Westmoreland-Lg & E Partners v. Va. Elec.

Present: All the Justices

WESTMORELAND-LG&E PARTNERS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 961410 CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO
June 6, 1997
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge

In an amended motion for judgment, Westmoreland-LG&E

Partners (Westmoreland) sought to recover from Virginia Electric

and Power Company (Virginia Power) damages resulting from

Virginia Power's alleged breach of a "Power Purchase and

Operating Agreement" (the Contract). Westmoreland appeals from

the award of summary judgment in Virginia Power's favor and the

dismissal of Westmoreland's action with prejudice.
Westmoreland makes three complaints on appeal. First,

Westmoreland says the trial court erred in holding that evidence

of trade custom and usage would not be permitted to explain the

meaning of certain contractual terms. Second, Westmoreland

contends the Contract is ambiguous and that the trial court erred

in ruling that parol evidence would not be allowed to show the

parties' intent and understanding with respect to certain of the

Contract's payment provisions. Third, relative to an alternative

basis for recovery, Westmoreland maintains the trial court erred

in failing to recognize that certain contractual language might

entitle Westmoreland to at least a partial recovery for Virginia

Power's alleged breach of the Contract.

The facts are not in dispute. Westmoreland, a Virginia

general partnership composed of Westmoreland Roanoke Valley, L.P.
and LG&E Roanoke Valley, L.P., is an independent power producer.

Virginia Power is a public utility providing electrical service

to its customers.

In the late 1970s, Virginia Power began purchasing

electricity from independent power producers. In 1988, Virginia

Power issued a request for proposals from a number of independent

power producers, including Westmoreland, for the supply of

electricity to Virginia Power. A model contract prepared by

Virginia Power accompanied the request for proposals.
Westmoreland responded with a proposal, which Virginia Power

accepted, and the two parties entered into the Contract on

January 24, 1989. 1 On or about the same date, Virginia Power

entered into agreements with approximately twenty other

independent power producers as a result of its request for

proposals.

In order to fulfill its obligations under the Contract,

Westmoreland constructed a $300 million power plant, known as
2
"ROVA I" (the Facility), near Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina.
The plant commenced commercial operations in May 1994 with the

capacity to produce approximately 150 megawatts of electricity.

Westmoreland is obligated under the Contract to supply this

capacity to Virginia Power upon demand for a term of twenty-five
1
The Contract was "amended and restated" in 1990 and 1991,
but the provisions in issue here have remained unchanged since
the 1989 version of the Contract was executed by the parties.
2
Virginia Power operates in North Carolina under the name
North Carolina Power. However, for convenience and clarity, we
will continue throughout this opinion to refer to Virginia Power
only.
years.

In the Contract, Westmoreland agrees to sell and Virginia

Power agrees to purchase "the Net Electrical Output of the

Facility." Also, Westmoreland agrees to sell and Virginia Power

agrees to purchase "Dependable Capacity from the Facility." "Net

Electrical Output" is defined in the Contract as "[a]ll of the

Facility's generating output made available for sale."

"Dependable Capacity" is defined as "[t]he amount of capacity set

by [Westmoreland based upon prescribed tests] and delivered from

the Facility" to Virginia Power.
Under the Contract, Westmoreland must "control and operate

the Facility consistent with [Virginia] Power's Dispatch of the

Facility." "Dispatch" is defined in the Contract as "[t]he right

of [Virginia] Power . . . to schedule and control . . . the

generating level of the Facility in order to commence, increase,

decrease, or cease the delivery of Net Electrical Output" to

Virginia Power. When Virginia Power dispatches the Facility by

providing notice to Westmoreland of the estimated needs for the

following week, Westmoreland must comply with the notice.

Virginia Power is obligated by the Contract to make two

types of payments to Westmoreland, one for net electrical output,

termed "Energy Payments," and the other for dependable capacity,

termed "Capacity Payments," based upon the different types of

costs incurred by Westmoreland. Energy Payments are designed to

compensate Westmoreland for the actual amount of electricity it

generates and delivers to Virginia Power and to reimburse

Westmoreland for its variable costs incurred to produce the
electricity.

