Ramey v. Bobbitt

Present: All the Justices

KIMBERLY DAWN RAMEY,
ADMINISTRATOR, ETC.

v. Record No. 950217 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
November 3, 1995
DELMOS BOBBITT, ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY
J. Robert Stump, Judge

In this appeal from a judgment entered in a wrongful death

action, the plaintiff's decedent was struck and killed by a motor

vehicle on a public street adjacent to his employer's premises

while on his way to work. The primary issue on appeal is whether

the trial court correctly ruled that the Virginia Workers'

Compensation Act (the Act), Code §§ 65.2-100 to -1310, provided

the plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the employer and a

fellow worker, who was driving the employer's truck at the time

of the accident.
On August 20, 1990, Kimberly D. Ramey, Administrator of the

Estate of Gene Scott Ramey (the Administrator), filed a motion

for judgment against Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, Inc., of

Virginia (Pepsi), and Delmos Bobbitt. The motion for judgment

alleged that Bobbitt, while acting within the scope of his

employment with Pepsi, wrongfully caused Ramey's death by driving

a truck in a negligent manner, thereby distracting the attention

of Margie H. Lawson, who was driving the car that actually struck

Ramey. At the time of his death, Ramey was employed by Pepsi.

Bobbitt and Pepsi filed pleas in bar, asserting that the

Administrator's action was barred by the exclusivity provision of

the Act, Code § 65.2-307. They also asserted that the action was
barred on the grounds of accord and satisfaction, as evidenced by

a release dated July 12, 1989, which was executed in connection

with a compromise settlement of the Administrator's wrongful

death action against Lawson in Dickenson County.

The trial court received stipulated facts concerning the

accident and the circumstances of Ramey's employment with Pepsi.

These facts show that Pepsi, which is in the business of

bottling, selling, and distributing soft drinks, operates a

manufacturing plant located on Park Avenue in the City of Norton.

At the time of the accident, Pepsi did not provide a parking lot

for its employees. Employees generally parked on public streets

near the plant, including Park Avenue, 12th Street, and Virginia

Avenue. Although the primary entrance to the Pepsi plant is

located off of Park Avenue, there are also other entrances.
Ramey was a route salesman for Pepsi and was paid on a

commission basis. Ramey was required to check in at the Pepsi

plant each morning before beginning his daily route to pick up

his loaded delivery truck and a box of tickets. However, he was

not required to report to work at a particular time. The

accident occurred between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., within the

time period when Ramey normally reported to work.

After parking his vehicle on Virginia Avenue, Ramey walked

down 12th Street and over to Park Avenue, which is adjacent to

the Pepsi plant. While attempting to cross Park Avenue, Ramey

was struck by Lawson's vehicle as Bobbitt was in the process of

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"backing" a tractor-trailer truck into the Pepsi plant. Bobbitt

was acting within the scope of his employment with Pepsi at the

time of the accident.

When the accident occurred, Ramey was wearing a Pepsi-Cola

uniform shirt, which Pepsi employees are required to wear while

they are on the job. Pepsi's route sales personnel customarily

dress in the uniform shirts at home and wear them when traveling

to and from work, because Pepsi does not provide lockers or

changing rooms for these employees.
At the time of the accident, Ramey had in his possession a

check from a customer made payable to Pepsi-Cola Bottling

Company. Route sales personnel generally deposit such checks at

the plant before beginning their daily routes.

The trial court denied the defendants' plea of accord and

satisfaction. However, the court sustained the defendants' plea

that the action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the

Act and entered an order dismissing the case. The Administrator

appeals the trial court's dismissal of her case, and the

defendants assign cross-error to the trial court's denial of

their plea of accord and satisfaction.

On appeal, the Administrator argues that the trial court

erred in ruling that her action was barred by the Act, because

Ramey was not killed while performing an act arising out of or in

the course of his employment. In support of her position, the

Administrator cites the general rule that an employee going to or

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from the place where his or her work is to be performed is not

engaged in any service growing out of and incidental to the

employment. Barnes v. Stokes, 233 Va. 249, 251, 355 S.E.2d 330,

331 (1987).

