Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Keenan, and
Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice
LUCAS E. WALL
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
v. Record No. 951927
September 13, 1996
FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Gerald Bruce Lee, Judge
In this appeal, we decide whether The Virginia Freedom of
Information Act, Code § 2.1-340, et seq. (the Act), requires the
disclosure of the total number of votes received by each
candidate in a public high school student election.
On May 3, 1995, an election was conducted at Centreville
High School, a public school in Fairfax County. In the election,
the students were afforded the opportunity to elect class
officers for the classes graduating in 1996, 1997, and 1998. The
students also had the opportunity to elect the school's student
representatives to the Student Advisory Committee (SAC). The
representatives, along with the SAC representatives from the
other Fairfax County high schools, elect a student representative
to the county school board.
Students who wished to vote were furnished a computer
"Scantron" sheet upon which they recorded their choices.
Thereafter, representatives of the school's Student Government
Association (SGA) collected the Scantron sheets and delivered
them to Mary Katherine Totten, a teacher and SGA advisor.
Totten, with the assistance of a class sponsor, then tabulated
the election results, and Totten retained the sheets and the
tabulated results in her exclusive possession.
Lucas Wall, a student at the time, was the Editor-in-Chief
of the Centreville Sentinel, the school's student newspaper.
Prior to the election, Wall made a request, pursuant to the Act,
to be given the vote totals received by each student candidate.
The request was delivered to Totten and Pamela Latt, the school's
principal. In a written response, Latt declined to release the
vote totals to Wall. She informed Wall, however, that each
student candidate would have access to his own vote total.
Additionally, the total number of students who voted in the
election was available to the entire student body.
In explaining her position, Latt stated that the individual
vote totals did not constitute "official records," as defined in
the Act. She further stated that, even if the totals were
"official records," they were also "scholastic records" and,
thus, exempt from disclosure under the Act. Latt also expressed
concern that the release of individual vote totals likely would
embarrass and humiliate those students who lost the election and
discourage many students from participating in the election
process. Totten shared Latt's views regarding the possible
effect the release of individual vote totals might have upon
student participation.
Thereupon, Wall filed a petition for mandamus against the
Fairfax County School Board and Totten. Following an ore tenus
hearing, the trial court refused to order mandamus. The court
concluded that, although the individual vote totals were
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"official records" subject to the Act, they, nonetheless, fell
within the Act's exemption for "scholastic records." We awarded
Wall an appeal. 1
We will assume, without deciding, that a student candidate's
individual vote total is an "official record" under the Act and,
therefore, must be disclosed absent an applicable exclusion. 2
Thus, the issue for decision is whether such information may be
withheld from disclosure pursuant to the Act's "scholastic
records" exemption.
Pursuant to Code § 2.1-342(B)(3), "scholastic records . . .
containing information concerning identifiable individuals" are
excluded from the provisions of the Act, "but [they] may be
disclosed by the custodian in his discretion, except where such
disclosure is prohibited by law." The term "[s]cholastic
records," as used in the Act, means, in pertinent part,
those records, files, documents, and other materials
containing information about a student and maintained
by a public body which is an educational agency or
institution or by a person acting for such agency or
1
In view of our decision, we do not consider the assignment
of cross-error regarding whether the individual vote totals were
"official records" subject to the Act.
2
The Act defines "[o]fficial records" as follows:
[A]ll written or printed books, papers, letters,
documents, maps and tapes, photographs, films, sound
recordings, reports or other material, regardless of
physical form or characteristics, prepared, owned, or
in the possession of a public body or any employee or
officer of a public body in the transaction of public
business.
Code § 2.1-341.
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institution.
Code § 2.1-341. (Emphasis added.)
It is firmly established that, when a statute is clear and
unambiguous, a court must accept its plain meaning and not resort
to rules of construction or extrinsic evidence. Carr v. Forst,
249 Va. 66, 69-70, 453 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1995). Therefore,
applying the plain-meaning rule to Code §§ 2.1-341 and -342(B)(3)
in the present case, we conclude that the material Wall seeks is
maintained by an educational institution, contains information
about identifiable students, and is exempt from mandatory
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disclosure under the Act.
Notwithstanding the plain meaning of Code §§ 2.1-341 and
-342(B)(3), Wall endeavors to buttress his claim by invoking Code
§ 22.1-287(C), a part of the Education Title of the Code. That
section states that various restrictions on the release of
information about pupils "shall not apply to the giving of
information by school personnel concerning participation in
athletics and other school activities, the winning of scholastic
or other honors and awards, and other like information."
We do not see how Code § 22.1-287(C) helps Wall. Even if we
3
We reach this conclusion with full awareness of the policy
expressly stated in Code § 2.1-340.1. This Code section
provides, in pertinent part, that the Act "shall be liberally
construed to promote an increased awareness by all persons of
governmental activities . . . [, and] [a]ny exception or
exemption from applicability shall be narrowly construed in order
that no thing which should be public may be hidden from any
person."
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assume that it permits the disclosure of the information he
seeks, it clearly does not require such disclosure. The issue
presented in this appeal is whether the Act requires disclosure,
and the Act clearly provides that disclosure of even exempt
information is in the custodian's discretion, except where such
disclosure is prohibited by law. Code § 2.1-342(B).
Consequently, we hold that the trial court properly ruled
that the information sought by Wall was exempt from disclosure
under the Act. Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
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