs argues that § 80 of the Compact
places no limitation on the amount of compensatory damages
that a plaintiff may recover from WMATA and that § 80 does
not incorporate the damage limitation contained in the
Virginia Tort Claims Act. We agree with Briggs.
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In PEPCO v. State Corporation Commission, 221 Va. 632,
635, 272 S.E.2d 214, 215 (1980), we held that WMATA is a
part of the State government. We observed:
“Title III, Article III, Section 4 of the
interstate compact provides that WMATA ‘is hereby
created, as an instrumentality and agency of each
of the signatory parties hereto’. Title III,
Article VII, Section 18(a), states that ‘[t]he
General Assembly of Virginia hereby authorizes and
designates the Authority as the agency to plan for
and provide transit facilities and services for
the area of Virginia encompassed within the
[compact] Zone.’ Two of the six members of
WMATA’s board of directors represent Virginia
. . . . WMATA is vested with the power of eminent
domain . . . . WMATA is funded, in part, by
Virginia through the Northern Virginia Transit
District Commission.” (alteration in original).
Even though WMATA is a part of the State government,
WMATA has expressly waived its right of sovereign immunity
for torts committed by its employees “in the conduct of any
proprietary function, in accordance with the law of the
applicable signatory (including rules on conflicts of laws)
. . . .” Code §§ 56-529 and –530. Section 80 of the
Compact does not contain any limitation on the amount of
compensatory damages that a plaintiff may recover from
WMATA, and § 80 does not mention or refer to the Virginia
Tort Claims Act.
Contrary to WMATA’s assertions, the phrase “in
accordance with the law of the applicable signatory”
contained in § 80 does not incorporate the limitation on
damages contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act. We are
of opinion this language means that courts in the
Commonwealth of Virginia must apply the substantive tort law
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governing the conduct of a director, officer, employee, or
agent of WMATA who commits a tort while performing any
proprietary function.
In view of the foregoing, we need not consider WMATA’s
remaining contentions. Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court will be
Affirmed.
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