In response, the defendants contend that Ramey was "at work"

when the accident occurred, because employment includes not only

the actual performance of the work but also "a reasonable margin

of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the

place where the work is to be done." Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 562,

565, 165 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1969) (quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v.

Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 (1928)). Therefore, the defendants

argue, Park Avenue was in practical effect part of the employer's

premises for purposes of coverage under the Act, because it was a

hazard that Pepsi employees had to encounter in order to enter

the Pepsi plant. We disagree with the defendants.

The central question for our determination is whether

Ramey's death by accident, in the language of the Act, was one

"arising out of and in the course of the employment." Code

§ 65.2-300. If Ramey's accident falls within this definition,

the Administrator's exclusive remedy is under the Act. Code

§ 65.2-307.

Generally, an employee going to or from his or her place of

employment is not performing a service arising out of and

incidental to the employment. Barnes v. Stokes, 233 Va. at 251,

355 S.E.2d at 331; GATX Tank Erection Co. v. Gnewuch, 221 Va.

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600, 603-04, 272 S.E.2d 200, 203 (1980); Kent v. Virginia-

Carolina Chem. Co., 143 Va. 62, 66, 129 S.E. 330, 331-32 (1925).

This general rule is commonly referred to as the "going to and

from work" rule. The Administrator and the defendants agree that

none of the three exceptions to this general rule is applicable

here. 1

We hold that the present case falls within the general rule

stated above. Unlike the employees in Barnes and Painter v.
Simmons, 238 Va. 196, 380 S.E.2d 663 (1989), cases cited by the

defendants, Ramey was not killed in an area which was, in

practical effect, a part of the employer's premises.

In Barnes, the employee was injured on a privately owned

parking lot located next to his place of employment. The

employer did not own or maintain the lot, but was provided

1
The three exceptions to the "going to and from work" rule are:

(1) when the means of transportation is provided by the employer

or the time consumed is paid for or included in the employee's

wages; (2) when the way used is the sole and exclusive way of

ingress and egress with no other way, or where the way of ingress

and egress is constructed by the employer; and (3) when the

employee on his or her way to or from work is still charged with

some duty or task in connection with the employment. Kent v.

Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 143 Va. 62, 66, 129 S.E. 330, 332

(1925).

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certain parking spaces in the lot as part of its lease of a

portion of the adjacent building in which it conducted its

business. The employer was "specifically requested" to require

its employees to park their vehicles in the designated area. The

accident occurred in the area of the parking lot allocated to the

employer. Based on these facts, we held that the situs of the

injury "was on premises of another that were in such proximity

and relation to the space leased by the employer as to be in

practical effect the employer's premises." 233 Va. at 252, 355

S.E.2d at 332.
In Painter, the employee was injured on a private road which

provided access to his place of employment, as well as to other

businesses. At the time of the accident, he had checked in for

work and was walking on the road from the location where he had

checked in to another of his employer's facilities located on

that same road. We held that the accident fell within the

provisions of the Act because it occurred at a place and time

where the employer expected the employee to be for employment

purposes. 238 Va. at 199, 380 S.E.2d at 665.

The fact that Ramey was killed on a public street places the

present case beyond the scope of Barnes and Painter. The public

street was not in such relation to Pepsi's plant that it was in

practical effect part of Pepsi's premises. Nor was it a place

where Pepsi expected Ramey to be for employment purposes.

We disagree with the defendants' argument that the "going to

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and from work" rule does not apply to Ramey because he did not

have fixed hours of work or a fixed place of employment. Ramey

was required to report to the Pepsi plant each morning to start

his work day. As stated above, the evidence showed that he

customarily reported to work at the Pepsi plant between 8:00 a.m.

and 9:00 a.m., and that the accident occurred within this time

period. These facts are sufficient to place his actions at the

time of the accident within the "going to and from work" rule.
We further disagree that our decision in Grand Union v.

Bynum, 226 Va. 140, 307 S.E.2d 456 (1983), requires a different

result. There, we held only that the employee did not die in the

course of his employment because he was killed after leaving

work, visiting one friend, and returning to his car to drive to

the house of another friend. The fact that the employee had

fixed hours of employment was relevant only in determining when

he had completed his work for the day.