Energy Payments are not in dispute here, but Capacity

Payments are. Capacity Payments are designed to compensate

Westmoreland for the costs it incurred in constructing the

Facility and for the fixed costs it incurs in operating and

maintaining the Facility.

Under § 10.15(a) of the Contract, Virginia Power is required

to make Capacity Payments in a fixed amount for a 25-year term,

"so long as the plant is available as required by the Contract."

Although paid monthly, the Capacity Payment is calculated at the

rate of approximately $200,000 per day.
The present controversy arose when Virginia Power withheld

Capacity Payments for each day it deemed to be a "Forced Outage

Day" within the meaning of the Contract. In its amended motion

for judgment, Westmoreland sought recovery for the total amount

withheld by Virginia Power.

Section 1.18 of the Contract defines a "Forced Outage" as

"[a]n interruption . . . of the Facility's delivery of the Net

Electrical Output [that] is not . . . the result of a Scheduled
3
Outage." Section 1.20 defines a "Forced Outage Day" as
[e]ach continuous twenty-four (24) hour period
beginning with the start of a Forced Outage (regardless
of the number of actual outages that may occur during
such twenty-four (24) hour period(s))

(a) designated by [Westmoreland] as a Forced
Outage Day,

(b) a Forced Outage Day which is determined
3
The Contract allows 30 days annually for scheduled outages.
Westmoreland says it is undisputed that Capacity Payments are
"never reduced on account of Scheduled Outages."
 pursuant to Section 10.15(d).

Section 10.15(d) forms the entire basis of Virginia Power's

defense in this case. It is a unique section, found only in the

contract involved here and not in the agreements Virginia Power

executed with other independent power producers at or about the

same time. 4 Section 10.15(d) provides as follows:
For each instance where [Westmoreland] fails, after the
second oral notification (such notification shall not
be less than fifteen (15) minutes from the first
notification) from [Virginia] Power, to maintain the
operating level specified by [Virginia] Power pursuant
to Section 7.6, to within + five (5%) percent of the
Dispatched level then for each percent or portion of a
percent deviation from the above allowed + five (5%)
percent, then at [Virginia] Power's option, the payment
for that Day's Dependable Capacity shall be reduced two
(2%) percent. If such deviation reduces that Day's
payment for Dependable Capacity to zero (0) then that
Day shall be a Forced Outage Day. Example: If the
Facility is Dispatched at 100MW but is only able to
deliver 87MW then the payment for Dependable Capacity
for that Day would be reduced by 16%.

Because, under § 10.15(d), the 2% reduced payment scale

applies to each percent of deviation from the dispatched level,

or portion thereof, the reduction in the capacity payment reaches

100% and a Forced Outage Day occurs on any day when power

generation falls below 46% of the dispatched level, giving credit

for the + 5% allowance. This is the result derived from the
4
The parties tell us on brief that the Model Agreement
accompanying Virginia Power's request for proposals contained a
provision that a Forced Outage Day would occur when the net
electrical output deviated from the dispatched level by more than
+ 5%. However, because Westmoreland planned to use a low grade
fuel to generate electricity, with likely reductions in power
output below 95% of the dispatched level, the parties agreed to
the inclusion of § 10.15(d) in the Contract, which increased from
5% to 55% the permitted deviation from the dispatched level
before a Forced Outage Day occurred.
formula, 100 - 5 = 95 - 45 = 50 x 2 = 100.

Sections 10.15(g) and 10.18 also relate to Forced Outage

Days. Section 10.15(g) provides in pertinent part as follows:
[Westmoreland] shall be allowed thirty (30) Forced
Outage Days per full Capacity Test Period (May 1
through April 30). . . . Payments for Dependable
Capacity will be reduced five hundred thousand
($500,000) dollars as liquidated damages for each
Forced Outage Day that occurred or was designated by
[Westmoreland] during that period in excess of the
above allowances.

And § 10.18 provides in pertinent part as follows:
The parties agree that [Virginia] Power will be
substantially damaged in amounts that will be difficult
or impossible to determine if the Facility:

. . . .

(d) Exceeds the allowed number of Forced Outage
Days in Section 10.15(g).

