Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, ET AL.
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 961854 October 31, 1997
CENTURY CONCRETE SERVICES, INC.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 15.1-549
prohibits a county from paying interest on a judgment.
Fairfax County executed a contract with Century
Concrete Services, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of the
contract, Century agreed to perform certain construction
work on a landfill basin. A dispute arose between Century
and the County. Century filed a motion for judgment against
the County and was awarded a judgment in the amount of
$60,340.00 plus prejudgment and judgment interest. The
County appeals that portion of the judgment which awarded
interest.
The County argues that the trial court erred by
entering an order which requires the County to pay interest.
The County asserts that Code § 15.1-549 prohibits the
County from paying interest on a judgment. Century responds
that Code § 15.1-549 does not bar the award of interest. We
agree with the County.
Code § 15.1-547 authorizes a county's board of
supervisors to issue and approve warrants to pay all valid
claims that may be asserted against a county. Code § 15.1-
549, which imposes certain limitations upon the issuance of
warrants, states in relevant part:
"No board of supervisors shall order any
warrant issued for any purpose other than the
payment of a claim received, audited and approved
as required by § 15.1-547.
. . . .
No interest shall be paid on any county
warrant.
Any clerk, deputy clerk or member of any
board of supervisors who shall violate or become a
party to the violation of any of the provisions of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
in addition thereto shall be guilty of malfeasance
in office."
In Lynchburg v. Amherst County, 115 Va. 600, 80 S.E.
117 (1913), we considered whether a city was entitled to a
jury instruction which would have permitted a jury to make
an award of prejudgment interest against a county. We
stated:
"As a rule, the common law did not imply a
promise to pay interest, and interest could not be
recovered, save where it was expressly contracted
for. . . . While the courts in this State, aided
by the legislature, have established a different
doctrine as between natural persons and private
corporations, viz., that it is but natural justice
that he who has the use of another's money should
pay interest on it . . . yet, so far as we know,
it has never been held by this court that a claim
asserted against the State or a county bears
interest where there is no provision in the
statute or authorized agreement creating the
liability for the payment of interest. Not only
is there no statute or precedent for the payment
of interest on claims like those asserted in this
case, but clause 2, section 834 of Pollard's Code
[the precursor to Code § 15.1-549], which provides
for the examination, settlement and allowance of
all accounts chargeable against the county and for
the issuance of warrants therefor when settled and
allowed, expressly declares that no interest shall
be paid by any county on any county warrant. If
the board of supervisors had allowed the claims of
the city, or any of them, and issued a warrant
therefor, and the county afterwards refused to pay
the claim and litigated its liability, as it had
the right to do . . . and judgment had been
rendered against it for the amount of the warrant
so issued, by the plain terms of the statute, it
would not have been chargeable with interest.
This being so, it is difficult to see upon what
ground the county would be liable for interest on
the same claims when disallowed by the board of
supervisors."
Id. at 608-09, 80 S.E. at 120.
The rationale that we invoked in Lynchburg v. Amherst
County is equally pertinent here. The County pays its
construction claims by ordering the issuance of warrants,
payable on demand, which may be converted to negotiable
checks. See Code § 15.1-547. That portion of the trial
court's judgment awarding interest against the County is
erroneous because Code § 15.1-549, which is similar to the
statute that we considered in Lynchburg v. Amherst County,
specifically states that "[n]o interest shall be paid on any
county warrant." And, consistent with our reasoning in
Lynchburg v. Amherst County, in the absence of a specific
statutory authorization, we will not permit a judgment
creditor to obtain an award of interest against a county
because to do so would enable that judgment creditor to
circumvent the express prohibition against an award of
interest contained in Code § 15.1-549.
Moreover, Code § 15.1-549, which prohibits payment of
interest in these circumstances, provides that any clerk,
deputy clerk, or member of any board of supervisors who
violates the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor and guilty
of malfeasance in office. Certainly, the language in this
statute is a strong command from the General Assembly that
the County cannot pay either prejudgment or post-judgment
interest on any claim against it.
It is true, as Century asserts, that Code § 8.01-382
permits a litigant to recover interest against a party in
certain instances. That Code section states in relevant
part:
"In any action at law or suit in equity, the
verdict of the jury, or if no jury the judgment or
decree of the court, may provide for interest on
any principal sum awarded, or any part thereof,
and fix the period at which the interest shall
commence. The judgment or decree entered shall
provide for such interest until such principal sum
be paid. If a judgment or decree be rendered
which does not provide for interest, the judgment
or decree awarded shall bear interest from its
date of entry, at the rate as provided in § 6.1-
330.54, and judgment or decree entered
accordingly; provided, if the judgment entered in
accordance with the verdict of a jury does not
provide for interest, interest shall commence from
the date that the verdict was rendered."
Contrary to Century's assertion, however, Code § 8.01-
382 simply has no application here. We must apply Code
§ 15.1-549 in this appeal because it is a statute of
specific application which takes precedence over Code
§ 8.01-382, a statute of general application. "'[W]hen one
statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another
deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific
manner, . . . where they conflict, the latter prevails.'"
Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Service, 241 Va. 89, 94-95,
400 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991) (quoting Virginia Nat'l Bank v.
Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979)); City
of Winchester v. American Woodmark, 250 Va. 451, 460, 464
S.E.2d 148, 153 (1995). * T
Finally, Century, relying upon City of Richmond v.
Blaylock, 247 Va. 250, 440 S.E.2d 598 (1994), says that this
Court held that "an award of prejudgment interest against
the City of Richmond, although denied, was properly within
the discretion of the court under Va. Code § 8.01-382."
Blaylock is not pertinent to our resolution of this appeal.
The litigants in Blaylock did not, and indeed, could not,
assert that Code § 15.1-549 precludes an award of interest
against the City of Richmond because Code § 15.1-549 is
applicable to counties only. Furthermore, in Blaylock, the
trial court refused to award prejudgment interest, and we
did not decide whether a city could be required to pay such
interest. Blaylock, 247 Va. at 253, 440 S.E.2d at 599.
We will reverse that portion of the trial court's
judgment which awards interest against the County, modify
the judgment accordingly, and enter final judgment in favor
of Century.
Reversed in part, modified and final judgment
*
In view of our holding, we need not address the
litigants' remaining arguments.