We next consider the defendants' assignment of cross-error

that the trial court erred in denying their plea of accord and

satisfaction. The defendants argue that, under the terms of the

release executed on July 12, 1989, the Administrator and Ramey's

other statutory beneficiaries released them, as well as Margie

Lawson and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. Specifically,

the defendants point to the language of the release in which the

Administrator and the other statutory beneficiaries agreed to
release and discharge Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company and Margie Lawson[,] his or their successors
and assigns, and all persons, firms or corporations who

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 are or might be liable, from all claims of any kind or
character which we have or might have against him or
them, and especially because of all damages, losses or
injuries to persons or property, or both, whether
developed or undeveloped or known or unknown, resulting
or to result from [this] accident.

On July 12, 1989, pursuant to Code § 8.01-55, the Circuit

Court of Dickenson County approved a compromise settlement of the

Administrator's action against Lawson. The court's order

provided that
said compromise settlement be, and the same hereby is
approved, and it is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that
Margie Lawson be, and she hereby is, released and
discharged of and from any and all liability and claims
which might be asserted against her by Kimberly D.
Ramey, [Administrator] of the Estate of Gene Scott
Ramey, deceased, . . . on account of the fatal injury
to Gene Scott Ramey resulting from the accident set out
in this proceeding.

This order also stated that "this case is continued."

On April 8, 1991, on motion of the Administrator, the

Dickenson County Circuit Court entered an order amending its July

12, 1989 order "to provide that Margie Lawson and her insurer,

Nationwide Mutual Insurance, and only those persons, are released

by the settlement approved by [this] Court in that foregoing

Order."

The defendants contend that the terms of the July 12, 1989,

release preclude the Administrator's action here. They assert

that, once the Dickenson County Circuit Court entered the July

12, 1989 order, the release became a binding contract. The

defendants further contend that the July 12, 1989 order was a

final order and that, therefore, the April 8, 1991 order was void

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under Rule 1:1.

In response, the Administrator argues that the July 12, 1989

order was not final because the Dickenson County Circuit Court

continued the case generally and did not limit the matters over

which it was retaining jurisdiction. Thus, the Administrator

contends that both orders are valid, and that their terms plainly

rebut the defendants' plea of accord and satisfaction.

In resolving this issue of first impression, we initially

observe that Code § 8.01-55 requires, before any compromise of a

wrongful death claim or action will be allowed, that the

compromise must have "the approval of the court wherein any such

action has been brought, or if none has been brought, with the

consent of any circuit court." In addition, Code § 8.01-35.1(C)

makes releases and covenants not to sue in respect to tort

liability "subject to the provisions of Code § 8.01-55."

Therefore, when a circuit court approves a compromise settlement

under Code § 8.01-55, the terms of the release on which it is

based likewise are subject to the court's approval.
Those portions of a release that are not made part of a

wrongful death compromise settlement approved by a circuit court

are not binding on the parties to the release. A contrary

interpretation of Code §§ 8.01-35.1(C) and -55 would allow

parties to a release effectively to circumvent the requirement of

court approval by excluding any release provision from the

compromise settlement.

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 In the present case, the July 12, 1989 order approved only

the release of Margie Lawson from liability for the accident. It

did not order the release of any other person or entity from

liability for the fatal injury to Ramey. Moreover, since the

Dickenson County Circuit Court continued the case in that order,

we look to the terms of its final order of April 8, 1991, which

specify that only Lawson and Nationwide were released by the

settlement approved by the court on July 12, 1989. Thus, we hold

that the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' plea

of accord and satisfaction. 2

For these reasons, we will affirm in part, and reverse in

part, the trial court's judgment and remand this case for further

proceedings consistent with the principles expressed in this

opinion.
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and remanded.

2
We also note that Cauthorn v. British Leyland, U.K., Ltd., 233

Va. 202, 355 S.E.2d 306 (1987), cited by defendant Pepsi, is

inapplicable to this analysis because the release at issue in that

case was executed in 1978, prior to the enactment of Code § 8.01-

35.1.

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