Therefore, to the limited extent set forth in the
Agreement, the Parties have agreed on sums which the
Parties agree are reasonable as liquidated damages for
such occurrences. It is further understood and agreed
that the payment of the liquidated damages is in lieu
of actual damages for such occurrences.

The relationship between § 10.15(d) and the terms "Forced

Outage Days" and "Force Majeure Days" is also relevant to this

dispute. Under § 14.1, a delay in performance occurring on a

given day is excused if Westmoreland designates such day a "Force

Majeure Day." A Force Majeure Day may be designated when a delay

in performance is "due solely to circumstances beyond the

reasonable control of the Party experiencing such delay, [for

example,] acts of God; . . . war; riots; . . . or accidents."

A Force Majeure Day does not count against the thirty Forced

Outage Days allowed before the $500,000 per day liquidated damage
provision of § 10.15(g) may be invoked. However, under

§ 10.15(b) of the Contract, if a forced outage is designated as

an event of Force Majeure, "then [Virginia] Power's obligation to

pay the payments for Dependable Capacity specified in Section

10.15(a) above shall cease, prorated daily, until the condition

of Force Majeure has been overcome."

In awarding summary judgment in Virginia Power's favor, the

trial court found that the Contract was unambiguous and,

therefore, that evidence of trade custom and usage as well as

parol evidence concerning the parties' intent and understanding

would be inadmissible. The court found further that Westmoreland

had "failed to maintain power generation at greater than 45% of

the specified level" on the days for which it sought recovery.

Hence, the court held, § 10.15(d) of the Contract expressly

permitted Virginia Power to withhold Capacity Payments for those

days, including the days Westmoreland had designated as Forced

Outage Days, and to charge Westmoreland with all such days "for

the purpose of determining the liquidated damages provision of

the parties' contract pursuant to § l0.15(g)."
Admissibility of Evidence
Concerning Trade Custom and Usage

Westmoreland argues that it should have been permitted to

introduce evidence showing that "the terms 'Capacity Purchase

Price' and 'Forced Outage Day' have special meaning in the trade

custom and usage, under which the occurrence of such Days does

not diminish the monthly payment unless the annual Forced Outage

Day allowance is exceeded." Westmoreland submits that "[t]his
trade custom and usage, reflected in all of the contracts

resulting from the 1988 solicitation, 'form a part [of the

Contract] ... unless the terms of the writing [clearly exclude]

the usage or custom.'" (Quoting Walker v. Gateway Milling Co.,

121 Va. 217, 224, 92 S.E. 826, 828 (1917)). Westmoreland

maintains there is no language in the Contract that clearly

excludes consideration of custom and usage.

Noting that the trial court excluded the evidence of trade

custom and usage because it found the Contract unambiguous,

Westmoreland cites Doswell Ltd. Partnership v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co., 251 Va. 215, 468 S.E.2d 84 (1996), for the

proposition that such evidence is admissible to show that

contract phrases or terms have acquired a peculiar meaning by

trade custom or usage "even though the phrases or terms

themselves are unambiguous." Id. at 225, 468 S.E.2d at 90.

Hence, Westmoreland concludes, the trial court erred in excluding

its evidence of trade custom or usage.

While we confirm what we said in Doswell, we disagree with
Westmoreland. In our opinion, Westmoreland has not met the

threshold requirement for admission of the disputed evidence.

In Walker, supra, we said that evidence of trade usage is

proper "to permit the jury to consider the situation of the

parties and the circumstances leading up to the making of the

contract for the purpose of determining whether the usage in

question operated upon the minds of the parties in using the

language which was employed in the contract." 121 Va. at 226, 92

S.E. at 829 (emphasis added). However, "knowledge of the
existence of the custom must be brought home to the [contracting

parties], unless the evidence shows that it is so uniform and

notorious at the place where the parties to be affected by it

reside, as to raise a prima facie presumption that they knew of

it." Bowles v. Rice, 107 Va. 51, 55, 57 S.E. 575, 577 (1907).

Because the Contract and the other agreements resulting from

the 1988 solicitation were made at or about the same time, what

was done under the other contracts could not possibly have been

brought home to, or have operated upon the minds of, the parties

to the Westmoreland contract at the time of its execution. In

other words, Westmoreland has failed to establish the existence,

at the time the Contract was executed, of any trade custom or

usage relevant to the meaning of the language that was employed

in the Contract. The trial court did not err, therefore, in

excluding evidence of trade custom and usage.
Admissibility of Parol Evidence

Westmoreland contends that § 10.15(d) of the Contract is

ambiguous, even when viewed in isolation, because it does not

"define the financial consequence of treating a day as a Forced

Outage Day." And, Westmoreland says, when the Contract,

including § 10.15(d), is read as a whole, it does not

"unambiguously permit any reduction of the capacity purchase

price on account of allowed Forced Outage Days." Hence,

Westmoreland concludes, "there was no justification for the

Circuit Court's foreclosure of parol evidence of the parties'

intent and understanding."

Virginia Power contends on the other hand that § 10.15(d) is
unambiguous. Virginia Power says that the "2-for-1 reduced

payment scale established by § 10.15(d) applies to all shortfalls

in Westmoreland's generating capacity after the initial five

percent variance." Therefore, Virginia Power asserts, "[w]hen

Westmoreland's generation is 45% or less of the Dispatched level,

. . . Virginia Power has the right, in the words of § 10.15(d),

to reduce 'that Day's payment for Dependable Capacity to zero

(0).'" This shortfall occurred, Virginia Power says, "on each

day for which [it] made no Dependable Capacity payment" and,

hence, it was excused from making payment for each of those days.
But, Virginia Power insists, even when § 10.15(d) is read

along with the other provisions of the Contract, no ambiguity

appears. "Those other provisions," Virginia Power says, "have

nothing to do with the situation addressed by § 10.15(d) and do

not make that section ambiguous." Hence, Virginia Power

concludes, the trial court did not err in excluding parol

evidence of the parties' intent and understanding.

"The question whether a writing is ambiguous is one of law,

not of fact." Tuomala v. Regent University, 252 Va. 368, 374,

477 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996). Thus, "we are not bound by the trial

court's conclusions on this issue, and we are permitted the same

opportunity as the trial court to consider the contract

provisions." Id.

In Doswell, supra, we reiterated the principle that

"'[p]arol evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral negotiations

are generally inadmissible to alter, contradict, or explain the

terms of a written instrument provided the document is complete,
unambiguous, and unconditional.'" 251 Va. at 222, 468 S.E.2d at

88 (quoting Renner Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v.

Renner, 225 Va. 508, 515, 303 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1983)). We also

said in Doswell:
Contracts are not rendered ambiguous merely because the
parties or their attorneys disagree upon the meaning of
the language employed to express the agreement. Even
though an agreement may have been drawn unartfully, the
court must construe the language as written if its
parts can be read together without conflict.

And, parol evidence may not be used to first
create an ambiguity and then to remove it. Finally, an
agreement is not rendered ambiguous merely because it
deals with a technical subject that may be considered
complex to the uninformed lay person who is not
familiar with the topic.

Id. at 222-23, 468 S.E.2d at 88-89 (citations omitted).

"A contract must be construed as a whole to determine the

parties' intent with respect to specific provisions." Hooper v.

Musolino, 234 Va. 558, 569, 364 S.E.2d 207, 212, cert. denied,

488 U.S. 823 (1988). "No word or clause in the contract will be

treated as meaningless if a reasonable meaning can be given to

it, and there is a presumption that the parties have not used

words needlessly." D.C. McClain, Inc. v. Arlington County, 249

Va. 131, 135-36, 452 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1995).

"'An ambiguity exists when language admits of being

understood in more than one way,'" Doswell, 251 Va. at 222, 468

S.E.2d at 88 (quoting Renner, 225 Va. at 515, 303 S.E.2d at 898),

or when "'language is of doubtful import,'" Galloway Corp. v.
S.B. Ballard Constr. Co., 250 Va. 493, 502, 464 S.E.2d 349, 355

(1995) (quoting Allen v. Green, 229 Va. 588, 592, 331 S.E.2d 472,

475 (1985)). And an award of summary judgment is improper when
"neither party has offered a construction of [contractual]

provisions that could be deemed so clear that it unambiguously

excludes the explanation offered by the opponent." Cascades

North Venture Ltd. Partnership v. PRC Inc., 249 Va. 574, 582, 457

S.E.2d 370, 374-75 (1995).

Guided by these principles, we reach the conclusion that the

Contract is ambiguous. In the first place, the language of

§ 10.15(d), even when read in isolation, admits of being

understood in more than one way, Doswell, 251 Va. at 222, 468
S.E.2d at 88, and, hence, is of doubtful import, Galloway, 250

Va. at 502, 464 S.E.2d at 355.

The penultimate sentence of § 10.15(d) contains the crucial

language. The sentence states that "[if the deviation from the

dispatched level on a given day] reduces that Day's payment for

Dependable Capacity to zero (0) then that Day shall be a Forced

Outage Day." If emphasis is placed upon the words, "reduces that

Day's payment for Dependable Capacity to zero," the language of

(d) may be taken to mean that the result of such a deviation

would be no capacity payment for that day. If, however, emphasis

is placed upon the words, "then that Day shall be a Forced Outage

Day," the language of (d) may just as well be taken to mean that

the only result of such a deviation would be the counting of the

day in question against the thirty Forced Outage Day allowance

provided by § 10.15(g) before the $500,000 per day liquidated

damage provision may be invoked.

Hence, this case presents a situation in which "neither

party has offered a construction of these provisions that could
be deemed so clear that it unambiguously excludes the explanation

offered by the opponent." Cascades North Venture, 249 Va. at

582, 457 S.E.2d at 374-75. This alone is sufficient to justify

the admission of parol evidence concerning the parties' intent

and understanding at the time they entered into the contract.

However, there is more. When § 10.15(d) is read in context

with other provisions of the Contract, the ambiguity becomes even

more apparent. First, a reading of § 10.15(b) demonstrates that

when the parties wished to make clear under what circumstances

Virginia Power would not be obligated to make Capacity Payments

for a Forced Outage, they knew how to accomplish the task, using

clear and precise language. Section 10.15(b) states that when

Westmoreland "designates [a] Forced Outage as an event of Force

Majeure, then [Virginia] Power's obligation to pay the payments
5
for Dependable Capacity . . . shall cease." As Westmoreland

suggests, the absence of such an explicit provision in § 10.15(d)

casts doubt upon the correctness of Virginia Power's assertion

that § 10.15(d) unambiguously relieves it from the obligation to

make Capacity Payments for all Forced Outage Days, however they

occur.

Virginia Power argues that § 10.15(b) is consistent with

§ 10.15(d) in that both "relieve[] Virginia Power of any

obligation to pay Westmoreland for capacity Virginia Power does

not receive." However, this assumes the correctness of Virginia
5
Similarly, § 5.3 of the Contract provides that Virginia
Power "shall not be obligated to make payments for Dependable
Capacity" during periods allowed to cure defaults under the
Contract.
Power's position and begs the question to be decided, i.e.,

whether § 10.15(d) really does relieve Virginia Power of the

obligation to make Capacity Payments for Forced Outage Days

occurring under § 10.15(d).

Virginia Power also argues that § 10.15(d) applies only to

those days on which Westmoreland's facility is dispatched to

produce electrical power while § 10.15(b) applies even if

Westmoreland is not so dispatched. But this argument misses the

point, viz., if it was necessary to say explicitly in
§ 10.15(b) that Capacity Payments cease for Force Majeure Days

occurring under that section, was it not just as necessary to say

explicitly in § 10.15(d) that payments cease for Forced Outage

Days occurring under that section? In any event, we do not think

it appears as a matter of law that the distinction drawn by

Virginia Power would make a difference in its obligation with

respect to Capacity Payments for Forced Outage Days, but perhaps

parol evidence submitted by the parties on remand will reveal

whether the distinction was intended to make a difference.
Second, § 10.15(g) allows Westmoreland thirty Forced Outage

Days annually before the provision for liquidated damages in the

amount of $500,000 per day may be invoked. Section 10.18

provides that "the payment of the liquidated damages is in lieu

of actual damages" Virginia Power may suffer if Westmoreland

"[e]xceeds the allowed number of Forced Outage Days in Section

10.15(g)." As Westmoreland maintains, these provisions support

the implication that liquidated damages may be the only penalty

Westmoreland must suffer for Forced Outage Days, and such an
implication is completely inconsistent with Virginia Power's

position that § 10.15(d) permits it to withhold Capacity Payments

for all Forced Outage Days in addition to collecting $500,000 per

day in liquidated damages if the number of such days exceeds the

thirty days allowed annually.

Virginia Power says, however, that § 10.15(g) "relates to a

different subject matter than § 10.15(d)," that "[n]either

section refers to the other," and that § 10.15(g) "has nothing

whatsoever to do with Virginia Power's obligation to make

Dependable Capacity payments." However, both sections mention

and deal with the subjects of Forced Outage Days and payments for

Dependable Capacity -- § 10.15(d) states that a Forced Outage Day

occurs when the deviation on a particular day reduces that day's

Dependable Capacity payment to zero and § 10.15(g) states that

payments for Dependable Capacity will be reduced by $500,000 for

each Forced Outage Day that exceeds the thirty-day allowance.
Moreover, § 10.15(d) is implicitly incorporated by reference

into § 10.15(g) because, in its final sentence, the latter

section states that "[p]ayments for Dependable Capacity will be

reduced five hundred thousand ($500,000) dollars as liquidated

damages for each Forced Outage Day that occurred or was
designated by [Westmoreland] during [a capacity test] period in

excess of the above allowances." (Emphasis added.) If a Forced

Outage Day is not designated by Westmoreland, it can only occur

as a result of the reductions required by the sliding scale set

forth in § 10.15(d).

Therefore, it is not correct to say categorically, as
Virginia Power would have us say, that § 10.15(g) has "nothing

whatsoever to do with Virginia Power's obligation to make

Dependable Capacity payments." Rather, Westmoreland should have

the opportunity to show by parol evidence on remand what the

parties intended by the language they employed in the Contract.

We hold that it was error for the trial court to exclude

parol evidence concerning the parties' intent and understanding

with respect to Forced Outage Days and Capacity Payments at the

time they executed the Contract.
Alternative Basis of Recovery

Westmoreland's amended motion for judgment contained an

alternative claim of breach of contract for Virginia Power's

withholding of Capacity Payments for days that Westmoreland

designated as Forced Outage Days pursuant to § 1.20(a) of the

Contract. The trial court's award of summary judgment in favor

of Virginia Power encompassed this alternative claim.

Under § 1.20, a Forced Outage Day occurs when "(a)

designated by [Westmoreland] as a Forced Outage Day," or "(b)

determined pursuant to Section 10.15(d)." Westmoreland argues

that "[e]ven if § 10.15(d) could be read as depriving [it] of

[capacity] payments attributable to days that are classified as

Forced Outage Days by [the section's] own operation, its impact

[should] be limited to such days." Hence, Westmoreland

concludes, it was "entitled, at a minimum, to a judgment for the

amount attributable to the days covered by § 1.20(a)." Virginia

Power says the trial court did not err in denying Westmoreland a

partial recovery for designated days.
 The trial court stated no reason for the inclusion of

Westmoreland's alternative basis for relief in its award of

summary judgment. As Westmoreland suggests in a footnote to its

brief, the trial court's disposition of this phase of the case

may have been inextricably entwined in the court's conclusion

that § 10.15(d) unambiguously "permits Virginia Power not to make

dependable capacity payments on days for which [Westmoreland]

seeks payment," which necessarily included Forced Outage Days

designated by Westmoreland pursuant to § 1.20(a). Since we hold
supra that the Contract is ambiguous, we think the trial court on

remand, if Westmoreland is unsuccessful on its principal claim

for breach of contract, should have the opportunity to consider

further the question whether Virginia Power is entitled to

withhold Capacity Payments for Forced Outage Days designated by

Westmoreland pursuant to § 1.20(a).

Conclusion

We will affirm the trial court's action in excluding

evidence of trade custom and usage. For the error in excluding

evidence concerning the parties' intent and understanding with

respect to Forced Outage Days and Capacity Payments, we will

reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for

further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this

opinion.
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and remanded.